Memoirs of Henry Villard, journalist and financier, 1835-1900

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MEMOIRS

OF

HE^EY VILLAED

IN TWO VOLUMES
VOLUME II

MEMOIRS

OF

HENEY VILLARD

3!ournalfet ana financier

1835-1900

IN TWO VOLUMES
VOL. II, 1863-1900

THE
-
OF

BOSTON AND NEW YORK
HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN AND COMPANY

jRmcrsidc press, Cambridge
1904

COPYRIGHT 1904

BY FANNY GARRISON VILLARD
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

Published March 1904

TABLE OF CONTENTS

VOLUME II

BOOK V.— IN CIVIL-WAR TIME: CHARLESTON

PAGE

CHAPTER XXIV.— AT HILTON HEAD (1863) 3

CHAPTER XXV.— NAVAL ATTACK ON FORTS SUMTER AND
MOULTRIE (1863) 27

CHAPTER XXVI.— FIRST VISIT TO BOSTON (1863) 52

BOOK VI.— IN CIVIL-WAR TIME: CHICKAMAUGA.

CHAPTER XXVII.— WITH ROSECRANS AT MURFREESBORO'
(1863) 59

CHAPTER XXVIII.— BRAGG DISLODGED PROM CHATTANOOGA
(1863) 78

CHAPTER XXIX.— CHICKAMAUGA : THE BATTLE OF THE FIRST

DAY (1863) 113

CHAPTER XXX.— THE BATTLE OF THE SECOND DAY (1863).. 126

BOOK VII.— IN CIVIL-WAR TIME: CHATTANOOGA

CHAPTER XXXI. — FEDERAL CONCENTRATION AND REORGANI
ZATION (1863) 177

CHAPTER XXXII.— CRISIS IN THE CONFEDERATE ARMY (1863). 193
CHAPTER XXXIIL— WHEELER'S RAID (1863) '. 199

CHAPTER XXXIV.— ROSECRANS RELIEVED FROM COMMAND
(1863) • 207

CHAPTER XXXV.— THE REOPENING OF THE TENNESSEE RIVER
(1863) 217

CHAPTER XXXVI.— PREPARATIONS FOR THE OFFENSIVE (1863). 229
CHAPTER XXXVII.— THE BATTLE ABOVE THE CLOUDS (1863). 241

v

18-1397

VI CONTENTS

BOOK Vm.— FINANCIAL CAREER

PAGE

CHAPTER XXXVHL— WASHINGTON, BOSTON, GERMANY (1863-
1873) 267

"CHAPTER XXXIX.— THE OREGON RAILROADS (1873-1879). . . .272

CHAPTER XL.— THE OREGON RAILWAY AND NAVIGATION Co.

(1879-1880) 284

CHAPTER XLI. — COMPLETION OF THE NORTHERN PACIFIC RAIL
WAY (1880-1883) 295

CHAPTER XLIL— THE WHEEL OF FORTUNE (1883-1890) 313

CHAPTER^ XLIIL— THE GUEST OF BISMARCK (1890) 338

CHAPTER XLIV.— LAST YEARS (1890-1900) 357

ILLUSTRATIONS

HENRY VILLARD, aged 53 frontispiece

From a photograph by G. C. Cox, New York.

HENRY VILLARD, aged 54 to face page 358

From a photograph by Sarony, New York.

MAPS

CHARLESTON AND ITS FORTS to face page 27

CHICKAMAUGA AND CHATTANOOGA to face page 113

OREGON AND WASHINGTON to face page 267

MEMOIRS OF HENRY VILLARD

BOOK FIVE
IN CIVIL-WAR TIME: CHARLESTON

CHAPTER XXIV

AT HILTON HEAD.— 1863

FOR a few days I was quite a lion in Washington as
the first arrival from the front. The Tribune office
was crowded day and night with army officers, members of
Congress and others who wished to talk with me about the
battle. Wherever I went— in the departments, at the hotels,
in private houses, and on the sidewalks— I was beset by
eager inquirers. I did not mince words, and can natter my
self that my earnest denunciations had something to do
with the early inquiry into the Fredericksburg campaign
instituted by the Congressional Committee on the Conduct
of the War, which fully brought out the facts of the case.
Owing to the contradictory evidence given by the com
manders involved, the public mind, however, remained
much befogged as to where the real responsibility for the
disaster belonged.

It is a matter of record that Burnside, notwithstanding
his thorough defeat, clung for some time to the plan of try
ing another offensive movement without delay, and that his
obstinacy and illusions in this respect were brought to an
end only by his famous so-called "mud march" on January
21. But I was convinced that the unfavorable season and
the condition of the army rendered further collisions be
tween the armies of the Potomac and Northern Virginia
before spring very improbable. I advised our managing
editor that I thought it not worth while on that account
to return to the front, and suggested that I be sent to the
coast of South Carolina in order to witness the impending
combined land and naval attack on Charleston. My recom
mendation was approved, and, accordingly, I left Washing-

4 HENEY VILLARD [1863

ton in the first week of January, 1863, for New York, and
sailed thence on the 14th on the steamship Arago for Port
Royal harbor.

The Arago had been running regularly before the war as
a passenger and freight steamer in the Havre trade, and
was a large and commodious, but not very fast, ship. She
had been chartered by the Government for some time, and
was making three trips a month to the port mentioned,
carrying Government supplies, but only such passengers
as were in the public service or had permits from the War
Department. Captain Gadsden was very obliging and
jolly. There were only seven passengers in all in the first
cabin, besides myself, including my old acquaintance,
Major-General David B. Hunter, and his assistant ad
jutant-general, Major Halpine, two other staff officers,
and some very nice ladies from Pennsylvania, who,
like so many other patriotic and self-sacrificing Northern
women, had volunteered for educational work among the
negroes of the Sea Islands. Major-General Hunter had
been in command of the Department of the South since the
preceding summer, but, having become involved in mis
understandings with the Washington authorities, had asked
and obtained leave in August to visit the capital for ex
planations. It was then decided to replace him by General
0. M. Mitchel, who died late in October, 1862, after holding
the command for a few weeks. Hunter was now return
ing to resume his position. He was over severity years old,
but tried to assume a younger appearance by wearing a
full, dark-brown wig and giving his short moustache the
same artificial color. He was a man of moderate ability,
but an ardent patriot, a true gentleman, and very pleasing
in his intercourse with others. I knew Major Halpine
as an Irish poet and wit, under the sobriquet of " Miles
O'Reilly," and a writer for the New York Times before
the war, and found him again a very entertaining and
amusing companion.

With the luxurious comforts of the Arago, the voyage

1863] AT HILTON HEAD 5

ought to have been a pleasure trip, J5ut we had stormy
weather from Sandy Hook to beyond Cape Hatteras; all
the passengers except myself were very sick. We ar
rived on the afternoon of the 18th of January. As we en
tered the harbor, the forts taken from the rebels, on the
right and left of its mouth, fired salutes in honor of the
department commander. After we were made fast to
the long dock, built out since the Federal occupation, from
Hilton Head Island, which formed the south side of the
harbor, many army and navy officers at once boarded the
Arago, including Brigadier-General Ferry and Fleet-Cap
tain Rodgers, to welcome General Hunter. Captain Gads-
den kindly permitted me to remain on the Arago while she
stayed in port, thus giving me several days in which to
consider and decide upon my future course.

A brief review of the operations of the Union army and
navy along the coast of South Carolina and Georgia be
fore my arrival will be in place here. A direct and special
punishment of the former State, as the hotbed of secession,
had been insisted upon by public opinion in the loyal
North ever since the first outbreak of the Rebellion. The
Federal Government was quite disposed to yield to the
popular demand. The occupation of the South Atlantic
ports was the subject of special study by a board of of
ficers which sat in Washington in June and July, 1861.
In the first days of August, orders were issued to General
Thomas W. Sherman to form an expeditionary corps of
12,000 men in the New England States, and to Captain
Dupont of the navy to collect a fleet of vessels in Hampton
Roads, for a combined aggressive movement down the coast.
According to Nicolay and Hay, President Lincoln explained
personally at a Cabinet meeting the purposes of the Gov
ernment in this direction to General Sherman, and ex
pressed to him the desire that the expedition should start
early in September. The starting was, however, postponed
till October, and did not actually take place before the end
of that month. On October 29, between fifty and sixty

6 HENRY VILLARD [1862

steam-vessels, of which fourteen were men-of-war and the
remainder loaded with troops and quartermasters' and
commissary stores, stood out from the Roads. The fleet
encountered a storm the very next day, which resulted in
the loss and disabling of some of the transports. The re
mainder reached Port Royal harbor in safety. On Novem
ber 7 the men-of-war attacked the two rebel forts on the
north and south sides of the entrance, mounting, respec
tively, twenty and twenty-three heavy guns, while the
Federal ships carried one hundred and thirty. Nine of the
ships, led by the frigate W abash, moved up the harbor,
following each other in a single line at short intervals, and
delivering their broadsides against the two forts as they
passed them. When beyond the range of the rebel guns,
the death-dealing procession steered around and steamed
back to the entrance, again firing broadsides while passing
the rebel works. This movement was repeated three times,
when the rebels abandoned, first, the strongest fort on the
south side, and, later, that on the north side. The fire of
the vessels had been so sweeping and destructive that the
enemy became panic-stricken and sought safety in precipi
tate flight. Our victory cost only eight killed and twenty-
three wounded. The fugitives spread the panic from the
forts to the whole coast, from North Edisto to Warsaw
Sound, with the result that the Sea Islands and the harbors
of Port Royal, St. Helena, North and South Edisto, Tybee
Roads, Warsaw Sound, and Ossabaw Sound fell under
Federal control without the shedding of another drop of
blood.

The troops were landed on the south shore of Port Royal
harbor and established themselves in regular camps. From
this base of operations the land and naval forces, during
1862, gradually reestablished the Federal authority, not
only along the Georgia and South Carolina coasts, but also
at points on the Florida coast, including Fernandina, Jack
sonville, and St. Augustine. The most noteworthy achieve
ment was the reduction, in Xpril, 1862, of Fort Pulaski, on

1862] HUNTER'S EMANCIPATION ORDER 7

Cockspur Island, at the mouth of the Cockspur River, com
manding the approach to the city of Savannah, under the
direction of General Quincy A. Gillmore of the regular
Corps of Engineers. He accomplished an extraordinary
feat by planting, during many weeks of night labor, eleven
batteries of thirty-six heavy guns, weighing from eight to
eight and a half tons each, in a bottomless morass, without
discovery and interference by the enemy. The siege was
remarkable also as the first practical demonstration of the
worthlessness of walls of masonry as a defence against
modern rifled artillery. The fire of our guns, at ranges
from 1650 to 3400 yards, made the fort untenable in thirty
hours, and surrender unconditional.

In the early spring of 1862, Major-General Hunter was
assigned to the chief command of the Department of the
South, while General T. W. Sherman remained in charge
of that of South Carolina. Hunter soon attracted general
attention by the famous order he issued on May 9, 1862,
announcing that "slavery and martial law in a free coun
try are altogether incompatible. The persons in the three
States of Georgia, Florida, and South Carolina, heretofore
held as slaves, are therefore declared forever free." This
act was nothing less than the abolition of slavery by mili
tary authority, five months in advance of the preliminary,
and eight months before the definitive, Emancipation Pro
clamation of President Lincoln. General Hunter had no
special authority from the War Department to issue the
order, but promulgated it By virtue of his absolute powers
as military ruler over territory under martial law. As one
of the truest loyalists in the regular and volunteer armies,
he was also moved by his sense of duty to the Government,
and was among the first to perceive that one of the most
effective blows that could be struck at the Rebellion would
be to deprive it of the benefit of unpaid slave labor in civil
pursuits and for military purposes. His strong anti-
slavery convictions doubtless likewise prompted him to
adopt this radical measure. The order made quite a sensa-

8 HENRY VILLARD [1862

tion in the North, and led to attacks upon its author and
the Administration by the Conservatives and Anti- War-
Democrats, which moved President Lincoln to issue his
well-known proclamation of May 19, 1862, in which, after
affirming that the Government had no knowledge of, or
part in, Hunter's act, he declared it null and void, and as
serted his exclusive right to determine whether it was
competent for him as Commander-in-chief of the Army
and Navy to declare slaves in any State or States free, and
whether, at any time and in any case, it had become a neces
sity indispensable to the maintenance of the Government
to exercise such a supposed power.

General Hunter, though repudiated, remained in com
mand, and soon found occasion to try another military
method of dealing with the slavery problem, which, while
not at once practically successful, was not disowned by the
Government, and was even subsequently adopted by the
War Department, and contributed much to the ultimate
triumph of the North. In other words, he was the first
to attempt to form military organizations out of fugitive
and abandoned slaves. The desertion of their plantations
on the Sea Islands by the great slave-owners had left
thousands of their human chattels without control or
restraint of any sort, and, as was natural, their sudden,
absolute freedom exposed them to the dangers of idleness,
vagabondism, and general lawlessness. Even before Gen
eral Hunter's advent, efforts had been inaugurated, under
the leadership of Northern philanthropists, to take the
blacks of the islands in hand, to systematize their labor, and
to teach them frugal and industrious ways. There were then
some fifty devoted men and women from the North en
gaged as teachers and overseers in that benevolent calling.
They had come South under the leadership of Edward L.
Pierce of Massachusetts, who had been put in charge, first,
of the organization of the colored refugees flocking to
Fortress Monroe into working parties, and now of the same
task in South Carolina, at the instance of Secretary Chase,

1862] ENLISTING BLACK TROOPS 9

whose friend and supporter he was. (Mr. Pierce subse
quently became widely known as a politician of the better
class, law writer, and biographer of Charles Sumner.) On
a number of the larger plantations, the regular work was
thus being carried on again.

The undertaking proved so great that the War Depart
ment lent a helping hand by detailing Brigadier-General
Saxton to take supreme charge of the "Freedmen's Aid"
movement in April, 1862. Still, the islands swarmed with
great numbers of idlers that could not, or would not, be
employed, and had to be fed and clothed at the expense of
the Government. General Hunter, on seeing this state of
things soon after his arrival, and upon the recommendation
of General Saxton, made up his mind that the best solution
would be to enroll as soldiers the negroes physically
qualified, and use them for whatever military purposes they
might be fit. He lost no time in applying to the Secretary
of War for 50,000 muskets, and "authority to arm such
loyal men as I can find in the country." He coupled his
requisition for arms with another which caused much won
der and some merriment at the time, asking for 50,000
pairs of scarlet pantaloons. "This is all the clothing,"
he wrote, "I shall require for these people." The Major-
General soon tried the effect of scarlet cloth on the blacks
in an attempt to organize a black regiment. It was actu
ally formed, but did not hold together more than a few
weeks, mainly owing to the unwillingness of the blacks to
serve. The attempt was renewed, in pursuance of an order
of the Secretary of War, dated August 25, 1862, author
izing Brigadier-General Saxton to arm, uniform, equip, and
drill not more than 5000 volunteers of African descent, to
guard and protect the plantations and settlements of Port
Royal and elsewhere. Only one regiment of a thousand
men was, however, got together after three months, of which
T. W. Higginson, the well-known Massachusetts liberal
clergyman and litterateur, became the colonel. This regi
ment donned red trousers.

10 HENRY YILLARD [1863

Such was the situation in South Carolina when I stepped
for the first time upon the sacred soil of the Palmetto
State on Hilton Head Island, bordering the harbor on the
south side and washed by the ocean on the east, on which
the Union troops had made their first landing, and on which
the department headquarters were situated. "The Head,"
as the natives called it for short, presented a very unin
viting, dreary aspect. It was, indeed, but a dead waste of
deep sand, "as flat as a pancake," varied only by a line
of low sand-hills or dunes. Not a tree, not a shrub, not a
green plant of any kind, was in sight ; the only green spots
being a few small grassplots produced by irrigation. Be
fore the landing of the Federal forces, no buildings ex
isted, and but a few scattering ones had been erected since.
The principal were two long one-story frame structures
of the plainest outer and interior finish, erected as quickly
and cheaply as possible for use as headquarters. They
extended along the shore, with a fine beach between them
and the water. A few hundred feet from their rear stood
a small but more substantial-looking two-story build
ing, in which the United States Custom-house was estab
lished. There was also a group of board shanties and wall-
tents, some with and some without wooden floors, which
served as mess-houses and sleeping quarters for the customs
officials and the officers and employees of the quartermas
ter's and commissary department. The habitations stood
directly on the virgin sand, without artificial walks or
streets. The truth was, indeed, that I had dropped into
a very desolate place, of which the only redeeming feature
was the bay and the ocean. I was comforted by the ex
pectation that my stay would be a short one— in which
hope I was, however, to be greatly disappointed.

Major Halpine promptly redeemed his voluntary promise
to provide me with quarters by assigning to me an empty
front room in one of the headquarters buildings, to which
I moved from the Arago. It was small, but with a good-
sized window overlooking the beach and bay. It being en-

1863] LIFE AT "THE HEAD" 11

tirely unfurnished, the Major showed me further favor by
sending me a small table, roughly made on the spot, and a
camp-stool. The next thing was to find something to sleep
on (as I had brought with me only a small pillow and
blankets) and washing utensils. As there was nothing of
that kind to be got at "The Head" for love or money, I
concluded to row back to the Arago and appeal to the
generosity of Captain Gadsden. He at once authorized the
steward to sell me a mattress, and advised me to apply to
the quartermaster on shore for a tin basin and cup, in
which quest I was successful. I slept on the mattress on
the floor for several days, when I persuaded the post-car
penter to make me a bedstead and washstand out of un-
planed lumber. With these appointments I managed to
get along during my sojourn at "The Head."

I found board as easily as lodging. I had brought a let
ter of introduction from Secretary Chase to Mr. T. C.
Severance, the Collector of the Port, who at once invited
me to join his mess. We had an excellent table, indeed as
good meals as at a first-class hotel in the North, and at a
very reasonable price. The mess consisted of the Collector,
two of his office assistants, a New England clergyman act
ing as Freedmen's agent, some commissary and quarter
master's clerks, Henry J. Winser, correspondent of the New
York Times, and myself. Mr. Severance had been a banker
at Cleveland, but had failed at the beginning of the Civil
War. His good nature and willingness to oblige were with
out limit. His official responsibilities were not great, the
arrivals of vessels subject to entry not averaging more
than one a month, and what little work there was, his chief
clerk did. Winser had a room next to mine and proved a
very genial, gentlemanly companion, with whom I kept up
close relations till his death in 1896. Mr. Howard, the
Freedmen's agent, was a Harvard graduate and a well-in
formed, entertaining, liberal-minded man. The other mem
bers of the mess were like the good children who are seen
but not heard.

12 HENRY VILLARD [1863

I made it my first business to become acquainted with the
officers of the fleet, not one of whom I knew. Assistant-
Secretary Fox had kindly given me a letter to Rear-
Admiral Dupont, in chief command of the South Atlantic
blockading squadron, which I presented, two days after
my landing, on board the flagship Wdbash. The Admiral
received me most courteously, and introduced me at once
to Captain C. R. P. Rodgers, his chief of staff, and the
other members of his official household, as well as the of
ficers of the frigate. The Admiral was one of the stateliest,
handsomest, and most polished gentlemen I ever met. He
looked the ideal naval commander. Captain Rodgers also
had a fine presence, and was most courteous and obliging.
It will always be a source of pride to me that I won the
lasting friendship of these two distinguished officers. Be
sides the flagship, there was, riding at anchor near it, the
New Ironsides, an iron-plated frigate under command of
Commodore Thomas Turner, with thirty-two Dahlgren
guns in broadside. The very next morning we had a
stirring surprise in the appearance of the Montauk, a re
production of the original Ericsson monitor, in tow of the
war-steamer Rhode Island, and commanded by John L.
Worden, the hero of the ever-memorable fight between
the Monitor and the rebel ram Merrimac. The Montauk
was the forerunner of the fleet of eight ironclads of the
monitor and other types that were expected from the North.

The presence of but one of these showed that I had left
the North under a wrong impression in supposing that the
preparations for the naval attack on Charleston were nearly
completed and that it would certainly come off shortly
after my arrival. This was confirmed by the Admiral him
self. As I had been commended by Assistant-Secretary
Fox to his confidence, I did not hesitate to ask him during
my first visit whether he felt at liberty to say to me, under
seal of secrecy, whether Charleston would be attacked soon
or not. He replied that he had no objection to telling me
that the fleet was not quite ready for it. I interpreted

1863] BEAUFORT AND ST. HELENA 13

this to mean that there would be considerable delay yet,
and my surmise proved correct. I learned by degrees that,
from the chief commander down to the lieutenants, the
officers of the fleet had not much faith in either the of
fensive capacity or the speed of the new forms of iron
clads, which were to be the principal instruments of attack,
and that they were to be given practical trials in both re
spects before being actually used in the proposed grand
effort to subdue Charleston.

I readily perceived that the key to the confidence of the
Admiral and his chief of staff was the strict observance
of their injunction not to say anything regarding the con
dition and purposes of the fleet in my correspondence, ex
cept what they should authorize to be published. I advised
the managing editor of my intention to submit to this re
striction, and confined myself at first to gathering material
for purely descriptive letters. The supply proved rather
meagre. One letter exhausted all that could possibly be
said about Hilton Head, the army headquarters, and the
fleet. The only other available sources of useful matter
were excursions on the ordinary steamboats that kept up
communication between the headquarters and the different
points of occupation on the Sea Islands, and some recon-
noissances by armed boats in the direction of the mainland,
and especially of the Savannah River, through the network
of tide-water inlets connecting the islands with one another.
The steamboats made regular runs, but the reconnoitring
trips, of course, took place only at the will of those in
command.

My first excursion was to the famous town of Beaufort
on St. Helena, the principal one of the islands. Our boat
was the small side-wheeler Planter, that had been run out
of Charleston harbor with a load of heavy siege-guns and
delivered to the blockading fleet by her colored pilot,
Robert Small, who had been its captain since, and whom
I found a good-looking, intelligent, and well-informed mu
latto. Beaufort was not more than eighteen miles from

14 HENRY VILLARD [1863

"The Head"— four across the bay, and the rest of the
distance through the inlets connecting Port Royal harbor
with St. Helena Sound. Extensive plantations with large
mansions and scattered live-oaks and palmetto trees were
visible on both sides of our course. Beaufort did not belie
its renown as the favorite pleasure-resort of the South Caro
lina slaveholding aristocracy. The town consisted of one
grand, broad avenue, two hundred and fifty feet wide,
lined with great evergreen oaks, behind which the stately
homes of the cotton lords stood, separated from each other
by gardens filled with a variety of brilliant flowers, in
dicative of the mildness of the winter climate. The houses,
while built of wood in a plain style, were nearly all three
stories high and of generous proportions, and impressed
one as both spacious and comfortable. Their owners, al
most without exception, had abandoned them to the care
of their slave servants. Several were made use of for
various purposes by the Northern invaders. One was oc
cupied by General Rufus Saxton, the Military Governor of
the islands; another by the General Agency of the Freed-
men's Bureau. Some served as boarding- and lodging-
houses for the volunteer teachers of the freedmen from the
North, and some for the schools in which colored adults
and children received free instruction in reading, writing,
and arithmetic, as well as in sewing, cutting, cooking, and
other domestic arts.

I paid my respects to General Saxton, whose marked per
sonality proved very true to the descriptions I had heard
given of him. He was a regular artillery officer, and one
of the few outright abolitionists in the army. He had a slen
der, wiry figure of middle height, a small head with fiery
black eyes, short-cropped black hair, and full beard. His
intense zeal in the Union cause and the sincerity of his deep
hatred of the Rebellion and what he considered its main
support— slavery— made him seem at first a glowing zealot,
like the martyred preachers of the Faith. But, while ardent
and unflinching in his duty, he was at heart as gentle

1863] REVIEW OF COLORED TROOPS 15

as a lamb. He was certainly the man for the task intrusted
to him of making soldiers out of the " contrabands " of
South Carolina and Georgia. He expressed himself as very
much pleased with his success so far in that direction, and
spoke very highly of the aptitude of the negroes for military
service. I also made the acquaintance of his assistant ad
jutant-general, Edward W. Hooper, son of the well-known
Massachusetts Congressman, Samuel Hooper, and one of
many Harvard graduates who, from the loftiest motives,
had left college to enter the service. In the same spirit,
this exemplary character devoted his life after the war to
the public weal in various capacities, ending with the
treasurership of Harvard College. I likewise met there, for
the first time, Mrs. Frances D. Gage, a lovable woman of
middle age, an able writer for the press (she wrote the
best letters on the " contrabands " to the Tribune), and an
enthusiastic anti-slavery advocate and champion of other
reforms. She was one of the Freedmen's Bureau agents,
and discharged her duties with untiring zeal, true benevo
lence and great ability.

Immediately after my Beaufort trip I had an opportunity
to witness the novel and interesting spectacle described in
the following reproduction of my letter to the Tribune on
the subject:

PORT ROYAL, January 22, 1863.

General Hunter and staff yesterday afternoon improved the re
turn of clear weather to visit and review the 1st Regiment of South
Carolina Volunteers. I was glad of the early opportunity to see
what appeared to me the most interesting feature of South Caro
lina, and satisfy myself, by personal observation, as to the relative
success of the experiment of transforming the black freedmen into
Union soldiers.

The party steamed up Beaufort River on the Beaufort packet
Flora to Smith's plantation, some eight miles distant, where the
black volunteers had their encampment. We were transferred from
the steamer to the right bank in small boats, and, after passing
through a magnificent grove of live-oak trees and a " street " of the
regimental camp, reached an implanted cotton field, where a line of

16 HENRY VILLARD [1863

black faces, blue trousers, red trousers, and muskets told us that
the object of our visit was before us.

The General and suite having taken position in front of the line,
the regiment was first made to go through the manual of arms. It
next marched past the General by companies both in ordinary and
quick step, and then went through several battalion manoeuvres.

Judged by the absolute standard of perfection in drill, the per
formances of the black soldiers appeared liable to criticism. But,
taking into consideration all the facts bearing upon the case— the
low intellectual status of the rank and file, the short training, the
inexperience of most of the white officers themselves— no honest-
minded, unprejudiced observer could come to any other conclusion
than that the regiment had attained a remarkable relative profi
ciency. I have no hesitation, with my extensive observations of the
capacities and acquirements of white volunteers in both the West
ern and Eastern armies, to say that no body of men in the service
has done better in seven weeks, the period during which the dark-
skinned South Carolinians have served upon the drilling-ground.

It is said by those unwilling to give the blacks credit for any
human capabilities that, although they may master the mere mech
anism of the service, through their great natural gift of imitation,
they will yet never become efficient soldiers, owing to the want of
" spirit"— of " heart " in the profession, and of proper appreciation of
the cause for which they bear arms. In refutation, the fact that every
one of the eight hundred and sixty men volunteered might be suf
ficient. But the best possible evidence to the contrary is furnished
by what happened at the close of the review. Having formed the
regiment in square, Colonel Higginson requested General Hunter
to say a few words to the men.

The General stepped inside the square amid three spontaneous
cheers from the ranks. He said in few but forcible and moving
words that he rejoiced to find the native soldiers so proficient; that,
judging from the progress they had already made, he could see no
reason why they should not become as good soldiers as any in the
world; that he expected them to fight as well as drill, as only men
willing to fight for their liberty are worthy of it, and that he hoped
before long to see fifty thousand of their friends striking for free
dom from bondage.

There was unmistakable intelligence, true warmth of emotion
and firmness of resolution speaking out of the enthusiastic response

1863] AT FORT PULASKI 17

of the black audience to these remarks. The most venomous pro-
slavery agitator in the North could not have denied that the Gen
eral was fully understood. But the wildest shouts of joy broke out
when General Saxton announced, after General Hunter had con
cluded, that fifty thousand muskets were arriving from the North
to arm the freedmen of South Carolina. Cheers for liberty and the
Union were never given more heartily by white volunteers than
those elicited by the announcement.

The monitor Montauk departed a few days after my ar
rival for the Ogeechee Eiver for a trial of her offensive and
defensive strength against the rebel Fort McAllister, which
protected the approaches to the city of Savannah. Colonel
Burton, of the Forty-eighth Regiment of New York Volun
teers, who was in command of the captured Fort Pulaski
at the mouth of the Savannah, had come to Hilton Head on
official business, and invited me to accompany him on his
return trip in order to witness the exploits of the monitor.
We left on January 28, reaching Pulaski in the evening.
The fort had been entirely restored and made stronger than
before. It mounted eighty guns and had a garrison of two
regiments. The next morning we started early for the
Ogeechee by the inland passage. We passed by the TyEee
River and Warsaw Sound into the network of channels con
necting the latter with Ossabaw Sound. Our pilot lost his
way, and we found ourselves caught in the Romney Marsh
in a passage so narrow and shallow that our boat grounded
and touched the banks on both sides. It was extricated
with great difficulty from its perilous position. As it was
unarmed, we should have been an easy prey to the enemy,
who happily did not discover our plight. It was a narrow
escape for me from a taste of Southern prisons. We
steamed back to Fort Pulaski, reaching there only late in
the evening. Our mishap was the more provoking as we
had been so near the scene of action that we not only heard
the firing, but saw the puffs of powder-smoke ascend after
each discharge. We learned the next morning from the
attacking fleet that there had been a severe artillery fight,

18 HENRY VILLARD [1863

lasting nearly all day, between the Montauk, four gun
boats, and a mortar-boat on our side, and the rebel fort,
mounting thirteen heavy guns. The Montauk approached
within a mile of the fort, when she was stopped by a row
of close piles driven into the channel. She was struck
thirteen times by heavy shot, but not injured beyond slight
dents in her armor. The attack led to the discovery that
the rebel cruiser Nashville was still in the Ogeechee, seven
miles from Fort McAllister. She had run in some months
before, and was prevented from getting to sea again by the
vigilance of our cruisers and the obstructions placed by us
in the outlets from the Ogeechee.

It was the purpose of Captain Worden, in command of
our flotilla, to get by the fort with the Montauk and attack
the rebel vessel. Our fire was supposed to have disabled
most of the armament of Fort McAllister. Captain Worden
was bent upon overcoming the obstructions in the river,
but, as this would take time, I returned to Hilton Head.
I found that the military and civilian community was
much stirred up by very exciting news, just arrived, of
a partially successful attack made by rebel rams from
Charleston harbor upon our blockading fleet, preceded
by the disablement and surrender of one of our gunboats
in Stono River. The veteran braggart, Beauregard, was
in command of Charleston at the time. On receiving the
report of the rebel rams, he launched forthwith a pro
clamation to the civilized world announcing that the
Federal blockading fleet, having been either destroyed or
dispersed, had disappeared, and that the blockade was
therefore raised. The proclamation was accompanied by an
official statement of a British naval officer and the resident
British consul that they had been out to sea on a tug, but
had seen no sign of the blockading fleet. The rebel Sec
retary of State followed this up by a circular to the Con
federate agents in Europe, announcing the reopening of
Charleston harbor to the ships of seafaring nations. This
performance of Beauregard and the British officials ranks

1863] COLORED TROOPS' EXPEDITION 19

high among the many extraordinary perversions of current
events which occurred during the Rebellion. It was de
nounced as an absolute falsehood in a protest addressed
to Admiral Dupont by all the commanders of the block
ading men-of-war. At first the rebel story was believed
even by the Washington Government, and credited by
the Northern press, which indulged in severe criticism
of the blockading fleet. The feelings of the Admiral and
his subordinates on reading these rash effusions may be
imagined. A partial compensation for the losses inflicted
by the rebel rams was the capture at that time of several
vessels with valuable cargoes trying to run the blockade.
A great prize among them was the British steamer
Princess Royal, which was brought to Port Royal harbor
and which I visited. She carried machinery and guns for
the rebel navy, besides a large miscellaneous cargo of
merchandise.

Another noteworthy event was the return of the First
South Carolina Volunteer Regiment from an expedition to
the coasts of Georgia and Florida, and up various rivers into
the interior of those States. It was intended to produce
a moral effect on the slave population by the sight of the
colored troops, who were to circulate the President's
Emancipation Proclamation. Another object was to se
cure brick, lumber, and other material needed for military
purposes. The expedition was successful in every respect.
The black soldiers received their baptism of fire, having
had several victorious encounters with rebel infantry,
cavalry, and artillery. Colonel Higginson was overflowing
with praise of the gallant conduct of his command, which
had inspired him with the conviction, loudly proclaimed,
that nothing would end the war quicker than the employ
ment of negro troops on the largest possible scale.

The long-announced reinforcements consisted of the entire
Federal force that had operated under command of Major-
General Foster on the North Carolina coast. It arrived
successively in a great fleet of one hundred and twenty-five

20 HENRY VILLARD [1863

vessels. The transports had encountered severe gales,
which had blown violently for a week along the South
Carolina coast and made us very anxious for them. No
disaster occurred, however, but the crowded troops suf
fered greatly from seasickness. Port Royal harbor was so
much disturbed by the storm that the transports could not
land the troops for several days; they were finally put
ashore, mostly on St. Helena Island. Their advent was
considered another sure indication that the opening of of
fensive operations by land and sea was not far off, but the
general expectation in this regard was once more doomed to
disappointment. Many weeks were yet to elapse before hope
deferred became fulfilled. Moreover, the coming of General
Foster led to lamentable dissensions between the com
manders of the land forces, which threatened to have a
paralyzing effect upon military operations. Although Gen
eral Hunter was, by seniority, the ranking major-general,
and, by general order of the War Department, the ranking
general officer took command when troops passed from one
military department into another, General Foster expected
to remain in independent command of all the forces he
brought to South Carolina, and was greatly taken aback
when, during his temporary absence on a flying trip to
North Carolina, General Hunter issued a general order
assuming command over his troops. Foster would not ac
cept the situation, but left for Washington on the first
steamer to make a personal appeal to the Secretary of War
and the President for the recognition of his claim. As he
did not succeed in this, he asked to be and was relieved from
duty in South Carolina. He left his staff behind, who had
so little sense of propriety and subordination that they
loudly boasted of the sure success of their chief's mission,
which would, of course, have resulted in the retirement of
General Hunter. Their indiscretion soon brought upon
them an order of expulsion from the Department, when
they followed their general to the North. Other subor
dinates of Foster were similarly infected. The chief

1863] COLORED TROOPS' EXPEDITION 21

quartermaster actually refused to turn the control of the
steam transports over, as in duty bound, to the chief quar
termaster of the Department, and had to be placed under
arrest. One of the brigadiers, General Stevenson, openly
proclaimed that he and his command would not fight beside
"niggers," for which General Hunter had him arrested and
confined. General Naglee, another brigadier, was also re
moved from command later on and sent North for mani
festing a similar spirit of insubordination. Some of Fos
ter's troops were guilty of perpetrating great outrages upon
the colored people on some of the Sea Islands, and had to
undergo rigorous disciplinary treatment. Altogether, the
morale of the accessions from the North was unsatisfactory,
and it was fortunate that offensive movements did not
commence until the bad spirit had been in a measure sup
pressed.

I had announced in the Tribune, about the middle of
February, that the intention was to send another expedition
of colored troops from Hilton Head on a regular recruiting
mission among the negro population of a certain Southern
State, and that thousands of muskets would be taken along
to arm male slaves. The publication caused a great sensa
tion in the North, some of the conservative Republican pa
pers pronouncing the news an outright malicious canard,
while the "Copperhead" press denounced in the most vio
lent language the attempt to excite "servile insurrection."
I was even personally attacked as the author of the bogus
intelligence. But, a week later, the correctness of the in
formation was proved by the actual departure of over a
thousand black troops, under Colonel Higginson, on the
very errand I had foretold. Forays were made up a num
ber of streams on the Georgia and South Carolina coasts,
but the expedition was far less successful than expected,
as many slave-owners had run their human chattels off into
the interior. It brought back, however, a few hundred
black recruits, many of them with their families.

Excepting the incidents mentioned, the month of Febru-

22 HENRY VILLARD [1863

ary passed away in rather monotonous quietude. The land
forces were ready for active work, but the navy was not
yet fully prepared for it. I clearly understood the true
cause of the past delay and of that still before us, but for
public reasons said nothing about it in my correspondence.
It was the procrastination in the North in getting ready
the monitors which were to play the leading part in Ad
miral Dupont's offensive, to the number of seven. They
all had been expected to be with the fleet by the end of
February at the latest, but only the Montaiik, the Patapsco,
and the Nahant had then turned up, much to the disappoint
ment of the Admiral and his officers and men.

I devoted part of my abundant leisure to a careful study
of the condition of the slave population on the Sea Islands
within our lines. It numbered a little over 9000, including
3617 children. General Saxton's department was divided
into two divisions. That comprising the islands embraced
no less than eighty-two plantations with 4015 adults and
2200 children, under the superintendence of Mr. Soule, a
man especially well fitted for his task by his qualities of
mind and heart. I visited the agencies in charge of sub
divisions, either with him or with a Northern clergyman
by the name of French, who acted as a sort of general
Protestant missionary among the more than half -heathenish
blacks. We could not understand the jargon spoken by
them, and they did not comprehend our English, yet my
clerical companion preached to them as though he were
addressing a Northern congregation. His whole gospel
work seemed, indeed, perfunctory and even farcical.
The fact was, that savage superstitions still prevailed
among the blacks, and that they practised fetish worship.
On one occasion, my reverend companion, after he got
through with his prayers and exhortation at a Sunday
service in one of the rude structures used for places of
worship for the slaves on the plantations, called on
"Brother" Yillard to address "our colored brethren. " I
did so, but let the gospel alone, and explained to my hearers

1863] TRAINING THE FREEDMEN 23

as well as I could what rights and duties their liberation
had vested them with. Although I used the simplest pos
sible language, I felt sure that I was not understood. Such
an audience I never looked upon before or since. Most of
the jet-black faces, with their protruding, glaring eyes,
thick noses, heavy outturned lips, glittering teeth, low re
ceding foreheads, and coarse twisted, matted hair, spoke
plainly of the Niger and the Congo. It seemed to me that
the efforts of the volunteer male and female teachers from
the North to instil even a little rudimentary knowledge into
the skulls of the adults were bound to prove futile, and so
they did. Nothing else could be expected, indeed, from
creatures who had been purposely kept in the condition of
brutes.

Upon the first appearance of the Northern liberators,
either the terror-stricken masters had sought safety in
flight and left their slaves to shift for themselves as best
they could, or the latter had taken refuge with them in the
Confederate lines. This inevitably produced a state of entire
disorder on the plantations. Most of the blacks abandoned
their customary work, and took advantage of the indis
criminate distribution of free rations that was at first prac
tised by our commanders. But the demoralizing influence
of this system was soon recognized, and it was abolished
after our occupation had been extended over the larger
islands and the plantations taken possession of by Govern
ment agents. The plan had been adopted, and generally
carried out, of letting the freedmen (as they came to be
called) become cultivators of the soil on the estates to
which they belonged, either as employees of the Govern
ment or for their own account. In the former case they
were required to perform regular daily tasks, and were
allowed in payment regular rations and small wages. In
the latter, they were allotted a certain acreage near their
cabins on which they could grow such crops as they chose.
The first-mentioned mode of employment, according to the
testimony of the agents, promised better results than the

24 HENRY VILLARD [1863

latter, but the trial had not been going on long enough to
justify definite conclusions. The agents expressed very
favorable opinions of their people as regarded docility,
willingness to work, and aptitude to learn, among both
young and old. They could not speak so well of them in
the matter of tidiness, truthfulness, and morality. I found
them, as a rule, well behaved, well fed — plenty of cornmeal,
bacon and molasses, a stock of pigs and chickens, made up
the sum of earthly bliss for them, and all these blessings
were now within their easy reach— .and contented, yes,
happy, in their inborn lightheartedness. Slavery had con
fined them to the simplest requirements in regard to habita
tion and personal wear, and they had not yet risen above
their compulsory indifference to appearances beyond a
fondness for loud colors, so that they presented a tattered,
dirty appearance as a rule. A noteworthy characteristic
was their proneness to express their moods of joy and sor
row in original songs, which indicated the natural musical
gift of the race.

The last days of February brought great cheer to the
navy, so eager for revenge for the attack of the rams on
the blockaders. The joyful news reached Hilton Head by
a despatch-boat that the Nashville had been utterly de
stroyed by the Montauk. The rebel craft had lain quiet for
a long time under the protecting guns of Fort McAllister,
watching for an opportunity to slip out to sea unobserved
by our vessels, but her attempts to do so were repeatedly
baffled by their vigilance. On February 27, she tried to run
out under cover of a thick fog. She got aground, and was
discovered in that predicament by the Montauk when the
fog lifted. Captain Worden lost no time in going for his
prey. He ran his monitor as close as possible to the ob
structions in the river, getting within 1200 yards of the
Nashville. Disregarding the furious fire of the fort upon
his vessel, he devoted himself exclusively to his victim.
His first experimental shots missed the mark, but, the
proper range being obtained, thirteen- and fifteen-inch

1863] THE NASHVILLE DESTROYED 25

shells were sent one after another into the doomed vessel.
The fourth fifteen-inch shell burst in her and set her on
fire. The flames spread rapidly, and speedily heated her
guns so as to explode their charges. Soon another shell
went crashing through her side, penetrating her powder-
magazine and causing a fearful explosion that finished
the work of destruction. The officers of the Montauk de
scribed the burning and blowing up of the Nashville as a
sight grand beyond description. No damage whatever to
ship or crew was suffered by the Montauk.

The monitors Patapsco and Nahant had been ordered to
Ossabaw Sound by the Admiral, but arrived too late to
share in the glory of the Montauk. They were followed
by the monitor Passaic, just arrived from the North, and
by several mortar-boats. The Admiral ordered all the new
comers to try their guns against Fort McAllister. The
Passaic, Patapsco, and Nahant accordingly moved towards
the fort on the morning of March 3, and took up posi
tions at distances of 1200, 1600, and 1800 yards, with
the mortar-schooners behind them. The fort promptly an
swered the fire of the monitors from all its guns, and the
exchange of shots continued all day. The fire of the fort
was rapid and ill aimed, while that of our vessels was slow
and deliberate, the main object being to make thorough tests
of the range and accuracy of fire of their guns. It was
indeed, on our part, a leisurely bombardment rather than
a spirited offensive action. The monitors stopped their
work at nightfall and fell down the river beyond the range
of the fort. They returned to Hilton Head during the fol
lowing days. The trial attack apparently demonstrated
that the three monitors engaged were as invulnerable as
the Montauk. The Passaic, being nearest to the fort and
hence most exposed to its fire, was struck thirty-three
times upon deck and turret by the heaviest shot and
shell, which left, however, only slight indentations on her
armor. Most of the rebel missiles were broken into frag
ments against it. One ten-inch shell fell unexploded upon

26 HENRY VILLARD [1863

the deck, after striking the pilot-house, and a thirteen-inch
shell struck the deck directly without causing more than
a crack. The Patapsco and Nahant were also hit but not
injured. As was to be expected, all rebeldom burst out into
a shout of triumph over the apparent repulse of our iron
clads.

OF THE

UNIVERSITY

OF

si •slasefe»?SF ^^NV 3 ,vi ^

^••7r ™|" ^

JS BIEN & CO.N.Y.

CHAPTER XXV

NAVAL ATTACK ON FORTS SUMTER AND MOULTRIE.— 1863

ON March 5, General Hunter issued the following ad
dress to his command in the form of a general order
(No. 16) :

SOLDIERS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE SOUTH : After long and
wearying delays, due to causes over which no one in this Depart
ment had control, we have at length the cheering prospect of active
and very important service.

Soldiers of the 10th Army Corps, you are stimulated by every
consideration of honor to vie with the gallant men from the Depart
ment of North Carolina who have been sent by the Government to
take part with you in the dangers and the glory of operations now
pending.

Officers and men of the command, you are adjured to the per
formance of every duty. All who earn distinction, no matter how
humble their positions, have my pledge that their services shall
be honorably acknowledged, and the acknowledgment pressed to
their advantage.

Alas, the General's manifesto proved but another decep
tion. One more entire month of weary waiting was to
elapse before the "pending operations " were actually com
menced. Again the delay in the arrival of the rest of the
monitors from the North was the cause of the postpone
ment. The Weehawken and the Nantucket appeared dur
ing March, but the last ironclad, the Keokuk, reported only
at the very end of the month. She was a departure from
the monitor model, and a new experiment, as she was turtle-
shaped, with sloping sides and two stationary turrets.

On March 31, I wrote from Hilton Head: "But for a
violent gale that arose suddenly last night, and has been

27

28 HENRY VILLARD [1863

blowing with unabated fury since, I should probably have
been able to announce definitely the day on which the army
and navy are to commence their long-delayed offensive
operations. Still, I can assure your readers with the utmost
positiveness, that the rough weather is now the only obstacle
to the immediate consummation of the aggressive plans of
General Hunter and Admiral Dupont." At last I was
right in my predictions. As soon as the elements of high
winds and heavy seas had quieted down, the combined
campaign by land and water really opened. I was thor
oughly tired of my long-enforced idleness, and heartily wel
comed the prospect of active work. I naturally assumed
that the extensive and protracted preparations for vigor
ous, telling strokes against the enemy would bring me
steady and stirring occupation for some time to come.
But the god of war ordained it otherwise. In little more
than one week our offensive energy was to be exhausted,
the carefully planned attack on arch-rebellious Charleston
to prove an utter failure, even in the very first stage of its
execution, and my task in South Carolina to be suddenly
brought to an end. How all this came about is told in the
following batch of reports to the Tribune, printed in its
issue of April 14 :

UNITED STATES SURVEYING STEAMER Bibb,

NORTH EDISTO HARBOR, April 4, 1863.

Preliminary movements and reconnoissances, embarkations and
landings, have been making for some time, both by the navy and
army; but it was only on Wednesday last that there was a general
readiness for the commencement of the main operations. High
wind and heavy sea caused another delay of twenty-four hours,
but on the day before yesterday morning the four ironclads still
remaining in Port Royal Harbor started at last for this general ren
dezvous ; the Admiral's blue flag was transferred from the Wdbash
to the James Adger, which left soon after the monitors; and a large
number of the army transports also followed in their wake. I
availed myself of a kind invitation of General Ferry, commanding
one of the divisions of the expedition, and made my way across the
bay to St. Helena landing and aboard his flagship, the steamer New

1863] NORTH EDISTO HARBOR 29

England, as soon as I saw the wheels of the James Adger in motion.
The New England formed the centre of a group of steamers and
propellers, all heavily laden with human freight. The troops had
been marched aboard the night before, in the expectation of an
immediate departure; but the means of landing (scows and surf-
boats) could not be secured until this morning, and the division got
under way only a short time before sundown.

The destination of General Ferry's command was Stono Inlet. It
was to make a landing on Cole's Island, already occupied for some
days by a regiment. The fleet had hardly crossed the bar when a
severe gale suddenly sprang up, and continued to blow all night.
When the sun rose on Friday morning, the sorry discovery was
made that the transports had been scattered, and lost in the storm
most of the surf-boats they had been towing. In the course of the
forenoon, however, the vessels all hove again in sight, but, low tide
preventing their passage over the bar, they were ordered to lie off
the entrance until high water. The New England having too deep
a draught for a safe crossing, she proceeded to this port in order
to transfer part of her load to another steamer.

North Edisto Harbor presented, when we entered it, an aspect at
once pleasing and imposing. Its placid waters, with well-defined,
graceful contours of shore lines, just contrasted and variegated
enough to give tone to the picture, formed an idyllic ensemble
strangely contrasting with the numerous novel and formidable
engines of naval war riding at anchor within its sheltering limits.
All the ironclads excepting the New-Ironsides, with the James Adger,
Seneca, Sebago, and Bibb, had arrived. Around them floated a great
floekfof sailing craft— mortar, ordnance, buoy and supply schooners;
the Adams Express steamer Mary Sanford, the Locust Point and
other propellers, together with several ever-puffing, ever-rushing
tugboats, imparting additional liveliness to the scene. Before leav
ing Port Royal, I had obtained Admiral Dupont's permission to
witness the operations of the ironclads from the New-Ironsides.
Soon after arriving, I boarded the James Adger in order to ascer
tain the best mode of reaching the former, and had a passage pro
vided for off: Charleston on the survey steamer Bibb, to which I
transferred myself and baggage forthwith from the New England.
My reception by Acting-Ensign Robert Platt, the commander of
the Bibb in the absence of Captain C. 0. Boutelle of the Coast Sur
vey, was as courteous as I could possibly desire it to be.

Instead of dying out, as expected in the morning, the wind grew

30 HENRY VILLARD [1863

more violent in the afternoon, so that our anchorage became ruffled
As the swell increased in volume and the vessels rocked and rolled
more and more, it became evident that the morrow was not likely to
bring the sound and fury of action. Still, the final preparations for
it were continued with unabated vigor on all the ironclads. Their
decks were stripped of what little in the way of spars and rigging
they had. The sides, turrets, pilot-houses, and decks of all were
covered with a thick and anything but elegant coat of grease.
Several were still receiving additional plating upon their most ex
posed portions. Various contrivances for exploding and taking up
torpedoes and obstructions were tried. The click and clank of
tools and the commands of officers and the shouts of working
parties resounded until long after sundown. Towards evening, the
steamship Ben Deford, carrying Major-General Hunter and staff,
came in and anchored close to the Admiral's flagship. Several
schooners and steamers also stood in, with a number of small boats
lost by General Ferry's transports, so that no hindrance of the
movements of the land forces need^be apprehended from that
mishap.

This morning it was manifest that we should experience rough
weather for another day. High winds, veering in the course of the
forenoon from N. E. to N. W., blew until towards evening. But,
shortly before sunset, the sky became clear of clouds, the wind settled
gradually into a calm, the surface of the water smoothened, and after
dark there was every indication of a change for the better. At day
light, a strange accident had happened to the Whitney Battery Keo-
kuJc. The strong tide made one of the monitors drag anchor, brush
past the former, carry off her anchor-chains, and set her adrift. Not
having steam up, she floated helplessly down the bay towards the
bar. Fortunately, before she reached the latter, her propellers had
been got to work and she was safely brought back. About sunrise
the naval squadron was joined by the gunboats Augusta, Memphis,
and South Carolina, ordered here from off Charleston to take the
monitors in tow. One of the two ironclad rafts with which the
Ericsson anchored for several days outside, was brought in early
this morning and attached to the bow of the WeehawJcen for experi
mental purposes. The officers and crews of the ironclads seemed
to be even more busy than yesterday with hastening their prepara
tions to completion. The greasing, the strengthening of the
armor, the rigging up of means of rendering submarine engines
of destruction harmless, continued all day. Experiments with

1863] IRONCLADS AGAINST FORTS 31

throwing the grapnel from a coehorn were made on the KeokuJc.
One of the discharges unluckily resulted in slightly injuring
Lieutenant Forrest.

In the evening several of the commanders of the ironclads came
on the Bibb for consultation as to the hydrography of Charleston
Harbor. Captain Charles 0. Boutelle also arrived from the North.
It became understood that, with anything like favorable weather,
the Admiral would order the whole squadron to get under way at
flood-tide in the morning.

April 5, 1863.

The presumptions of last evening were well founded. A clear
sun, cloudless sky, and calm sea removed this morning the last im
pediment to the attack, and about 6 o'clock the general signal to
get under way was made from the flagship.

The consummation of what has been preparing so long, so care
fully, and on so extensive a scale, being now close at hand, certain
statements, without which the character of the operations about to
begin can not well be fully appreciated, may safely be made. An
erroneous impression has undoubtedly prevailed all along in the
North as to the offensive strength of the troops to be employed in
the attack upon Charleston. I cannot, of course, at this moment
state the real number of effectives at the disposal of General Hunter ;
but I can say, with a full knowledge of the actual figures, that it is
far below the popular estimate. It is comparatively so small, in
deed, that the land forces will be necessarily limited to a secondary
part. They will have to act very much after the fashion of General
Butler's command in the operations resulting in the capture of New
Orleans. They will simply follow up [the conquests of the navy ;
move in its wake and occupy the localities opened by it.

Of the navy, the armored vessels will do the main work. The
facts ascertained in regard to the armament of the rebel defenses of
Charleston Harbor would render the employment of the wooden
ships under the command of Admiral Dupont (many of which are
merchant vessels converted into men-of-war, and as weak as those
that fell so easy a prey to the rebel ironclads in their late sortie) in
any attempt at the reduction of the regular rebel forts exceedingly
hazardous. The country may rest assured that all the pros and
cons in connection with this question have been well weighed, and
that wisdom required that the brunt of the contest should be borne
by the ironclads. The aggressive qualities of these seem to be
much misconceived by the general public. Popular fancy, nurtured

32 HENEY VILLARD [1863

by journalistic ignorance and exaggeration, has enveloped them
with a nimbus of irresistibility not at all warranted by their real
merits. Their fighting capacities should consist of running, offen
sive and defensive powers. Were the impending combat over, I
could disclose facts proving that they are far from being the models
of perfection in the light of which they appear to unprofessional
minds. As it is, I can only say ^that, although they are beyond
gainsay in certain respects more powerful than anything else afloat,
they have marked deficiencies which render success not by any
means absolutely certain.

Two months ago the plan of attack was to make a landing of
troops under the guns of the navy on Morris Island, clear it gradu
ally of the enemy, and, after Cumming's Point had been occupied,
to support the attack of the forts by the ironclads with shore bat
teries. Since then the supposition that the defenses of the island
had been so strengthened as to make this mode of operation im
practicable, caused a modification of the original plan. It is now
proposed to reduce the forts by the ironclads alone, and to bring
and keep the land forces only as near as possible to the island, so
as to secure its ready occupation after the fall of the forts shall
have isolated it and necessitated the evacuation or surrender of its
defenses. For this latter purpose the main body of the troops has
now been landed on Cole's Island, occupied, as already stated, for
some time by a regiment, with a view to working their way across
it to Folly Island, as close to Morris Island as practicable. A safe
anchorage for the navy nearer than Port Royal being desirable,
Edisto Island was taken possession of last week by the brigade of
General Stevenson, and the control of the harbor it commands
secured.

It would not be difficult to demonstrate that this whole movement
against Charleston cannot stand the test of sound strategy ; that
it is not likely to be successful without a much larger land force
than that at the command of General Hunter. But as it is positively
determined upon, and about being made in accordance with the
wishes of the Government and the people rather than with the
judgment of those entrusted with its execution, comments of this
kind had better be deferred until its prudence can be measured by
its results. One condition of success is certainly fulfilled : the heads
of the two branches are'resolved upon the utmost efforts to accom
plish the desired end, and^to make the best possible use of the ships,
men, and material under their ^ control. It is true, one of the old

1863] THE SQUADRON IN MOTION 33

maxims of naval warfare is, that one gun on shore is equal to an
entire ship's battery. Still, there is reason to suppose that the
armament of the ironclads, although comparatively not very numer
ous, is so powerful in point of calibre as to be adequate to the task
before it. The only fear of naval men is, that obstructions will
prevent the vessels from reaching the proper position for an effective
bombardment. If they can but bring the seven fifteen-inch and
twenty- two eleven-inch guns and three rifled two-hundred-pounders,
throwing combinedly nearly six tons of iron, to bear at close range,
the result cannot be doubtful.

And now I will resume my narrative. At 7 o'clock the Bibb, which
was to take the lead, was under way, and soon afterward the whole
fleet was in motion. A magnificent spectacle spread out before us
after we had crossed the bar and gained the open sea. The sun
shone brightly, defining plainly every.object upon the vast expanse
of water. Slight undulations only disturbed the blue deep in its
rest from the riot of yesterday. In our way rose the huge form of
the Ericsson, and the horizon was lined with transports black with
troops and headed in a northeasterly direction. The proud squad
ron steamed in grand and grim procession. What would old mari
ners from foreign waters think of the strange floating medley of
swift, well-proportioned steamers and sails, and the slow, besmeared,
ugly ironclad monsters? There came first the Bibb, next the Locust
Point and KeoJcuJc, then the Memphis and Nahant, the flagship and
the Flambeau, the South Carolina and Patapsco, the tug Dandelion,
and the Montauk, the Augusta and Catskill and Passaic.

When about two miles out, the gunboats Locust Point and Dande
lion stopped and took the ironclads in tow. The WeehawJcen dropped
her raft, which was again taken up by the Ericsson. The Memphis,
in standing to the southward to wait for its charge, ran foul of the
bow of the KeoJcuJc, and, although it seemed but just to touch the
latter, was so seriously injured that she had at once to be sent to
Port Royal for repairs. Excepting this mishap, we made our desti
nation in safety. After two hours' steaming, we came up with the
blockaders and in full sight of Fort Sumter. The 'flagship had
preceded us, and already assumed a station near the New-Ironsides,
whose massive, graceless, barren hull, with its "tier of huge guns,
looked at a distance strikingly like" a great swimming castle. As
the different vessels approached, they took position in range with
the flagship, and soon formed a line stretching far to the southward
and northward about two miles from the bar. The last of the iron-

3

34 HENRY VILLARD [1863

clads had just been brought up when rapidly succeeding reports of
heavy guns from the harbor told us that the advent of the fleet had
been noticed and the alarm sounded by the enemy.

The fleet being assembled, the next move was to buoy the channel
to the bar. This duty was performed by the Bibb, the buoy schooner
Admiral Dupont, and the KeoJcuk. The range to the bar was marked
out by the former two by noon. Early in the afternoon Mr. Platt
of the Bibb went on board the KeokuJc, and under his guidance she
gallantly steered for the bar. As she neared the shore the whole
fleet watched eagerly her course. The battery supposed to cover
Folly Inlet was every moment expected to open upon her. But the
buoys were rolled off from the deck over her slanting sides at the
proper points without molestation from the enemy. The buoys
being placed, she steamed over to Swash Channel, after sounding
which for several hours Captain^Rhind brought her back to within
a short distance from the Bibb.

The way over the bar was now opened, and the harbor accessible
to all of the ironclads at the next flood tide. About 3 P.M. a stiff
breeze rose suddenly, and speedily produced such a commotion of
the sea as to drive the crews of the monitors from the decks, upon
which they had been basking in the sun. The sky remained clear,
but the wind gained in force. With the provoking, all but uninter
rupted, unpropitiousness of the weather during the last two weeks,
we are almost inclined to believe that Providence frowns upon our
cause. At sunset the Patapsco got in motion, made directly for the
bar and crossed it, and took a picket station, as it were, inside, from
which to prevent the removal of the buoys by the rebels during
the night. Her bold movement drew out no more of an opposing
demonstration from the enemy than that of the Keokuk. As soon
as the Patapsco commenced moving, the Catskill and Passaic also
got under way, standing for the bar, close to which they remained
during the night. We presume that they are intended as a support
to the Patapsco in case her isolated position should tempt the rebel
rams into an attack.

Late in the afternoon the Ericsson joined the fleet with her two
rafts. At sunset the Ben Deford also appeared among it. About
dark the Dandelion visited the several ironclads and delivered the
final instructions of the Admiral for the movement of to-morrow.
The whole ironclad squadron will enter the harbor at high tide in
the morning, but whether the attack is to be commenced will de
pend upon wind and weather. There is a general weariness through-

1863] ON BOARD THE NEW IRONSIDES 35

out the fleet of the delay of action, from day to day, by the freaks
of the weather. The strain of nerves by the expected conflict itself
can scarcely be more trying than the torture of suspense. May the
next twenty-four hours bring us relief from the tantalization of
expectation !

ON BOARD U. S. STEAM FRIGATE New-Ironsides

April 6, 9 A.M.

A quiet atmosphere and lulled sea greeted me at daybreak upon
the quarter-deck of the Bibb. All signs augured for a commem
oration of the anniversary of the battle of Shiloh by the opening
of our guns upon Fort Sumter. About 7 A.M. I took leave of my
kind hosts of the Bibb, and in a few minutes stood upon the spar-
deck of the New-Ironsides. Admiral Dupont with his staff, com
prising Fleet Captain C. R. P. Rodgers j Lieutenant A. S. Mackenzie,
Ordnance Officer; Flag-Lieutenant S. W. Preston j Ensign M. L.
Johnson, Aide-de-camp and Signal Officer; and Mr. A. McKenly,
Secretary, had boarded the ship from the James Adger early in the
morning. Duty did not absolutely require the presence of the
Admiral on one of the ironclads, but a chivalric sympathy with his
subordinates appeared to impel him to share the dangers of the
fearful ordeal through which they were about passing.

One could not help beholding the Ironsides with a sensation of
awe rather than admiration. The sense of the beautiful was not
touched either by symmetry or elegance of form or neatness of
general appointment. But she looked the fighting craft— the ma
chine of destruction— all over. Outwardly and inwardly, her every
visible inch revealed her devotion to war and to war alone. With
her body stripped of the last vestige of spars and rigging, her sides
discolored with slush and yawning with monstrous guns, she im
pressed one like a fit head and leader of the turreted nondescripts
around her. Her deck, in addition to its iron plating, was protected
with untanned hides aft, and a layer of sand-bags forward. To
provide against penetration by shot or shell of her unarmored bow
and stern, barricades of sand-bags from three to four feet thick,
and rising from deck to deck, had been piled up on the gun and
powder-decks. They filled the cabins and deprived the officers of
their use. The furniture was stowed away below. To increase the
resistance of the sand by moisture, a steady stream of water that
flooded the cabins was poured from hose upon the bags. Upon
the gun-deck the 11-inch Dahlgrens and 200-pound Parrotts shone

36 HENRY VILLARD [1863

with a festive gloss. Muskets, cutlasses and pistols were stacked
and heaped about The powder-ways were open. The surgeons
had their knives, pincers and saws displayed. Upon the whole, the
flagship, though hardly replete with comfort, was attractive enough
to one who could appreciate the stern pathos of preparation for
battle.

I had been aboard about two hours when the signal to get under
way was ordered to be made to all the ironclads outside of the bar.
Simultaneously the drum and fife called all hands to quarters,
and in a few minutes every man on board was at his post, and the
ship ready to commence action at any moment. The general com
mand of the ship was exercised by Commodore Thomas Turner
and Lieutenant- Commander George E. Belknap. Lieutenant-Com
mander Barnes, commanding the gunboat Dawn, had also been
detailed for special duty on this occasion. . . .

The crossing of the bar involved considerable risk from ground
ing, but all passed it safely, and were at anchor inside by ten o'clock.
The WeehawJcen lagged somewhat^ behind, by having a raft from
the Ericsson again fitted to her bow, but soon joined the rest.
Charleston bar is a ridge-like elevation of the bottom of the sea,
reaching from one end of the entrance of the harbor to the other.
Large vessels can safely make the inside only through three open
ings in this, known as the Main Ship, Swash, and North Channels.
The first runs to the south of the bar, almost parallel to Morris
Island. The third to the north of the bar, along Sullivan's Island j
and Swash Channel, between the two. The Main Ship Channel is
commanded by the forts and batteries on Morris Island ; the Swash
and North Channels by those on Sullivan's. All three channels run
into one directly in front of and at short range from Fort Sumter,
whose guns, with those of the equidistant Fort Moultrie and Cum-
ming's Point battery, thus defend the entrance to the harbor proper
by a concentric fire. In addition to the mentioned works, there is
said to be another heavy battery (Fort Bee) on Sullivan's Island,
between the Moultrie House and the fort. It is presumed that the
fire of nearly 150 guns converges at the described junction of the
three channels.

The course of the ironclads was up the Main Ship Channel. It
was expected that before coming under the fire of Sumter and
Moultrie they would have to run, in a distance of three miles from
the bar, the gauntlet of four works on the beach of Morris Island
—one at Lighthouse Inlet, another near Lawford Beacon, a third

1863] ATTACK POSTPONED 37

at Morris Lighthouse, and a fourth at Cumming's Point. The
general belief was that the first-mentioned would interfere with the
passage of the bar, and hence all hands were Bordered below. But
the eyes of the commanders and pilots were vainly strained in
trying to discover its outlines, and the opinion became general that
it had no existence. The walls and parapets of the forts further
up, however, could be distinctly made out. . . .

The ironclads had come to anchor to get the benefit of the ebb
tide, which it was deemed the part of prudence to await in order
to discover more readily, and avoid, take up or destroy more easily,
the various obstructions of the channels ; but shortly after eleven
a haze arose, and in the course of an hour rendered the shore lines
indistinct. In the absence of any other means of guidance, Pilot
Godfrey deemed these requisite for safe steering, and declared a
postponement of the attack to the next day necessary. The Ad
miral assented to it, and hence, after standing some distance further
in so as to bring us directly opposite Lighthouse Inlet, we again let
go our anchor. Our turreted consorts likewise came to anchor to
the southeastward and northwestward of us, in the line designated
in the order of battle.

From the spar-deck of the Ironsides a unique panoramic scene was
now in range of vision. The apprehensions of the closeness of
rebel batteries having been allayed, the hatches of all the ironclads
were opened, and their decks crowded with swarms of men from
stern to bow, that made the quaint forms of the monitors and
Whitney Battery appear like as many small islands with low mounds
and teeming population. Through the mist the walls of Fort
Sumter rose dimly to the northwest. Seaward the Powhatan,
Canandaigua, Huron, Housatonic, Wissahickon, Unadilla, Flambeau,
Ladona, Flag, Bibb, Sen Deford and others ranged in a long semi
circle around the horizon. Upon Morris Island beach, crowds of
curious rebels watched the strange sights before them with evident
amazement. At intervals guns from the forts and batteries spoke
of the enemy's readiness for the combat to which we were chal
lenging them. Those around me manifestly first fretted from dis
appointed expectation, but by degrees lost their ill humor and
indulged in ^pastimes little in keeping with their earnest duties.
The crew seemed unusually jolly, and amused themselves with such
sports as only sailors know how to practise.

In the latter part of the afternoon General Seymour and Major
Duane, Chief of Engineers, came aboard and had a brief consulta-

38 HENRY VILLARD [1863

tion with the Admiral. A brigade of General Ferry's division, it
is understood, is engaged in working its way up Folly Island, with
some siege batteries. That the army will remain passive witnesses
of the attack by the ironclads is now certain. A spirit of indifferent
merriment continues to prevail among my shipmates. On the gun'
deck and in the wardrooms, jovial groups while away the time with
songs and jokes, as though they were not on the eve of a struggle
to the fierceness of which human records will probably have no
counterpart, but about joyously returning home from a long cruise.
The Admiral and staff had occupied the cabins of Captain Turner
and his officers at the stern of the ship ; but, the cabins having been
filled with sand-bags, we all slept on mattresses spread on the gun-
deck, where the hammocks of most of the crew were also swung.
About four hundred officers and men occupied the common space,
yet almost perfect stillness prevailed during most of the night.

Evening, April 7.

In a few brief hours this afternoon, history has been enlarged
with volumes of memorable matter. The combat for which we have
been so long accumulating strength, is over. It was short and
decisive. We have experienced a bitter repulse. The ironclads
have come short of the expectations even of the most diffident, and
we are now mourning over the apparent certainty of an abandon
ment of the enterprise of which the country, with more faith than
reason, hoped such great results.

At sunrise a veil of mist hung over the horizon, but toward the
middle of the forenoon it cleared rapidly away, and at ten o'clock the
pilot announced that, at last, our work would commence. Early in the
morning, signals from the shore revealed to us the undisputed occupa
tion of Folly Island by Colonel Howell's brigade. General Seymour
is with it, and seems at a loss to know why we did not move to the
attack with daybreak. The Admiral, Commodore Turner and all
are anxious to get under way as soon as the mist has disappeared.
But Pilot Godfrey again prevails with his argumentation in favor
of going in upon low tide, and we must put up with continuing
upon the rock of suspense until after noon. The opportune arrival
of a mail on the supply-steamer Massachusetts assisted greatly in-
passing the dragging hours. Officers and men forgot for a while
the approaching dangers in the eager perusal of letters from home.

As the morning hours advanced, the sphere of our operations
became more and more defined. On the lower end of Morris

1863] THE LINE IN MOTION 39

Island, rebels could be seen dragging heavy guns to the beach.
The men and guns on the walls of Forts Sumter and Moultrie could
be readily counted. The spires and even the houses of Charleston
seemed not more than a mile or two off. Our friends outside evi
dently know that we are about striking blows. The gunboats and
transports are all standing closer to the bar. The Flambeau, Bibb,
Sen Dcford, and Nantucket are seeking the best points of observa
tion from the North Channel, but a shell or two from Fort Beau-
regard, the outer work on Sullivan's Island, compelled the latter to
make a hasty retreat to a safer position. At noon, there is a call
for a general muster on the gun-deck. From the Admiral down to
the powder-boys, all humbly kneel and listen to, and seek strength
for the coming trial from, a short, touching prayer read by Com
modore Turner. The recollection of the sight of those four hundred
determined, battle-eager men, bowing in picturesque groups before
their Maker, around the grimmest implements of war, will never be
effaced from my memory.

At 12 :10 faithful Captain Barrymore of the tender Dandelion took
leave of us, and, with the parting of his tug, the last link connecting
us with the outside world was severed At the same time the order
to weigh anchor was given. At 12 :30 the signal to get under way
was hoisted on the flagship. The question how the ironclads were
to communicate with each other during action had often puzzled
me, but an ingenious arrangement contrived by the officers of the
Ironsides and the Admiral's staff, and consisting of a narrow open
ing in the plate over the aft masthole, through which a long pole
with small flags was raised above the spar-deck, gave assurance of
a ready communication and comprehension of orders. There was
some delay with the monitors ahead of us, but at ten minutes of
two o'clock the whole line was in motion. General Seymour tele
graphed a " God bless you" when our screw made its first revolutions.

Now comes the stirring general call to quarters. There was a
great bustle for a few seconds, but the apparent chaos on the gun
and powder-decks quickly changed into the most perfect order and
quietude, and, in a few minutes after the order was given, every
breathing body, Lieutenant Town of the Army Signal Corps, his
two assistants, and myself alone excepted, was ready to do his part
in the action. There was not that boisterous, evanescent enthusiasm
I have often seen rise in the army to a high pitch and then suddenly
fall to the depth of craven-heartednessj but the calm resolution and
prompt obedience of orders that are the vital condition of success in

40 HENRY VILLARD [1863

battle. There were four hundred men on the two decks, but a re
markable quietness was maintained.

The iron bulkheads fore and aft on the gun-deck, forming the
casemates with the plated sides, were next closed. Streams of water
were then again let upon the hides and sand-bags above and below.
The pilot-house received another liberal dressing of slush. These
last measures of protection being taken, Lieutenant-Commander
Belknap's command, "Close port-holes!" rang through his trumpet
over the gun-deck. In a second the ponderous shutters fell, and the
hatchways were the only sources of daylight to those below. A
"Look out for fore-and-aft shot!" from the trumpet next brought
the gunners down behind their pieces. The grating over the hatch
ways was fastened by this time, with the exception of a small open
ing aft, through which the few permitted to remain upon the
spar-deck were passing up and down. We were going at the rate
of about four knots an hour. The little craft before and behind us
were vigorously plowing the water with their blunt bows, keeping
well in line. Nearer and nearer did we approach; clearer and
clearer became the lines of the rebel defenses. Already we can
count the guns on Fort Wagner (the work next to Morris Light
house) and Cumming's Point, and the windows of the houses of St.
Vincent and Moultrieville. At 2 : 25 the first signs of the afterward
fatal difficulty of steering the ship in a tideway became manifest
The bow swung to the port side, and it was necessary to stop her
engines to steady her course. In a few minutes we were again in
motion.

The first four monitors had already passed Fort Wagner, and we
were now abreast of it. We can look into the very mouths of the
guns, but they remain silent. We know not what to make of it.
Ahead we steam, anxiously awaiting the report of the first gun.
At , last, about 3 o'clock, two flashes of fire burst from Fort Moultrie,
and two shots flew across the bow of the Weehawken, the foremost
monitor, that seemed to have approached within less than half a
mile. This fairly opened the action. Everybody was now ordered
below from the spar-deck and the last hatch closed. Pilot Godfrey,
the Admiral, Captain Rodgers and Commodore Turner took their
station in the pilot-house. The order, " Fifteen pounds up ! " sounded
over the gun-deck, and directly the whole ship's battery was shotted.
Then followed a few minutes of intense anxiety. For me and a
few others, the pilot-house and the ports' that were kept open to
heave the lead, afforded means enough of observing what was pass-

1863] THE IRONSIDES UNMANAGEABLE 41

ing outside. But the mass of those aboard must have felt, for
moments at least, natural diffidence at the thought of groping in
darkness, as it were, into the deadly strife with the enemy.

The suspense did not last long. Six bells had just struck when
a dull sound, like that of a sledge-hammer upon an anvil, was heard
on the bow port side. It was the hostile greeting of Fort Sumter,
now within 1200 yards of us. A second and a third, more violently
than the first, shook the sides of the ship. Soon came the hum
ming and whizzing of rifled and round shot and shell overhead.
Still the successive discharges could be distinguished. The several
reports had not yet been drowned, so to speak, in a continuous
roar. But, hark ! There is a reverberation as though of numerous,
simultaneous thunder-claps j now a fierce, unceasing roar vibrating
the air with a violence that causes even the solid mass of our ship
to tremble. A look through the open port on the port side dis
closes the cause of the furious outburst. The first four monitors
had reached the converging point of the fire of Cumming's Point
battery, Forts Sumter and Moultrie, and Battery Bee. One after
the other had steadily steamed, without firing a shot, to the verge
of the concentrating ranges. The enemy evidently reserved their
main fire for work at close quarters j but when the Weehawken had
reached within six hundred yards of Fort Sumter, a long, broad,
brilliant flame suddenly leaped from its side, with all but simulta
neous intense glares from Cumming's Point and Moultrie, followed
instantaneously by immense volumes of smoke and a rain of pro
jectiles that fairly hid the turrets of our craft with countless spouts
of water thrown up by striking shot and shell. Again and again
this appalling scene was enacted in ah1 its dire sublimity. As the
forts and batteries, like so many vomiting craters of volcanoes, sent
forth one torrent of destruction after another, my heart failed and
panged with the fear of seeing the little monitors shivered into
atoms. But when, in response to a signal from the flagship, they
commenced replying to the enemy with the thunder of their huge
batteries, and the combat was no longer one-sided, my confidence
revived.

Meantime the Ironsides had vainly tried to keep up with the
monitors ahead. At 3:37 we were startled by the command,
" Stand by the starboard anchor ! " followed soon by " Let go the
starboard anchor! " The ship had again been disobeying the
rudder and threatening to swing on the shoals on our port side.
The enemy at once noticed our embarrassed position, and, improv-

42 HENRY VILLARD [1863

ing the fixed mark afforded by the stoppage, diverted their long-
range guns for a while from the monitors upon us. Bang, bang,
their shot went against the sides almost faster than we could count.
Happily the anchor straightened the course of the ship, and in a
few minutes we were again under way. We had hardly gained a
hundred or so yards upon Fort Sumter when the ship became once
more unmanageable, and the anchor was again let go. The Ad
miral now had the monitors in our wake signalled to disregard the
movements of the flagship, and run past it toward the forts. The
two nearest, the Catskill and Nantucket, however, from their own
heavy, unsteady steering and our own swinging, got foul of us and
brushed on the port and starboard side, but got again clear, and
headed on in disordered line with the Nahant and Keokuh

The Ironsides continued almost helpless at the mercy of the tide
— now gaining a little, now backing, now striking bottom, now
swinging to right and left. Officers and crew grew restive. The
enemy's guns were continually playing upon us. We had not yet
returned a single shot. There was, indeed, something grand in this
scornful disdain of the rebel fire; but our gunners nevertheless
chafed under it. At last, at 4:30, while swinging on the starboard
side, our port broadside came to bear fully on Fort Moultrie, and
Commodore Turner would not let this opportunity slip. "Open
port-holes, aim, fire ! ". followed by a severe concussion of the air,
and the first and only offensive effort of the Ironsides in the action
was made. Shortly after, the strong ebb tide rendered it utterly
impossible to make headway with the ship, and the order was given
to drop back. Never was a command more reluctantly given or
obeyed. Deep chagrin settled upon all. Still, no other course was
left, and we slowly steamed back, after signalling to the monitors
to withdraw from the action and follow the flagship, and anchored
under the guns of Fort Wagner.

While the Ironsides struggled, a passive mark, with the tide, the
other eight ironclads had one after another become engaged in what
will live in history as the most desperate— despite its brief duration
—naval action known to mankind. I have already made an attempt
to describe the raking, roaring intensity of the concentric fire of
the rebel works. I might fill page after page with descriptive
phrases without reflecting anything like the reality of its fury. The
facts and figures respecting its effect upon the monitors which I
give below will convey a better idea of its character than vain
word-painting.

1863] IRONCLADS DISABLED 43

Under it the captains of the Weehawlcen, Passaic, Montauk, and
Patapsco were working with might and main to come abreast, with
their badly steering vessels, of the northwest face of the fort, as
directed in the order of battle, firing all the while their guns, now
at Sumter, then a^Moultrie. But they were still under the fire of
the northeast face when they discovered three lines of floating
obstructions, with another consisting of a row of piles across the
whole harbor a short distance beyond. They endeavored to gain
the narrow passage left open through the first, but found themselves
unable to exercise sufficient control over their vessels to do so. While
making this attempt, the turret of the Passaic was so bent in by a
single shot as to make the working of the 11-inch gun impracti
cable. A short while after, the turret refused altogether to turn,
depriving her of all offensive power. The 200-pounder Parrott of
the Patapsco also became early disabled. But, aside from these
damages to two, the fact that not one of the four could make head
way past the batteries, rendered their stay under the heaviest fire
useless, and hence they turned about and steered back, after having
been in concentric range nearly an hour. The motion of the Wee-
hawJcen was very much impeded by the Ericsson raft chained to
her bow. A torpedo exploded close to her port side, but did not
inflict any damage. On the way up, the Patapsco's screw caught
in a kind of network of chains and cable, kept afloat by barrels and
perpendicular by weights. For a while it seemed as though she
could not be extricated from the mesh, but in the end she worked
clear.

The CatsMll, Nantucket, Ndhant, and Keokuk had'the same experi
ence. When the Catskill and Nantucket got entangled with the Iron
sides, the last-mentioned steamed ahead of the three others, but all
four got into action shortly after each other, and about the time
those that had preceded them were turning back. The enemy had
by no means spent the force of their fire upon the first four. The
increased number of assailants seemed to spur them, on the con
trary, into doubling their energies. For nearly half an hour the
scene was wrapped in intensified sheets of flame, clouds of smoke
and sprays of water. Then the impassability of the obstructions
compelled the last four to fall back with the others. The Catskill,
Nantucket and Nahant had kept their course half-way between Forts
Sumter and Moultrie, received and replied to the hottest fire of
both. The Keokuk had stood more to the left, and come within 300
yards of Fort Sumter, the fire of the whole northeast face of which

44 HENRY VILLARD [1863

it seemed to sustain for some time alone, without being able to fire
more than three shots in return— from what cause I will show below.

About fifteen minutes before 5 o'clock a signal^ was made from
the flagship to cease firing and withdraw from the enemy's fire.
Shortly after 5 o'clock the monitors, followed by the Keokuk, were
within hail of the flagship, and the fire of the enemy stopped. In
dropping down, the Nantucket aimed a few shots at Fort Wagner,
which were the last fired on our side. When the vessels were near
est the obstructions, the pilots made out the ironclad rams Palmetto
State and Chicora, with a wooden gunboat, standing toward them
from the city. After approaching within a mile of the obstructions,
they came, however, to a discreet halt, and did not venture to en
gage the monitors.

Upon coming out of range, the hatchways of the Ironsides were
opened, and we could once more have a full view of things around
us. As I reached the spar-deck, the Keokuk was just passing our
starboard side, with Captain Rhind limping about the forward
turret. A sorry sight she presented. Her sides and turrets showed
innumerable holes. She was evidently used up. The Nahant,
Patapsco, and Nantucket also passed, and the commanders of each
reported more or less damage. The pilot-house of the first was
badly shattered. But the full extent of the injuries to the ironclads
was not known until their commanders personally reported them to
the Admiral in the course of the evening. The Keokuk had 90 shots
in all— 19 on the water line (12 starboard, 7 port); 15 in the after
turret (5 of them through); 12 in the forward turret (3; of them
through); 25 on the sloping sides (15 starboard, 10 port); 8 through
sheeting on after turret; 10 through smoke-stack (7 through, 3
glanced); 4 through the boats, 2 glanced off the deck; 1 cut signal-
staff; 3 or 4 went through the flag.

The New-Ironsides was hit between sixty and seventy times, but
sustained no material damage. One of the shutters of port five,
port side, was knocked off; an 11-inch shell lodged in the bow
between the sides and the sand -bags. A shot passed through the
smoke-stack, and her bulwarks were much shattered. The Wee-
hawken was struck fifty-nine times. The turret was badly dented,
and worked with difficulty. Many bolts in the pilot-house had
been loosened and driven through. The Montauk was hit twenty
times; the Passaic, fifty-eight times (in addition to the damage
already stated, her pilot-house was much weakened by the loosening
and driving through of the bolts). The Nantucket was struck fifty-

1863] HAVOC ON BOTH SIDES 45

one times, and had her turret stopped twice by shot. The Catskill
received about the same number of shots. Both the latter had
their decks almost torn open by rifled bolts. The Patapsco was hit
between forty and fifty times, and, besides the disabling of her 200-
pounder Parrott, had her turret much dented and pilot-house weak
ened. The Naliant was struck eighty times, and had her pilot-house
almost broken into pieces. Four men were wounded, one mortally,
in it, from flying bolts.

Of ammunition, the different vessels fired: Ironsides 8 rounds,
Catskill 25, Keokuk 3, Montauk 26, Nantucket 15, Passaic 9, Naliant
24, Weehawken 26, Patapsco 18, a total of 154. Assuming that one
out of every ten rebel shots struck — a very liberal allowance — it
would appear that the enemy fired over four thousand rounds.
Three-fourths of these, at least, were discharged while the monitors
and Keokuk were within the con verging granges— that is, in less than
three-quarters of an hour ; so that it appears the forts and batteries
averaged almost two hundred discharges per minute. Their fire
was excellently directed. Their guns were all of heavy, calibre^
throwing 8, 9, 10, and 11-inch round shot and shell, and 5 and
6-inch rifled shot. The enemy had a few very effective Whitworth
guns playing upon us. Several of the steel-pointed bolts thrown
by them were found inside the Keokuk and upon the decks of several
of the ironclads. The great force with which the rebel missiles
struck and dented, bulged in and broke, the decks, sides, turrets,
and pilot-houses, indicated high velocities from the heaviest prac
ticable charges.

In spite of the comparative weakness of our fire, considerable
damage was done to the forts. The northeast face of Fort Sumter
was marked with eleven holes, plainly visible at our distance of
three miles. Some gaps werelhree feet wide, and looked as though
the shot had plowed right through the wall. Two embrasures
seemed almost knocked into one. One of our first shots brought
down the flag-staff of Fort Moultrie.

I conversed with all the captains of the ironclads during their
meeting on board. Their opinions had but one drift : that it would
be folly and sure destruction to renew the attack after to-day's
experience, resulting in the total disabling of two '(Keokuk and
Passaic} and partial of three more (Nahant, Nantucket and Patapsco}.
The Admiral quietly received their reports, but did not ask for their
opinions or make known his decision of the question of the renewal
or abandonment of the attack.

46 HENRY VILLARD [1863

April 8, 1863.

Late last evening the whole squadron dropped a mile further
down the channel and anchored close to the bar. Almost my first
look from the spar-deck this morning fell upon a sad sight. The
Kedkuk was sinking. She had anchored on the bar during the
night. Her crew had been busy ever since last evening trying to
keep her afloat by plugging the holes at her water line. But at
daybreak a stiff breeze set the sea rolling, rendering their attempts
futile. Captain Rhind hoisted a signal of distress at about 7, but
it remained unnoticed until nearly 8, when the tug Dandelion came
alongside the sinking craft. Through the strenuous efforts of her
Captain, and Acting-Master Barrymore, every soul on board was
saved, with a loss, however, of all they had. There was a mixture
of the comic with the tragic in seeing officers and men lose their
foothold in trying to get down the greasy slopes of the turtle-back
deck and slide helter-skelter into the water, whence they were
rescued by small boats. The crew were received with lusty cheers
on board the Ironsides, and in the course of the morning sent to
Port Royal on board the Wissahickon. The Keohuk went down
precisely at 8 : 10, with her flag flying, in eighteen feet of water
In order to prevent the rebels from appropriating the machinery
and guns, the wreck will be blown up.

The Weehawken lost her raft during the night. In the course of
the morning it was washed ashore on Morris Island, and taken pos
session of by the enemy.

About noon the Admiral had the captains of the monitors called
together, and declared his determination to them to withdraw their
vessels from this harbor. As is the habit of his independent mind,
he had arrived at this conclusion after cool reflection upon the facts
officially reported to him, without consultation with any one else.
But of course he was gratified with the coincidence of the opinion
of his captains. To give the order to withdraw from the harbor
was undoubtedly the most painful act of the Admiral's long and
faithful career in the service of his country. He had to choose be
tween the almost certain destruction of what was left fit for action
of the ironclads, and the loss of personal prestige from accepting a
repulse as the result of yesterday's attack. He chose the latter;
and I say, with all the confidence personal observation can givo, the
country should thank him for it. When'the fire of the rebel forts
and batteries he was to attack and destroy, in the short time of
three-quarters of an hour, disabled five and weakened all of the

1863] NORTHWARD BOUND 47

ironclads, how could he feel justified in continuing a work requiring
in all probability a trial of days of the powers of offense and defense
that had failed in less than an hour?

It is evidence of true courage of the highest order on his part to
listen to the dictates of reason rather than follow the impulses of
rash daring. The honor of the North was fully upheld in the action,
and the loyal people can be justly proud of the devotion and gal
lantry of all engaged in it. ...

When I left the flagship on Wednesday night, the Patapsco had
already started for Port Royal, and the remainder of the monitors
were expected to follow on the following day. The Ironsides was
to return to her station among the blockaders. The Rear- Admiral
and staff were to reestablish themselves on the Wabash in Port
Royal Harbor. The land forces, being numerically too small for
independent aggressive conquests, will not be able to maintain
themselves without the support of the ironclads on the islands be
tween the Stono and Charleston, and probably will return, soon
after the evacuation of the harbor, to their encampments at Hilton
Head and St. Helena. Upon the whole, the loyal public had better
accept the abandonment of all offensive demonstrations against
Charleston as an accomplished fact.

The Admiral determined to send the Bibb at once to
Washington with the reports of the action of himself and all
the commanders under him. He promptly granted me per
mission to go North on her, which made me feel very jubi
lant, as it promised to enable me to outstrip by far all
other press correspondents, not only as to knowledge of
the details of the naval battle— of this I was sure anyway,
as not one of my competitors had, like myself, shared its
risks, but all of them had been far out of the range of
fire on the transports— but also as to the time of publica
tion. But this calculation came to naught. William Swin-
ton, the very able correspondent of the New York Times,
who, after the Rebellion, made quite a reputation as a his
torian of the war, managed to come aboard the Ironsides
shortly after I had left her for the Bibb, to gather particu
lars of the fight from the officers and also to secure the

48 HENRY VILLARD [1863

privilege of going North on the despatch-vessel. My an
noyance on seeing him come aboard may be imagined.

The voyage on the Bibb was eventless. It took us three
days and a half to reach Washington, giving me ample
time to leisurely work up my notes and enjoy a welcome,
soothing rest, after the intense excitement and nervous
strain of the preceding days. My rival left the Bibb at
Fortress Monroe, in the expectation, as I guessed at once,
of getting the start of me by going on the regular boat to
Baltimore and thence by train to New York, but we reached
our common destination at the same time — that is, on the
morning of the 13th. My report was at once issued by
the Tribune as an extra and reprinted in the paper of the
following day. It was referred to on the editorial page as
follows :

Our special correspondent's account of the great naval contest at
Charleston, which we printed in an Extra early yesterday morning,
will be found in full in other columns. It is a complete and admir
able description, and is especially valuable because it is the account
of an eye-witness. Its author shared the perils of the conflict
which he describes, on board the New-Ironsides, the flagship of
Admiral Dupont, and is the only correspondent who was with the
fleet during the engagement. The assertion in a morning paper
of yesterday, previous to the reception of any account except by
telegraph, makes it proper for us to add that our correspondent
with difficulty obtained permission from Admiral Dupont to as
sume his perilous station. When, however, it had been granted
him, the Admiral with considerate courtesy extended the offer to
the other representatives of Fthe press, but they unanimously de
clined it, and no one of them witnessed the contest, except at a safe
distance from the scene of danger.

The allusion to my sole presence on the Ironsides was oc
casioned by the impudent fraud which the correspondent
of the Times attempted to perpetrate by dating his account
from the Ironsides, and making it read so as to create the
impression that the writer had been on board the iron
clad during the action.

1863] PRAISE FROM CAPTAIN RODGERS 49

Mr. Greeley and the whole editorial staff of the Tribune
complimented me highly upon my achievement, and I re
ceived also considerable praise from the press. A sub
stantial recognition was also awarded to me in the form
of an extra allowance of one hundred dollars and two
weeks' leave of absence. I need not say that all this made
me not a little proud.

The repulse in Charleston Harbor led to very savage at
tacks on Admiral Dupont in a number of Northern papers.
George W. Smalley, who was then military and naval
editor of the Tribune, defended him very vigorously in
that paper. I wrote to Captain C. R. P. Rodgers with ref
erence to this, and received in reply the following letter,
which I have always prized very highly :

(Private.) U. S. S. Wabash,

PORT ROYAL, 25 April, 1863.

MY DEAR MR. VlLLARD :

I am very much obliged to you for your kindness in writing to
me. Your letter was deeply interesting to the Admiral as well as
to myself. Your graphic and powerful account of the attack upon
Charleston has done much to form public opinion, and I feel under
great obligations to my old friend, Mr. Smalley, for the vigor and
skill with which he has espoused our cause. Your own personal
gallantry and unhesitating devotion in the exercise of your pro
fessional duty won for you the respect and confidence of us all, and
I hope that it may be my good fortune soon to meet you again,
and to find in a fairer field that success which we failed to win on
the 7th.

Your letter to me was full of valuable information, and I can
not sufficiently thank you for it.

I write briefly now, for I am sorely pressed by many unanswered
letters, but I beg you to believe in the warm regard with which
I am Faithfully yours,

C. R. P. RODGERS.

HENRY VILLARD, ESQ., New York.

On the same day Captain Rodgers thus wrote to Mr.
Smalley :

50 HENEY VILLARD [1863

(Confidential.) U. S. S. Wdbash,

PORT ROYAL, 25 April, 1863.
MY DEAR MR. SMALLEY :

I beg you to receive my very cordial thanks'f or your kind letter,
which I received by the Arago. It is a great satisfaction to me to
find that one whom I had learned to regard as a tried comrade,
has so effectively sustained our brave Admiral, under his first
reverse, when an interested and powerful clique was so earnestly
endeavoring to destroy a reputation so dear to those who have
served under his orders. Mr. Villard's excellent letter and your
skilful editorials have done much to frustrate the interested
malignity which sought to win new contracts and large disburse
ments at the expense of the honor of men who have, at least, dur
ing this war served bravely and faithfully. The commanding
officers who fought at Charleston are, as one man, emphatic and
unanimous in coinciding with the Admiral in his views and
decision. We were charged with the difficult task of taking
Charleston by machinery. Twelve hundred men in ingenious
machines were to take a strongly fortified city upon which the
resources of the Rebellion had been lavished for two years. When
these machines came to us, they were wholly untried, and we were
to experiment with them under such a fire as the world has never
before witnessed. Our attack was gallantly delivered, but the
machines were found not equal to the task assigned them. After
forty minutes' fighting, without endeavoring to force the obstruc
tions, five out of the eight smaller vessels were found wholly, or
one-half, disabled, and every commanding officer in the attacking
force was convinced that a persistence in the attack would turn fail
ure into utter disaster. We might have produced a more dramatic
effect by lingering until a portion of the fleet had been sunk, and
have thus gratified the sensationalists, but it was certain that the
Admiral could not take Charleston with the naval force given him
—could not even take Fort Sumter, which I had hoped we should
destroy. The power of the new ordnance and the heavy projectiles
was greater than the endurance of the monitors. The shattering
process was rapidly going on, and another hour's engagement
would have destroyed many of the vessels.

Our people are shocked that there was so little loss of life.
They forget that, in these mailed vessels, when the loss of life
begins, swift destruction follows. They are nearly safe until they
are destroyed. Had Charleston been taken, scores of new monitors

1863] PRAISE FROM CAPTAIN RODGERS 51

would have been built, and now disappointed constructors are
ready for denunciation. It remains to be seen whether the country
will be influenced by the opinion of carefully selected Naval Com
manders or by disappointed inventors and their interested parti
sans. If an issue is demanded, the Naval Commanders are ready
for it— ready and defiant.

I am deeply impressed by your kindness in this matter. I have
shown your letter to the Admiral, and he fully shares this feeling.
I thank you most warmly, and I beg you to believe me, with true
regard and respect,

Ever faithfully yours,

C. R. P. RODGERS.
G. W. SMALLEY, ESQ., New York.

P. S. I had occasion to observe and admire the nerve and courage
of Mr. Villard, and to witness the untiring fidelity with which he
sought to perform his duties as an observer and recorder of all
that was occurring.

CHAPTER XXVI

FIRST VISIT TO BOSTON.— 1863

THE main consequence of the Charleston affair to me
personally remains to be told. My vacation acci
dentally led to an episode destined to direct the course of
my whole life. When Sydney Howard Gay, the managing
editor of the Tribune, announced to me that I could have
two weeks' leave of absence, I remarked, "I am much
obliged, but where shall I spend it?" "Have you ever
been to Boston?" he asked; and when I answered, "No,"
he said, "Go to the 'Hub' by all means." Accordingly,
after having * ' taken it easy ' ' for a few days in New York,
I followed his advice. I reached Boston on Thursday,
April 21st, and spent the next day in walking about the
city. On the 23d I called on Mrs. Severance, presenting
a letter of introduction to her from her husband, the Col
lector at Port Royal. As she was not at home, her daughter
Julia received me, and invited me to accompany her to the
gymnasium of Dr. Diocletian Lewis, to witness the exer
cises of a class of young men and women. I accepted, went
with her, and stayed through the performance. I was in
troduced to Dr. Lewis and others, among them the son of
William Lloyd Garrison, the famous abolitionist. From
the latter I received an invitation to go with him to hear
the Rev. Samuel Johnson of Salem, a well-known liberal-
minded, free-religious preacher, speak the next (Sunday)
morning, and afterwards to dine with his family, in order
to make their acquaintance. I gladly accepted.

I mentioned, in speaking of my deep interest in the
Fremont campaign of 1856, that, like most Europeans, I
looked upon the existence of slavery as an outrageous

52

1863] WILLIAM LLOYD GARRISON 53

shame and an abominable disgrace to the American Re
public; that I was shocked and disgusted by the incom
prehensible and most contemptible prejudice in the North
ern States against the inspired patriots who demanded the
abolition of the horrible institution, at the risk of constant,
bitter persecution and personal danger. For them I had
always felt the deepest sympathy and admiration; hence,
I was delighted to receive from George W. Smalley a letter
of introduction to Wendell Phillips, which I had not then
delivered, and was, of course, rejoiced at the opportunity
to become acquainted with his noble compeer.

Young William Lloyd and his younger brother Frank,
a boy fifteen years of age, called for me, as agreed, and
took me to hear Mr. Johnson, who preached in a public
hall. Their sister was also present and joined us after
the sermon, and we all walked together to their home. I
was heartily welcomed by the parents, and at once felt
entirely at home with them. Mrs. Garrison was a fine-
looking woman, with a pleasant expression, but seemingly
of a shy, retiring disposition. Mr. Garrison's exterior was
a complete surprise to me. His public character as the
most determined, fearless antislavery champion had so im
pressed me, as it did most people, that I had supposed
his outward appearance must be in keeping with it. In
other words, I had expected to see a fighting figure of
powerful build, with thick hair, full beard, and fiery, de
fiant eyes. It seemed almost ludicrous to behold a man
of middle size, completely bald and clean shaven, with
kindly eyes behind spectacles, and, instead of a fierce, an
entirely benignant expression. He appeared, indeed, more
like the typical New England minister of the Gospel than
the relentless agitator that he was. The inner man cor
responded fully to the outer one. He was forbearing, and
mildness itself, in manner and speech. Being a journalist
himself, he took a special interest in my war experiences
as a correspondent, which I was made to relate during and
after the dinner, with the whole family as eager listeners.

54 HENRY VILLARD [1863

The next morning Mr. Garrison's youngest son, Frank,
called for me early, and acted as my guide in an exploration
of the older part of Boston. We climbed to the cupola
of the State House and ascended Bunker Hill Monument.
If I remember rightly, he also took me to the residence of
Wendell Phillips, to whom I presented Mr. Smalley's let
ter of introduction. The latter had had close personal re
lations with the great orator ever since he had protected
him from the violence of a Boston mob, and subsequently
married his adopted daughter. Mr. Phillips lived in a
very small house with hardly space for the enjoyment of
even ordinary comfort. He received me very cordially,
and I conversed for an hour with this famous man, and
became deeply impressed by his fascinating personality.
Throughout the rest of my stay in Boston, I was much in
company with the Garrisons, visiting with them (among
others places) Readville, some fifteen miles south of Boston,
where the Fifty-fourth and Fifty-fifth Massachusetts col
ored regiments — the first ones organized in Massachusetts —
were encamped. The oldest son of Mr. Garrison, George
Thompson, had entered the army, much against the wishes
of his father, who had always been an advocate of the doc
trine of non-resistance. Mr. Garrison finally gave his sanc
tion, however, and George ultimately became quartermaster
in the Fifty-fifth Regiment. At Readville, Colonel Robert
G. Shaw, of the Fifty-fourth Regiment, attracted especial
attention, no one knowing how soon his fine young life was
to He sacrificed in battle. He fell in the assault on Fort
Wagner.

On reaching my hotel on my return from the camp, I
found a letter from Mr. Gay, saying that he had received
reliable information that Rosecrans's army was to enter
upon aggressive movements, early in May, from Murfrees-
boro', and asking whether I was willing to shorten my
leave of absence and start at once for Tennessee, to report
the impending campaign. It was midnight when I reached
a definite resolution, and, with deep regret that I should

1863] MISS GARRISON 55

have to give up the rest of my vacation, wrote in answer
to Mr. Gay that I would report for duty the day after the
morrow. It was to this chance visit to Boston that I owe
the greatest happiness of my life — my marriage to Miss
Fanny Garrison, the only daughter of the great abolition
ist, to whose charms of mind and person I surrendered on
first acquaintance.

I returned to New York by the night train.

MEMOIES OF HENRY VILLARD

BOOK SIX
IN CIVIL-WAR TIME: CHICKAMAUGA

CHAPTER XXVII

WITH ROSECRANS AT MURFREESBORO'.— 1863

I LEFT New York on May 3, and went directly to Cin
cinnati. Here I remained ten days, mainly for the
purpose of watching the developments in the case of Val-
landigham, the notorious leader of secession sympathizers.
General Burnside, now in command of the Department of
the Ohio, had arrested him on a charge of treason, and was
about to bring him to trial before a court-martial. But
as the General requested me not to publish anything in
regard to the matter until the trial was over, at which no
reporters were permitted to be present, it seemed useless
to tarry longer, and I resumed my journey and reached
Rosecrans's headquarters at Murf reesboro ', Tennessee, five
days later.

A short review of the experiences of the Army of the
Ohio since I left it in eastern Kentucky, will be in place
here. The campaign of Perryville had been brought to a
close in October, 1862, by the successful retreat of Bragg 's
army into Tennessee. General Buell halted the pursuing
columns north of the Cumberland River, and, after a few
days' rest, turned his army again in a western direction
towards Glasgow and Bowling Green. He had hardly is
sued orders to this effect when he was directed by the Presi
dent to turn his command over to Major-General W. S.
Rosecrans, who assumed charge on October 30. General
McCook's and General Gilbert's corps were then concen
trated at Bowling Green, and General Crittenden's corps
reached Glasgow a few days later.

The strong dissatisfaction with the disappointing per-

59

60 HENRY VILLARD [1863

f ormances of General Buell that was generally felt in official
circles at Washington, at the capitals of Western States,
and by the loyal public, was the principal cause of his
removal; but the immediate one was, that he again mani
fested his former disinclination to comply with the orders
from Washington to move directly into East Tennessee.
Subsequent events proved, however, that for once he was
right in remonstrating against those orders, on the ground
that Bragg was aiming at the capture of Nashville, and that
the protection of the Tennessee capital and the control of
middle Tennessee were more important than the occupation
of the eastern part of the State. General Rosecrans, too,
was compelled to decide at once against the movement so
long desired by the Government, by positive information
of the appearance of Bragg at Murf reesboro ', only thirty-
three miles from Nashville, and to order the whole army,
within a few days after his assumption of the command, to
make for that city by forced marches.

Nashville was occupied during the Perryville campaign
by the divisions of Generals Negley and Palmer. The place
had been well fortified, and was never really in danger
from the inferior rebel forces under General Breckinridge
that hovered about it during the fall, acting more as a corps
of observation than as besiegers, although they made some
offensive attempts, and even boldly demanded the surren
der of the city. But the advent of the aggressive Bragg
within one and a half days' march of it formed an immi
nent danger, and justified the southward rush of the army
for its protection. General McCook's corps reached its
destination on November 9, having marched seventy-two
miles in three days, and was directly followed by the other
corps.

One of the first acts of General Rosecrans was a reorgan
ization of the army. Its name was changed to "Army of
the Cumberland/' and it was divided into the right wing,
under Major-General Alexander McD. McCook, composed of
the three divisions of Johnson, Davis (the slayer of Nelson),

1863] ADVANCE ON MURFREESBORO' 61

and Sheridan; the centre, under General Thomas, with
Rousseau, Negley, and Reynolds for division commanders;
and the left wing, under General Crittenden, with the three
divisions of Wood, Palmer, and Van Cleve. The new Com
mander-in-chief devoted himself assiduously to the improve
ment of Jhe efficiency of his command, filling its thinned
ranks with fresh troops, and weeding out incompetent offi
cers. He also worked vigorously in other respects to get it
ready for resuming the offensive as early as possible. Offi
cers and men were greatly in need of clothing and foot-wear.
The cavalry and artillery and the transportation depart
ment required extensive remounting, and an accumulation
of quartermaster, commissary, and ordnance stores had also
to precede a forward movement. Rosecrans's efforts to sup
ply all these urgent needs were very much impeded by ob
struction of communications with the North. The main line
of the Louisville & Nashville Railroad had not been fully
repaired since the destruction wrought upon it by the last
formidable raid of the rebel cavalry leader Morgan, and
hauling had to be done for many miles with army wagons.
Nor was it found possible to ensure the regular operation
of that sole available rail-line. More or less successful at
tempts to interrupt it were repeated again and again dur
ing November and December by the rebel chieftains Morgan,
Wheeler, Wharton, Forrest, and others. Still, the wants of
the army were gradually so far satisfied that, towards the
end of the year, it could be considered ready to resume
active operations.

Accordingly, General Rosecrans, on Christmas day,
1862, issued orders for a general advance the following
morning upon Murf reesboro ', where Bragg 's army had re
mained stationary, receiving the benefits of rest, replenish
ment, and reinforcement. The army moved on December
26, in three columns: McCook on the right, Thomas with
three of his five divisions in the centre, and Crittenden on
the left. They came upon the rebel pickets and outposts
within a few miles of Nashville, and, pushing them and

62 HENEY VILLARD [1863

their supports steadily Hefore them, on December 29 reached
the west bank of Stone's River in the immediate vicinity
of Murf reesboro ', which lies on the east side of it. General
Rosecrans had believed that his antagonist would retreat
on his approach, but found him well concentrated, and
evidently ready to accept battle, with the two corps of
Generals Polk and Hardee, and a division under General
Breckinridge. Unknown to each other, both commanders
prepared on the 30th to attack the next morning. By an
extraordinary coincidence, the plans of battle were exact
counterparts. Rosecrans aimed to inflict a great defeat
upon the enemy by turning his right, and Bragg was de
termined to try the Perryville tactics again by a flanking
movement with the bulk of his army against our right,
which he doubtless knew was commanded by the same gen
eral, McCook, upon whom he had tried the same game
all but successfully. In this concurrence of the purposes
of the two adversaries, he who struck first and heaviest
would naturally have the best chance to win, and this
advantage unfortunately fell to Bragg.

Thus the great battle of Stone's River, one of the blood
iest of the Civil War, came to be fought on the last day of
the year 1862. Bragg, by a general wheel of his centre and
left under Polk and Hardee, managed to work around our
right, and to hurl upon this flank massive columns with
such irresistible impetus that they swept before them,
partly dispersed, and partly captured the first of our divi
sions encountered, and rolled back upon the centre the other
two divisions. The centre, being thus exposed to deter
mined attacks from the front, flank, and rear, was also com
pelled to give ground, and succeeded in staying the steady
advance of the rebels from a new position only with the
help of divisions from our left. For some time during the
day there was the gravest peril of a general and crushing
defeat of our whole army, and it may still be considered
an open question whether the prevention of such a terrible
catastrophe was due more to our resistance than to the

1863] BATTLE OF STONE'S RIVER 63

gradual tiring out of the assailants and their lack of re
serves to follow up their success. As it was, the close of
that awful day found us with a loss of nearly 10,000 killed
and wounded, not far from 4000 prisoners (out of a total
of 43,000 effectives) , and 30 pieces of artillery, and forced
back on a new line forming almost a right angle to the
one first held. The enemy's casualties in killed and
wounded were even heavier, out of an effective total of
8000 less than ours. The result of the exhaustion of both
sides was that the opposing hosts lay confronting one an
other for the next two days. On the afternoon of the third
day, the enemy attempted another assault, upon our left,
ending in a severe repulse with heavy loss. Bragg retreated
in the night of the fourth day— much to the relief of
Rosecrans, who had even thought of a retreat to Nashville
immediately after the misfortunes of the first day. What
could at best be called a drawn battle by our side was now
proclaimed, of course, a Union victory, coupled with the
usual assertion that it was won over greatly superior num
bers. Indeed, Rosecrans telegraphed to the War Depart
ment that he had encountered more than 62,000 rebels.
Bragg, to be sure, likewise exaggerated our strength beyond
60,000. But the Official Records leave no doubt of the cor
rectness of the respective strengths above given.

Rosecrans had set out from Nashville for an offensive
winter campaign. Had the outcome of his main trial of
strength with Bragg been satisfactory, as he confidently
expected, he would doubtless have carried out that purpose,
unless severe winter weather and, maybe, the course of
events in other parts of the theatre of war had pre
vented it. The shock received by his command on Stone's
River was so great, however, that he would have been
obliged to lie still for a time at least for general recupera
tion, but he lapsed into inactivity for months. The severe
handling he suffered from Bragg had apparently taken
most of the aggressive "starch" out of him, and his con
fidence in the army was greatly diminished. Indeed, the

64 HENRY VILLARD [1863

relative reverse he had undergone transformed him from
a buoyant fighter into another cautious and irresolute
"cunctator" of the McClellan and Buell type.

The first evidence of this change of spirit was the ex
tensive fortifications he planned and had carried out around
Murf reesboro '. They were on such an elaborate scale as
to indicate a decided fear of the enemy. Next came the
prominence he gave, in his communications to the Govern
ment, to the great need of more drill and discipline in his
army, although this shortcoming had not been considered
serious enough by him before to delay his advance against
Bragg. Other strong symptoms of his loss of pluck were
his continuous and clamorous demands for more troops,
more equipment, and more supplies. His likeness to the
prototypes mentioned grew very striking when the one
sound excuse for his prolonged lethargy, the protracted
very bad weather, could not be pleaded any longer upon
the advent of spring, and the Government began to urge
upon him the resumption of offensive operations. Like the
others, he did not seem to be able to get ready to move. He
had no end of excuses. Suggestions to him only led to long
deprecatory arguments against them. Orders from Wash
ington produced no other effect than to draw from him
remonstrances and protests. He gradually developed even
an obstinate obstreperousness and outright resistance to
the wishes of his superiors, and resented their interference
almost as an insult and outrage. His conduct naturally
produced discouragement and distrust of him at the national
capital. The dissatisfaction of the Government with his
inertia became known to the public, and led to criticism of
him in the Eastern papers, while he had many strong
champions in the Western press.

This was the state of things when I reached Murfrees-
boro ' in May. On presenting my credentials, General Rose-
crans received me with literally profuse cordiality. Re
ferring to my review of his predecessor, he assured me that
he deemed it a privilege to have so able and well-known a

1863] ROSECRANS HANGS BACK 65

critic join him. Although I had only a slight acquaintance
with him (I had seen him a few times during the siege of
Corinth), he invited me at once to his mess, offered to
provide sleeping-quarters for me next to his, and to furnish
me horses and servants. This excessive hospitality con
firmed the impression which prevailed among newspaper
men, and which I had brought with me, that he tried to work
the press systematically for his personal benefit. I felt
that, if I placed myself under obligations to him by accept
ing the offered favors, he would expect services in return,
and my independence as a writer could not be preserved.
Accordingly, I declined his offers as politely as I could, and
again joined my old friends, General McCook and his staff,
who occupied a spacious brick mansion, the former home
of the owner of a large plantation adjacent to the town,
in which I was given a small but comfortable room. I also
secured a serviceable horse and a negro servant.

My very first talk with Rosecrans satisfied me that I need
not have made haste to retake the field, as he had no thought
of an immediate advance. Fully six weeks were, indeed,
to elapse before his army got again in motion, and during
that time my work remained very light, as I was subject,
of course, to the usual restrictions upon the publication
of information regarding intended movements, the strength
and condition of the army, and other matters that might
have given "aid and comfort to the enemy." Murfrees-
boro ' was an attractive, solidly built-up town, but offered no
social diversions, as most of the ten thousand inhabitants
had disappeared. But I found plenty of other means of
pleasantly whiling away my abundant leisure. To return
to this army was to me almost like returning to one's large
family, owing to the great number of friends I had in it.
There had been but few changes among the general offi
cers, and in visits to them much of my time was agreeably
spent. Then General McCook and his military family were
a very jolly set, and provided a good deal of fun. The sing
ing of songs in chorus was a constant amusement. A con-

66 HENRY VILLARD [1863

tinuous flow of official and unofficial callers also added to
the liveliness of our headquarters. Drills, parades, and
reviews likewise afforded diversion. The weather was most
propitious for outdoor life, and I took advantage of it by
daily horseback exercise.

It was my duty as well as my pleasure to pay frequent
visits to the general headquarters, where I always received
a hearty welcome from both General Rosecrans and his
chief of staff, General James A. Garfield, in whom nobody
then foresaw a future President of the United States. I
will describe them separately. General Rosecrans was of
middle stature, with a broad upper body and rather short,
bow legs (owing to which peculiarities he presented a far
better appearance when mounted than on foot) ; a head
not large, with short, thin, light-brown hair; a narrow,
long face with kindly blue eyes, strong nose and mouth,
and scanty full grayish beard. His general expression was
very genial. He was a great talker, voluble, earnest, and
persuasive— one of the elements of his strength. General
Garfield, not much over thirty years old, presented a far
more commanding and attractive appearance. Very nearly,
if not fully, six feet high, well formed, of erect carriage,
with a big head of sandy hair, a strong-featured, broad
and frank countenance, set in a full beard and lighted
up by large blue eyes and a most pleasing smile, he looked
like a distinguished personage. His manners were very
gentlemanly and cordial, and altogether he produced and
sustained a most agreeable impression.

It was not difficult for me to get on a confidential footing
with Rosecrans. In fact, he freely offered his confidence to
me of his own accord, and thus enabled me promptly to take
a correct measure of the man. He showed at once that his
disagreements with the Washington authorities were the
uppermost thoughts in his mind, and that it gratified him
greatly to express his ill-humor towards them. Indeed,
he criticised General Halleck and Secretary Stanton with
such freedom— with such a total disregard of official pro-

1863J ROSECRANS 67

priety— not once, but repeatedly, that it really embarrassed
me to listen to him, although, fortunately, he was content
to do the talking without expecting sympathetic echoes from
me. He dwelt upon the disregard of some of his wishes by
those superiors as a public wrong, and denounced as crim
inal their efforts to force him into the offensive before he
was completely ready. Nor did he hesitate to expatiate upon
his plans for future operations, and this with scarcely con
cealed self-appreciation. He evidently believed that he
was destined to play the most prominent part and reach the
greatest distinction among all the Union generals. He un
folded to me his conception of the grand strategy by which
the triumph of the North could be assured, coupling it with
a broad intimation that Halleck and Stanton would have
to be got out of the way, leaving me to infer that, after this
was done, the next necessary step was to put him in the
former's place. Talk of this kind was so regularly repeated
by him that I could not help concluding that he was anxious
to impress me with his greatness and to have that impression
reflected in the Tribune. There was a correspondent at
tached to his headquarters, W. D. Bickham, who did that
sort of work for him very willingly in the columns of the
Cincinnati Commercial. But the more "Old Rosey," as
the puffer in question had nicknamed him, tried to make
me help in pointing him out as the great and only hope of
the country, the less I was inclined to gratify him, and the
smaller grew my faith in his fitness to command a large
army and lead it to victory. Notwithstanding his trans
parent vanity and love of approbation, he tried to make me
—and, for that matter, everybody else, including his supe
riors—believe that he disliked publicity and shrank espe
cially from newspaper notoriety.

His principal justification of the inaction of his com
mand was that, as long as he stood still, he held Bragg fast
in his front, and prevented the sending of reinforcements
from him to General Johnston in his efforts to foil Grant in
the capture of Vicksburg. He explained to me at length

68 HENRY VILLARD [1863

the strategic theory on which he rested this plea. As ap
pears from the Official Records, he used the same argument
with General Halleck, who, however, tripped him up very
effectively in replying to it. The simple truth regarding
his real motives was, that the display of rebel valor and
the lack of resisting stamina in his own troops on Stone's
River still exercised a deterrent influence on his mind, and
that under it he persisted in his belief in the superior
strength of Bragg, and had not pluck enough to again un
dertake anything against him until he had at his command
what in his judgment was a sufficient preponderance, nu
merically and otherwise.

General Garneld was also talkative, but more reserved
and discreet than his chief. He professed to have great
admiration for him and implicit faith in his military talents,
but, unlike him, believed that the army was fully ready in
the first half of May to enter upon a new campaign. He
expressed himself freely upon the several ways of conduct
ing operations against Bragg that suggested themselves
from the relative positions of the opposed armies. He ap
peared to have a very clear and sound strategic judgment
for one whose experience as commander had been limited to
petty warfare, at the head of a small brigade, with raiders
and guerrillas in eastern Kentucky. I recognized also his
general capacity and great store of information. A dis
tinguished career seemed certain for him, but I am sure
that he himself did not dream that the chief magistracy of
the nation was awaiting him.

There could be no doubt, however, that the long stay at
Murf reesboro ' had resulted in the much greater proficiency
of the army. As more than one-third of it consisted of
newly enlisted officers and men, there was great need of
improvement in drill and discipline, and it must be said that
the commanding general and the commanders under him
had tried their best in that respect. "Whenever the weather
permitted, the exercises of the troops had been energetically
pushed. But I could not learn that anything beyond drills

1863] COUNTER-STROKES BY ROSECRANS 69

by companies and regiments had been attempted. The ex
planation of this was that the Army of the Cumberland was
as deficient as the Army of the Potomac and that under
Grant in generals able to conduct brigade and division
drills. But the same deficiency prevailed on the rebel side.

While the main body of the Army of the Cumberland
enjoyed entire immunity from rebel disturbance, the enemy
resumed his daring coups against a number of our isolated
posts and his bold raids in our rear and upon our lines of
communication, not long after the battle of Stone's River.
His exploits forced Rosecrans to resort to counter-strokes,
and from the latter part of January till June the news
papers published almost daily accounts of the more or less
important undertakings of this kind on both sides, some of
which I will mention. Towards the end of January, the
united rebel cavalry under Forrest, Wheeler, and Wharton
turned up in middle Tennessee, north of the Cumberland,
and on February 3 appeared before Fort Donelson, but were
repulsed by the garrison. On March 4, Colonel Colburn
was sent from Franklin on a reconnoissance with a Union
force of 1900 men, fell into a trap set for him by the rebel
General Van Dorn, and was captured with 1400 of his
command. On March 20 the rebel raider Morgan suffered
a small defeat. A few days later, Forrest made a success
ful descent upon the Nashville & Columbia Railroad. Early
in April our General Reynolds raided the Manchester &
McMinnville Railroad, and soon thereafter Colonel Streight
with 1600 men started from our side on his daring but
disastrous raid into northern Alabama and Georgia, where
he was captured with his whole force tiy Forrest. In May
and early June, further raids were undertaken by our Gen
eral Stanley and the tireless rebel Forrest.

The irritating friction between the Government and Gen
eral Rosecrans continued steadily after my arrival, and even
grew in severity through the month of May. But, early in
June, the General found himself driven into a corner by the
proof that he had failed to hold Bragg 's entire force, a large

70 HENRY VILLARD [1863

part of it having actually reinforced Johnston in Missis
sippi. Ordered by the Government to take advantage of
the weakening of his foe by a forward movement, and yet
unwilling to comply, he bethought himself of an indirect
mode of evading the command from Washington. He sum
moned his corps and division commanders to a council of
war, and succeeded in obtaining from fifteen out of seven
teen an endorsement of his opposition to an advance, which
vote he triumphantly telegraphed to General Halleck, who
answered him cuttingly that ' ' councils of war never fight. ' '
As the Government was loath to override the opinion of the
council, General Rosecrans would probably have had his
way but for the efforts of his chief of staff. In controver-
sion of the views and verdict of the generals, General Gar-
field prepared and submitted an exhaustive memorandum.
It set forth in detail the actual strength of our army and
the estimated one of Bragg 's, according to which figures
we had fully one-third more effectives. It clearly stated
all the arguments for and against an immediate advance.
One of the strong points which he made, and which mainly
moved the Government in urging Rosecrans to activity, was
the imperative political necessity of stopping the growth of
the anti-war sentiment in the loyal States (as shown by the
spread of "copperheadism") by Union victories in the field.
Although the Commander-in-chief did not yield at once, the
deliberate conclusion of his chief of staff that an advance
should no longer be delayed, no doubt greatly influenced his
early decision to move.

On June 11, General Halleck telegraphed from Wash
ington to General Rosecrans : "I deem it my duty to repeat
to you the great dissatisfaction that is felt here at your
inactivity. There seems to be no doubt that a part of
Bragg 's force has gone to Johnston. " It appears that no
answer to this was deigned by Rosecrans, whereupon Hal
leck wired him again on June 16: " Is it your intention
to make an immediate movement forward? A definite
answer, 'Yes' or 'No,' is required." This peremptory

1863] REBUKE BY LINCOLN 71

demand elicited the following response : ' ' In reply to your
inquiry, if 'immediate' means to-night or to-morrow, No.
If it means as soon as all things are ready, say five days,
Yes." This extraordinary telegraphic incident was closed
by a despatch dated Murf reesboro ', June 24, 2.10 A.M.,
saying laconically: "Major-General Halleck, General-in-
chief : The army begins to move at three o 'clock this morn
ing. W. S. Rosecrans, Major-General."

In this connection I will also quote a telling rebuke from
a letter of President Lincoln in reply to a long defence of
his course which the General had sent to him :

EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, August 10, 1863.
MY DEAR GENERAL ROSECRANS :

Yours of the 1st was received two days ago. I think you must
have inferred more than General Halleck has intended as to any
dissatisfaction of mine with you. I am sure you, as a reasonable
man, would not have been wounded could you have heard all my
words and seen all my thoughts in regard to you. I have not
abated in my kind feeling for and confidence in you. I have
seen most of your dispatches to General Halleck— probably all of
them. After Grant invested Vicksburg, I was very anxious lest
Johnston should overwhelm him from the outside; and when it
appeared certain that part of Bragg's force had gone and was
going to Johnston, it did seem to me it was exactly the proper
time for you to attack Bragg with what force he had left. In all
kindness let me say, it so seems to me yet. Finding from your dis
patches to General Halleck that your judgment was different, and
being very anxious for Grant, I, on one occasion, told General
Halleck I thought he should direct you to decide at once to im
mediately attack Bragg or to stand on the defensive and send part
of your force to Grant. He replied he had already so directed in
substance. Soon after, dispatches from Grant abated my anxiety
for him, and in proportion abated my anxiety about any movement
of yours. When afterwards, however, I saw a dispatch of yours
arguing that the right time for you to attack Bragg was not before,
but would be after, the fall of Vicksburg, it impressed me very
strangely; and I think I so stated to the Secretary of War and
General Halleck. It seemed no other than the proposition that you

72 HENRY VILLARD [1863

could better fight Bragg when Johnston should be at liberty to
return and assist him than you could before he could so return to
his assistance.

According to the official returns, the aggregate of officers
and men present for duty at the opening of the campaign
was: Fourteenth Corps, 26,058; Twentieth Corps, 16,047;
Twenty-first Corps, 17,023 ; reserve corps, 20,615 ; cavalry
corps, 12,281 — making a total of infantry, artillery, and
cavalry of over 90,000. But, from this total, the staffs and
escorts of the army, corps, and division headquarters, and
the division of Van Cleve left to garrison the works at Mur-
f reesboro ', had to be deducted, so that the available number
of actual combatants was under 70,000.

Bragg 's army was known to occupy a strong position on
the range of much-broken, rocky hills extending north of
and parallel to Duck River, a tributary of the Cumberland.
His lines extended from Shelbyville to Wartrace at an
average distance of something over twenty miles south of
ours. His front was about ten miles long, and covered the
railroad from Nashville to Chattanooga and the principal
ordinary highways in the same direction. The nature of the
country gave the enemy great advantages for defence, and,
moreover, a line of field-works had been constructed for
the better protection of the approaches. A cavalry force
covered each of his wings. His effective total was estimated
at under 40,000 bayonets and sabres.

Rosecrans's plan of operations was that of an able strate
gist. A front attack being forbidden by the f ormidableness
of the rebel position, he proposed to turn Bragg 's right and
assail him on that flank and his rear. To that end, the
corps of General Granger was to make a show of an advance
in force from Triune upon the enemy's left at Shelbyville,
and, at the same time, a forward movement of infantry and
cavalry columns in an easterly direction was to have the
appearance of a feint to divert attention from Granger. The
bulk of the three corps of Thomas, McCook, and Crittenden

1863] ORDERS TO MOVE 73

was to execute the principal movement around the rebel
right by hurried marches in a southeasterly direction, with
the town of Manchester (on the south bank of the Duck) as
the objective-point, on reaching which, the rebel flank, rear,
and communications would have been exposed to us.

The corps commanders were summoned to the army head
quarters on the evening of June 23, and this plan was
fully explained to them by the General-in-chief. I had re
ceived a plain intimation of what was to come from General
Garfield during the day, and made my preparations accord
ingly. As the army was to move with only twelve days ' ra
tions and as little baggage as possible, I arranged to leave
my trunk with the headquarters train of McCook's corps,
and to set out with no other impedimenta than toilet things
and two changes of underclothing in my saddle-bags. Gen
eral Garfield had offered to provide for me at the general
headquarters during the campaign; but as, in his opinion,
McCook's corps was most likely to be the first to collide with
the enemy, I concluded to accompany it for a few days at
least. Learning that the division of General Johnson was
to be in the lead, I gladly accepted an invitation to spend
the night at his headquarters and ride with him next day.

The actual orders to move were not issued till after mid
night. The division was roused at four and ready to get
under way at five, but was not put in motion till eight.
I had grown very tired, towards the end, of the monotony
of our routine life at Murf reesboro ', and heartily welcomed
the impending change to the stir and excitement of cam
paigning. I felt in perfect health and highest spirits, and
looked and hoped for a long period of active work. But
it was ordained that my new career should be brief —indeed,
cut short at its very beginning. The greatest disappoint
ment I experienced in the Civil War was in immediate store
for me.

The second division first marched for six miles over the
Shelbyville turnpike, and then turned to the left into an
ordinary country road leading to the sadly dilapidated

74 HENRY VILLARD [1863

town of Old Millersburg and beyond it to "Liberty Gap,"
one of the several narrow defiles through the rough hills
north of the Duck River. The division was preceded by
five companies of mounted infantry, immediately behind
which General Johnson and staff and myself followed.
Nothing was seen or heard of the enemy until we approached
the Gap in the afternoon, which the mounted infantry found
strongly guarded by rebels. A lively skirmish ensued, and,
the ground being unfavorable for a cavalry attack, the Gen
eral ordered the leading brigade under General Willich to
clear the way. The latter had his command ready for an
advance in a short time, and moved forward with a strong
line of skirmishers and supporting companies in advance,
and one regiment on the right and another on the left of the
road, with two regiments and a battery in reserve. The
rebel skirmishers fell back before us upon their supports
on the high hills forming the entrance to the Gap. A direct
attack being hardly practicable, Willich made his regiments
feel their way around the flanks of the enemy, and, aided
by part of another brigade, finally swept them from their
position just before dark, by scaling the heights in a rush,
with considerable loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners.
Their camps were also captured. We lost a small number in
killed and wounded. Our troops displayed a good deal of
dash.

Up to that day, the weather had been all that could be
wished for many weeks. But, soon after sunrise, the sky
became covered, and by noon it commenced raining, and
turned into a steady downpour in the course "of the after
noon. It was the beginning of one of the worst rain storms
that ever visited that part of the country, and actually con
tinued with hardly any interruption for fully a fortnight.
It quickly made the roads almost impassable, and the con
sequent obstruction of the movements of the army eventu
ally prevented the full success of Rosecrans's strategy. I
had no waterproof, but an ordinary army overcoat, which
afforded little protection. By nightfall I was literally wet

1863] IN HOSPITAL AT MURFREESBORO' 75

to the skin. General Johnson invited me to share his tent,
and had a big fire built under a large "fly" stretched over
the entrance to it. Having no change of clothing, as even
the extra underwear in my saddle-bags was wet, I had to
spend the night in my soaked condition. In a few hours
I became very feverish, and felt rheumatic pains all over
my body. I suffered intensely, too, all night, from a fear
ful headache. In the morning, the fever was so high and
the rheumatism so acute that I was entirely unable to move.
The General sent for the chief surgeon of the division, who
came promptly, and, after examining me thoroughly, ex
pressed the opinion that I was suffering from a very severe
attack of malarial fever and inflammatory rheumatism.
He added that it was altogether out of the question for me
to keep on with the army, and that the best thing I could
do would be to return to Murf reesboro ' or Nashville and go
into a hospital. He offered to send me to the former place
on an ambulance-train that was soon to start with our
wounded of the day before. The thought of having to
abandon the field within the first twenty-four hours was
most irksome, but as I began to feel confused in my mind
and could not stand on my legs, and had to choose between
being taken back or left alone in a wild rebel region, I sub
mitted to the inexorable.

An ambulance soon drove up, into which I was lifted on
a stretcher. There were already two wounded officers in it,
one of whom was able to sit up, so that there was room
enough for me to be carried in a lying position. A surgeon
accompanied us. The rain continued to come down heavily,
and, what with its effect and that of the passage of artillery
and trains, the roads had become so bad that our team had
to be walked all the forenoon till we struck the turnpike.
The ride was very rough, and would have discomforted me
greatly had I not been partly out of my senses. It was late
in the evening when we arrived at Murf reesboro ', where I
was transferred to a military hospital that had been estab
lished in a large brick building ordinarily used for mer-

76 HENRY YILLARD [1863

cantile purposes. I had a severe attack of bilious nausea
on the way, which recurred during the night and made
me very weak and unable to take food of any kind. The
doctor in charge interested himself specially in my case,
and the next day offered to send me North in a hospital
railroad car that was about to start with a load of sick
and wounded officers and men for Louisville. He told me
frankly that it would take me some time to get well, and
advised me strongly to avail myself of the opportunity.
Accordingly, I was put on the train which started from
Murf reesboro ' on the second morning and brought us to
Louisville the next day. My fever and rheumatic aches
increased during that long railroad journey, and I was a
very sick man when we reached our destination. The Gait
House people had been informed by telegraph, and were
on hand at the station to receive and take me to the hotel.
Here I was confined to my bed till July 21, when I was
sufficiently improved to take the risk of a transfer by boat
to Cincinnati, where I put up at the Burnet House. The
all-absorbing event of the day was the extraordinary
raid which the rebel guerrilla leader Morgan was making
through the southern parts of Indiana and Ohio. It was the
most daring venture of the kind since the outbreak of the
war. His force, consisting of several thousand mounted
men, swam their horses across the Ohio not far from Louis
ville, and then started upon their plundering career, moving
northward at first and then eastward through southeastern
Indiana and across the whole State of Ohio, their route
lying about half-way between Cincinnati and Columbus.
This sudden invasion produced the greatest excitement and
consternation in the two States, as well as throughout the
Northwest. Great efforts were made to intercept the rebels
with militia and troops from the enlistment camps at Cin
cinnati, Indianapolis, and Columbus ; but the raiders moved
so rapidly, and interrupted communication by rail and
telegraph so much, that no concentration of forces was ef
fected in time to stop them. Several bodies of militia and

1863] CAPTURE OF MORGAN 77

troops had, however, encounters with detachments of the
enemy, and killed, wounded, and captured more or less of
them. It was only when the raiders were nearing the Ohio
in the eastern part of the State that a considerable body
of them, with Morgan himself, were finally cornered and
captured, the remainder escaping across the river.

Having recovered strength enough to resume work, I
devoted myself to supplying the Tribune with news about
the raid by telegraph and mail ; and, in pursuit of that ob
ject, I went to Columbus, the capital of the State, where I
prepared a long account of the rebel incursion. From
Columbus I went to Yellow Sulphur Springs, near Spring
field, Ohio, to drink the waters for a fortnight ; but, instead
of thus completing my restoration to health, I was suddenly
attacked again with bilious intermittent fever, and barely
managed to get back to Cincinnati, where I was once more
confined to my bed for nearly three weeks. The fever
threatened at one time to assume a typhoid character, but,
fortunately, did not actually develop into it. I was again
convalescent when intelligence was received of the two days'
fighting at Chickamauga between Rosecrans's and Bragg 's
armies and of the disastrous result to our side. As I had
hoped all along to be able to take the field again Before any
serious collision between the two armies occurred, I felt
great disappointment that I had not witnessed it, but did
what I could to utilize for the benefit of the Tribune the
information regarding the battle received by the local pa
pers. I remained in Cincinnati till September 29, when at
last I started again for the front.

I here break off the narrative of my personal experiences
in order to make room for a history of the battle of
Chickamauga.

CHAPTER XXVIII

BRAGG DISLODGED FROM CHATTANOOGA.— 1863

WITHIN a little over a week after I left it, the Army
of the Cumberland had compelled Bragg 's forces to
abandon the fortified line described in the preceding chap
ter, by the literally "brief and brilliant" so-called Tulla-
homa campaign. Had the full execution of Rosecrans's
strategic programme not been prevented by the extra
ordinary inclemency of the unseasonable weather, he would
probably have succeeded in working around the enemy's
right flank and upon his lines of communication, and in
flicting a complete defeat upon him. As it was, he forced
the enemy, with a loss of about two thousand in killed,
wounded, and prisoners, and some guns, out of middle Ten
nessee, while his own loss hardly reached five hundred.
Bragg, in his official reports to the rebel authorities, ad
mitted that our flanking movements compelled him to fall
back first from the Shelbyville-Wartrace line to Tullahoma,
and thence to Elk River, and finally to retreat over the
mountains to Chattanooga. He claimed that he did this
to save his army from ' ' destruction without a battle, ' ' which
latter issue, much desired by himself and his command,
he had offered to the enemy, but failed to bring him to it.
His retreat was fully approved by the commanders under
him, as is shown by a direct communication from Lieu
tenant-General Polk to President Davis, but was neverthe
less a great disappointment to the Confederate Government.
It had a right to expect different results from an army
whose condition, according to the reports of an aide-de
camp of Jefferson Davis who had made a thorough inspec-

78

1863] BRAGG CROSSES THE TENNESSEE 79

tion of it but a short time before, was better as to equip
ment, drill, discipline, and health than that of any other
in the rebel service. This condition was naturally changed
for the worse by the inevitably demoralizing effect of a
retrograde movement.

Our army thus found itself once more in almost the same
position it had occupied twelve months before, until Bragg 's
flanking march into Kentucky had compelled its abandon
ment. Nor was there any compensation in the military
situation for the grievous loss of a whole year's time, for
the task before Rosecrans was now identical with that of
Buell, viz., the advance upon Chattanooga; and its ac
complishment was really rendered more difficult by the
greater strength of the opposing forces, and by the dimin
ished resources of the intervening country in consequence
of its long occupation by the rebels.

Rosecrans endeavored to push after the enemy as soon as
his retreat from Shelbyville and Tullahoma became known ;
but the continuous rainfall, the heavy roads, and mainly
the high stage of the water-courses and the destruction of
the bridges, rendered it impossible to interfere with the fall
ing-back of the rebels over the Cumberland Mountains.
The Commander-in-chief therefore determined to bring his
main bodies to a halt, and carefully prepare for a further
advance in the direction of Chattanooga by repairing the
railroads to the Tennessee River and accumulating supplies.
The army came to rest in a position extending from Mc-
Minnville to Winchester, with advanced posts at Pelham
and Stevenson. Flying columns, however, were sent out
over the enemy's lines of retreat, by which it was fully
ascertained that Bragg had passed the Cumberland Moun
tains by the so-called Tantallon and University roads, and
followed Battle Creek to the Tennessee. He crossed it at
three points, and marched directly to Chattanooga, burning
the railroad bridges and trestles behind him. The strategic
importance of Chattanooga warranted the assumption that
Bragg would strive to hold it, and imposed the correspond-

80 HENRY VILLARD [1863

ingly difficult duty upon Rosecrans of wresting it from the
enemy.

The most creditable achievement of the Army of the
Cumberland in manoeuvring Bragg into a retreat was not
appreciated in the North as it should have been. The rea
son was that the news of it reached the loyal public while
it was trembling over the issue of the mighty struggle
between the armies of Meade and Lee at Gettysburg, and
was in feverish expectation of the final outcome of the siege
of Vicksburg. The authorities at Washington, in their ela
tion over the defeat of Lee and the fall of the Mississippi
stronghold, and in their angry remembrance of Rosecrans 's
conduct, also failed to award the meed of praise the latter
had expected. Secretary Stanton telegraphed on July 7
to him, in announcing the triumphs of Meade and Grant:
"You and your noble army now have the chance to give
the finishing blow to the Rebellion. Will you neglect the
chance?" This deliberate prod provoked a caustic retort
from Rosecrans, in which he said: "You do not appear to
observe the fact that this noble army has driven the rebels
from middle Tennessee, of which my despatches advised
you. I beg on behalf of this army that the War Department
may not overlook so great an event because it is not written
in letters of blood."

Rosecrans informed Halleck and the War Department in
detail of the difficulties in the wray of the movement on Chat
tanooga, but they were not considered by his superiors as
great as by himself. Still, he was allowed some weeks to
get ready, but when, towards the end of August, there were
no signs of renewed activity on his part, the Government
began afresh to spur him on. President Lincoln 's cherished
plan of relieving the loyalists in East Tennessee was again
pressed upon him. Halleck combined this with general urg
ing in despatches and letters on July 24 and 25. But, while
Rosecrans 's delay at Murf reesHoro ', with the enemy within
easy striking distance, was justly found fault with, he made
out a much better case for himself in his explanation to

1863] PEREMPTORY ORDERS TO ROSECRANS 81

the Government. He was two hundred and sixty- four miles
from his primary base at Louisville, and eighty-three miles
from his secondary at Nashville. All his subsistence, equip
ments of every sort, ammunition, and most of his forage had
to be hauled the total distance by rail. There was between
him and the Tennessee fifty to sixty miles of barren, moun
tainous country, which would have to be passed by means
of difficult roads unless the railroad to the river was re
paired. There was also the formidable passage of and
movement along the banks of the latter, which was from
2000 to 3000 feet wide and enclosed on both sides by precipi
tous elevations. But all this, in the judgment of his su
periors, did not justify further delay. On August 3,
Halleck wired him to report the position of all his forces.
The reply having furnished proof that they had remained
stationary, a peremptory order reached Rosecrans on the
next day from the General-in-chief in these words : ' ' Your
forces must move forward without further delay. You
will daily report the movement of each corps till you cross
the Tennessee River." Rosecrans, in acknowledging re
ceipt, answered : ' ' As I have determined to cross the river
as soon as practicable, and have been making all prepara
tions and getting such information as may enable me to do
so without being driven back like Hooker, I wish to know if
your order is to take away my discretion as to time and
manner of moving my troops." Halleck replied promptly
on August 5 : i l The orders for the advance of your army
and that its movements He reported daily are peremptory. ' '
Rosecrans wired another remonstrance, indicating his pur
pose to move in a few days, and adding, if literal obedience
of the order of the General-in-chief was expected, he must
insist upon its modification or upon being relieved from
command. The upshot of it all was that the Army of the
Cumberland was in motion again by the middle of the
month.

The opening campaign was to be supported by the simul
taneous movement of an army under Major-General Burn-

82 HENRY VILLARD [1863

side from southeastern Kentucky into eastern Tennessee.
Burnside had not long been kept in retirement after leaving
the Army of the Potomac, but in March was put in com
mand of the Department of the Ohio, comprising all the
States between the Alleghenies, the Ohio, and the Missis
sippi, as well as Kentucky, with headquarters at Cincinnati.
During the spring and until late in the summer, he was
occupied with suppressing active manifestations of rebel
sympathy in Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, fighting the rebel
leader J. H. Morgan's new raid in July, and organizing an
army for East Tennessee. He started from central Ken
tucky in the middle of August with about 15,000 men,
organized as the Twenty-third Army Corps, and reached
Knoxville on September 4 without having encountered the
enemy. The Confederate troops in East Tennessee were un
der command of General Buckner and not much inferior
to Burnside 's, but withdrew down the Tennessee, fearing
a front movement from him and a simultaneous one to their
rear by the force detached from the Army of the Cumber
land for the feint against Chattanooga hereinafter men
tioned.

The Cumberland Mountains divide the waters of the
Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers, and extend from east
ern Tennessee in a general southwesterly direction to near
Athens, Alabama, rising to a height of 1000 to 2000 feet.
The chain is cleft in two, for fifty miles from where it abuts
on the Tennessee, by the parallel valley of the Sequatchie
River, with an average breadth not exceeding four miles.
The portion of the Cumberland Mountains between the
Sequatchie and the Tennessee bears the specific name of
Walden's Ridge. Both the main range and the ridge are
masses of rock, rising to a height of 1500 to 2000 feet, with
steep sides furrowed by numerous ravines, and wide but
broken and timbered crests. The average distance from the
line occupied by the army to the Tennessee did not exceed
from sixty-five to seventy miles, but the formidable natural
barriers and the character of the means of communication

1863] ADVANCE ON CHATTANOOGA 83

made the movement to the river an arduous undertaking.
The Nashville & Chattanooga Railroad had been repaired
to Bridgeport on the Tennessee, but to transport the army,
with its artillery and baggage, ammunition, provision, and
forage trains, over its single track with the limited motive-
power and rolling-stock available would have required many
weeks. The troops had, therefore, to use the ordinary roads
over the mountains, which, as a rule, were narrow, extremely
rough, and difficult in grade. Their precarious character
rendered it further necessary to utilize as many of them
as possible.

The configuration of the country and the lines of com
munication were such that General Rosecrans had the sole
choice of approaching Chattanooga either by an eastward
movement to the Tennessee and thence down the valley, or
of making for the river to the west of the objective-point
by way of the Sequatchie and the more direct routes to
Bridgeport, Stevenson, and other points on the north bank.
As the former course would have had to be made over fewer
roads, and would have exposed our lines of communication
and possibly invited another rebel invasion of middle Ten
nessee, the Commander-in-chief determined upon the latter
movement. In order to mislead the enemy as to his real
purpose, a direct advance was to be undertaken by part of
his forces from the Sequatchie over Walden's Ridge to
points opposite and above Chattanooga. Accordingly, the
three divisions of Crittenden's Twenty-first Army Corps,
forming the left, crossed the main ridge of the Cumberland
Mountains in three columns, over as many roads, into the
Sequatchie Valley. Thence the infantry brigades of Hazen
and Wagner, together with Minty's and Wilder 's mounted
ones, were detached for the diversion against Chattanooga,
while the remainder of the corps marched down the Se
quatchie. General Thomas's Fourteenth Army Corps, con
stituting the centre, took the so-called University and Tan-
tallon roads leading to the mouth of Battle Creek and to
near Stevenson. Of McCook's Twentieth Army Corps,

84 HENRY VILLARD [1863

which was the right, Sheridan's division was already in an
advanced position on the river. The other two divisions
under Johnson and Davis marched respectively to Belief onte
and Stevenson. The reserve corps under Major-General
Granger followed the river as soon as the preceding columns
were out of the way. All these movements were so promptly
executed that by August 21 the whole army was in the val
ley of the Tennessee. But the crossing of the river was not
commenced till August 29, when it was successfully ac
complished over pontoon and trestle bridges, and by boats
and rafts, at three different points, by all the troops and
their impedimenta in less than a week.

According to the regular tri-monthly returns made to
the army headquarters on August 10, the total strength of
the Army of the Cumberland was 4735 officers and 75,183
men— cavalry, infantry, and artillery— of which the cav
alry corps comprised 9973 officers and men, the Twenty-first
Army Corps 14,367 men, the Fourteenth 22,389, the Twen
tieth 14,222, and the reserve corps 16,936 ; the remainder
consisting of detached bodies serving as escorts, engineers,
and in other duties. As the reserve corps took no part in
the operations south of the river till some weeks after the
other corps, its number should be deducted from the total,
thus reducing the aggregate with which Rosecrans at first
confronted Bragg to about 64,000. The artillery numbered
216 field guns.

A despatch sent by General Bragg to the Richmond Gov
ernment on August 24 proves that he learned of Rosecrans 's
and Burnside 's advances only on that day, when the former
had already reached the Tennessee. He reported that Rose-
crans had four corps with 70,000 men (a rebel estimate for
once under the actual number), and Burnside 25,000 men
(an overestimate by 10,000). According to his own state
ments, he himself had less than 30,000 effectives of the two
army corps of Lieutenant-Generals L. Polk and D. H. Hill,
and the reserve corps under Major-General Walker. Folk's
army corps consisted of the divisions of Cheatham and

1863] ADVANCE ON CHATTANOOGA 85

Hindman, Hill 's of Cleburne 's and Breckinridge 's divisions,
and Walker's of two small divisions under Brigadier-Gen
erals Gist and Liddell, about Chattanooga, and 8000 under
Buckner made up of Preston's and Stewart's divisions in
East Tennessee. On these figures he based a strong appeal
for reinforcements, which were sent to him at once to the
extent of two small divisions from General J. E. Johnston's
command in Mississippi. He had the unpleasant duty of an
nouncing, in the above-mentioned despatch, that a Federal
force had appeared directly opposite Chattanooga on the
day mentioned (this being the advance of the four brigades
detached from the Twenty-first Army Corps) and shelled
the town. Their sudden appearance was evidently a stun
ning surprise to him. He was deceived as to their strength,
and spoke of them in his report as a "corps" when they
hardly numbered 2000 men. Their nearness irritated him
so much that, when he was sure that they were isolated from
the rest of Eosecrans's army, he formed a plan to capture
or destroy them by a coup de main, to be executed by a
sudden rush over the river by Hill 's corps. Some prepara
tions were made to carry out this plan, but nothing came of
it in the end.

Directly in the way of the Army of the Cumberland there
rose on the south side of the Tennessee, running in a north
easterly direction to the vicinity of Chattanooga, two great
mountain ranges, the one nearest to the river being known
as Sand Mountain and the other as Lookout Mountain.
They are separated by a narrow valley down which Lookout
Creek flows into the Tennessee. The sides of Sand Moun
tain, with a maximum altitude of over 2000 feet, rise so
abruptly that no road is practicable along its base except
for a few miles ; but a few very difficult roads lead over it
and into Lookout Valley. Lookout Mountain, a great rocky
mass, reaches a height of nearly 2500 feet above the level of
the sea, and also declines very steeply on both sides. There
were then but three wagon-roads over it— one around its
precipitous abutment on the river two miles from Chatta
nooga, another at a distance of twenty-five miles from the

86 HENRY VILLARD [1863

town, and the last forty-two miles from the first. Beyond
Lookout Mountain several minor ridges follow the same
general course a little east of north. The nearest to it is Mis
sionary Ridge, and, next to this, Pigeon Mountain. Between
Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge flows Chattanooga
Creek, and between Missionary Ridge and Pigeon Moun
tain the West Branch of Chickamauga Creek. These are
tributaries of the Tennessee, which they enter respectively
below and above Chattanooga. The valley of the West
Chickamauga bears the name of McLemore's Cove. Pigeon
Mountain is separated by Pea Vine Creek from Chick
amauga Hills, the next minor ridge. Between this and
Taylor's Ridge runs Middle Chickamauga Creek, which,
dividing, flows along the western base of the latter ridge as
East Chickamauga Creek. This whole region of mountains
and valleys was then covered with a dense growth of timber
and underbrush, with the exception of clearings here and
there for farming purposes. The roads leading over the
minor ridges were as steep and rough as those over the
higher ones.

The passage over the river being effected, and Bragg 's
army apparently waiting to be attacked in its position about
Chattanooga, Rosecrans had to decide between taking the
direct offensive against the enemy and a repetition of his
Tullahoma plan— that is, to compel Bragg 's withdrawal
from Chattanooga by a flanking movement against his com
munications. The great natural obstacles in the way of the
former stamped it as a very rash venture to seek the rebels
on their chosen fortified ground, and hence the Commander-
in-chief once more resolved upon turning operations. He
set his troops in motion from the south bank without delay,
with McCook again on the right, Thomas in the centre, Crit-
tenden on the left, and Granger in reserve. The general ob
ject was to reach and hold or destroy the main rebel line
of supply formed by the Atlanta & Chattanooga and East
Tennessee & Georgia Railroads, both north and south of
their junction at Dalton, Georgia, and thereby also cut
all the enemy's lines of retreat in a southward direction.

1863] FEINT AGAINST CHATTANOOGA 87

On our extreme right, a cavalry division, under command
of my friend Colonel Edward M. McCook, led the advance,
passed over Raccoon and Lookout Mountains into the valley
of the Chattanooga River, and pushed on in a general south
westerly direction toward Rome as far as the towns of Al
pine and Summerville. The whole Twentieth Army Corps
followed in its wake as fast as possible. The Fourteenth
Army Corps crossed Sand Mountain and had descended
into Lookout Valley by September 6. Continuing up Look
out Mountain, it seized the passes at Johnson's Brook and
Cooper's and Stevens 's Gaps without resistance, and by the
10th had made its way down Lookout Mountain and over
the southern end of Missionary Ridge into McLemore's
Cove. It proved an exceedingly difficult march. General
Thomas describes the roads as the worst imaginable. The
ascents and descents were so long and difficult that teams
had to be doubled in hauling over wagons and guns, thereby
causing great delay. The Twenty-first Army Corps
marched from Shellmound on the Tennessee to Hunting
Water Creek, issuing from a narrow valley, up which ex
tended the Nashville & Chattanooga railroad track to a
long tunnel, with a wagon-road alongside leading over
Raccoon Mountain, as the northern end of Sand Mountain
is called. The whole corps followed this road into Lookout
Valley, and, by the evening of September 6, General Wood 's
division, forming the left, was at the junction of the Nash
ville & Chattanooga with the Trenton branch railroad up
the valley, only seven miles from Chattanooga.

In the meantime, the two infantry and two cavalry bri
gades under Hazen, Wagner, Minty, and Wilder had thor
oughly performed their part of a feint against Chatta
nooga by continuously and ostentatiously demonstrating
with all three arms at different points opposite the town
for a distance of fifteen miles up the river. On September
8, Colonel Wagner, who had taken position in the narrow
bend of the river directly opposite Chattanooga, discovered
indications that the enemy was withdrawing from the town,
and sent word to that effect to the army headquarters.

88 HENRY VILLARD [1863

Towards evening the evacuation had become a certainty, so
that Wagner crossed over and took unopposed possession
the next morning.

This exhilarating fact was quickly made known to all
parts of the army. Rumors from various sources of the
rebel purpose to abandon Chattanooga had reached Rose-
crans for several days before the actual evacuation. In or
der to test them, several bold reconnoissances were made
by General Thomas along the crest of Lookout Mountain,
and by General Crittenden down the Lookout Valley and
around the northern slope of the Mountain. But Wagner's
announcement of the occupation of the town was received
by the General-in-chief before the reconnoissances confirmed
the retirement of the rebels from it. General Bragg had
acquired, by September 6, a sufficiently clear perception of
the object of his adversary's movements to come to a de
cision regarding his own. He recognized the advance of
our right upon his southern communications as a most
threatening move, and prudently, though reluctantly, ac
cepted the inevitable consequence of it, namely, that he
could not allow Rosecrans to get between him and Rome,
and that therefore his withdrawal from Chattanooga was
necessary. Anticipating this as a possible contingency, he
had ordered Buckner to join him. On September 6, he
issued a circular order directing that the troops of his
army should move immediately toward Rome in four col
umns. This general indication was followed only by march
ing directions fr<5m Chattanooga to Lafayette, a small town
twenty-five miles a little east of south of Chattanooga, and
the point of junction of the main roads thence and from
Ringgold to the Coosa Valley and Rome. The corps of Polk
and Hill were to march via Rossville; the commands of
Buckner and Walker, with the supply trains, over a more
easterly route. The troops were to carry six days' rations,
and to include only ' ' fighting men. ' '

The dramatic first words of the order ("In order to meet
the enemy and strike him") may have been intended to

1863] WITHDRAWAL FROM CHATTANOOGA 89

counteract the demoralizing effect of retreat upon his troops,
or may have reflected the rebel commander's actual pur
pose. The naming of Rome as the army's destination and
the six days' rations would seem to confirm the former
theory, while his subsequent bold offensive corroborated the
latter. In his report of the Chickamauga campaign, he
asserts that he purposely accelerated the evacuation and the
first marches in order to deceive Rosecrans into the belief
that he was actually retreating as fast as he could, and thus
induce his adversary to press his columns on in pursuit
and " expose himself in detail," while he was really con
centrating against Rosecrans 's centre and determined to
avail of the first chance to attack. As the assertion is fully
borne out by his subsequent acts, he cannot well be denied
proper credit for successfully shifting his command so as
to protect his main line of supply, and, this being accom
plished, to seek rather than avoid his enemy. That his
purpose was to fight is also rendered more than probable
by the assurance he had obtained from Richmond of fur
ther heavy reinforcement by Longstreet's division of Lee's
army.

The withdrawal from Chattanooga was intended to begin
on the day the order for it was issued, but was postponed
till dark the next day. Hill's corps moved first over the
direct road to Lafayette, and was followed by Polk. Walker
preceded Buckner over the road to Ringgold. The columns
marched so quickly that on the evening of the 8th they were
in position in McLemore's Cove, between Lee and Gordon's
Mills, twelve miles from Chattanooga, and Lafayette, facing
the eastern slope of the Lookout Mountains, where they
remained to await and take advantage of Rosecrans 's move
ments. Bragg did not have to wait long for tempting
developments.

It was but natural and even justifiable that Rosecrans
should feel highly elated at the result of his strategy in
forcing Bragg to yield Chattanooga to him without a strug
gle. It may be freely admitted, too, that, but for the sub-

90 HENRY VILLARD [1863

sequent untoward turn of events, his flanking movement,
well conceived as it was, and carried out with extraordinary
energy in passing first over the mountainous country to
the north of Tennessee, then crossing the river, and next
overcoming the difficulties of two rugged ranges, all within
three weeks, would have ranked as one of the greatest
achievements of the Civil War. He claimed his success as
a great triumph in exultant language in his telegraphic re
port to the Government. He believed at first, as shown by
his own despatches and those of Assistant Secretary of War
Dana (who was with him from September 11) to the Gov
ernment, that Bragg was retreating south as fast as he
could by way of Rome. He was so far carried away that he
boldly boasted of having gained a position from which he
could effectually advance on Rome and Atlanta and deliver
there the finishing blows of the war. He even felt confident
of being able to intercept the enemy's retreat before he
reached Rome.

Acting upon these assumptions, he issued orders to all
the corps commanders to make vigorous pursuit. General
Crittenden had marched his corps around Lookout Moun
tain to Rossville, five miles from Chattanooga, and then
pushed on to Chattanooga with Wood's division on the 9th.
He was ordered to recall the remainder of his troops from
the north side, leave one brigade in the town, and follow
the enemy on the road to Ringgold. General Thomas was
directed to push over Pigeon Mountain by way of Dug Gap,
and make quickly for Lafayette. Neither he nor his su
perior was aware that this point was also the objective of
Bragg 's army. General McCook received, on the evening
of the 9th, from general headquarters, the news of the oc
cupation of Chattanooga, together with orders to move
rapidly upon Alpine and Summerville, so as to get upon
the enemy's line of retreat and strike him in the flank.

Strange as it may seem, for three whole days after the
occupation of Chattanooga, neither our General-in-chief
nor the commanders of the Fourteenth and Twentieth Army

1863] THOMAS ORDERED TO LAFAYETTE 91

Corps suspected that, instead of trying to elude their pur
suit, the rebel army was lying like a crouched lion in their
path, ready to spring with all its might upon the first hos
tile body coming within reach. The advance of Crittenden
caught up with rebel cavalry on the way to Ringgold and
had some lively skirmishes with them. But though his
mounted troops followed the enemy some distance beyond
the last-named town, they did not discover him in force.
The corps commander accepted their reports to this effect,
and informed General Garfield, as chief of staff of the
army, on the night of the llth, that "in his opinion the
enemy had fled beyond his reach, ' ' and that * ' his only hope,
or rather his great hope/' was "that General Thomas or
General McCook may be able to hit them a side lick."
Yet, when he sent this utterly erroneous conclusion, the bulk
of his corps was directly east and therefore in the rear of
Bragg, at a distance of not more than eight miles in an air
line from him, or, in other words, with Bragg 's army driven
in like a huge live wedge between him and the rest of our
troops. So absolute was Crittenden 's delusion that, a few
hours after he had sent his message to the chief of staff,
he despatched another report in which he expressed the
belief that, what with Thomas in the vicinity cf Lafayette,
and Wilder 's cavalry on the Ringgold road, "all the enemy
north of Lafayette would be effectually bagged."

General Thomas had been ordered to reach Lafayette
and connect with McCook on his right by September 10.
He tried his utmost to be there, but, most happily for the
Union cause, was two days behind time, owing to the un
expected difficulties of the roads. Had he managed to de
bouch earlier from the passes of Pigeon Mountain in the
order in which he marched, with one division after another,
he would have fallen prey piecemeal to the enemy. Even as
it was, he had a narrow escape from that fate. The divi
sion of General Negley was in the lead on the 10th, on the
march toward Dug Gap. On nearing it, he discovered
that the approach was obstructed by felled timBer and de-

92 HENRY VILLARD [1863

fended by rebel pickets. Reconnoissances and the state
ments of residents showing the rebel presence in strength
before him, he decided to stop at the mouth of the gorge
leading to the Gap till he was assured of support, in case
of need, from the rest of the corps. Baird's division came
up with his early on the llth. During the day it became
evident that heavy rebel columns were moving from the
north over Pigeon Mountain through Catlett's Gap and
from the south through Blue Bird Gap, obviously bent upon
an early attack upon our forces from both directions.

This surmise was entirely correct. During tlie 9th, Gen
eral Bragg had become aware that a Federal column, esti
mated by him as from 4000 to 8000 strong, had descended
from Lookout Mountain into McLemore's Cove. Seeing
his first chance to strike an isolated body, he issued orders
from Lee and Gordon's Mills just before midnight on the
same day to Hindman '& and Cleburne 's divisions to move at
once against the Federals in the Cove through Dug and
Catlett's Gaps. Hill, Cleburne 's corps commander, on re
ceiving the order, replied that it could not be carried out,
as General Cleburne was sick, four regiments of the divi
sion were on detached duty, and the two gaps were so
blocked that it would take twenty- four hours to clear them
for the passage of troops. Hindman moved promptly at
midnight, and reached the western foot of the mountain
through Worthen's Gap at daylight, having marched thir
teen miles. In view of Hill's reply, Bragg ordered Buck-
ner early on the 10th to follow and report to Hindman with
his two divisions, and, to make sure that the intended blow
would be quickly and vigorously struck, moved his head
quarters near the scene of action in the evening of that day.
He also ordered General Polk to move Cheatham's division
to the support of Hindman from Lafayette, required
Cleburne 's division to remove the obstructions at Dug and
Catlett's Gaps as speedily as possible and to join Hindman,
and finally directed Walker 's reserve to move up at once.

Thus Bragg left nothing undone to avail of his oppor-

1863] REBEL UNCERTAINTY 93

tunity to the utmost. His whole army was, in fact, con
verging upon Thomas's advance. There can be no doubt
that Negley 's division would have been doomed on the 10th,
when it was advancing alone, with Baird's half a day's
march in the rear, but for the obstructions in the Gap, for
Hindman was making for the junction of roads known as
Widow Davis 's Cross-roads, near which Negley had halted
on the 10th, and would have struck the latter 's rear had
he not felt in duty bound to await the approach of Cle-
burne's division. He stopped four miles from the cross
roads. He had moved so promptly that he failed to learn
Hill's reply, and was left to discover by his own scouting
parties in the blockaded gaps the clue to Cleburne's non-
appearance. A message from Hill reached him only late
in the day, giving the reasons already mentioned for Cle
burne's delay. Toward evening, General Buckner reported
to him with his two divisions, thereby giving the rebels three
divisions for an attack the next morning against our two.
Of this superiority they failed, however, to avail themselves.
Hindman had received another communication from Hill
during the afternoon, informing him that the Federals were
advancing upon Dug Gap in force, and that he, Hill,
thought that, if he was attacked, Hindman had a good
chance to assail them from the rear. This Hindman read
as directing him to attack after Hill had become engaged.
Feeling puzzled as to the proper course to pursue, he as
sembled his general officers late in the evening for a council
of war. During the meeting two communications from Gen
eral Bragg were received, one urging him to finish his al
lotted work in the Cove as rapidly as possible in view of
the advance of Crittenden's corps in their rear, and a later
one impressing upon him that their forces were superior to
the Federals and that it was of the highest importance to
move vigorously and crush them. Notwithstanding this,
the council voted to recommend the abandonment of the
attack upon the Federals in front of Hindman, and the
substitution for it of a concentrated move upon Crittenden.

94 HENRY VILLARD [1863

A letter to this effect was sent to the army commander by
a staff officer and reached him shortly before midnight.
Bragg questioned the officer as to the character of the in
formation that led Hindman and his generals to ask for
a modification of his orders. Finding that it was not posi
tive, he said that it amounted to nothing, and started the
officer back at once with an oral message that his plans
could not be changed and that his orders must be carried
out. Half an hour later, a formal order was despatched,
reaching Hindman at 4:20 A.M. on the llth, containing
these words : ' ' General Bragg orders you to attack and force
your way through the enemy to this point [Lafayette] at
the earliest hour that you can see him in the morning.
Cleburne will attack in front the moment your guns are
heard."

Hindman inferred from the order that the general com
manding looked upon his position as a perilous one, and ex
pected him no longer to capture the enemy, but to avoid
being captured himself. Being thus put on his guard, he
moved his command at 7 A.M. slowly and with great cau
tion. At about 11 A.M. he encountered the Federal skir
mishers, when he formed his line for attack. He had just
driven in the former when he received a despatch from
headquarters directing him, if he found the enemy too
strong for an attack, to fall back at once on Lafayette
through Catlett's Gap, which had been cleared of obstruc
tions, and requiring him to make his decision immediately.
He answered that he was not sufficiently informed as to the
enemy to decide upon his course, 15ut would retire if neces
sary. An hour later, a staff officer from headquarters ap
peared to inquire whether he felt certain that he could make
good his retreat through Catlett's Gap. He replied that
he had no doubt that he could do so in case he decided to
retire, but that he had ordered an advance. Soon after
ward another despatch from headquarters arrived, advising
him that a Federal force of from 12,000 to 15,000 was form
ing in front of Dug Gap, that the general commanding was

1863] REBEL MOVEMENTS AGAINST NEGLEY 95

most anxious and wished to hear from him by couriers once
an hour, and that despatch was necessary. How great
Bragg's anxiety was is also shown by a private note to
Hindman, dated 3 P.M., sent with this despatch and saying :
"Dear General: Time is precious. The enemy presses from
the north. We must unite or both must retire. The
enemy is in small force in line of battle in our front, and
we only wait for your attack. ' ' This record clearly demon
strates that, while Bragg was on the 9th and 10th and up
to the morning of the llth determined upon an attack, he
then became uncertain as to his proper course, and vacil
lated between advance and retreat. This was doubtless due
to the evidence that had reached him that the Federals
before him now numbered many more than two days be
fore, and also to the intelligence he had received of the ap
pearance of McCook's advance seven miles from Lafayette,
and of Crittenden 's movements in the rear. But it was only
natural that the commanding general's evident indecision
made Hindman hesitate, and, after consultation with the
generals under him, determine upon retreat. He had hardly
issued his order to fall back upon Catlett's Gap when re
ports of returning scouts that the enemy was retiring
reached him. He at once ordered his line to advance as rap
idly as possible in order to intercept the retreating enemy.
The pursuit was kept up till dark, when, at Davis 's Cross
roads, General Bragg, who had appeared upon the field in
person, ordered it to cease.

The rebel movements against Negley, of which he became
cognizant on the 10th and llth, as mentioned, were those
just described. He did not feel warranted in accepting
battle when he was threatened with attack from two direc
tions, and resolved to retrace his steps to a safer position
near Stevens 's Gap. Setting first his trains in motion,
he commenced falling back with his troops in the middle
of the afternoon. Skirmishing with Hindman 's pursuing
columns soon began, but the division was across the West

96 HENRY VILLARD [1863

Branch of the Chickamauga when the enemy appeared
in heavy force on the opposite bank. Negley tried to check
him from the north bank with ten guns, to which he replied
with two batteries. The rebel infantry deployed and ad
vanced against Negley 's left, and was soon heavily engaged.
By skilful manreuvring, the incipient attack was, how
ever, foiled, and the retreat continued in good order, though
at first it had to be made step by step and in constant
conflict with the enemy; and the base of Lookout Moun
tain was reached in safety by the two divisions. It was
altogether a lucky escape, for our strength did not exceed
9000, while the pursuing enemy numbered, according to
the rebel records, over 15,000.

General McCook had made discoveries by his reconnois-
sances that left him no choice but to take the responsibility
of not obeying his orders to advance rapidly to Summer-
ville. The information brought in by his cavalry was so
positive as to leave no doubt in his mind that the bulk of
the rebel army was not retreating, but concentrating be
tween him and the other corps. He wisely stopped his
command for this and the additional reason that he failed
to discover any signs of the approach of General Thomas's
corps, which, as already stated, was to be at Lafayette and
connect with his left on the 10th. McCook unquestionably
did right in not running the risk of getting involved in an
unequal contest with the enemy without being assured of
support. He accordingly remained stationary, except that
he cautiously moved his trains back to a safer position. He
received an explanation of the delay of the Fourteenth
Corps en route late in the evening of the llth from General
Thomas, indicating his purpose to continue his march to
Lafayette, which he expected to reach on the 12th.

General Rosecrans clung to the illusion that Bragg was
in full retreat and bent upon flight and not upon fight,
until the reports of McCook 's discoveries and Negley 's ex
periences opened his eyes as to the real situation on the

1863] ROSECRANS UNDECEIVED 97

llth. As late as the 10th, he chided Thomas for not having
reached Lafayette more promptly, and later on expressed
doubt as to the necessity of Negley's retreat. The awaken
ing was naturally a rude one. There was his army divided
in three parts, more than a good day's march even in an air
line from each other, and this distance was practically much
increased by the difficult character of the intervening
ground and of the means of communication. There were
actually several chains of hills between Crittenden and
Thomas, and Lookout Mountain between Thomas and Mc-
Cook. The Commander-in-chief must have confessed to
himself that, with the rebel army concentrated against him,
as it appeared to be, he had himself created the opportunity
for his adversary to overwhelm him in detail. It must have
been clear to him, also, that the separation of his army ren
dered a rapid retrograde movement upon the only avail
able common point— Chattanooga— out of the question.
There was, indeed, no other course left to him than the
quickest possible concentration of his command in a good
position for offence or defence, which would secure him like
wise a good line of retreat to Chattanooga. He resolved
upon this at once when the truth had dawned upon him
that Bragg was before him on both slopes of Pigeon Moun
tain, and immediately took energetic steps to bring the
concentration about. He would hardly have succeeded
but for misunderstandings and accidents on the rebel side,
already partly related, which came to his rescue and en
abled him to accomplish what he himself in his official report
called a matter of "life and death."

At midnight on September 12, General McCook received
orders from army headquarters, through General Thomas,
to move with the utmost expedition to his support, after
taking proper measures for the safety of his trains. The
corps was in motion at daylight on the 13th. McCook first
intended to march by the direct road to Dougherty's Gap
and through it into McLemore's Cove, and expected to be
himself with Thomas on the night of the same day. But,

98 HENRY VILLARD [1863

when he learned on the way that the road beyond the Gap
was not practicable, and received information during the
day from headquarters indicating the presence of the enemy
in the Cove, he decided to change his route. He asked and
received the advice of General Thomas regarding it, and
adopted one that required crossing Lookout Mountain into
Lookout Valley, a march down it to the road to Stevens 's
Gap, and then up the Mountain again and through the
Gap to the other side. While an air-line from Alpine to
Thomas's position would not exceed twenty-five miles, by
his roundabout route McCook marched nearly sixty miles.
Instead of joining Thomas within a day or two, it was actu
ally five days before he came in touch with him. Having
reported his change of route to army headquarters, he was
peremptorily ordered to turn back, against which he an
grily remonstrated, and was permitted to keep on; but
neither General Rosecrans nor his chief of staff, Garfield,
was ever fully satisfied that he had not wasted several days '
time, and exposed the other two corps to the danger of
being attacked singly on the east side of Lookout Mountain
while he was following the west side. The point in dispute
has never been fully cleared up, but my opinion has always
been that McCook acted properly in the light of his in
formation and instructions. It cannot be denied, however,
that the loss of three days by him delayed the execution of
the concentrating movement correspondingly, and might
have proved fatal.

General Hindman states in his official report that, when
he reported in person soon after dark on the llth at Davis 's
Cross-roads to General Bragg, the latter said to him at once,
"We can't stay here," and immediately ordered the whole
force to make a night march to Lafayette, which was done,
Buckner's division going by Dug Gap and the remainder
of the army by Catlett's Gap. It seems to have puzzled
the generals under him that he should have abandoned the
advance when the several divisions were at last united for it.
Bragg affirmed that, having become satisfied of the failure

1863] BRAGGPS ORDERS TO POLK 99

of Hindman,1 the new movement was directed by him with
a view to falling upon the separate Federal force moving
via Ringgold. In pursuance of this new purpose, General
Folk's and Walker's corps moved on the following day from
Lafayette in the direction of Lee and Gordon's Mills.
Bragg received a report during the day from his cavalry
under Pegram that a Federal division was marching by
itself up the Pea Vine Creek valley. He informed General
Polk of this in a note dated 6 P.M., September 12, and
added : * ' This presents you a fine opportunity for striking
Crittenden in detail, and I hope you will avail yourself of
it at daylight to-morrow. This division crushed, and the
others are yours. We can then turn again on the force
in the Cove. I shall be delighted to hear of your success. ' '
Bragg followed this communication at 8 P.M. with a positive
order worded thus by his adjutant-general: "I now give
you the orders of the Commanding General, viz., to attack
at day-dawn to-morrow. The infantry column to be at
tacked is reported at three-quarters of a mile beyond Pea
Vine Church on the road to Graysville from Lafayette."
At 11 P.M. a disappointing reply came from Polk, stating
that he had taken a strong position for defence, and request
ing heavy reinforcements. Bragg answered that he must
not defer the ordered attack, that he was already stronger
than the enemy, that success depended on the rapidity of
his movements, and that Buckner's command would be in
supporting distance of him the next morning. Bragg re
inforced this prod by another at 12:30 A.M. on the 13th, as
follows: "The enemy is approaching from the south, and it
is highly important that your attack in the morning should
be quick and decided. Let no time be lost." He relates
further in his report that, when he reached the front in

1 Bragg subsequently preferred asked for a court of inquiry, but the

charges against Hindman and re- difficulty was settled in the end by

lieved him from command for "dis- the intervention of the President

obedience of the lawful command of the Confederacy,
of his superior officer," Hindman

100 HENRY VILLARD [1863

the morning of the 13th, he found that Polk had not ad
vanced against the enemy, and that i l the latter 's forces had
formed a junction and recrossed the Chickamauga. " His
language clearly conveys the impression that, but for Polk 's
remissness, the intended attack on part of Crittenden's
corps would have been made. It appears, however, from
Polk's report to army headquarters, dated September 12,
8 P.M., that Bragg did him injustice. Polk reached the
ground in good season, but the information he collected
after his arrival led him to believe that not one of Critten
den's divisions, but all three, were in front of him and
advancing "with steady step upon my position, and will
no doubt attack early in the morning ' ' ; hence he considered
it his duty to ask "most respectfully and urgently" for
reinforcements. Polk added : ' ' My troops I cannot get into
position in time to attack, myself, at so early an hour as
day-dawn. If I find he is not going to attack me, I will
attack him without delay."

The truth was, however, that while Bragg 's information,
on which he based his order to Polk to attack the one divi
sion of Crittenden's corps, was reliable, Polk's assumption
that three divisions were before him was also well founded.
General Barker's brigade of Wood's division, forming the
rear of the corps, had been ordered by Crittenden early on
the llth to make a reconnoissance from Rossville to Lee
and Gordon's Mills. Early in the afternoon Wood was
ordered to move at once to the support of Harker with his
other brigade (his third had been left at Chattanooga),
which he did. It was the movement of these two brigades
that was reported to Bragg. But when General Rosecrans
perceived that his salvation lay in the immediate concen
tration of his army, he sent, simultaneously with his orders
to McCook to join Thomas, directions to Crittenden to move
also towards the latter by marching his whole corps "by
the most available route," and as quickly as possible, to the
road from Rossville to Lafayette that Wood had followed,
and to close up with the latter. Crittenden marched

1863] POLK CAUTIOUS 101

promptly early the next morning, and, on the evening of
the 12th, his three divisions were in exactly the positions in
which Polk reported them to be to Bragg. But Polk was
mistaken in assuming that Crittenden was steadily advanc
ing on him and would attack early in the morning. Crit
tenden of his own accord did what Polk had done before
him, on the morning of the 13th, by taking up a good de
fensive position, and had no more thought of attacking than
the bishop-general opposed to him had before receiving re
inforcements. There was, however, this great difference
between them, that the rebel commander acted cautiously
because of his knowledge of the presence of the enemy in
force before him, while the Federal general stood on the
defensive from utter ignorance of the rebel whereabouts.
Crittenden not only knew nothing of Folk's advance upon
him, but had not yet divested his mind of the belief that
the enemy was continuing his retreat towards Rome, and
persisted in expressing it to the army headquarters, even
after reaching Lee and Gordon's Mills. The chief of staff
found himself obliged, indeed, to tell him, in a despatch
dated September 12, 9:30 P.M.: " There is no longer any
doubt that the enemy is in heavy force in the neighborhood
of Lafayette, and there is far more probability of his at
tacking you than that he is running. Get your command
well in hand, and be ready for defense or advance as may
be necessary." Yet, just before receiving this emphatic re
buke of his credulity, Crittenden had, in a report dated
9 :45 P.M., reiterated his disbelief in these words : "I do not
yet believe that there is a strong force of infantry in the
vicinity of Lafayette." This town is twelve miles from
Lee and Gordon 's Mills, so that, while he would not be per
suaded that the enemy was within that long distance, Polk
was really no further than two or three miles from him.

According to the official rebel story, Bragg, on reaching
Folk's front on the morning of the 13th, accepted the lat
ter 's conclusion that Crittenden 's whole corps was united
before them, and decided to concentrate all his forces along

102 HENRY VILLARD [1863

the West Chickamauga Creek for an offensive flanking
movement. This was done between the 13th and the 17th,
and on the latter day the rebel line was fully formed and
extended up the eastern bank of the Creek from Reed's
Bridge to some distance above Lee and Gordon's Mills.
General Bushrod R. Johnson, with six brigades, of which
five were reinforcements just arrived by rail, formed his
right; next came Walker's corps, opposite Alexander's
Bridge; then Buckner's, near Tedford's Fork, followed
by Folk's opposite Lee and Gordon's Mills, with Hill's on
the extreme left. General Wheeler, with two divisions of
cavalry, protected the left ; General Forrest, with two other
mounted divisions, the right and front. Both of these
leaders had achieved equal success and renown as cavalry
commanders.

On September 16, Bragg issued a characteristic "Gen
eral Order," in part to this effect: "The troops will be
held ready for an immediate move against the enemy. His
demonstration on our flank has been thwarted, and twice
has he retired before us when offered battle. We must now
force him to the issue. Soldiers, you are largely reinforced.
You must now seek the contest. In so doing I know you
will be content to suffer privations and encounter hard
ships." It cannot be said that Bragg overstated the case
in claiming that Rosecrans's flanking movement had been
thwarted, and that he had twice declined the offer of battle,
for our efforts to concentrate meant, of course, an abandon
ment of the flanking operations, and the retreat of Negley
could be taken as one declination to fight, while Bragg 's
boast of another was occasioned by Crittenden 's next move
ment away from Folk's front, of which I will speak directly.

On the night of September 17, Bragg issued his "order
of battle." His plan of attack was just the reverse of
that in the battle of Stone's River. His line, beginning on
the right and with the centre as a pivot, was to execute a
"grand wheel" across the Chickamauga and thence up its
west bank. Our line was to be rolled up from left to right,

1863] BRAGG'S ORDER OF BATTLE 103

forced from the roads to Chattanooga, and driven up Mc-
Lemore's Cove against Lookout Mountain, and thus de
stroyed or dispersed. As the order prescribed in detail:
Johnson to cross at or near Reed's Bridge and turn to the
left up the stream toward Lee and Gordon 's Mills ; Walker
to cross at Alexander's Bridge and join in this move; Buck-
ner to cross at Tedford's Fork and join Walker to the
left and press the enemy up the stream from Folk's front;
Polk to push his troops to the front of Lee and Gordon's
Mills and unite in the attack wherever the enemy may be ;
Hill to cover the left flank, and, in case the enemy should
He developing his main strength at the Mills, to attack him
in the flank; Wheeler's cavalry to hold the gaps of Pigeon
Mountain and cover the rear. The order closed: "These
movements will be executed with the utmost promptness,
vigor, and persistence."

Crittenden had hardly got his corps into a favorable posi
tion on the 13th when he received orders, dated 12 : 20 P.M.,
to post Wood's division in a strong defensible position at
Lee and Gordon 's Mills, in which it could resist stoutly any
attempt of the enemy to seize the Chattanooga road; to
move his other two divisions during the evening and
night to a position on Missionary Ridge, so as to cover the
roads in both the valley of Chattanooga Creek and Chick-
amauga Creek ; and to send Wilder 's cavalry brigade up the
former stream to join General Thomas as soon as possible.
Another order, dated five minutes later and not very clearly
expressed, was understood by Crittenden to require him
merely to hold himself in readiness to execute the new move
ment, so that it was only begun early the next morning on
receipt of another order to start promptly. His troops
reached the new position on the Ridge in a few hours'
march, and he rode in advance of them to reconnoitre. At
12 : 30 P.M., he reported to the army headquarters as the re
sult that he was confident no considerable force of the
enemy was in his front for five miles. He added, that no
water had been found on the Ridge, and that hence he

104 HENRY VILLARD [1863

could not remain and would have to descend into the valley
or return to his former position. He was directed conse
quently, late in the evening, to move his corps back to a
good position for water along the Chickamauga from Owen's
Ford to Gower's, which he did the next morning. In this
position the corps remained quietly during the 15th and
16th. Crittenden certainly had not the remotest conception
that a battle-cloud was gathering near him and about to
burst until it was indicated to him by an order, received
at 9 : 30 P.M. on the 16th, to issue to his command three days'
rations in haversacks, and twenty rounds for the pockets of
each man, in addition to full cartridge-boxes.

At the time last named, McCook had not yet connected
with Thomas, who remained stationary about Stevens
Gap awaiting his approach, and Crittenden communicated
with the Fourteenth Corps only by his cavalry. Even
when the Twentieth Corps had finally come within support
ing distance of the Fourteenth on September 17, the line
of the Twenty-first Corps was not in contact with Thomas
as the centre. Thus, if Bragg had been able to execute the
attack ordered by him for early morning on the 18th, the
Army of the Cumberland would have been struck while
still divided, and would probably have suffered a much
worse fate than actually befell it. Crittenden would doubt
less have been overwhelmed, and the rear of Rosecrans and
the roads from his position to Chattanooga gained. But,
as the rebel commander relates: "The resistance of the
enemy's cavalry and the difficulties arising from the bad
and narrow country roads caused unexpected delay in the
execution of my orders." In fact, a whole day was lost
by him, and the onset upon the Federals, intended for the
18th, did not begin until the following day.

There is no evidence on record that General Rosecrans
began to perceive Bragg 's real purpose against his left
before the night of the 15th to 16th. He was aware on
the 14th that the rebels had abandoned the valley between
Lookout and Pigeon Mountains, and he had also learned

1863] THOMAS IN NEW POSITION 105

of strong indications of their withdrawal from Lafayette,
but nothing was known at the army headquarters of the
direction in which the bulk of their forces had subsequently
moved. Their drift down the Chickamauga towards our
left, however, was sufficiently recognized, by the time
named, to produce an order dated September 16, 8:05 A.M.,
which showed that Rosecrans was then roused to the great
gravity of the situation. This, summarily stated, was
that the enemy with his whole army was practically half a
day's march nearer to Chattanooga than himself, and
had to push only a few miles to the eastward to get
between him and the town. The order required Thomas
to concentrate his corps, provided with three days' rations
and extra ammunition, between Gower's and Bird's Mills,
so as to command the Chattanooga Road, and "to do it
to-day and as secretly as possible." This meant a move
ment to the left down the Chickamauga so as to bring his
corps close to Crittenden's right. Thomas received the or
der at 3:30 P.M., but failed to comprehend its urgency—
probably because he was not informed of the enemy's de
signs — and considered it unwise to leave his position before
the arrival of McCook; hence he answered: " General
McCook's troops have not yet arrived. I will send Baird's
and Negley's divisions to take position to-morrow morn
ing, and Reynolds 's and Brannan's the day following."
To this came response from the chief of staff, dated 8 : 45
P.M. : ' ' The General Commanding fears that the movement
will be too late if delayed till the time you mention. The
enemy seems to be massing on our left, and the General
Commanding desires that our flank movement to the left
may be accomplished as soon as possible." With this ex
change of despatches the day went by, and General Thomas
did not get under way before the morning of the 17th, but
was in the new position by evening, with his left connecting
with the Twenty-first Corps at Owen's Ford.

It has already been mentioned that the Twentieth Corps
did not effect contact with Thomas until the 17th, when

106 HENEY VILLARD [1863

the latter was already in motion down the Chiekamauga.
General McCook himself, however, was already at the foot
of Stevens Gap on the evening of the 16th, when he re
ported the whereabouts of his divisions to the general head
quarters. He was as ignorant as the other corps com
manders of the doings of the enemy. Indeed, in a despatch
to General Thomas dated September 16, 3:15 P.M., he ex
pressed the opinion that the rebel forces were at Lafayette,
''except Loring's division, which went to Charleston," and
that he did not think they would fight there, "as they
could find much better places further to their rear." It
may be easily imagined, therefore, how surprised he must
have been when he received, soon after, an order from Gen
eral Rosecrans to issue three days' rations and extra am
munition to his men, and to mass his corps at once between
Pond Spring and Gower— that is, to move also to the left,
following Thomas, and connect with him at the last-men
tioned point, and to send his trains down Chattanooga
Creek. He sent corresponding orders to his three divisions,
of which Sheridan's reached the foot of Stevens Gap
in the evening, and Davis 's at noon and Johnson's in the
afternoon of the next day. Starting them as soon as pos
sible to his new destination, he soon found himself ob
structed by Thomas's troops moving in advance of him on
the same road, and asked for a modification of his orders,
which he received, with directions to take position to the
right and left of Pond Spring. This he did early on the
18th, making connection with Thomas's right.

The Army of the Cumberland was now extricated from
the peril involved in the isolation of the several corps which
had hung over it for a week. But, although the three corps
were at last in supporting distance of each other, the army
was not yet secure against being cut off from Chattanooga
by the flanking movement of the enemy. Evidence of the
rebel preparations for an attack en masse against our left
accumulated on the 18th, and made Rosecrans alive to the
necessity of another rapid counter-concentration. The very

1863] ROSECRANS'S BOLD MANOEUVRE 107

great urgency of the situation made him resolve upon a
bold and almost desperate manoeuvre in order to meet the
apparent overreaching of our extreme left (Wood's divi
sion) by the enemy, viz., the withdrawing of Thomas's
corps from the centre and moving it during the evening and
night by the rear of Crittenden's corps to its left, and
simultaneously shifting McCook's corps to the position va
cated by Thomas. The great risk lay in breaking and en
tirely reversing our line in the face of the enemy, whose
onslaught might be expected any moment. The shift was
accomplished not entirely, but sufficiently, as events proved,
to save the Army of the Cumberland from destruction.
Thomas was under way by 4 P.M., and kept in motion all
night. His columns had a most toilsome task in finding
their way in the dark over narrow cross-roads and through
the woods; and although the distance traversed was only
between four and five miles, the head, Baird's division,
reached its destination at " Kelly's Farm " on Crittenden's
left only at daylight on the 19th. This was the very posi
tion whose valiant defence by Thomas and his troops dur
ing the impending battle was destined to prevent the utter
rout of all of Rosecrans's forces.

Me Cook received his orders to move to the position va
cated by Thomas shortly after midnight, and marched
at early dawn, with Johnson 's division in the lead, followed
by Davis 's and Sheridan's. He himself reported in person
between eight and nine to the Commander-in-chief at Craw
fish Springs (about a mile southeast of Lee and Gordon's
Mills) , and was ordered by him to mass his corps about that
point and await further instructions, which was done. Crit
tenden's corps lay still on the 17th, except that he moved
Palmer's division to the left in order to make room for one
of Thomas's then approaching.

Between 10 A.M. and noon on the 18th, General Wood
sent in several reports that the enemy was advancing on
both his left and right, and asked for reinforcement by a
brigade. But no collision came from this move on the part

108 HENRY VILLARD [1863

of the rebels, which was apparently intended simply to
secure a new position, but led to a change of Crittenden 's
line by shifting Van Cleve's division from the right to the
left of Wood's, and of Palmer's to replace Van Cleve's.
This extension of our left, Crittenden made on his own
responsibility. It anticipated to that extent Thomas 's night
move to the left. It seems almost incredible, but Crittenden
says distinctly, in his official report, that he heard of
Thomas's march by his rear accidentally the next morning,
implying that he had not received any official advice of it.
Thus the hostile hosts became arrayed against each other
for the terrible struggle into which they were about to
plunge. Rosecrans tried his utmost to get ready for it, but
was not, as his new line was still forming when the fighting
began. He had been forced to exchange the confident part
of victory and pursuit for that of an anxious defensive.
He was not only anxious, but was actually apprehensive
of failure, as is shown by his orders anticipatory of a pos
sible defeat. And well he might be, in view of the positive
information that had reached him, in the last few days,
of the heavy reinforcements sent to Bragg from the West
as well as from Lee's army. He knew, too, that, although
orders had been sent from Washington in the light of those
facts to Generals Grant, Hurlbut, and Burnside to send
him all the troops they could possibly spare, help from any
quarter could not arrive in time. Here these singular
circumstances may be recorded: First, General-in-chief
Halleck was under the delusion, almost to the middle of
the month, that, instead of Bragg being reinforced from
Lee, the reverse was the case. His belief was based upon
misleading rebel newspaper reports, the surrender of Chat
tanooga without a fight, and upon Rosecrans 's positive
reports that Bragg was in full retreat southwardly. Sec
ondly, Burnside, though repeatedly directed from Wash
ington and requested by Rosecrans, after the occupation
of Chattanooga, to close up with him, had made no serious
efforts to that effect. He excused himself by Rosecrans 's

1863] RESPECTIVE FOECES 109

advices that Bragg was in full retreat, which seemed to him
to render haste unnecessary.

No proof exists that Bragg knew, before the battle, of
the desperate effort made by Rosecrans to thwart him by
massing his forces on the left, but it is not probable that
such knowledge would have made him hesitate to offer
battle ; for, as is shown in the exhortation addressed to his
army, he must have been inspired with faith in success by
the reinforcements of his command already received and
about to arrive. There is a riddle, however, in this con
nection which the rebel records fail to clear up. While,
according to Bragg 's report of the battle, a considerable
body had joined him some days before, Longstreet's corps
was still on the way to him when he decided to attack on
the 18th, and could not reach the field in time to support
him. How did it happen that he deliberately did not wait
for the advent of the flower of Lee's army, sent to him
especially to ensure a victory over Rosecrans? Had he
fought on the 18th, Longstreet would have been too late
for any share in the action. As it was, he arrived only in
time to contribute to the rebel success on the second day.
No light has ever been thrown on Bragg 's motive.

The battle about to be fought forms no exception to the
all but general rule that, in the great actions of the Civil
War, the losing as well as the winning side claimed that it
had to contend against far superior numbers. Yet, as will
be seen from the following comparison, the contestants in
this struggle were almost evenly matched, there being but
a slight numerical superiority on the Union side. Accord
ing to the tri-monthly return of the Army of the Cumber
land of September 10, the Fourteenth Army Corps had then
present for duty 22,781 officers and men, the Twentieth
13,156, and the Twenty-first 14,660, making a total of
50,597 infantry and artillery. This aggregate was reduced
by about ten per cent, by the disabled and stragglers lost
during the continuous and hard marching between the 10th
and the 19th, thus leaving (say) about 45,000 effectives,

110 HENRY VILLARD [1863

less about 2000 on escort and other detached duties. There
was also the cavalry corps, with 9676 officers and men ; but,
owing to the broken and thickly wooded character of the
scene of action, the mounted troops did only desultory fight
ing on a part of the front and on the wings, and may well
be excluded, therefore, from the number of participants
in the main action. The reserve corps under General
Granger did not come into action until late on the second
day, with the exception of one brigade under Colonel
Daniel McCook, whose presence was, however, more than
offset by the absence of Wagner's brigade of the Twenty-
first Corps, garrisoning Chattanooga, and of one of Davis 's
brigades of the Twentieth Corps left to guard Stevens Gap.
Hence it is right to say that there were about 43,000 com
batants, exclusive of cavalry, on the Union side, with 196
pieces of artillery.

Bragg had 35,000 effectives, exclusive of cavalry, when
he marched away from Chattanooga, from which five per
cent, may be deducted for decrease from sickness and strag
gling (the rebels having been campaigning only half as long
as the Unionists) . He admits having been strengthened in
time for the battle by two brigades of foot from Mississippi
and five brigades of Longstreet's corps, which he, how
ever, describes as weak and not exceeding five thousand
effectives. But the seven brigades numbered certainly not
less than 8000, bringing the effectives up to something under
42,000. This total is borne out by the aggregates of officers
and men engaged given in the reports of the corps and
division commanders, which foot up exactly 41,700 infantry
and artillery. The rebel cavalry was stronger than the
Federal, but its part also was confined to small and scatter
ing fights, excepting the attack, hereafter mentioned, by
Forrest's corps at the opening of the battle on the first day.
The artillery numbered about the same as the Unionists*.

In another respect than numbers, about equal conditions
prevailed on both sides. Neither the Unionists nor the
Confederates were in fresh condition. The officers and men

1863J THE BATTLE-GROUND 111

in the two armies, from the generals in command down
to the privates, were tired out by all but continuous march
ing by day and night. The former had been steadily on
the move for nearly five weeks, the latter since the evacua
tion of Chattanooga. The last week, neither the one nor the
other had had proper rest or regular nourishment. For
days before the battle, the bulk of the troops on each side
had not had cooked meals. There was much suffering, not
only from hunger, but from thirst, owing to the scarcity
of water on the ridges between the several streams. The
animals, too, had fared very badly as to food and water.
The long lack of rain in that region had caused such dry-
ness that the movements of the masses of men and animals
took place in suffocating clouds of dust, which greatly in
creased their hardships. By the dust rising from the roads,
the signal services of the two armies divined their respec
tive movements. The Union forces, having been longer un
der way by three weeks, were naturally more exhausted
than their enemies. As nearly the whole of them were
in motion during the entire night of the 18th to the 19th,
they were really unfit for a general action. The Con
federates were at least lying still during that night, and
hence were better prepared for their bloody task.

It is difficult to give a description of the ground fought
over on the memorable 19th and 20th of September that
will convey a clear idea of it. It lay entirely on Georgia
soil just south of the Tennessee boundary. It comprised
the part of the valley of the West Chickamauga extending
northerly from Lee and Gordon's Mills for a distance
of a little over four miles. The course of the stream is
so meandering that the width of the valley varies greatly
and its form is very irregular. The surface is undulating,
and was then generally covered with heavy timber, and
largely also with an undergrowth so dense that a clear
view ahead could be had only for a hundred to two hundred
feet. The timber entirely concealed the movements of the
hostile forces from one another. There were, however,

112 HENRY VILLARD [1863

a number of farms with clearings and cultivated fields of
greater or less extent. General Thomas took position on
the largest of these at Kelly's, three and a half miles from
Lee and Gordon's Mills and about two miles from the
Chickamauga. The road from Lafayette to Chattanooga,
the possession of which was the object of the struggle,
crossed the whole length of the battle-field due north and
south from Kelly's to Lee and Gordon's Mills. The road
ran along the eastern foot of Missionary Ridge, but between
it and the slope there was first a narrow skirt of timber,
stretching from " Widow Glenn's Farm," one and a half
miles north of Lee and Gordon's Mills, for nearly three
miles to McDonald's, about three-quarters of a mile north
of Kelly's. Beyond this strip, and parallel to it, there
was a succession of cultivated clearings. The reason for
taking the Unionist position between the State road and the
Chickamauga instead of along the stream itself was the
winding flow and numerous fords, which rendered it im
possible to form any defensive line on the bank not ex
posed to flank and rear attacks.

CHAPTER XXIX

THE BATTLE OF THE FIRST DAY.— 1863

GENERAL THOMAS had just succeeded in placing his
leading divisions under Baird and Brannan in posi
tion early on the morning of September 19 when Colonel
Daniel McCook, commanding the brigade of the reserve
corps that had been serving on the front for some days,
reported to him that he had discovered during the night
an isolated rebel brigade on the west bank near Reed's
Bridge, and that it could be cut off and captured, as he
had destroyed that bridge behind it. Thereupon Gen
eral Thomas ordered General Brannan to try and capture
the rebel body. Brannan proceeded to carry out the order
at once, and, by nine o'clock, his second brigade had taken
one road to Reed's Bridge, and the third brigade another
running a short distance to the north from McDonald's
house in the same direction, so as to catch the rebels be
tween them. The two brigades were followed by the first
as support. The second brigade, after advancing three-
quarters of a mile and driving the hostile skirmishers be
fore them, was brought to bay and vigorously attacked at
about 10 A.M. by a large body. It was part of Forrest's
cavalry corps fighting as infantry under his own command.
A severe conflict ensued, in which two regimental com
manders fell, but, being reinforced by a regiment, the
brigade managed to hold its ground for a time. The third
brigade, after marching about a mile and a half towards
the stream, also struck the dismounted rebels, who opened
upon it a heavy fire of musketry and artillery at short
range ; but it pushed on and pressed them back to within a
8 113

114 HENRY VILLARD [1863

short distance of the creek. These two collisions ushered in
the two days' battle. General Thomas certainly had no
intention of provoking the conflict, and would of course
not have undertaken the venture with Brannan's division
had he not been utterly ignorant of the forming of the rebel
line for a general attack directly before him.

General Bragg, who was much disappointed that his
army did not succeed in crossing the Chickamauga in time
to attack on the 18th, insinuates in his report that General
Bushrod Johnson, commanding on his right, might have
moved quicker, and that he felt relieved when General
Hood arrived on the field direct from Richmond with his
division, and replaced Johnson as the ranking officer. The
rebel right managed to cross the stream by 4 P.M. at Reed's
Bridge, after a skirmish for its possession with Minty's
cavalry brigade, and at a ford above, and advanced to
Jay's Saw-mill, three-quarters of a mile to the west in line
of battle, and thence turned southwardly for two and a
half miles past Alexander's Bridge to within less than two
miles of Lee and Gordon's Mills, where, after dark, the
head of their column struck the Federal skirmishers. Hood
formed a line facing southwest, and remained in this posi
tion all night with his troops resting on their arms. Hood
had, unknown to himself and his adversaries, passed along
most of the Federal front. Only Walker's Confederate
reserve corps got across the Chickamauga on the 18th in
addition to Hood. It found Alexander's Bridge defended
by Wilder 's mounted brigade, which yielded it only after
a stubborn fight and dismantled the structure under fire.
Walker's command crossed after dark at Byram's Ford
below the bridge, and bivouacked for the night a mile to
the west of it. There is no doubt that the rebel body seen
by Colonel Daniel McCook was part of Hood's command,
but it had passed from Thomas 's front, and the force which
Brannan's brigades encountered belonged to Walker's re
serve corps. Hood having cleared the way for their unob
structed passage, Buckner's force and Cheatham's division

1863] FEDERAL ROUT 115

passed the stream at daylight on the 19th. By nine o'clock,
the rebel line was re-formed with Walker on the right, Hood
in the centre, and Buckner on the left, about one mile below
Lee and Gordon's Mills, with Cheatham's division in re
serve. Polk, with another division of his corps, and Hill's
whole corps, were kept on the east bank until later in the
day.

When Forrest found himself pushed back by Brannan's
brigades, he sent for infantry support, and Wilson's bri
gade of Gist's division of Walker's reserve corps went first
to his aid, followed soon by Ector's of the same division.
Thus strengthened, Forrest took the offensive against
Brannan, and pressed his right so hard that he sent ''re
peated and earnest requests" to General Thomas for rein
forcements. The corps commander at once ordered Baird's
division to his relief. Baird formed on Brannan's right and
moved vigorously upon the enemy, forcing him back three-
quarters of a mile. The enemy having disappeared from
his front, he stopped to readjust his line to Brannan's.
While so doing, he was suddenly set upon by a large body
of rebels, which overwhelmed and drove back in utter con
fusion first Scribner's brigade, and next the brigade of
regular troops under General King, upon and through the
centre of Brannan, thereby exposing both of the latter 's
flanks. It was a complete rout, of which Baird said in his
report that ' ' entire destruction seemed inevitable, " ' ' whole
battalions were wiped out of existence," and "the men
could only be stopped after they had passed far to the
rear." The rebels captured 23 commissioned officers, more
than 400 rank and file, and the two brigade batteries. Bat
tery H of the Fifth U. S. Artillery had more than half of its
officers and men killed and wounded, and forty horses killed
and twenty wounded. This rout was inflicted by the two
brigades of Liddell's division of Walker's reserve corps
coming to the succor of Gist's brigades, which had yielded
to Baird's -onset. At this critical juncture, greater dis
aster was fortunately averted by the appearance of John-

116 HENRY VILLARD [1863

son 's division of McCook 's corps, which had been prudently
ordered to the support of General Thomas by General Rose-
crans when the firing on the left indicated the development
of a general engagement. The division formed at once on
Thomas's left with Willich's brigade on the right, Baldwin's
on the left, and Dodge 's in reserve, advanced, and, striking
the rebels in the flank, drove them in disorder for a mile
towards the Chickamauga. Willich captured five guns in
a bayonet charge. Meantime, Brannan had managed to stop
and break the onset of Liddell's division by a counter
attack with his first and third brigades, in which the Ger
man Ninth Ohio Regiment— the same that decided the
battle of Mill Spring— recaptured at the point of the
bayonet the battery taken from the regulars.

General Crittenden, being satisfied from the roar of battle
that Thomas was getting heavily engaged, had of his own
accord ordered Palmer's division to the assistance of the
Fourteenth Corps between eleven o'clock and noon. It
reached the front at about the same time as Johnson 's, and,
forming on the latter 's right, advanced upon the enemy
in echeloned columns of brigades. It became directly en
gaged, and, after a hot exchange of fire for an hour, the
enemy yielded ground and was pursued for some distance.
General Reynolds, with the second and third brigades of
the fourth division of the Fourteenth Corps— the first be
ing mounted and detached under command of Colonel
Wilder— reached the field behind Johnson's division. His
command did not join in the fight as a unit, but served to
support and relieve, in parts of brigades, the left of John
son and the right of Palmer, whose experiences they shared.

At half-past eleven, General Crittenden received a note
from General Thomas, saying that, if he could spare an
other division, it should be sent to him without delay. A
very heavy musketry fire then bursting out in the direction
in which Palmer was moving, the corps commander sent
two of his staff to the latter to ascertain the state of the
fight. They soon returned, reporting that they had not been

1863] GENERAL ENGAGEMENT 117

able to reach Palmer, being stopped and fired at by the
enemy. This led Crittenden to fear that his second divi
sion was being attacked from both front and rear,
and to send hastily to the army headquarters for permis
sion to order Van Cleve 's to its relief, which was readily
granted. Anticipating the approval of the Commander-
in-chief, orders to hurry forward were sent simultaneously
to Van Cleve, who started at 1 P.M. with two brigades at
the double-quick, leaving one to guard the crossing at Lee
and Gordon's Mills. He reached the scene of action before
2, formed on Palmer's right, and became at once severely
engaged. Before hearing of Van Cleve 's movement, Gen
eral Rosecrans had ordered Davis 's division of McCook's
corps to the front, where it arrived about the same time
as Van Cleve 's division. It took position alongside on the
extreme right and came likewise at once under fire.

This narrative shows that the beginning of the action
was as accidental as the subsequent course of the battle.
Kosecrans, not being ready to fight, had not formed a plan
for it. Bragg operated under a preconceived programme,
which was upset by the incidents related. From the initial
collision between small bodies, the conflict grew into a gen
eral action by one force after another being sent forward
to the support of those already engaged. We have seen
how on our side the fight of Brannan's second brigade be
came that of the division, and how Baird's, Johnson's, Rey
nolds 's, Palmer's, Van Cleve 's, and Davis 's brigades were
successively drawn into it. Events took a corresponding
course on the rebel side. At the opening, Forrest's dis
mounted cavalry fought alone. His appeal for help
brought first one and then another of Walthall's brigades
under fire. In response to Walthall's call for support, Lid-
dell's division came to the rescue. When the whole of the
rebel reserve corps had thus become involved and found
itself hard pressed and forced to fall back, General Bragg
at 11 A.M. ordered General Cheatham's division of Polk's
corps to its assistance. Moving immediately, it was formed

118 HENRY VILLARD [1863

in line of battle with three brigades in front and two in re
serve by noon, and then advanced and collided within a
few minutes with the Federal line, which was driving
Liddell 's brigades. Cheatham not only checked the Federal
advance, but forced it back about three-quarters of a
mile, when he encountered fresh hostile columns which
made him yield in turn. Learning this, General Bragg
ordered Stewart's division of Buckner's corps to make an
attack for his relief. Stewart formed his line promptly,
and reached the front in time for the rescue of Wright's bri
gade, forming Cheatham 's left, which was falling back
in disorder with the loss of its battery. Stewart became
at once hotly engaged. As he gained no ground for some
time, while losing heavily, Bragg ordered Hood 's corps into
action on the left of Stewart. Its strongest division, under
Bushrod Johnson, entered the fight shortly before 3 P.M.
After it had been engaged for some time without decided
result, Robertson's brigade of the division Hood had
brought with him from Virginia, and Trigg's brigade of
Preston's division of Buckner's corps, were sent to its
assistance.

In this wise it happened that, in the latter part of the
afternoon, no less than seven Federal divisions, less two
detached brigades, and five divisions and two brigades of
the enemy, had been drawn into the vortex of the battle.
Hence there cannot have been much difference between the
numbers of combatants on each side. The action shifted
during the day from right to left. It was not continuous,
but like the rise and fall of the tide. As the several bodies
successively came into the fray, it rose to fierceness at the
points of collision, surged and roared for a time as the
assailing columns advanced, and subsided into more or less
protracted lulls as they fell away from each other. It was
offensive at first on our part, but became more and more
defensive in the course of the day. Foiled in their early
attempts to break the left of our line, the rebels directed
their onsets from noon against our centre. Brannan, Baird,

1863] FINAL REPULSE OF VAN CLEVE 119

and Johnson on the left were let alone after the events al
ready described. But Palmer, Van Cleve, and Davis were
kept at the bloody work during the afternoon by their ad
versaries, Cheatham, Stewart, and Bushrod Johnson and
the two supporting brigades. Palmer's division was forced
back, after his first success, in considerable confusion and
at one time outflanked, but he managed to stop and re-form
his troops in a defensive position before dark. Van Cleve
fared no better. Advancing on the right of Palmer with his
two brigades, he drove the enemy rapidly and captured
four guns, wrhen he found himself flanked on the right by
strong numbers, and compelled to fall back and leave the
captured guns. He rallied his men and made another suc
cessful attack, taking four more guns, which were brought
off. Assailed in turn, he had to yield again, but returned
once more to the charge, when he encountered a fresh rebel
mass which pressed his force back in such confusion that
he could rally only a portion of them some distance to the
rear. Van Cleve 's other brigade, which had been left at
Lee and Gordon's Mills, had been ordered to his relief, and
came into action to his right when he was already discom
fited, followed by Davis with Colonel Heg's and General
Carlin's brigades.

Stewart and Bushrod Johnson were expected by General
Bragg to make up for the repulse on our left by forcing
our centre, gaining the Chattanooga road, and thereby cut
ting our army in two. His expectation was fulfilled, but,
happily for us, only for a short time. Stewart, by his final
repulse of Van Cleve, opened the way to the coveted high
way, and not only reached it, but pushed nearly half a
mile beyond it, and claimed to have captured twelve pieces
of artillery. But this onset carried him singly so far from
the Confederate line and all support that he directly found
himself menaced on both flanks, and concluded to seek safety
in retreat. As he mildly puts it in his official report: "In
consequence of threatening movements on the right and
left, my command fell leisurely back about sunset, re-form-

120 HENRY VILLARD [1863

ing on the east side of the Chattanooga road." Bushrod
Johnson, between three and four o'clock, fell upon Barnes's
and Davis 's brigades, made them, after a stout resistance,
give way in partial disorder, and followed them to and be
yond the Chattanooga road. At this juncture, two brigades
under General Wood, which General Crittenden had asked
and obtained permission to send to the succor of Van Cleve
in his precarious plight, became also involved. Wood had
orders to go in on Van Cleve 's right, but, meeting Davis
on the way and hearing from him of his distress, and seeing
the evidence of it in a stream of fugitives from Heg's bri
gade that came pouring out of the woods, he directed
Colonel Harker's brigade to form in line and push forward
in an oblique direction and engage the advancing enemy.
The brigade succeeded in checking him after a hot fight
in which it lost very heavily. Wood's other brigade, un
der Colonel Buell, got ready to support Carlin's, holding
Davis 's right, and was about to advance when the latter
brigade was also driven back by the rebels. The fugitive
crowd got mixed up with Buell 's men and swept them along
with it some distance beyond the Chattanooga road, when
the enemy was stopped by the fire of Wilder 's brigade,
which was lying there dismounted, and the concentrated
fire of twenty-six guns which General Crittenden had or
dered to open. General Sheridan had been directed by
Rosecrans to hurry from Lee and Gordon's Mills with two
brigades to the relief of our right, and arrived just in time
to help check the pursuit of Davis 's and Wood's men.
Colonel Bradley 's brigade of his division formed hastily,
and, after a short and severe fight, in which it recaptured a
Federal battery, succeeded in driving the enemy back to
the east side of the Chattanooga road. Davis 's and Wood 's
commands then re-formed and regained their former
position.

General Negley's division had been left to guard the
fords on our extreme right, while the other three divisions
of the Fourteenth Corps made their night move to the left.

1863] NIGHT ATTACK 121

It was not molested until noon, when the enemy opened
with two batteries upon it, and soon after advanced with
an infantry force which was, however, easily repulsed.
It was a feint on the rebel part to hold our forces in place.
At 3:30 P.M., Negley received orders to move quickly to
the support of General Thomas. He reached the front,
where Van Cleve had been fighting, shortly before five, and
discovered the enemy making a flank movement through
a break in our line. He promptly sent two brigades against
the rebels, \vhich stopped them, and then, taking the of
fensive, pushed forward about half a mile in a brisk en
gagement lasting till after seven. The division did not
resume its march to join Thomas, but remained on McCook's
line.

Dusk and darkness had come during the last-mentioned
incidents. The lull that had prevailed on our left during
the afternoon was suddenly broken after dark by a tre
mendous outburst of musketry and artillery. Bragg was
not satisfied with the compensation for the failures of For
rest, Waltham, Liddell, and Cheatham afforded by the
partial successes of Stewart and Johnson — partial because
they could not hold the Chattanooga road, and because our
torn line was re-knitted. Moreover, the developments of the
day had made him cognizant of the concentration of the
main strength of the Federals on their left. He resolved
to try again to break the latter. The new blow was to be
struck by a night attack, so as to double its effect by
a surprise. The best division of his army— Cleburne's
veterans— was to deal it. It had not been engaged, and
came therefore comparatively fresh to the task. It had
been in position on the rebel left during the forenoon and
part of the afternoon on the west bank of the Chickamauga,
when it was ordered to cross at Tedford's Fork and march
as rapidly as possible along the rear of the rebel lines to
the right. It reached there after sunset, formed and moved
forward by six o'clock with all three brigades in a front
line and each followed by a battery. Cleburne says: "In

122 HENRY VILLARD [1863

a few moments I was heavily engaged on my right and
centre. The enemy, posted behind hastily constructed
breastworks, opened a heavy fire of both small arms and
artillery. For half an hour, the firing was the heaviest
I ever heard. It was dark, however, and accurate shooting
impossible. Each side was aiming at the flashes of the
other, and few of the shot from either side took effect.
Two of my batteries were run forward within sixty yards
of the enemy's line and opened a rapid fire." Cleburne,
according to his own story, drove the enemy for a mile and
a half, when, his command having got confused by the ad
vance in the darkness, and his artillery finding it imprac
ticable to move further in the woods, he stopped, readjusted
his lines and bivouacked. He claims that he captured three
guns, two flags, and between two and three hundred pris
oners, and that it was nine o 'clock before firing on his front
ceased.

Cleburne had struck Johnson's division and the left of
Baird's. A terrible roar suddenly arose in front of them.
The three brigades of the former and Scribner's of the
latter found themselves instantly exposed to a fearful
shower of bullets and crashing shot and bursting shell, and
immediately thereafter furiously assailed by yelling in
fantry in front and flank. Johnson's left, formed by the
brigade of Willich, had remained unprotected all the after
noon, although its commander repeatedly called attention
to its exposure. The first rebel onset swept our first line
back upon the reserves with heavy losses, but it then appears
to have stood its ground till the enemy stopped fighting.
The attack evidently threw our troops into great confusion,
and many more of them were taken prisoners than Cleburne
brought off, the greater number escaping in the darkness.
Our line got so mixed up that Willich 's and Scribner's
commands fired into Baird's second brigade and made it
retreat in disorder.

This night fight— one of the most extraordinary incidents
of the war— closed the day's struggle. It had been mostly a

1863] FEAT OF GENERAL WILLICH 123

hap-hazard contest, from the first to the last, on both sides.
Neither the generals-in-chief nor the heads of the corps ex
ercised much command. They confined themselves to or
dering one part of their troops after another into action,
after which the character of the ground, the dense woods,
and the difficulty of communication compelled them to let
the immediate commanders do the best they could. As
General Longstreet fitly expresses it in his recollections of
the war: "The division commanders fought the battle."
The Official War Records afford incontestable proof that the
commanders not only of divisions, but of brigades and even
regiments, had to shift for themselves. They warrant the
assertion that, in no other of the great battles of the rebel
lion, are there to be found so many complaints from com
manding officers, in both armies, of being unsupported in
attacks and left exposed on the flanks and obliged to fall
back by being actually taken on the sides and in the rear.
A number of allegations appear that gaps from a few hun
dred feet to a mile and a quarter wide existed in the Fed
eral and Confederate lines. For the same reason, but
scanty laurels were gathered by commanders in this field
for tactical achievements. Yet there are many instances
of gallant conduct on record, and among them a remark
able feat of General Willich deserves to be mentioned.
Major Williams, commanding the Eighty-ninth Illinois
Infantry, in his report, after mentioning that at one time
the heavy fire of the enemy made his command waver, says :
"At this point General Willich came forward, and, stand
ing in front of the regiment amid a shower of bullets, com
plimented it for its previous impetuous advance, calmed
their excitement, instructed them how to advance, fire, and
maintain their alignment, then dressed and drilled them
for a short time ; and his own inimitable coolness of manner
restored order and confidence in the regiment so that,
when he ordered them to advance, they did so promptly
and in good order." A drill under the hottest fire— cer
tainly an extraordinary example of the coolest courage.

124 HENRY VILLARD [1863

The strife having been actually a series of "little
battles, " fought by particular units of the respective armies
against each other with fluctuating results, it is not sur
prising that the division and brigade commanders engaged
should, almost without exception on both sides, resort again
in their reports to the plea of having encountered largely
superior numbers, in extenuation of failure and in exag
geration of success. It is but natural that such fictions
should be echoed first in the reports of corps commanders
and then of the commanders-in-chief.

General Bragg had, to recapitulate, sought first to break
our left and plant his army between us and Chattanooga,
and next, when he had failed in this, to cut us in two by
piercing our centre. General Rosecrans's chief object was to
secure the concentration of his army and thereby his lines
of communication with Chattanooga. As both of Bragg 's
attempts had miscarried, while Rosecrans had his forces
fully in hand and commanded the two roads— the Rossville
and the Dry Valley— to Chattanooga at the close of the day,
the outcome may well b'e deemed to have been in our favor.
It must be admitted at the same time that it was not our
tactics but the Confederate to which the result was due,
for the course which the action took through the aggres
siveness of the enemy promoted, so to speak, and accelerated
our concentrating movement. The hostile pressure con
tracted, as it were, our extended and loose lines, and forced
us into a position astride the important roads. But it is
also true that the line gained by the Confederates during
the day was far better for a further offensive than
that occupied by them on the morning of the 19th, since
the Chickamauga was no longer between most of their
troops and our own, they were within easy striking distance
of us and, in front of both our flanks, much nearer to the
Chattanooga roads, and, moreover, they were no longer
hampered in their movements by ignorance of the ground.

Bragg was fully aware of all this, and had no other
thought than to renew the struggle as early the next day as

1863] THE FIRST DAY REVIEWED 125

possible, and felt sure of success. Rosecrans likewise knew
but too well that another battle was still before him. The
condition of the rebels was certainly better for another trial
of strength and skill than ours. Their losses had been
very severe, and no doubt greater than ours, except in
prisoners. Their organizations were also much shaken and
loosened by the varying fortunes of the day. Their general
physical exhaustion was also great. But they had a reserve
force of more than one-third of their army, consisting of
the divisions of Hindman, Breckinridge, and Preston, from
which only two brigades had been drawn into the action,
as has been mentioned. They were reinforced, too, during
the night by the arrival of two more brigades from Virginia.
Another important accession was Lieutenant- General Long-
street in time to exercise command the next day.

On our side, the loss in killed was relatively small, but
disproportionately large in wounded. The hauls of prison
ers made by the enemy in his onsets comprised in not a few
cases the larger parts of regiments, battalions, and bat
teries. But the worst we had suffered was the disrupture
and scattering and mixing up of so many organizations,
which could not fully be reestablished in the dark. More
over, our whole army had been engaged, barring Sheridan's
two brigades, which, with the reserve corps, constituted
the only available fresh troops, and Granger's command,
which was at a distance. Our condition was, indeed, such
that only the defensive could be thought of, and, accord
ingly, large details of our men were kept felling timber
all night and erecting breastworks of logs for the protection
of our lines. General Rosecrans certainly drew a fanciful
picture when he said, in his telegraphic summary of the
battle to the Government, "The army is in excellent con
dition and spirits." That he really felt very anxious for
the fate of his army appears plainly from the sentence
with which he closed his official account of the events of
the 19th, viz., "The battle of the next day must be for the
safety of the army and the possession of Chattanooga."

CHAPTER XXX

THE BATTLE OF THE SECOND DAY.— 1863

BOTH armies J5ivouacked, or rather lay on their arms,
during the night. Excepting the pickets and their
supports and the working parties, the rank and file en
joyed some hours of rest. But the commanding officers
on either side were not allowed that boon. Rosecrans sum
moned his corps commanders to his headquarters at the
Glenn House between nine and ten o'clock, where they
remained till midnight to report the location and condition
of their troops and to receive their instructions for the next
day. Most of the remainder of the night the tired Union
generals devoted to conforming their lines to their orders.
The position in which our army awaited the next at
tempts of the enemy was as follows: Thomas formed the
left on substantially the line he held at nightfall, which
was almost at a right angle to that from which he had
opened the action in the morning, and extended from the
road to Reed's Bridge to the direct road from Lee and
Gordon's Mills to Rossville and thence to the so-called Dry
Valley road, leading through Missionary Ridge from
Crawfish Springs to Rossville. McCook formed the right—
his left, Negley's division, filling the place of Johnson's,
still on Thomas's line, connecting with Thomas's right;
and his right, Sheridan's division, near the Glenn House
in front of the gap through which the Dry Valley road
runs. Davis 's two brigades were the reserve of the corps.
As the divisions of Generals Johnson and Palmer re
mained under Thomas's orders, McCook and Crittenden
had only two divisions each to command on the 20th,

126

1863] BRAGGPS PLAN OF BATTLE 127

and the former was soon to be deprived even of Negley's,
which, as will appear, was also sent to reinforce the left.
Crittenden's corps extended as the general reserve along
the eastern slope of Missionary Ridge, with Wood's divi
sion on the right and Van Cleve's on the left, and was so
posted as to support both Thomas and McCook. In the
line thus constituted, Baird's division held the extreme
left, Johnson's came next, then Palmer's, Reynolds 's, and
Brannan's on the slopes of Missionary Ridge, followed by
McCook with Negley's (till withdrawn) on the left, Sheri
dan's on the right, and Davis 's in reserve. There is no
record of any direction to the reserve corps under General
Granger to move up closer to the front on either the first
or the second day of the battle, but it was left in a posi
tion covering the junction of the roads from Ringgold and
Cleveland to Chattanooga at a distance of nearly four
miles from our extreme left, until its commander, of his
own accord, as will be seen, led it into the action on Sun
day afternoon.

A council of war likewise took place during the night
at Bragg 's headquarters, which did not have the shelter
of a building, but were located around a camp-fire. The
rebel generals were informed by their commander that the
army was to be fought the next day in two parts: the
right wing to consist of Hill's corps, Walker's reserve
corps and Cheatham's and Breckinridge 's divisions, and
to be commanded by Lieutenant-General Polk, and the
left wing to be composed of Hindman's and Bushrod John
son's divisions, Buckner's corps and Longstreet's corps
(or so much of it as had arrived), with Major-General Hood
in command, to be led by Lieutenant-General Longstreet.
Bragg 's plan of battle, as communicated to his corps com
manders, was to execute with his army a general move
ment by a wheel upon the extreme left as a pivot— an
exact repetition of the Stone's River plan. Polk was to
attack at daylight, and the action was to be taken up suc
cessively from right to left. General Longstreet reached

128 HENRY VILLARD [1863

Bragg 's bivouac only at 11 P.M., when General Polk had
already returned to his corps. He had arrived by train
near Ringgold at 2 P.M., and left thence for the field with
two staff officers as soon as horses could be procured. The
party missed their way, rode into the Federal lines and
were fired at, and came very near being taken prisoners.
Thus General Longstreet had the responsibility thrust upon
him of leading troops immediately into action of whom he
had seen only those of his own corps. He was as unfamil
iar with the ground as with the greater part of his com
mand, and spent the night in learning all he could of the
latter, and in studying maps.

General Bragg had personally given his verbal order to
General Polk to attack with his extreme right at day
break. A curious chapter of incidents and accidents now
occurred that will be related in full, as it had an impor
tant bearing upon the impending action. General Polk
had started between 10 and 11 P.M. for his headquar
ters, east of Alexander's bridge, to prepare for executing
his orders. On the way he met an aide-de-camp of Gen
eral Hill, to whom he communicated his orders, with the
further message that he desired to see General Hill at his
headquarters, and that he would have fires started and
orderlies stationed at the bridge to conduct the general
to him. At 11 : 30 P.M., he issued written orders to Gen
erals Hill and Cheatham to attack the enemy simultane
ously at daylight, and to General Walker to remain in
reserve, and sent them by couriers to the headquarters of
these three commanders. The couriers to Cheatham and
Walker promptly returned with receipts for the orders.
The one sent to Hill searched for him in vain all night, and
returned at daylight with the report that he had been un
able to find him. Nor did General Hill put in an appear
ance in compliance with the order sent to him through
his aide-de-camp. Thereupon General Polk sent direct
orders to General Cleburne and Breckinridge, Hill's divi
sion commanders, to attack at once, and rode himself to the

1863] POLE'S GRAVE MISTAKE 129

front. Here he received at 7 A.M. a message from Gen
eral Hill that he had gone to Alexander's Bridge, but failed
to meet there the orderlies that were to guide him to head
quarters, and was, therefore, unable to find them and him,
that his divisions were getting breakfast, and would not
be ready to move for an hour or more. He also advised
General Polk to examine their line and correct some ir
regularities in it before attacking, and expressed the opin
ion that, as the Yankees had been felling trees all night,
their position had become too strong to be taken by direct
assault.

General Polk no doubt had committed a very grave mis
take in allowing six hours to elapse between the starting
and the return of the courier to General Hill before tak
ing any other action to insure the execution of his supe
rior 's order to attack at dawn of day. General Hill 's pref
erence of his own judgment as to the proper course for him
self to pursue to the peremptory order of his immediate
superior must be considered an act of insubordination.
Two curious features of this incident, which proved very
serious for the two generals, were, first, that Polk es
tablished the fact that he had stationed the promised
guides for Hill at the bridge by the soldiers themselves de
tailed for that duty, while Hill and staff testified that they
found none there ; and that Polk claimed positively that he
had sent the verbal order to attack at daylight to Hill
through the latter 's aide-de-camp, while Hill absolutely
denied having ever received it, and the staff officer in ques
tion denied having been given such a message. The effect
of it all was that the rebel right, instead of attacking at
daybreak, as ordered, did not commence the action till 10
A.M. This at least is the hour stated in General Bragg 's
subsequent formal charges against General Polk for dis
obedience of orders. Rosecrans, however, asserts that the
battle began at 8 : 30 A.M., and Thomas also mentions an
earlier hour. Breckinridge, who opened on the rebel right,
makes it 9 : 30 A.M. In his official report, General Bragg
thus speaks of the delay :

130 HENRY VILLARD [1863

Before the dawn of day, myself and staff were ready for the
saddle, occupying a position immediately in rear of and accessi
ble to all parts of the line. With increasing anxiety and disappoint
ment I waited until after sunrise without hearing a gun, and at
length despatched a staff officer to General Polk to ascertain the
cause of the delay and urge him to a prompt and speedy move
ment. This officer, not finding the General with his troops, and
learning where he had spent the night, proceeded across Alexander's
Bridge to the east side of the Chickamauga, and there delivered
my message. Proceeding in person to the right wing, I found the
troops not even prepared for the movement. Messengers were
immediately despatched for General Polk, and he shortly after
joined me. My orders were renewed and the General urged
to their prompt execution, the more important as the ear was
saluted throughout the night with the sounds of the axe and fall
ing timber, as the enemy had labored industriously to strengthen
his position by hastily constructed barricades and breastworks. A
reconnoissance made in the front of our extreme right during
this delay crossed the main road to Chattanooga, and proved the
important fact that this greatly desired position was open to our
possession. The reasons assigned for this unfortunate delay by the
wing commander appear in the reports of his subordinates. It is
sufficient to say they are entirely unsatisfactory.

If Bragg 's contention that the way to the main Chat
tanooga road from his right— that is, around the left flank
of Thomas and to his rear— was open early in the morn
ing, was well-founded, the salvation of the Union army
from entire destruction was doubtless due to the delay of
the rebel attack. But a search of all the reports of the
general officers commanding on the rebel right failed to
discover any evidence corroborating Bragg 's allegation.
General Polk, moreover, in a long letter addressed to Presi
dent Davis after his suspension from command, combats
most strenuously, but not altogether convincingly, the as
sumption that the outcome of the battle would have been
different had the attack been made as early as ordered.

At all events, the gain of those hours enabled General
Rosecrans to correct some faults in our lines, which he
discovered, as he narrates, on inspecting them with his

1863J ROSECRANS URGES NEGLEY 131

staff at daybreak. The time was also diligently utilized
to further strengthen our line by additional breastworks.
General Thomas having received a message at 2 A.M.
from General Baird that his left could not be extended
as ordered to the road to Reed's Bridge without weakening
it too much, immediately requested the army headquar
ters to send Negley's division so that it could be placed on
Baird 's left and rear, to which General Rosecrans re
sponded that he would issue the order at once. Finding
that Negley had not arrived, he sent an aide-de-camp
to urge him forward as rapidly as possible. Negley
says in his report that he received the order from the aide
at 8 A.M., but makes no reference to any preceding one
from army headquarters. It is of record, however, that
General Rosecrans issued it at 6 : 30 A.M., as well as an
other to McCook to relieve Negley. The General Com
manding was surprised to find, on his return to the right
from his inspecting ride, that these orders had not been
carried out. As it was hazardous so late in the morning to
cause a wide gap in the line by the withdrawal of the
whole division at once, Rosecrans ordered Negley to send
only his reserve brigade under Beatty immediately to
General Thomas, and to withdraw the two others only when
actually relieved on the line. This new order prevented
Negley's compliance with that of Thomas's brought by
the aide. General Crittenden, as nearest to Negley, was
directed by the Commander-in-chief to relieve him, and did
so by directing Wood's division and a brigade of Van
Cleve's to move into the vacated position. There is no evi
dence that the alleged order was issued from the army
headquarters to Negley or received by him, but McCook 's
report contains a copy of a despatch dated 6 : 35 A.M. from
General Garfield, advising him that Negley's division had
been ordered to General Thomas, and directing him to fill
the space left by his withdrawal, if practicable. The
order reached General McCook so late that, although he
rode immediately with General Sheridan to the position

132 HENRY VILLARD [1863

vacated by Negley, he found it already occupied by Wood 's
men. There must have been carelessness or confusion at
Rosecrans's headquarters in issuing orders, for General
McCook, in returning, met Davis with his two brigades
advancing, also by direct order of the General Commanding,
to Wood's position. Three divisions had therefore been
actually ordered to take the place of one. McCook directed
Davis to occupy part of Wood's line with one brigade
and hold the other in reserve.

The tardiness in meeting General Thomas's call for help
led to a bad beginning of the battle for us, for Beatty's
brigade was just moving into line on Baird's left when
the enemy opened the action by a furious assault at that
point. The brigade had first formed perpendicularly to
Baird for the better protection of our flank from a turning
movement, but was directly ordered, against the remon
strance of its commander, to advance to a low ridge a
quarter of a mile distant. This left a gap between the
right of the brigade and Baird's left. The left of the
brigade reached the ridge unopposed, but its centre and
right met the enemy half way, and were not only stopped,
but pressed so heavily that they had to fall back until the
rebels were checked and driven to shelter by a shower of
grape from the brigade battery.

Such was the beginning of the second day's struggle.
The rebel attack extended quickly to nearly the whole of
our left, involving the divisions of Baird, Johnson, Palmer,
and Reynolds. It was delivered by Breckinridge and Cle-
burne's divisions of Hill's corps. As explained, instead
of attacking at daybreak as ordered by Generals Bragg and
Polk, they had delayed in order to enable their men to
fight on full stomachs. Breckinridge 's line was formed
and began to advance on the left at 9 : 30 A.M. Cleburne
on the right moved forward when Breckinridge had already
been in motion for some time, with the result that there was
no contact between the two divisions and that they fought
independently of each other. Breckinridge advanced with

1863] THE SECOND DAY'S FIGHT 133

Helm's brigade on the left, Stovall's in the centre, and
Adams's on the right. Pushing forward some seven hun
dred yards, Helm came under fire. His left found itself
opposite the breastworks protecting Baird's line, and was
brought to a halt by the withering fire from behind them,
while the rest of the brigade came in conflict with Beatty's
men. Helm was mortally wounded while urging on the
regiments on his left, which upon his fall retreated in
disorder. Meantime Stovall's and Adams's Confederate
brigades had steadily moved forward, resisted at first only
by lines of skirmishers, until Adams came up with Beatty
in the position to which the latter had retired before Helm.
Adams succeeded, by a vigorous onset, in pressing back
Beatty and taking from him a section of his battery, after
killing nearly all the men and animals belonging to it.
The Federal brigade was cut in two, and its two right regi
ments became separated from it for the rest of the day.
Adams continued on, and actually reached the Chatta
nooga road and passed some distance to the west of it.
Stovall also reached the road, where he halted. In fact,
these two brigades overreached our left, and virtually
turned our flank by their movement. Their commander
perceived and reported this to General Breckinridge, who
rode up and ordered them to change front perpendicularly
to their original line and renew the advance, with the left
of Adams and the right of Stovall resting on the Chatta
nooga road. In this position they were directly in the rear
of General Baird's division — a most threatening juncture
at this early stage of the action.

"When Helm recoiled, Baird made no counter-attacks,
but, on the withdrawal of the enemy, sent out skirmishers
who took many prisoners. He knew the weakness of his
left since Beatty's withdrawal from it, and he was trying
to strengthen it with regiments from other divisions when
the overwhelming attack upon Beatty also forced back his
left, and even reached the rear of Johnson, whose left bri
gade became severely engaged. When Adams and Stovall

134 HENRY VILLARD [1863

resumed the offensive in their new formation, Baird had
to order his line to face about and meet the attack fronting
to the rear. Fortunately, the appearance of abundant
succor insured the repulse of the rebels. General Thomas,
when he was apprised of Beatty's discomfiture, at once
ordered Van Derveer's brigade of Brannan's division,
Barnes's brigade of Wood's, Grose's of Palmer's, and
Stanley's of Negley's, to the support of the left, with the
help of which reinforcements Breckinridge 's brigades were
beaten back. This phase of the struggle is described by
Breckinridge as follows:

The brigades advanced in fine order over a field and entered the
woods beyond. Stovall, after a severe and well-contested struggle,
was checked and forced to retire. Adams, on the west of the
Chattanooga road, met two lines of the enemy who had improved
the short time to bring up reinforcements and re-form nearly at a
right angle to his main works. The first line was routed, but it was
impossible to break the second, aided as it was by artillery j and,
after a sanguinary contest, we were forced back in some confusion.
Here General Adams was severely wounded and fell into the hands
of the enemy.

Breckinridge 's division, thus badly defeated in detail
(it lost over one-third of its number), fell back to a
position a short distance in advance of that from which it
had begun its attacks, and continued /tors de combat till
nearly the end of the day, leaving Baird 's front corre
spondingly unmolested.

Had the imminent peril from Breckinridge 's push to
the rear of our left not been averted, complete defeat
would doubtless have overtaken the Union army then and
there. Our escape was plainly due alone to the fact that
the rebel division attacked without proper support, Breck
inridge complains of this in his report, and apparently
with good reason (although his brigades found their way
around our flank by chance and not by design), for he
had informed his corps commander of his discovery, and

1863] CLEBURNE CHECKED 135

requested and obtained consent to the change of his line;
but his superior evidently did not appreciate his oppor
tunity, and continued the front attack with the rest of his
command.

Cleburne's division was to fare no better than Breck
inridge 's. It moved forward with Deshler 's brigade on
the left, Wood's in the centre, and Polk on the right, when
Breckinridge was already on the way, and its effort to
catch up caused, as Cleburne admits, hurry and confusion.
In this condition the division became exposed, its com
mander says, to the heaviest artillery fire he had ever expe
rienced. A hurricane of shot and shell swept the woods
from the unseen enemy in front. The Union guns checked
the right of the rebel division within less than two hun
dred yards of the breastworks. Its centre and left found
themselves impeded in their progress by Stewart's division.
Wood's brigade got mixed up with Bates 's of that division,
and Deshler's was entirely stopped for a time. Wood's bri
gade disentangled itself, and, advancing again, attempted to
cross an open field extending to the Chattanooga road. It
received a heavy oblique fire from small arms and artillery
which drove it back. It lost five hundred men in killed
and wounded within a few minutes. Folk's line had also
given way, and the two brigades retreated for a quarter
of a mile. Cleburne had succeeded in bringing Deshler to
the front by a move by the right flank, but he too failed
to make headway against the Union fire, and fell back to
the position of the other brigades. Deshler himself was
killed by a shell that passed clear through his body.

Upon the repulse of Helm's brigade, General Hill sent
to General Walker of the reserve corps for a brigade to
fill the opening in his line made by the withdrawal of
Helm. His request was misunderstood, and, instead of one
brigade, the two divisions of the corps came up accom
panied by Lieutenant-General Polk. They were ordered
to resume the attack abandoned by Breckinridge, but, to
quote from Hill's report, "met with a front and flank fire

136 HENRY VILLARD [1863

which threw them in confusion and drove them "Back pre
cipitately."

Four divisions of the rebel right were thus used up.
The fifth, Cheatham's, was spared and kept in reserve.
While Breckinridge and the three brigades of Walker were
contending against Baird and his supports, Cleburne and
Walker's other brigades made futile efforts in front of
Johnson's, Palmer's, and Reynolds 's divisions. These,
like Baird, acted mainly on the defensive, checking the
enemy by a very heavy infantry and artillery fire when
ever he tried to rush forward. A rain of bullets, shot, and
shell was poured forth incessantly from our breastworks,
the front infantry ranks doing the firing and the rear ones
the loading. All the rebel reports speak of our fire as more
fearful than any they had ever before witnessed. Only
General Willich, with his usual impetuosity, sallied forth
at the head of one of his regiments, and followed the re
treating enemy for a mile, inflicting considerable loss on
him. General Thomas himself did not think of striking a
counterblow after the rebels' offensive had been repelled
and disappeared from his front, for Breckinridge 's rear
attack had much shaken and confused his command, and,
moreover, his supply of ammunition had grown short. But
the danger to our left had now fully passed, and the rebels
did not disturb it again till near the close of the day.

The struggle there had not wholly ceased when an all
but fatal turn took place on our right. General Longstreet
relates that he arranged the line of the left wing so that
Stewart's division formed his right, followed by Bushrod
Johnson's, Hood's, Hindman's, and Preston's divisions as
the centre and left. Only three brigades of Hood's having
arrived, Kershaw's and Humphrey's brigades of McLaws's
division were also placed under his command. The divi
sions were formed with two brigades in the front and the
others behind them in supporting distance. When the ac
tion on the Confederate right had been raging for some
time, without any apparent progress, Longstreet grew anx-

1863] REBEL PRESSURE ON THOMAS 137

ions, and sent an aide to General Bragg with an inquiry
whether he had not better attack. Before the aide returned,
Longstreet learned that the Commander-in-chief had al
ready sent orders direct to his division commanders to ad
vance. Thus all of Longstreet 's divisions got in motion
except Preston's, which remained in reserve on the extreme
left. The rebel left was to achieve the success that had
been denied to the right, and the stranger lieutenant-gen
eral from Virginia, who had not even yet seen most of the
general officers and the troops now placed under his or
ders, snatched the laurels which the old commanders under
Bragg had failed to pluck.

What occurred on our right during the fighting along
Thomas's front and up to the time that Longstreet moved
to the attack, was as follows : Negley 's two remaining bri
gades were relieved from the front line by Wood's division
only at 9 : 30 A.M. Stanley's brigade was sent quickly to the
support of the left, and took an active part in the repulse
of Breckinridge. Negley 's, with Sirwell's, was stopped on
the way to the left by an order from General Thomas to
mass artillery on the elevations to the left and rear of
Baird's position. Negley did not properly comply with the
order, but placed the guns so that they protected the ex
treme right under Brannan instead of the left.

The rebel pressure on Thomas being apparently very
great and steadily increasing, General Rosecrans decided
to make dispositions to hold the left at all hazards, and
to go even to the length of withdrawing his right wholly
behind it. The resolve was a risky one, as it involved the
abandonment to the enemy of one of the two lines of com
munication with Chattanooga, viz., the Crawfish Springs
and Chattanooga road. But Rosecrans believed that the
whole rebel army was being hurled against Thomas, and
did not dream that a mightier force than had assailed his
left was about to fall upon his right. By a message dated
10 : 10 A.M., he notified General McCook of his intention,
directing him to prepare at once for a withdrawal of the

138 HENRY VILLARD [1863

right, and to be ready to send reinforcements to Thomas at
a moment's warning. Twenty minutes later, another order
was despatched to McCook requiring him to send two bri
gades of Sheridan's division immediately, and with all
despatch, to support Thomas, and to let the third brigade
follow as soon as the lines could be drawn in sufficiently.
McCook received the two orders within six minutes of each
other, and lost no time in executing them. Lytle's and
Walworth's brigades were taken from the extreme right
and started for the left at the double quick. After Gen
eral Wood had moved to occupy Negley's position, and
when Davis 's division was ordered to the front, Van Cleve's
was also moved forward twice by the direction of the
General Commanding, for the better support of Wood and
Davis. Sheridan's third brigade, under Colonel Laiboldt,
was held in reserve to Davis.

General Rosecrans states in his report that one of
Thomas's aides, who brought him a request for further
help, informed him at the same time that Brannan was out
of line and Reynolds 's right thereby exposed. The aide
was mistaken, as Brannan was really in echelon slightly in
the rear of Reynolds 's right; but the Commander-in-chief
acted without further inquiry on the wrong information,
and at once sent an aide on the gallop to General Wood
with the following order :." September 20, 10:45 A.M.:
The General Commanding directs that you close up on Rey
nolds as fast as possible and support him." The order
was received at about eleven o 'clock by Wood, who was then
a short distance in the rear of the centre of his command,
and he immediately proceeded to carry it out. General
McCook was with him at the time, and must have received
his own order to move Sheridan's brigade about the same
time, shortly before or after. He says in his report that,
simultaneously with the movement of Sheridan and much
to his surprise, Wood's division left its position in the line.
This naturally suggests the question why McCook did not
make an effort to prevent the execution of the General-in-

1863] LONGSTREET ATTACKS 139

chief's order to Wood if he considered it unwise and dan
gerous. He did nothing, and that unlucky order, to which
the disaster to our army was unquestionably due, was lit
erally obeyed. Brannan 's division being between Wood
and Reynolds, Wood, in order to close up on and support
the latter as ordered, had to pass his command in rear of
Brannan. Wood's withdrawal left a wide gap in our
line, to fill which General Rosecrans gave no order, sup
posing that Wood was occupying the vacant space created
by the assumed change of Brannan 's position. Wood had
requested McCook to make Davis close up to the left, and
an attempt to do so was made, according to McCook, but
could not and did not prevent the impending catastrophe.

Wood was diverted from his intended destination. Rid
ing in advance of his brigade to find General Reynolds, he
met General Thomas, after searching vainly for the former,
told him of his order, and requested instructions as to how
to place his command. The corps commander told him
that Reynolds was not in need of support, but that Baird
was. Wood then asked whether Thomas would take the
responsibility of changing his order, to which the latter
replied he would. Wood consented accordingly to go to the
support of Baird, and asked for a staff officer to conduct
him. He rode back jvith the aide to meet his command,
but, on reaching them, " found," as he says in his report,
"the valley south of them swarming with the enemy."

Thus it happened that General Longstreet advanced to
attack our right when almost the whole of it was in motion
for changes of position. There is great divergence in the
statements of the official reports on both sides as to the
time at which his column struck our line, but it seems cor
rect to say that Stewart's division on his right collided
first with Brannan 's between eleven and half-past, and the
other divisions quickly became engaged successively as they
swung from the right as on a pivot to the left, and that
before noon all were under fire. Stewart's right brigade un
der Brown moved forward simultaneously with S. A. M.

140 HENRY VILLARD [1863

Wood's brigade of Cleburne's division on its left, followed
by Clayton 's and Bate 's brigades. They pushed on for sev
eral hundred yards under a destructive fire, when Wood's
brigade broke in confusion and exposed Brown's to an en
filading fire. The latter brigade continued on for a short
distance, when its right gave way, but its left and centre,
followed by Clayton and Bate, pressed on some hundreds
of yards beyond the Chattanooga road, driving the Fed
erals before them. Brown's right had recoiled from Rey
nolds 's front. The other parts of Stewart's command came
upon Brannan's division, striking it obliquely, and turn
ing first its left, formed by Council's brigade. After a
brief resistance this brigade, as its commander says,
"broke in confusion and fled to the rear." The right bri
gade under Croxton was taken in flank and rear in conse
quence, and also driven off. Reynolds, learning that the
troops to his right were yielding, sent a regiment to their
support, but it also was involved in the flight. Stewart,
however, found himself confronted by another force. Gen
eral T. J. Wood, on discovering the rebels, as related, in the
large open field behind him, at once sought to meet the
emergency as best he could with the available part of his
command. Hastening forward, he found that Colonel
Harker, a brigade commander, had already been warned by
one of Brannan's staff of what had happened, but felt in
doubt whether the approaching troops were foes or friends,
as it seemed almost incredible that the enemy should sud
denly turn up at that point. Riding forward to determine
their character and being fired on, Harker went back and
formed an east and west line directly in the way of the
advancing rebels. This movement appears to have led
Stewart to stop and fall back. He explains: "New bat
teries being opened by the enemy on our front and flank,
heavily supported by infantry, it became necessary to retire
the command, re-forming on the ground occupied before
the advance. ' ' The division was so crippled that it did not
take part in the action again until just before its close.

1863] BUELL OVERWHELMED 141

According to Longstreet's account, Hood's division, fol
lowed by Bushrod Johnson's, attacked next to Stewart's;
but Johnson claims, and no doubt correctly, that he led,
followed by Hood's (under Brigadier-General Law, Hood
exercising command over both it and Johnson's). The two
divisions formed a broad column three lines deep, thus
bringing great weight of numbers to bear. The moving
mass hit our most vulnerable point. The direction of its
advance led it accidentally to the gap in our line made by
the withdrawal of T. J. Wood's division. Passing the un
occupied breastworks of rails and logs, they fell a short
distance beyond them upon Wood's rear brigade, under
Colonel Buell, as it was moving to the left. Colonel
Buell thus narrates what befell him:

We had scarcely moved one brigade front when the shock came
like an avalanche. My little brigade seemed to be instantly swept
off the field. The greater portion of it was cut off from me and
driven to the rear. My staff, who were executing orders at the
time, were also cut off. The orderly carrying the' headquarters
flag was captured. Captain Estes succeeded in getting away in
hot haste with the brigade battery to a position four hundred yards
to the rear, from which he opened on the enemy, but the latter
worked around to it and captured it after killing thirty-five of the
horses.

Another of T. J. Wood's batteries was also forced back
without a chance to fire, but escaped without being able to
rejoin the division.

Having made short work of Buell 's men, the attacking
column directly caused further havoc. The Federal Gen
eral Van Cleve, after his two advances towards the front,
was finally ordered to the line of battle. His two brigades
had moved but a short distance when another order reached
them to hurry also to the relief of General Thomas. They
were hastening in that direction when Buell 's men sud
denly rushed over them in their pell-mell flight. Some
batteries were also driven at full speed through their ranks,

142 HENRY VILLARD [1863

breaking them up and wounding several men seriously.
This threw the brigades into great confusion, and before
order could be restored the rebels were upon them. Bush-
rod Johnson's column again worked like a wedge, splitting
the brigades in two and scattering one to the left and one
to the right. The rebel general gives this graphic descrip
tion of the scenes that followed:

Our lines now emerged from the forest] into open ground on the
border of long, open fields, over which the enemy was retreating,
under cover of several batteries, which were arranged along the
crest of a ridge on our right and front, running up to the corner of
a stubble-field, and one battery on our left and front posted on an
elevation in the edge of the woods, just at the corner of a field near a
peach orchard and southwest of Dyer's house. The scene now pre
sented was unspeakably grand. The resolute and impetuous charge,
the rush of our heavy columns sweeping out from the shadow and
gloom of the forest into the open fields flooded with sunlight, the
glitter of arms, the onward dash of artillery and mounted men, the
retreat of the foe, the shouts of the hosts of our army, the dust,
the smoke, the noise of firearms— of whistling balls and grape-shot
and of bursting shell— made up a battle-scene of unsurpassed
grandeur. Here General Hood gave me the last order I received
from him on the field— "Go ahead, and keep ahead of everything."
How this order was obeyed will be best determined by those who
investigate all the details of this battle.

The unusual depth of our columns of attack in this part of the
field, and the force and power with which it was thrown upon the
enemy's line, had now completely broken and routed their centre,
and cast the shattered fragments to the right and left. Everett's
battery was here ordered into action on the right of Johnson's
brigade, and opened upon the retreating foe while my line con
tinued to advance.

There was now an interval of about 800 yards between Hind-
man's division, on my left, and my command. Johnson's brigade,
on the left, bore but slightly to the right, its left regiment stretch
ing across the road from Dyer's house to Crawfish [Springs] road
and passing on both sides of the house. Gregg's brigade, in the
centre, moved a little to the right, so as to flank and capture nine
pieces of artillery on its right, posted on the ascent to the eminence

18G3] CRITTENDEN CUT OFF 143

in the corner of the field north of Dyer's house. McNair's brigade,
now somewhat in rear of the two left brigades, moved obliquely to
the right and directly upon this eminence. My line was here un
covered by Hood's division, ivhich must have changed its direction to the
right.

At the moment Van Cleve was b'eing overborne, General
Crittenden was placing the corps artillery in a command
ing position on a hill to the rear with several hundred yards
of clear fields in front. Turning from the batteries to the
troops, he was astounded to see sudden and unaccountable
disorder among them. He says : ' ' There was but little fir
ing at this moment near the troops, and I was unable to
account for the confusion. In a moment, however, the
enemy had driven all before them, and I was cut off from
my command, though not one hundred yards in rear and in
full view, and also cut off from our army. Returning to
the batteries, I found them without the support of a single
company of infantry." All the support that came a little
later were from sixty to seventy men, the small remainder
of Van Cleve 's command brought up by that unfortunate
commander himself. Troops were seen advancing over the
open ground before the artillery. Our guns held their fire
at first, as there was doubt whether they were foes or
friends, but opened vigorously upon them when, on coming
nearer, the rebel uniforms and flags were recognized. Gen
eral Crittenden rode off to find additional help. He had
hardly left when the batteries were obliged to fly precipi
tately. The enemy had come close up to them ; his severe
fire killed many of the horses, and only fifteen of the
twenty-six guns got away. General Van Cleve did not
succeed in getting more of his men together, but the greater
portion of three of his regiments which had been driven
to the right soon rallied, and did more or less fighting in the
afternoon under other commanders.

All this mischief was done by the right of Hood's col
umn. Its left and Hindman 's division wrought still greater
havoc. By the marching off of T. J. Wood's and Sheridan's

144 HENRY VILLARD [1863

brigades, Davis 's division had Hecome an isolated outpost,
as it were, in its position a few hundred yards to the west
of the Chattanooga road behind rude breastworks— a weak
outpost, too, for the losses of the previous day had reduced
his force to a little over twelve hundred effectives. Or
dered by his corps commander to fill the gap left by Wood,
he was just moving his left brigade for that purpose when
he found himself enveloped on the front and flanks by the
enemy. His men fired a few rounds, but, after a short
resistance, were utterly overcome. He called on his sup
port, Laiboldt's brigade of Sheridan's division, for help,
but it too was overwhelmed before it could be brought into
line. Indeed, Davis 's own men fleeing through its ranks
made it helpless. In very little time the three brigades
were swept away in complete rout. Repeated attempts
were made to rally them, but they could not be brought to
a stand before they were far out of harm 's way.

Sheridan's brigades succumbed to the same assailants,
but only after more resistance. The brigades were moving
at the double-quick to the left when Davis received the
shock, and orders reached Sheridan from McCook to halt
and form his command for action. Directly the enemy
was upon him, his men being shot down while forming.
The odds against him were too great, and he was forced
back some hundreds of yards, when his men rallied and
drove the rebels back to Laiboldt's position before the
attack. They even captured rebel colors and a number
of prisoners. But they came upon the strong rebel re
serves, and were forced back in turn beyond their starting-
point. Sheridan's struggle was altogether with the divi
sion of Hindman, who claims to have captured in this at
tack eleven hundred prisoners (including three colonels),
seventeen pieces of artillery, and six flags. General Lytle,
one of Sheridan's brigade commanders, lost his life in the
contest.

These rebel successes were achieved in less than an hour,
by noon, and with relatively little loss in killed and

1863] WILDER'S STAND 145

wounded. General Hood, however, had his hip shattered
by a bullet, and was supposed to be mortally wounded,
but recovered with the loss of a leg. Bushrod Johnson
assumed command in his place. Our eight overwhelmed
brigades— one of T. J. ^^7ood's, two of Van Cleve's, two of
Davis 's, and three of Sheridan's, almost the equivalent
of two divisions— were not only swept off the field, but
carried in such a direction and to such a distance as to
withdraw them entirely from the struggle. They were
forced both off the Lafayette and Chattanooga road which
formed the means of communication between them and
our left, and out of the valley of the Chickamauga into the
valley of the Chattanooga, so that Missionary Ridge
became a barrier between them and the remainder of the
army. Buell's, Van Cleve's, and Davis 's men got all
mixed up, and made off in confused swarms. Sheridan,
after being pushed back, re-formed his brigades on a
ridge overlooking the scene of his fight; but, when he as
certained that all our troops to his left had disappeared,
and that the enemy was between him and General Thomas,
he determined to make an attempt to recover connection
with the latter by marching his command on the arc of a
circle over the hills of the so-called Dry Valley road, and by
it to the Crawfish Springs road, and thence over Mis
sionary Ridge to our lines. He was obliged to disencumber
himself of twenty-four guns and forty-six caissons which
he had found abandoned by other organizations and scat
tered promiscuously over the ground.

Colonel Wilder, with his brigade of mounted infantry,
which had been guarding our right flank while moving to
the left in the wake of Sheridan, struck the extreme left
of the column assailing the latter, and succeeded in check
ing and driving it back, capturing two guns. He remained
on the ground, and had another successful encounter with
the enemy in the course of the afternoon. He took position
on the outrunners of Missionary Ridge and held it till
4 P.M., although he was repeatedly advised by superior
10

146 HENRY VILLARD [1863

officers to fall back to the passes of Lookout Mountain. He
then retreated unmolested to the Chattanooga Valley,
bringing off with him a large number of stragglers, many
ammunition wagons, caissons, ambulances, and stray beef
cattle. The record of the brigade is worth mentioning as
that of almost the only unit of our army fighting by itself
and coming off successfully.

The impetus of victory had carried the rebels in the
wake of the fugitive Federals up and down and again up
the group of hills intervening between the Lafayette and
Chattanooga and the Crawfish Springs and Chattanooga
roads. They gathered up many spoils on the way — guns,
caissons, small arms, piles of knapsacks and tents. With
Bushrod Johnson's division still in the lead, they reached
the crest commanding the gap through which the last-
mentioned road passes into the valley of Chattanooga
Creek, and in which they discovered some of our retreating
trains. They managed to send some shot and shell among
the wagons, producing a panic among the drivers, who
abandoned their charge to save themselves. Some more
guns moving with the trains also fell into their hands.
By thus pushing vigorously after our shattered troops,
Johnson made it impossible to rally any of Davis's men
before they reached McFarland's Gap and Farm on the
Crawfish Springs road, between two and three miles from
Rossville. He also prevented Sheridan from rejoining
Thomas, as he had planned, and compelled him to march
nearly five miles down to Rossville, whence he marched
south for four miles over the Lafayette road, but did not
reach the front again. Davis succeeded in collecting at
McFarland's between twenty-five hundred and three thou
sand of his own command and of Wood's and Van Cleve's
men, whom he led back late in the afternoon by the cross
road towards the battle-front. On arriving near it, he was
ordered to fall back to Rossville.

The dispersal of our right had another momentous con
sequence. The Commander-in-chief found himself sud-

1863] ROSECRANS DESERTS HIS ARMY 147

denly isolated from every part of the army. He describes
his misfortune as follows:

At the moment of the repulse of Davis's division, I was standing
in rear of his right, waiting the completion of the closing of
McCook's corps to the left. Seeing confusion among Van Cleve's
troops, and the distance Davis's men were falling back, and the tide
of battle surging towards us, the urgency for Sheridan's troops to
intervene became imminent, and I hastened in person to the extreme
right to direct Sheridan's movement on the flank of the advancing
enemy. It was too late. The crowd of returning troops rolled
back and the enemy advanced. Giving the troops directions to
rally behind the ridge west of the Dry Valley road, I passed down
it, accompanied by General Garfield, Major McMichael, Major Bond
and Captain Young of my staff and a few of my escort under a
shower of grape, canister and musketry for two or three hundred
yards, and attempted to rejoin General Thomas and the troops sent
to his support by passing to the rear of the broken portion of our
lines, but found the routed troops far towards the left, and, hearing
the enemy's advancing musketry and cheers, I became doubtful
whether the left had held its ground, and started for Rossville.

In other words, the Commanding General, without an
attempt to ascertain the real condition of the left, as in
duty and in honor bound, himself magnified the doubt he
felt regarding it into the assumption that total defeat had
already overtaken the army, and, giving up all thought of
further resistance, rode off with a squad of followers, leav
ing his command to its fate. He put, as we shall see, not
only the four miles to Rossville, but the eight to Chat
tanooga, between himself and his soldiers. This act cost
him the loss of his command and irretrievably blotted his
record.

General Crittenden became a like victim of the disaster.
He tried to find support for his corps batteries, and, when
they had been driven off, remained with a small force of
about one hundred men on an adjacent hill. After vainly
waiting for some time for tidings, the fear seized him
that Generals Rosecrans, McCook, Sheridan, and Davis had

148 HENRY VILLARD [1863

all fallen into the hands of the enemy. No other course
seemed to be open to him than to leave the field and to
find his way if possible to Rossville. He does not claim
to have been cut off from Thomas, but he no doubt was.
Riding over the hills, he reached the Rossville road, which
he found filled all the way with soldiers, cannon, caissons,
and trains. Before reaching Rossville, he learned that
General Rosecrans had not been captured, but had gone to
Chattanooga, and he determined to follow him there. He
should at least have tried, like Davis and Sheridan, to re
turn to the front when he heard, as he did, that Thomas was
still fighting. It is true that he was left entirely without
command by the orders of Rosecrans transferring Palmer's
division on the first day, and Wood's and Van Cleve's on
the second, to Thomas, and therefore he cannot be ac
cused of deserting his command; still, he was riding away
from instead of towards his divisions. For this he had to
atone grievously.

General McCook was a third victim. He met Davis,
while he was being driven back, and exerted himself to
rally his troops, but without avail. He followed the divi
sion commander, and instructed him regarding his further
retreat, and then set out to find General Rosecrans, but
failed to discover him. He got the impression that our
left was also beaten, and, learning from one of General
Crittenden's staff that the latter had gone to Chattanooga,
he decided to go there also. Had he remained with Davis
to the last, he would have had opportunity, in the course
of the afternoon, to fall in again with Sheridan's division
and resume command over it. It was a strange fatality,
indeed, that thus led the General-in-chief and two of the
three corps commanders separately back to Chattanooga,
as if fugitives from the battle-field, accompanied by mere
squads of followers. All three were in ignorance of each
other's fate when they turned their backs upon the scene
of the struggle. All three believed that the whole army
was utterly beaten and shattered, and the bulk of it de-

1863] THOMAS ASSAILED 149

stroyed or captured. It is easy to imagine the deep dis
tress of mind which must have harassed them on that un
lucky ride.

General Thomas was as ignorant of what had befallen
his superior and his fellow corps commanders and their
troops as they were of his condition at the time of and after
the rout of the right. But he was made to feel the effect
of it by the sudden threatening of his right rear before
Breckinridge's brigades had been fully beaten back from
his left rear. He states in his report that, hearing heavy
firing to his right and rear at about 2 P.M.— he must have
been mistaken in the hour, or it is misprinted in the Official
Kecords, as a score of witnesses testify that the crisis oc
curred much earlier— he rode in that direction to ascertain
the cause. On the way he met one of his staff, whom he had
sent to hurry up Sheridan's brigades, who reported that,
in attempting to reach them, he had met a large force
moving with a line of skirmishers in front who fired on
him and compelled him to return. The aide had also en
countered Brigade-Commander Harker when the latter was
yet uncertain whether the body in sight was a hostile or a
friendly one. Thomas thereupon at once sought Harker
to instruct him to fire on the approaching line if he was
fired on, and was not long in verifying the portentous dis
covery that the enemy had gained his right rear, and was
already behind Reynolds. The duty now devolved upon
him to direct during the afternoon as determined a resist
ance to the rebel efforts to overcome his right as he had
offered in the forenoon on the left. While his failure to
hear anything from the Commander-in-chief and from the
rest of the army made him apprehend that something seri
ous had occurred beyond his right, hours elapsed before he
clearly understood that he was fighting alone for the honor
and safety of the army.

Bushrod Johnson's leading column had moved forward
all but due west so fast that the division behind it under
Law lost sight of it and became diverted in a northwest-

150 HENEY VILLARD [1863

erly direction. This led it obliquely towards Barker's
brigade and part of BueH's, the remnant of the division of
General T. J. Wood to which he had returned after discov
ering the enemy behind him. As the advancing rebels
threatened his right flank, Wood retired his command to a
narrow and short spur shooting out nearly due east and
west at right angles from the main Missionary Ridge. The
ridge fell off abruptly to the south, thus forming a strong
and commanding position. When Brannan's two brigades
were driven off in confusion by Stewart's division, he
managed to rally a small number of his men about half a
mile to the west on the hills from which the ridge occu
pied by Wood's troops extended. He and his staff and
other officers succeeded also, by strenuous efforts, in gath
ering up and getting into line some hundreds of stragglers
from various organizations. Wood effected connection by
his right with Brannan's left, which was barely done when
the Confederates delivered the first of the vehement on
slaughts upon them which they attempted one after an
other in the course of the afternoon.

The heights constituting the southern outrunners of
Missionary Ridge were the scene of the new conflict. They
extend from a short distance west of the Lafayette road
for about a mile to the Crawfish Springs road. They rise
to a height of one hundred feet, and have a gentle, but
irregular and spurring slope to the south and east, and
were then covered with open woods. Their southeastern
parts were within the boundaries of a farm belonging to
one Snodgrass, and hence locally known as "Snodgrass
Hill," as which it appears in the records of both sides.
The struggle now ensuing was for the possession of it, from
which the enemy would have commanded the rear of
Thomas's line as well as the Lafayette road, the only line
of retreat left to us. The lines of Wood and Brannan on
these elevations formed a curve having almost the shape
of a horseshoe, which gave our troops an enfilading and
plunging fire upon the assailing enemy.

1863] DEFENCE OF THE "HORSESHOE" 151

The chance-medley of troops hardly aggregated one thou
sand officers and men, an entirely inadequate number for
the defence of the "horseshoe"; but they were gradually
succored, after the beginning of the desperate wrestle, by
the second brigade and one regiment of the third brigade
of Negley's division, and also by Brannan's third brigade
under Colonel Van Derveer, who, after taking a decisive
part in repelling Breckinridge 's division, had been led by
the rising roar of battle on Snodgrass Hill to march of his
own accord to the relief of his division commander. But
even these reinforcements increased the defenders by only
about fifteen hundred, and would have left their total
less than one-fifth of the number Longstreet could bring
against them. These overwhelming odds would doubtless
have overpowered them in one of the early rebel onsets,
had not, luckily, further aid come in time by the appear
ance upon the scene of General Granger, with the greater
part of the reserve corps. Granger had been charged
with guarding the lower crossings of the Chickamauga and
the road from Ringgold to Chattanooga. He had heard the
heavy firing in the direction of the army from 10 : 30 A.M.,
and, after listening to its swelling intensity for some time
with growing anxiety, he determined to hurry to the front
as quickly as possible without waiting for a call. In this,
as General Rosecrans well says of him, he followed "the
instinct of a true soldier." Leaving Colonel McCook's
brigade to watch the Ringgold road, he started with Gen
eral Whitaker's and Colonel Mitchell's brigades, and two
additional regiments under the direct command of Major-
General Steedman, soon after eleven o'clock. The force
represented a total of thirty-seven hundred officers and
men. After marching about two miles, he was suddenly
fired upon by rebel skirmishers and a section of artillery.
It was part of Forrest's cavalry which was guarding the
rebel right. Granger stopped long enough to brush them
aside, but moved on, after satisfying himself that they
were only a small body and ordering up McCook's brigade

152 HENRY VILLARD [1863

to keep the Lafayette road open between that point and
the front. He reported to General Thomas for orders at
1: 30 P.M. (according to Steedman), and naturally received
a most grateful welcome. He was directed to go into posi
tion on the right of Brannan, which he did with alacrity.
As we shall see, he was in the nick of time to prevent an
attempt of the enemy to attack the " horseshoe" on the
right flank and rear.

General Negley performed a different part at this stage
of the battle, which subjected him to much and severe ani
madversion. He was charged with nothing less than
marching off his command from the battle-field shortly
after noon without orders. It appears that while he was
moving in the forenoon to the relief of Baird's division,
General Thomas had ordered him to concentrate all the
artillery that could be spared from the line, with strong
infantry supports, on a point of Missionary Ridge com
manding the ground to the left and rear of Baird.
Misunderstanding this order, he had occupied a hill some
distance to the north of Snodgrass Hill, and nearly in the
rear of Reynolds, with three batteries and Sirwell's bri
gade, which rendered effective service in checking Breck-
inridge's movement to our rear. Upon the rout of the
right, swarms of runaways came up the ravines and over
the ridge to his position, and several batteries from the
broken divisions joined those already there. Negley and a
number of other officers exerted themselves to rally the re
treating troops for the protection of the artillery, but,
as a staff officer describes it: "As soon as the detachments
formed of them and brought to the front heard the sound
of the enemy's muskets, they disappeared like smoke. All
these scattered troops were soon gone." Finding it impos
sible to stop the fleeing troops, and unable to communicate
with General Thomas, Negley deemed it his duty to secure
the safety of the artillery, which was threatened with
immediate capture by a large force of the enemy, and, ac
cordingly, marched off with the guns and infantry to Me-

1863] DEFENCE OF THE "HORSESHOE" 153

Farland's Gap within two miles of Rossville. His retreat
led to direct imputations of misconduct on his part by
Generals Brannan and Wood in their official reports.

Meanwhile, on the rebel left, after the brushing away of
our right and before the assaults on the " horseshoe, " Bush-
rod Johnson, who had occupied the elevation commanding
the defile of the Crawfish Springs and Chattanooga roads
and captured our trains, found himself separated from the
other Confederate troops both on the right and left, and
far in advance of them. He observed, too, the gathering
of Federal batteries on Snodgrass Hill, which dominated
his position, and therefore decided to halt until he was
reinforced. He sent one of his staff to General Long-
street to report his situation, and to ask for infantry and
artillery, and at the same time also despatched aides in
other directions for help. None appearing for some time,
he galloped off himself in search of assistance. After rid
ing some distance to the right and rear, he came upon Gen
eral Hindman, escorted by his staff officers. They first had
to settle the question of rank between them, Johnson hav
ing learned only just before their meeting of the disable
ment of General Hood. Hindman was recognized as the
superior in rank by virtue of his seniority, and ordered
at once Anderson's and Deas's brigades to the support
of Johnson, who then returned to his command.

Pending the arrival of the expected reinforcements,
Johnson ordered one of his batteries to open fire upon the
rear of the Federal position on the "horseshoe," which
was about six hundred yards to his right. Having vainly
waited for some time for the promised brigades, he grew
restive and resolved to advance without them. He formed
his line facing to the north and almost perpendicular to
the Lafayette road, with Johnson's brigade on the left and
Gregg's on the right. He was just getting in motion when
Deas's and Anderson's brigades reported, followed by
the third brigade of Hindman 's division under Manigault.
This and Deas's were brought into position on the left

154 HENRY VILLARD [1863

and Anderson on the right of Johnson, under whose im
mediate orders all the five brigades fought, although Hind-
man exercised superior command over them and Ker-
shaw's and Humphrey's brigades, which were brought into
connection with the line of attack on the right of Ander
son. McNair's brigade, which had got astray, was also
brought up in time in the rear of Johnson.

It being reported to Hindman that a force was trying
to work around his left, he erroneously assumed that they
were the same troops who were driven off by him and
Johnson (indeed, neither he nor any other rebel general
knew the extent of the havoc they had inflicted), but had
been rallied and brought back to the field. Apprehensive
of an attack in the rear, he sent to Generals Longstreet and
Buckner for help, and, at the same time, ordered a vigorous
general attack. The brigades of the centre and left were
to wheel to the right until faced east, and then to advance
against the enemy's flank. Anderson and Kershaw, as the
pivot, were to stand still till the firing commenced to their
left, and then also to advance. Hindman felt confident
that this movement would drive the remnants of the Fed
eral army upon the rebel right, thereby insuring their
capture or destruction. According to him, it did not com
mence till 3 : 30 P.M., but in other reports an earlier hour
is mentioned. His appeal and Bushrod Johnson's previous
one for assistance failed to bring it. General Longstreet,
who did not deem it safe to weaken any part of his line,
nor prudent to draw so early on his reserve (Preston's
division) for that purpose, applied to General Bragg for
troops from the right wing. He was answered that the
latter had been beaten back so badly that they could be
of no service to him, from which the commander of the
left deduced that the discomfiture of the rebel right had
been just as great as that of the Federal right, and that
the fate of the day was depending on him and his com
mand.

Bushrod Johnson's wheeling movement commenced un-

1863] DEFENCE OF THE "HORSESHOE" 155

der the protection of artillery fire upon the " horseshoe, "
and brought the rebel line within range of our musketry
within a few minutes. It advanced determinedly up the
slope, firing volley after volley, towards the crest for the
defence of which Steedman's division had just hurriedly
formed. Steedman boldly delivered a counter-attack upon
the approaching enemy. Gallantly seizing a regimental
flag, he led his men forward. With defiant shouts they
rushed upon the foe, and, after a desperate conflict of
twenty minutes, drove him back in confusion and gained
a good advanced position. Johnson admits in his report
that Deas's and Anderson's brigades and all but two regi
ments of Manigault's suffered so severely that they did
not again participate in the action. He says further that
the retreat of his whole line was precipitate, and that it
required all the exertions he could make, joined to the
"appeals, commands, and physical efforts" of the officers,
to prevent the abandonment of the hill from which his
troops had started, and of the artillery firing from it. He
claims that these batteries checked our attack. The slaugh
ter on both sides was terrible, especially among officers.
The feat of Steedman's men was the more creditable as
most of them had never been under fire before.

Kershaw's brigade, forming with Anderson's the pivot
of the wheel, also came to the attack on the right simul
taneously with Johnson's. They had been previously en
gaged and gained some ground, but found themselves com
pelled to fall back. Advancing again, they soon became
exposed by the repulse of Anderson 's brigade on their left.
Kershaw claims that he not only stopped the Federals, but
drove them with three of his regiments and the Anderson
reserve regiments "pell-mell," and that he "followed them
to the top of the hill, the Second South Carolina reaching
even the crest." But he adds that the commander of the
last-mentioned regiment, finding that the troops on his left
had fallen back to their former position, was reluctantly
obliged to retreat also. Longstreet refers to this part of

156 HENRY VILLARD [1863

the action as follows: "Kershaw made a most handsome
attack upon the heights at the Snodgrass house, simulta
neously with Johnson and Hindman, but was not strong
enough for the work."

The rebel attempts to capture the "horseshoe" were di
rected both against the left and the front of it, and were
repelled from the latter only by the firm resistance of
Wood's and Brannan's commands. These did not attack
in return, but confined themselves strictly to the defensive.
Anderson's brigade recoiled from them in a shattered con
dition, and they foiled Kershaw's onset, which the de
fenders describe as extremely determined. But our men
fought from the shelter afforded by the rampart-like crest,
overwhelming the advancing enemy by their continuous
volleys.

General Thomas had established his headquarters at the
Snodgrass house, from which he directed the course of the
action during the remainder of the afternoon. He was
made very anxious before the arrival of General Granger,
on account of the short ammunition of his men, as, by
somebody's unauthorized orders— the name of the guilty
party is not mentioned in the reports — the ammunition-
trains had been ordered back. There were not more than
two or three rounds to the man left when a partial supply
was obtained from the train following Steedman's division,
giving an average of ten rounds per head. At half-past
three Thomas received, for the first time, authentic intelli
gence of the full extent and consequences of the disaster to
our right— four hours after it had happened!— by the ar
rival of General Garfield, accompanied by Lieutenant- Col
onel Thurston, General McCook's assistant adjutant-gen
eral, and two of his own staff.

The chief of staff and his companions had made their
way back to the front, following roads part of the way,
but cutting right through the woods over Missionary
Ridge the greater part, urging their animals to the utmost
speed, with the sounds of battle for their guidance. Once

1863] GARFIELD RETURNS TO THE FIELD 157

they rode right upon a party of the enemy, who fired upon
them, and they narrowly escaped death or capture. Gen
eral Garfield had followed the Commander-in-chief as far
as Rossville. During the ride to that point past the re
treating soldiery, artillery, and trains of every sort, grave
and quickly growing doubts rose in his mind and pricked
his conscience (I heard the story from his own lips in
Chattanooga, within a fortnight after the battle) regarding
the official and personal propriety of his chief's and his
own conduct in turning their backs upon the battle-field,
and going a long distance from it without any knowledge
of the fate of the greater portion of the army, and without
any earnest effort to ascertain it. He expressed this feel
ing to his superior, with the suggestion that they proceed
no further than Rossville and try to learn something defi
nite about Thomas, and he offered to go himself in search
cf reliable information. General Rosecrans at first ob
jected to both recommendations, but finally yielded to the
chief of staff's urgent plea for permission to set out in
quest of Thomas. Garfield 's success in reaching the front
proved that communication with Thomas was possible. As
General Wood expresses it pointedly in his report: "He
showed thereby that the road was open to all who might
choose to follow it where duty called." But still stronger
proof lay in the fact that the two aides of Thomas, who
came with Garfield, led back with them one of the miss
ing ammunition-trains which they had overtaken far to
the rear. Garfield 's ride has been commemorated perhaps
more than it deserved in both prose and poetry.

His tale of Rosecrans 's escape and the sorry plight of the
rest of the army was hardly apt to inspire General Thomas
with greater confidence in his ability to save the fortunes of
the day. But that stern character was not daunted by it,
and resolved to hold his ground to the last. Shortly after
Garfield 's appearance, instructions from General Rose
crans, dated Chattanooga, 4 : 15 P.M., reached Thomas over
the field telegraph (thus demonstrating how easy it really

158 HENRY VILLARD [1863

was to communicate with the front), instructing him " to
assume command of all the forces, and with Crittenden
and McCook take a strong position and assume a threat
ening attitude at Rossville. Send all the unorganized force
to this place for reorganization. " This was virtually an
order to leave the field to the enemy and retreat. Neither
General Thomas nor the chief of staff thought such a
course necessary. The latter, in his first report of Thomas 's
condition to Roseerans, dated 3 : 45 P.M., indicated this and
even said : " I think we may in the main retrieve our morn
ing disaster." But the order was not modified, and so
Thomas had to obey it. He determined, however, to hold
the position until nightfall. The fresh supply of ammuni
tion was distributed as quickly as possible. Our line was
strengthened by moving in Hazen's brigade, which was the
only one left with full cartridge-boxes, from Palmer 's front
between Reynolds 's right and Wood's left. The expecta
tion that the enemy would renew his attacks was fulfilled
directly.

General Longstreet had kept his reserve division under
Preston inactive notwithstanding the repeated requests
from his sub-commanders for assistance. But, upon the
failure of the general assault upon the Federal position,
he decided to respond to a further pressing demand
from Hindman. Indeed, having satisfied himself by per
sonal observation that to gain the Snodgrass heights
would make him complete master of the field, he resolved
upon a supreme effort to take them, and sent orders to
General Buckner to move Preston to the attack. The lat
ter first led Gracie's and Kelly's brigades forward, his
third one under Trigg being kept back to meet an appre
hended cavalry attack against the left and rear. In sup
port of the advance, Buckner ordered the reserve artillery
of his corps to a commanding position, from which the
eleven pieces opened a heavy, continuous fire upon the
hills. Preston's men passed through the discomfited lines
of Anderson and Kershaw. The two brigades were to

1863] DEFENCE OF THE "HORSESHOE" 159

form beyond them for a joint attack, but Gracie in the lead
followed directions from Kershaw to push on, and directly
received a withering musketry fire from the " horseshoe."
Still, he moved on to the base of the hills and then made
a rush up the nearest spur. The Second Alabama actu
ally gained the height. There the brigade was checked by
our infantry fire, suffering terrible losses. The Second
Alabama went in with 239 officers and men and lost 169.
Its flag was pierced eighty-three times. Gracie contended
against Granger's command. Kelly's brigade followed in
about ten minutes, and, bearing more to the right, attacked
Brannan and Wood. He became at once as hotly engaged
as Gracie, and also gained a lodgment on the outrunners
of the hills. But both he and Gracie found themselves
so severely pressed that they sent word to the division
commander that they could not maintain themselves with
out reinforcements. Trigg's brigade was thereupon hur
ried up, one of its regiments going to the support of Gracie
and the remainder making a fresh attack to the left of
Kelly. At the same time, by order of General Longstreet,
Stewart's division resumed action after hours of passivity,
and advanced to the right of Kelly.

As Longstreet himself admits that Preston's attack was
not a success, the claim of all the commanders of the de
fenders of the " horseshoe " that they maintained their
position even against these last rebel onsets, deserves
credit. The truth was, doubtless, that the enemy won
some elevated ground held by our skirmishers in front and
on the flanks, but did not actually penetrate our main line.
But our leaders agree that the onslaughts upon them were
made with extraordinary energy and bravery. General
Wood states that the attack last referred to brought on
the most terrific musketry duel, the fierce, continued roar
of which inspired a sentiment of grandeur in which the
awful and sublime were intermingled. Our front line ad
vanced to the crest of the ridge, anc\ delivered their fire
by volleys at the command, and then retired a few paces to

160 HENRY VILLARD [1863

reload, while the rear line took its turn in firing, thus keep
ing up a rain of missiles upon the enemy. Colonel Harker
says that he never before witnessed so grand an example of
effective musketry. General Granger speaks of our line
being continually enveloped in smoke and fire. His men,
in the end, got out of ammunition and had only their
bayonets with which to repel the foe. Our troops were en
couraged and cheered by the presence of Generals Thomas
and Garfield under fire. The latter remained till the close
of the action with Harker 's brigade, his own former com
mand, sustaining the spirits of rank and file by animating
words and acts.

Before five o'clock, General Thomas notified the division
commanders through a staff officer to prepare to withdraw
their commands from the field as soon as they received
formal orders to that effect. These preparations meant
the drawing in of the picket lines and their reserves, and
could be carried out on our left only where the enemy had
abstained from offensive movements since the forenoon.
Not long before, General Bragg had concluded to second
indirectly the final effort of Longstreet by a new general
attack with his left, and sent orders to General Polk to
press forward at once with his whole line. There was con
siderable delay in distributing corresponding orders to the
corps and division commanders under Polk, and it was
near dusk before they were carried out. The line of attack
was formed with Liddell's division on the right, and next
Gist's, Breckinridge's, Cleburne's, and Cheatham's respect
ively. It so happened that, in the meantime, further orders
to begin the withdrawal had been sent to the division com
manders Reynolds, Palmer, Johnson and Baird, and their
execution was just commencing when Folk's columns ad
vanced. Reynolds withdrew first, and General Thomas
left Wood's rear to direct Reynolds to a proper posi
tion to cover the retirement of the other troops from the
left. On the way he received warning that a rebel column
was advancing perpendicularly upon Reynolds, and

1863J RETREAT UNDER FIRE 161

reached the latter in time to prevent his surprise and
the loss of the line of retreat. Turchin's brigade threw
itself upon the approaching rebels, and routed and drove
them beyond Baird 's left, with the loss of over two hun
dred prisoners. It was Liddell's division that received this
staggering blow. Reynolds 's division was then so posted
to the east of the Chattanooga road as to form a curtain,
as it were, behind which the retirement might be effected,
it was hoped, without molestation ; but it turned out other
wise.

Palmer was to move away first, Johnson next, and Baird
last. The rebel attack struck them, however, before they
could get out of reach. As in the morning, Baird was in
volved first and worst. He describes the onset as more vio
lent than that of the morning. Three batteries opened
upon him, while the rebel infantry pushed on towards him.
He held fast to his position for a time, as it seemed to him
safer to remain than to fall back with the enemy upon him ;
then, seeing the troops of Palmer and Johnson moving off,
he attempted to follow suit. But he was pressed so closely
that many of his men were struck down, while a large por
tion of the remainder became disordered, and saved them
selves in separate squads, or, in the confusion, ran into the
enemy's lines. Johnson asserts that he was appealed to
personally by Baird, and that he sent Willich to his sup
port, and that the latter 's brigade charged the enemy "and
drove them back with terrible slaughter." Strange to say,
Baird makes no mention whatever of this alleged incident.
Johnson further relates that, as his front was already at
tacked when he received the order to withdraw, he sent
a staff officer to tell General Thomas that he supposed the
general was under the impression, when he gave the order,
that all was quiet on his front, whereas he was so fearfully
assailed that a retreat might prove disastrous. Before the
staff officer's return, however, the withdrawal of Palmer,
followed by a hostile body, exposed Johnson's flank so that
he felt obliged to retire also, barely saving his command
11

162 HENRY VILLARD [1863

from complete destruction. He gives credit to his reserve
brigade under Willich for having saved the troops from
annihilation and capture by being able to "engage the
enemy in four different directions," but makes the dis
graceful confession that he neglected to send an order to
withdraw to the gallant brigadier, who, however, took good
care of himself and others.

Palmer also suffered in his retreat. He supposed that he
was to retire only some distance to another position in the
rear of the centre and there to re-form for further resist
ance. His men had moved but a few hundred yards when
the rebels rushed over the abandoned breastworks, and, in
a few moments, opened upon them with artillery from right
and left and small arms from the rear. It was almost
impossible under such severe fire to preserve the forma
tions. Grose's brigade became disordered, but the re
mainder got off in better shape, and the loss of the division
was not great. Palmer halted and formed his command
beyond range so as to constitute a rallying-point for the
large crowds of stragglers which came up with him. His
order did not direct him to what point to fall back, but,
after waiting until night had set in, he started of his own
accord for Rossville.

It was Stewart's division which, in advancing, had come
upon and passed over the breastworks abandoned by Rey
nolds and then chased Palmer and made captures from
him. His men joined the divisions of the Confederate
right in making hill and dale ring with the frantic
yells of joy over the apparent ease with which they had
now carried the position against which they had vainly
butted with heavy loss in the morning. The rebels did
not discover, indeed, that Thomas was in retreat, but all
thought that they had driven him off to another position.
As dusk had set in, and the different parts of Folk's com
mand had become much mixed up in pressing after our
troops, and there was danger of their mistaking each other
for enemies after dark, they were brought to a halt all
along their line.

1863] FEDERAL RETREAT TO ROSSVILLE 163

The rebel offensive in front of Brannan, "Wood, and
Granger by the command of Hindman and Buckner also
ceased as the shades of evening descended upon the field.
But the defenders of the " horseshoe" were made to hold
their position until after the left had been withdrawn.
Thomas sent orders to retire to the three generals simul
taneously, but they do not agree as to the time at which
they did so. Brannan says he withdrew "soon after sun
set," while both Wood and Granger give seven o'clock as
the hour when they received the order. Fortunately,
moonlight facilitated the retreat towards Rossville. It
was effected by Brannan and Wood without disturbance
from the enemy, but Granger fared worse. By a most cen
surable negligence, three regiments of Whitaker's brigade
did not receive notice to withdraw, and found themselves
suddenly enveloped by the two rebel brigades of Trigg and
Kelly, and were compelled to surrender almost bodily with
all their field officers and flags.

Our several columns reached the vicinity of Rossville
before ten o 'clock, with the exception of Generals Reynolds
and Willich, whom General Thomas had directed to protect
the rear with their commands, and who remained in posi
tion in the field till the last of the other bodies had passed,
and did not get into bivouac before midnight. General
Thomas, accompanied by Generals Garfield and Granger,
had ridden in advance (in compliance with the Comman
der-in-chief's order to assume a "threatening attitude"),
to select as good a position commanding the approaches to
the town as could be found in the night and in the early
morning. This the troops occupied as they arrived.

The enemy remained in entire ignorance of our retreat
during the night. None of the rebel commanders was
aware, indeed, of the extent of their success before the next
day. General Bragg telegraphed cautiously in the evening
to Richmond that, ' ' after two days ' hard fighting, we have
driven the enemy, after a desperate resistance, from several
positions and now hold the field, but he still confronts us.
The losses are heavy on both sides, especially in our officers.

164 HENRY VILLARD [1863

We have taken over twenty pieces of artillery and some
2500 prisoners." The secession Governor Isham G. Har
ris, one of the bitterest rebels (he died in 1897, a United
States Senator), who was with Bragg, wired at the same
time to a newspaper: ''After two days' fighting, we suc
ceeded in driving the enemy from his positions. The en
gagement not yet decisive." General Bragg was even led
to believe, from alleged indications of movements in his
front, that his foes were making dispositions for a renewal
of the conflict in the morning. He was not at all anxious
for this, "with his troops exhausted," to quote from his
report, "by two days' battle, and with very limited supplies
of provisions and almost destitute of water ' ' ; and the news
of our disappearance must have been most welcome to him.
He heard it first, while riding early in the morning towards
Folk's headquarters, from General Liddell, whose pickets
had discovered at dawn and reported that there were no
signs of the Federals. He immediately gave orders to send
out skirmishers along the whole line and move all the cav
alry to the front. The rebel left still believed in the
presence of our army when Bragg 's aides reached it
with these orders. The reconnoitring of the cavalry soon
brought confirmation of the contrary. It was only then
that Bragg dared to claim a "complete victory" in a second
despatch to the rebel War Department. But he felt too
weak for immediate pursuit. Having an aggregate loss of
nearly fifty per cent, of his effective strength, including
a very large percentage of officers, and considering the dis
organization of the remainder, he felt that it would be
reckless and disastrous to follow the enemy immediately
and attack him in the entrenchments at Chattanooga, to
which he supposed we had at once fallen back. His judg
ment was doubtless correct. His army certainly needed at
least a short respite for rest and reorganization and
replenishment of supplies. But his decision to remain quiet
was, as will be seen, the beginning, so to speak, of his
downfall.

1863] ROSECRANS IN CHATTANOOGA 165

General Rosecrans continued his mournful ride from
Rossville to Chattanooga in gloomiest despondency, as I
learned afterwards from his companions, for he was still
under the impression that the whole army had been over
whelmed. He reached the town about 4 P.M., and estab
lished his headquarters in the building occupied by Gen
eral Wagner, the post commander. Within half an hour of
his arrival, both General McCook and General Crittenden
rode into the place separately and reported to the Com
mander-in-chief for orders. McCook, accompanied by Gen
eral Morton, Chief-Engineer, and three aides-de-camp, had
been conducted by a guide over by-roads without meeting
any of our troops until he struck the main road within less
than two miles of Chattanooga. Here he met a force under
command of General Spears on its way to Rossville by
order of General Rosecrans to render what assistance it
could to the army. The whereabouts of the Commanding
General in town being thus ascertained, McCook gal
loped on. Crittenden had stopped a short time at Rossville
to make inquiries regarding his command and General
Rosecrans. He failed to get any reliable information
regarding the former, but, learning from some staff officers
of Rosecrans 's presence in Chattanooga, he pushed on as
fast as possible.

The two corps commanders had not been long with the
General-in-chief when the first report from General Gar-
field was received. It was the first intelligence that had
reached General Rosecrans that Thomas had not suc
cumbed, but was still holding the enemy at bay. The chief
of staff said in the same message : * * Granger thinks we can
defeat them badly to-morrow if all our forces come in. I
think you had better come to Rossville to-night and bring
ammunition." Notwithstanding this appeal, General Rose
crans not only did not himself act on this suggestion to
return to the front, but remained in Chattanooga, and did
not even send Generals McCook and Crittenden back. He
told them to get some rest, which they both did.

166 HENEY VILLAKD [1863

Immediately after hearing from General Garfield, the
Commanding General sent the first telegraphic report of
the day 's events to Washington. He wired : * * We have met
with a serious disaster. Extent not yet ascertained.
Enemy overwhelmed us, drove our right, pierced our centre
and scattered troops there. Thomas, who had seven di
visions, remained intact at last news." This was a sorry
sequel to his report of the first day's battle, which had
closed with these words: "By the blessing of Providence,
the defeat of the enemy will be total to-morrow." Far
worse tidings had already reached the national authori
ties in the frantic, terror-stricken messages to the Secretary
of War of Charles A. Dana, whom Mr. Stanton had chosen
as one of his assistants, in reward really for the "vigorous
editorial championship" of the Secretary after Dana had
quarrelled with Horace Greeley and resigned as managing
editor of the Tribune. Dana was sent on a roving mission
to visit the different armies in the West, and report con
fidentially to the Secretary upon their condition, as well as
his own opinions of their commanders and the leading
generals under them. His part was something like that of
the committees which the Convention in the first French
Revolution kept at the headquarters of the armies in the
field. He had joined Rosecrans on the llth of September,
and was with him in the battle, but became separated from
him on the 20th, when the rebels broke our right. He fled
back to Chattanooga, reaching there earlier than Rosecrans,
and telegraphed at once under the impression of the
rout of McCook's and Crittenden's troops, and without
any knowledge of Thomas's successful resistance in the
afternoon, and on the assumption that the whole army was
defeated when he left the field. His report commenced,
"My report to-day is of deplorable importance. Chicka-
mauga is as fatal a name as Bull Run," and contained
these passages: "Our troops turned and fled. It was
wholesale panic. Vain were all attempts to rally them."
"Our wounded are all left behind, some 6000 in number.

1863] GARFIELD'S REPORTS 167

We have lost heavily in killed to-day. The total of our
killed, wounded, and prisoners can hardly be less than
20,000, and may be much more." " Enemy not yet arrived
before Chattanooga." The official reporter of the War
Department went to sleep directly after this performance
and did not learn of Garfield 's report until 8 P.M., when
he was obliged, in a second despatch, to modify the alarm
ing fictions born of his fright, as follows: "My report
proves to have given too dark a picture. Having been my
self swept bodily off the battle-field by the panic-stricken
rabble of Davis 's and Sheridan's divisions, my own im
pressions were naturally colored by the aspect of that of
the field." What a confession! Then he gives a pretty
correct account of the course of the action, but adds : ' ' The
latest report from Thomas is that he was driving back the
enemy." He also overestimated the strength of the enemy
at 70,000.

At 8 : 40 P.M., Garfield sent another summary of the
events of the afternoon to General Rosecrans from Ross-
ville, in which he expressed more favorable and hopeful
views of the result than the facts warranted, using such
language as this: "Longstreet's Virginians have got their
bellies full." "I believe we can whip them to-morrow and
crown the battle with victory." "Granger regards them
as thoroughly whipped to-night. ' ' He added : " I hope you
will not budge an inch from this position, but come up early
in the morning, and, if the rebs try it on, accommodate
them." Rosecrans answered that he liked his suggestions,
but did not respond to his second appeal to come to Ross-
ville any more than to the first. Nor was a third more
successful which Garfield made five hours later in these
words : " I hope you will get here as soon as possible to or
ganize the army and victory before the storm sets in."
The General Commanding thought more of saving the rem
nants of the army than of achieving a victory.

It appears from the records that Generals McCook and
Crittenden were ready again for orders at General Rose-

168 HENRY VILLARD [1863

crans's headquarters between 11 and 12 P.M. They were
finally directed to proceed to Rossville and report to Gen
eral Thomas. The two generals say in their reports that
they started together at 12 P.M., but, according to Captain
John J. McCook of Crittenden's staff, they did not get
under way till 2 A.M. General Rousseau, who had just
reached Chattanooga on his return from an official visit
to the North, accompanied them. The two corps comman
ders found in line what had been gathered of their several
divisions and resumed command over them.

The chief of staff's sanguine expectations for the next
day were not fulfilled. In the morning, after studying
the ground about Rossville by daylight, he and General
Thomas became satisfied that it was not a good one for de
fence, being exposed on the right to an easy flanking
movement, and they united in a recommendation to the
General Commanding to concentrate the army at Chatta
nooga; he assented to it by an order received at 6 P.M.
by General Thomas. The movement commenced at 9 P.M.
and was successfully carried out, and by 7 A.M. the next
day, September 22, the troops were all in the positions in
front of Chattanooga staked off for them by engineer offi
cers. McCook was once more on the right, Thomas in the
centre, and Crittenden on the left. The retreat was not
disturbed in the least by the enemy. Rifle-pits were at once
dug and breastworks thrown up, and the entrenchments
subsequently improved from day to day until they were
sufficiently strong for all defensive purposes.

In the forenoon of the 22d, Rosecrans telegraphed to
General Halleck: "Our position is a strong one. Think
we can hold out for several days. ' ' In the afternoon of the
same day, he answered President Lincoln, in reply to an
anxious inquiry from him about the position and condition
of his army: "We are now in Chattanooga in line of battle,
the enemy threatening our whole front. Have pushed
to our picket line. Whether they will attack us to-day un
certain. We are about 30,000 brave and determined men,

1863] DOUBLE CLAIM TO VICTORY 169

but our fate is in the hands of God, in whom I hope."
On the 23d, his confidence was so much restored that he
wired to the White House: "We hold this point, and can
not be dislodged except by very superior numbers and after
a great battle."

Bragg 's troops only shifted their bivouacs slightly on
the 21st, so as to be nearer to water in Chickamauga
Creek, buried the dead, and gathered the wounded of both
sides, and collected the spoils of the field in guns, small
arms, accoutrements, tents, ambulances, ammunition, and
quartermaster's and commissary supplies. On the 22d
they were moved some miles further down the valley, but it
was only on the morning of the next day that they appeared
in force on the heights along our front, after some lively
skirmishes with our outposts, so that Rosecrans was mis
taken in reporting their presence the day before.

The rebel Commander-in-chief addressed a congratula
tory order to his army on the 22d, opening thus :

It has pleased Almighty God to reward the valor and endurance
of our troops by giving to our arms a complete victory over the

enemy's superior numbers Soldiers, after two days of

severe battle you have stormed the barricades and breastworks of
the enemy,'and driven before you in confusion and disorder an
army largely superior hi numbers.

Our own Commanding General was, of course, in duty
bound to let off a counterblast. He did this in a high-flown
proclamation, dated October 2, in which he told his soldiers,
among other boastful flatteries:

You have made a grand and successful campaign. You have
driven the rebels from Middle Tennessee. . . . You fought the
combined armies of Bragg, of Johnston and the tried veterans
of Longstreet's corps, and for two days held them at bay, giving
them blow for blow with heavy interest. When the day closed,
you held the field, from which you withdrew in the face of over
powering numbers to occupy the point for which you set out—

170 HENRY VILLARD [1863

Chattanooga. You have accomplished the great work of the cam
paign. You hold the key of East Tennessee and North Georgia.
. . . You hold in your hands the substantial fruits of a victory,
and deserve and will receive the honor and plaudits of a grateful
nation.

As between the rival claims to victory of the two gener-
als-in-chief, the balance of truth no doubt inclines in favor
of Bragg. For even the one basis of Rosecrans's boasts,
the possession of Chattanooga, became directly a doubtful
advantage and threatened to prove a fatal trap for him.
He could not prevent the immediate close investment of the
town, and, before the end of the month, the enemy held him
in so tight a grip that the confidence expressed in the
despatch of the 23d to the President in his ability
to successfully defend the place was very much shaken.
He certainly would never have extricated himself from the
rebel toils with his reduced force, and, but for the rein
forcements which were hurried to his relief from the East,
West, and South, would have been compelled to choose be
tween starvation and surrender or retreat.

Historic justice must, indeed, award the palm to Gen
eral Bragg, although his performance fell short of his chief
object of interposing his army between ours and Chatta
nooga. At the close of the first day, it is true, the battle
might be considered a drawn one, but the issue of the
second warrants no other verdict than that the Army of
the Cumberland suffered a complete defeat. The in
contestable facts were that fully one-third of it was over
whelmed in one attack and driven off in great disorder, and
that the remainder had to abandon the whole field, with its
dead and severely wounded and numerous trophies, to the
enemy. Nor can it be denied that the rebel triumph was
due to superior generalship. Bragg had, indeed, failed to
turn our left on the 19th, but he struck us so hard that he
kept us on the defensive on both days. Rosecrans had
no plan of battle beyond the protection of his lines to
Chattanooga. Bragg adopted a bold one for the 20th, jus-

1863] THE LOSSES AT CHICKAMAUGA 171

tified By the situation and the rules of the art of war, and
substantially carried it out. He was favored by the acci
dent of hitting our right just when most of it was out of
position and in motion. But the strength of his assailing
columns and vigor of their onset would doubtless have been
too much for our wing if it had been in line. General
Longstreet is, however, justly entitled to a share of the
laurels. The debut of Lee's tried corps commander upon
this new theatre was certainly a brilliant one. It will be
difficult, indeed, to find another instance on record of a
general assuming command at midnight over entirely
strange troops and successfully fighting a great action with
them the very next day. Most singular was the final out
come of the battle of Chickamauga in that it proved fatal
in its consequence to both the victorious and the vanquished
commanders-in-chief.

According to the official lists, our casualties on the two
days were 140 officers, including one brigadier-general
(Lytle) and 1517 enlisted men killed, 609 officers and 9147
enlisted men wounded, and 248 officers and 4503 enlisted
men captured, making a total loss of 16,164. The propor
tion of nearly one officer to every sixteen enlisted men is
very large. On the Confederate side, a number of organi
zations appear to have failed to make returns, so that com
plete lists were never available. The closest estimates show
a total rebel loss of nearly 18,000. As 2000 prisoners fell
into our hands, the aggregate of their killed and wounded
must have been almost equal to our total loss, and fully
one-third larger than ours in killed and wounded. This
was the natural result of the constant offensive of the
enemy on both days. Three Confederate generals were
killed and four wounded. There is a great discrepancy
between the returns of the respective chiefs of ordnance as
to the loss of artillery on our side. Rosecrans's chief ad
mits the loss of only thirty-six pieces, while Bragg 's claims
fifty-two.

The battle of Chickamauga will live in memory as one

172 HENRY VILLARD [1863

of the bloodiest ever fought. The killed and wounded on
the two days reached fully twenty-five per cent, in the
Union and thirty-three per cent, in the Confederate army
of the number engaged. But the percentage of the losses
of particular organizations was much higher on both sides.
In a number of regiments and brigades it ranged from
forty to fifty per cent, and over, with even higher percen
tages of officers, so that regiments were commanded by
captains and first lieutenants, and brigades by majors. By
far the greatest relative losses were suffered during the
closing struggle on the second day. Among the assailants
as well as the defenders of Snodgrass Hill, almost all the
casualties occurred in the two hours, and in some brigades
in the last hour, before dark. Of the Confederates, Bush-
rod Johnson's and Cleburne's divisions, and of the Union
ists Steedman's, shed the most blood.

As I was not an eye-witness of the struggle described in
the foregoing, it may be asked why I undertook to write
its history. The answer is a simple one. In order properly
to introduce the story of the events at and about Chatta
nooga, which will be related in the next chapter, it was
necessary to review the Chickamauga campaign. For this
purpose, I examined both the Official War Records and
other works relating to it, and, in so doing, was struck by
the imperfections of all the existing narratives of the memo
rable battle. I found them incomplete, incoherent, and
contradictory in a greater degree than those of almost any
other of the great actions of the Civil War. These very
defects excited a desire on my part to draw from the avail
able material a truer picture of the extraordinary contest.
I was not long in finding out that, owing to the complicated
movements of the two armies preceding the culminating
collision, to the extension of the fighting over two days, and
to the insufficiency of the sources of information, I had un
dertaken a most difficult task. But its very difficulties
stimulated my determination to overcome them. It in
volved months of arduous labor. I am obliged to confess,

1863] THE STORY OF CHICKAMAUGA 173

however, that their result is not as satisfactory as I could
wish it to be as regards fulness and accuracy. Yet I can
affirm that its shortcomings are not due to any want of
conscientious endeavor on my part, but to the impossibility
of making up a consecutive, complete and absolutely clear
and true account from the material at my command. I
have done the best I could with it, however, and I believe
I can justly claim that my story is fuller and more correct
than any of the existing publications upon the subject, and
that it will be readily intelligible to the general reader.

MEMOIRS OF HENRY VILLARD

BOOK SEVEN
IN CIVIL-WAR TIME: CHATTANOOGA

CHAPTER XXXI

FEDERAL CONCENTRATION AND REORGANIZATION.— 1863

WHEN the Government at Washington became con
vinced that part of Lee's army had been detached
to reinforce Bragg, the General-in-chief, Halleck, ordered
General Grant, on September 15, four days before the bat
tle of Chickamauga, to send all the troops he could spare,
with all possible promptness, to the assistance of General
Rosecrans. The order reached Grant at Vicksburg only on
the 22d, but he at once complied with it, and soon
fleets of steamboats were carrying tens of thousands of
men up the Mississippi, bound for Memphis, whence they
were to move by land. The deep effect of the news of the
reverse at Chickamauga upon the Government is shown by
the fact that, for the first time since the outbreak of the
Rebellion, it was led to subordinate the theretofore always
predominant considerations for the safety of the national
capital to the requirements of a crisis elsewhere upon the
theatre of war, and to overcome its reluctance to weaken
the Army of the Potomac by reinforcing other armies from
it. The decision was reached to send the llth and 12th
Army Corps, under Generals Howard and Slocum, as
quickly as possible, by rail, to the Tennessee, under the
command of General Hooker. The transfer of the nearly
20,000 men of the two corps, of guns, horses and teams and
their belongings, was effected in a week— a very creditable
achievement for those days. It took place as secretly as
possible, and, in response to an appeal from the War De
partment to the Northern press, not a single reference was
made to it in the newspapers.

I was just getting ready to start from Cincinnati for
12 177

178 HENRY VILLARD [1863

Chattanooga when I was surprised on September 29 by
the sudden arrival of General Hooker, accompanied by Gen
eral Butterfield, whom he had appointed his chief of staff,
at the Burnet House, where I was stopping. They wel
comed me very heartily, and invited me to accompany them
on their way to Chattanooga. As they travelled by special
trains, their offer was eagerly accepted, and I set out 'with
them in the course of the same day for Louisville, where
we stopped half a day, and then continued our journey to
Nashville and Bridgeport. Railroad travel at that time
was, compared with its present perfection, of a primitive
character. Sleeping or parlor cars were not yet known;
hence long day and night journeys were very fatiguing.
Although we had the right of way, we were delayed at
every point by the crowding of the lines with trains carry
ing troops and supplies. It took us nearly two days and
a half to reach Bridgeport on October 2, the regular run
ning time being only fourteen hours. Directly in the wake
of us, a dozen or more trains landed the two divisions of
the llth Corps under Generals Carl Schurz and Steinwehr
on the banks of the Tennessee.

General Hooker's elation at being restored to active ser
vice was very great. Since I had last seen him, at Freder-
icksburg, he had passed through the ordeal of the battle
of Chancellorsville, and had considered himself definitively
shelved in consequence of his great failure there. He was
in the highest spirits, and full of confident expectation of
new distinction in the field. He talked in a lively and gay
manner on the way, but was very indiscreet in discussing
his past disappointments. He had hoped to have an imme
diate chance to do some fighting, and was very much taken
aback when he received orders to remain himself at Bridge
port, and to employ his two corps in guarding the lines of
communication between Nashville and Chattanooga. This
meant scattering his troops in small bodies over about 200
miles of distance and did not suit him at all. But this
duty was only temporary, and he was kept busy enough

1863] BRIDGEPORT TO CHATTANOOGA 179

while it lasted by rebel raids upon our communications,
of which I shall speak hereafter.

I lost no time in pushing on from Bridgeport to Chatta
nooga, which I found to be an arduous undertaking of
much hardship. The falling back of our army had been
unfortunately accompanied by the abandonment of Look
out Mountain and Lookout Valley to the enemy. The
Mountain rises, within a little over a mile from and to the
west of the town limits, sheer up from the south bank of
the Tennessee to the height of 2500 feet. Around its base
ran the roads which formed the only direct western ap
proaches from the Tennessee to Chattanooga, one down
Lookout Valley, and the other over Raccoon Moun
tain. The occupation of Lookout by the rebels cut us
completely off from the use of these roads, and limited
us to the one longer and very difficult line of supply
from Stevenson and Bridgeport up the Sequatchie Val
ley to Jasper, and thence over Walden's Ridge to the north
bank of the Tennessee River opposite Chattanooga, a
distance of forty-eight miles. I had no choice but to take
this. I left Bridgeport on the afternoon of October 3, in
an ambulance with three officers, and our horses gave out
when we reached Jasper, ten miles distant, after dark.
Starting again at daylight, the roads proved so execrable
that we decided to continue on foot, and had the hardest
struggle in ascending and descending in the darkness. It
took until after midnight to make the eight miles to the
river. I bivouacked the rest of the night with some team
sters around a camp fire, and crossed over to the town on
one of the two bridges at daybreak on the 5th. I went
directly to the general headquarters, where I was very well
received by Generals Rosecrans and Garfield. The chief
of staff provided me with quarters in a small brick house
of which some of the staff had taken possession. Having
been obliged to leave my hand valise and roll of wraps be
hind in the ambulance, my whole equipment consisted of
what I carried on my body. I continued in this uncom-

180 HENRY VILLARD [1863

fortable predicament for nearly three days, when, to my
great relief, I recovered my retarded belongings, and could
discharge my duties in an easier state of mind.

Feeling very tired from my rough night's experience, I
lay down for a good sleep at about 9 A.M., but was roused,
after resting hardly an hour, by the sound of heavy guns.
It was the beginning of the long bombardment of Chatta
nooga from the rebel positions on Lookout Mountain and
the heights to the south of the town. The enemy had tried
some desultory firing upon us on previous days, apparently
in order to get the proper range, but on this, the 5th day
of October, 1863, our troops had their first experience of
continuous discharges. As the sounds did not cease, I got
up and set out to learn what the firing meant. I spent the
rest of the day in working my way on foot along our lines
and becoming acquainted with the situation.

Chattanooga occupies one of the peninsulas formed by
the crooked course of the Tennessee in that mountainous
region. The town had, before the Northern invasion, a
population of about 10,000, and, as the junction of impor
tant railroads from all points of the compass, was a flour
ishing commercial and industrial centre. It extended from
the left bank of the river southwardly for about a mile,
with an average width of half that distance. The ground
rose gradually, the lower part near the river forming the
business, and the upper the residence, portion. Most of
the buildings were of red brick, giving the place a solid
and well-to-do appearance. There were some flour- and
saw-mills, a foundry, rolling-mill, and other industries.
The common station of the railroads was at the southern
end. Of the population only a few hundred were left,
white and black. General Rosecrans was anxious to get
rid of the rest of the whites by sending them into the rebel
lines. Business was completely at a standstill. The con
tents of the stores had been removed. Many of the build
ings were being used for military purposes, and a number
of private houses as headquarters; but the bulk of the
troops camped under tents in the outskirts.

1863] CHATTANOOGA FORTIFIED 181

Our lines extended across the widest part of the peninsula.
Our right, to the west of the town, under General Alex
ander McD. McCook, first rested near the mouth of Chatta
nooga Creek, but was subsequently drawn in further. Next
came the centre, under Thomas, and the left, under Crit-
tenden, thus repeating the formation that had been fol
lowed through the campaign. On reaching the assigned
positions, our troops were at once put to work digging rifle-
pits for immediate protection. Then day and night were
employed in the construction of breastworks of solid earth
in the rear of the pits. They arose like magic. The
rebels had erected several forts within the town limits,
which were put to use. The chief engineer, General Mor
ton, had designed an interior chain of redoubts connected
by breastworks, which were rapidly approaching comple
tion. On Cameron Hill, an abrupt elevation on the west
side of the peninsula, a regular casemated citadel was being
constructed. Altogether the army could be said to be well
sheltered within a strongly entrenched camp. Three days
after the battle, Rosecrans reported to the War Department
that he had 30,000 effectives left. This number had been
increased in the meantime by returned stragglers and fur-
loughed officers and men, and by various bodies on detached
service, to about 35,000— an ample number to hold the place
behind the entrenchments against any attack by the rebel
army. Our security was, nevertheless, by no means abso
lutely assured; we were, on the contrary, exposed to the
double danger of being either bombarded or starved out of
the place.

Missionary Ridge divides the valleys of the Chattanooga
and Chickamauga. It rises abruptly, like a mighty ram
part, to a height of 1600 feet above the Tennessee River,
and at an average distance of about two miles from Chatta
nooga. From the nearest part of its summit every quarter
of the town is commanded. The rebel lines stretched from
near the abutment of the Ridge on the Chickamauga along
its brow to and beyond Chattanooga Creek, up the slopes
of Lookout Mountain facing the town. The enemy's camps

182 HENRY VILLARD [1863

were concealed by heavy timber, but their presence along
this extended front had been well ascertained by reconnois-
sances, spies and deserters. The length of the line was
nearly eight miles— too great — and became a source of
weakness to which the final rebel defeat was due. The Con
federate, like the Union army, retained its formation of
Chickamauga during the first stages of the investment at
Chattanooga— that is, the wing under Lieutenant-General
Polk formed the right, and that under Lieutenant-General
Longstreet the left. The strength of Bragg 's forces was,
according to the returns telegraphed to the Richmond War
Office on October 7 : Present for duty, infantry, 4664 offi
cers, 46,447 enlisted men; artillery, 157 officers, 3480 en
listed men, making a total of 54,748 officers and men. The
enemy's superiority in infantry and artillery thus appears
to have been about thirty per cent. It was shown that the
losses at Chickamauga had reduced Bragg 's strength of
42,000, exclusive of cavalry, to about 24,000, so that 30,000
men must have been added to his command during the in
tervening two weeks and a half. These heavy reinforce
ments appear to have been made up of the two brigades of
McLaws's division and two of Hood's divisions of Long-
street's corps, which joined the army just after the battle,
a division from Mississippi under Major-General Stevenson,
and many thousands of absentees on furlough and sick
leave, whom the rebel authorities, by strenuous efforts, suc
ceeded in gathering up and returning to the front.

The Confederate Commander-in-chief had made up his
mind to confine his operations against Chattanooga to as
close an investment as the local conditions allowed, and to
compel the Unionists, both by interrupting their supplies
and by shot and shell, either to surrender or retreat north
of the Tennessee. This decision was contrary to the judg
ment of his leading generals, and, as will duly appear, led
to what was nothing less than outright insubordination on
their part. The interruption of our supplies had already
been accomplished in a great measure by forcing us off the

1863] THE BOMBARDMENT 183

river route, through the occupancy of Lookout Mountain
and by cavalry raids upon our lines of communication be
tween the Tennessee and Nashville. Haste had also been
made in bringing up heavy guns for the bombardment of
the town. It was their debut that roused me from my
slumber.

I made my way to the summit of Cameron Hill, where
I had a fine panoramic view of the town, Missionary Ridge,
and Lookout Mountain. The firing was carried on by ten
guns stationed singly at considerable intervals along the
winding road up the Mountain, and from one heavy piece
and several light rifled pieces on Missionary Ridge. The
highest gun on Lookout seemed to fire from an elevation of
from 1200 to 1500 feet above the river. The heavy guns
fired from a distance, measured by the sound, of about
three miles. The firing continued all day till sunset, but
varied greatly. Sometimes there were lively outbursts so
that I could not count the number of shots, and again the
discharges were single and in slow succession, as if for pur
poses of range-finding. Hundreds of shells were thrown
in the course of the day, ranging from missiles six inches
in diameter to those of three-inch fieldpieces. But the
enemy inflicted hardly any damage. So far as I could
learn, only one private was wounded in our camps, al
though crowds of our men freely exposed themselves by
watching the fire from our parapets. Even the children
pursued their games in the streets without concern. From
our side only one field battery tried a little rifle practice
from one of the redoubts. A couple of thirty-pounder rifle
Parrotts had arrived from Nashville, but were not yet in
position.

Before my return to the army, the Northern papers had
been full of all sorts of accounts of the course of the two
days' battles, the causes of our defeat, and the behavior of
Generals Rosecrans, McCook, Crittenden, Negley, Davis,
Sheridan, Wood, and Van Cleve. Charges that the first
three had sought safety in flight from the battle-field had

184 HENRY VILLARD [1863

been freely published all over the loyal States, and official
investigations called for in the press, by various State
authorities, and in Washington. There was so much con
tradiction and partisanship in the printed versions that I
resolved to ascertain the truth on reaching Chattanooga
and to write a review of the battle. I began at once to
gather material for it. Generals Rosecrans and Garfield
expressed their readiness to place at my disposal all the
information they had, including the official reports of the
corps, division, and brigade commanders, as fast as they
came, together with the orders issued before, during, and
after the conflict. Both were also not only willing but
eager to give me the benefit of their opinions of men and
matters without the least reserve. Indeed, they had a
good deal on their minds, which they were very glad of an
opportunity to relieve by speaking out unrestrainedly.

General Rosecrans represented himself the victim of the
Washington authorities generally, and of the General-in-
chief and Secretary Stanton in particular. He was even
more bitter and vehement than at Murf reesboro ' in his
denunciations of them for interfering with his plans and
for not complying with his recommendations and requisi
tions. He announced his firm intention to "show up"
these two principal offenders in his official report— a threat
which he was, however, wise enough not to carry out. He
affirmed emphatically that the direct and sole cause of the
disaster on the second day was the want of judgment and
discretion on the part of General Wood in executing the
momentous order "to close up on Reynolds as fast as possi
ble and support him," and opening a gap in the line al
though aware that the enemy was about to attack that part
of it. He applied the strongest language to that division
commander, and even charged that he withdrew from the
line, notwithstanding that Wood; in doubt as to the pru
dence of moving away, had sought advice of General
Thomas, who told him to stay where he was. General Rose
crans was also unqualified in his censure of Generals Me-

1863] ROSECRANS'S PERPLEXITIES 185

Cook and Crittenden for coming to Chattanooga ''without
orders," and at the same time thought it necessary to de
fend himself by a long argument on the duties and powers
of a commander-in-chief for having preceded them. On
my referring to the stories about Negley, he said promptly
that this general had marched his troops away without
orders, and ought to be tried by court-martial and dismissed
from the service.

When I broached the subject of his own plans, he did not
speak in as resolute a way about holding Chattanooga as
I expected to hear. He was evidently in serious doubt
whether sufficient supplies to maintain his men and animals
could be secured. The destruction of several hundred
wagons in the Sequatchie Valley by Wheeler's cavalry, to
be followed probably by a new interruption of our only
railroad connection with Nashville, made the outlook very
grave. He confessed that there were rations for only a
few days on hand, and so little forage that he was
obliged to send away officers' and artillery horses. The
lack of forage diminished greatly the quantities of supplies
hauled by the wagon trains, since they had to carry food
for their own animals for the round trip. The badness of
the roads, destructive alike of wagons and of teams, so im
peded their movements that it took them over a week to go
and return. The reinforcements from the East, under
Hooker, practically did Rosecrans no good, as they could
not be brought up within supporting distance, owing to the
difficulty of feeding them. He was clearly comforting him
self in advance with excuses for a step which he did not
like to take, but to which he feared he might be forced.
Altogether, I found him very nervous, vindictive, irreso
lute, with little courage and self-reliance left, and showing
generally the demoralizing effect of the lost battle.

General Garfield, knowing that he was safe with me,
took me freely into his confidence. He told me how fully
convinced he was that his chief was making a mortal mis
take in going to Chattanooga, how he tried to dissuade him

186 HENEY VILLARD [1863

from it, and how relieved he himself was to be permitted
to rejoin Thomas. He asserted that a very strong feeling
prevailed in the army over the conduct of the Commanding
General and the two corps commanders, and intimated that
he considered their removal from command probable. He
had grave doubts also as to the possibility of keeping pos
session of Chattanooga. Having been nominated for Con
gress in an Ohio district sure to give him a strong majority
at the impending election, his days of active service were
numbered anyway. While he did not say so directly, it
could be inferred from his remarks that his faith in Rose-
crans's military qualifications was shaken, if not lost, and
that he was not sorry to part official company with him.
His changed opinion naturally made his position very em
barrassing to him. In corroboration of this, I will antici
pate events by quoting from a despatch of Secretary Stan-
ton to Assistant Secretary Watson, dated Louisville, Oc
tober 21, as follows: "Generals Garfield and Steedman
are here on their way home. Their representations of the
incidents of the battle of Chickamauga more than confirm
the worst that has reached us from other sources as to the
conduct of the Commanding General and the great credit
that is due to General Thomas." (War Records, Series 1,
Volume XXXI, Part I, page 684.)

I sought the headquarters of General McCook before
dark on the day of my arrival and found General Critten-
den with him. Both generals were in a state of great irri
tation and apprehension over the severe censures and de
mands for their removal and punishment with which the
Northern papers were filled, and welcomed the chance of
uttering their grievances to an old acquaintance through
whom they hoped to get a hearing in the press for their
side. The principal defence of both was that they had
been virtually deprived of their commands by the succes
sive orders of General Rosecrans to send one after another
of their divisions to the support of General Thomas. In
proof, they cited the original orders. McCook also showed

1863] McCOOK AND CRITTENDEN 187

me the order dated September 20, 10 : 30 A.M., requiring
him, after sending Sheridan's division to General Thomas,
"to report in person at these headquarters as soon as your
orders are given in regard to Sheridan's movement." He
considered it a complete justification of his following the
General Commanding to Chattanooga. But it may well be
asked, Would he have been court-martialled if he had not
obeyed the order, in view of the change in the situation?
And would it not have been to his great credit, and would
he not have kept his command, if he had stayed at the
front? Crittenden claimed, that, having no longer any
troops to command and being without orders, he was in
duty bound to report to the head of the army, which could
be done only by following him to the town.

I spent the whole evening with the generals and Mc-
Cook's staff, all of whose members were in a bitter and
depressed frame of mind. The corps commanders had not
indicated any fears of personal consequences, but the staff
officers were all apprehensive. Not being fully convinced
by their arguments, I should have been embarrassed but
that, in their excitement and wrath, they did most of the
talking. As to the charge made and reiterated by the whole
press that they had gone to sleep after reaching Chatta
nooga, they explained it as I have already done. They em
phasized the fact that the Commander-in-chief had found
no fault with their conduct— an assertion which astonished
me not a little, as I had heard him express himself any
thing but approvingly regarding it only two hours before.

The blow they anticipated had already fallen even while
I was discussing the subject with them. Nashville papers
three days old were received late that night, with the news
that the War Department had issued an order, dated Sep
tember 28, consolidating the 20th and 21st Army Corps
into a new one numbered 4th, appointing Major-General
Gordon Granger to the command of it, relieving Generals
McCook and Crittenden from duty in the Army of the
Cumberland, and ordering them to hold themselves ready

188 HENRY VILLARD [1863

to respond to a summons before a court of inquiry. I
did not hear this until late the next morning, when I went
at once to the general headquarters to ascertain whether
the startling announcement was true. General Rosecrans
admitted that he had received intimations from Washing
ton that such orders would be issued, but he had not yet
received them. Such was the fact, and the formal order
was not promulgated by him until October 9. The intelli
gence created a great sensation throughout the camps, and
consternation at the headquarters of the two affected corps.
Generals McCook and Crittenden took it very hard, al
though they tried to seem indifferent. They felt that the
indirect method of relieving them by the consolidation
would deceive nobody, but would still leave upon them the
stigma of punishment for their part in the battle by re
moval from command, and they made known their deter
mination to demand courts of inquiry without delay. They
manifested deep regret that ignominy should also be fas
tened upon their troops by the wiping out of the two corps
organizations. I expected that the consolidation would
not, on that account, be well received by their officers and
men ; but all, from commanders of division down, appeared
to submit quietly to the change.

I tried to discover who was directly responsible for the
act. Both Rosecrans and Garfield denied that they had
recommended it or any other punitive measure at Wash
ington, and subsequent developments confirmed this.
Then I had a talk with Charles A. Dana, the Assistant
Secretary of War, still at the army headquarters, but he was
entirely non-committal. It is a matter of record, however-
first through the publication of his reports to Secretary
Stanton, and again lately through his own admission in
the personal memoirs printed in McClure's Magazine—
that his representations regarding the part played by the
two generals at Chickamauga and its effect upon their
subordinates had as much to do with the decision of the
Washington authorities to remove them as any other influ-

1863] CHARLES A. DANA 189

ence. He is responsible for the assertion that Garfield,
Wood, Palmer, Sheridan, Johnson, and Hazen demanded
the removal. Justice calls for the statement that he was
entirely wrong in some of his animadversions upon those
corps commanders, and showed strong, bordering on ma
lignant, bias against them. He received and conveyed im
pressions, like the professional journalist that he was, has
tily, flippantly, and recklessly. He thus involved himself
in glaring inconsistencies and contradictions and humil
iating self-corrections. This criticism certainly holds good
of his official correspondence relative to the Chickamauga
and Chattanooga campaigns as reprinted in the War Rec
ords. It must be admitted, nevertheless, that his reports
indicate great power of observation and expression, and that
his characterizations of military leaders were sometimes
very able and true. Nor can it be doubted that he was
animated by sincere patriotic ardor, recognition of which
led Secretary Stanton to overlook the shortcomings of
the work of his special reporter. Wherever the latter was,
his superior was kept better advised on all matters in
that part of the theatre of war than from any other source.
He was indefatigable, and shrank from no hardship and
personal danger in discharging what he considered his
duty. Yet his zeal often degenerated into officiousness,
and he fell at times into the role of the informer, without
perhaps being conscious of it. I saw a great deal of him
during ou'r joint stay— at least once and often several times
a day— and never failed to find him very communicative.
Being a man of great natural parts and wide and thorough
acquirements, and affable withal, his society was a real
boon.

Generals Me Cook and Crittenden left for the North, ac
companied by their entire staff, on October 10. It was a
bitter trial for them to take final farewell of their com
panions in arms, whom they had led for two years and in
five different campaigns— Shiloh and Corinth, Middle Ten
nessee, Perryville, Stone River, Tullahoma and Chicka-

190 HENRY VILLARD [1863

mauga. It must be said that they did not receive any too
much sympathy from the officers and men of their com
mands. I felt sincerely for them, knowing them always to
have tried to perform their duties to the best of their abil
ity. I had been one of McCook's military family so often,
and received so much kindness from all its members, that
their departure moved me like a great personal loss. Their
separation from the Army of the Cumberland was perma
nent, although they both underwent courts of inquiry into
their conduct at Chickamauga, which found that General
McCook committed a mistake in leaving the field to go to
Chattanooga, but that this was only an error of judgment,
and that in all respects his behavior was faultless, and
which pronounced that "General Crittenden's conduct not
only showed no cause for censure, but that it was most
creditable, and that he was not even censurable for going
to Chattanooga." I did not see General McCook again
before the close of the war, but I found General Crittenden
once more in active service six months later, at the head of
a division in the Army of the Potomac. Both issued pa
thetic farewell orders to their corps.

On the same day, the reorganization of the army, neces
sitated by the formation of a new corps out of the 20th
and 21st, was formally promulgated by general order.
The 4th Corps was to consist of three divisions commanded
respectively by Generals Palmer, Sheridan, and Wood.
Each division comprised three brigades, commanded in
the first by Colonel Cruft, General Whitaker, and Colonel
Grose; in the second by Generals Steedman and Wag
ner and Colonel Harker; and in the third by Generals
Willich, Hazen, and Beatty. The divisions averaged be
tween 6000 and 7000 men, and the total strength of the
corps was nearly 20,000. The 14th Corps also consti
tuted three divisions, instead of the former four, under
Generals Rousseau (who resumed command on return from
leave, relieving General Brannan), Baird, and Davis, and
each division consisted of three brigades— in the first under

1863] GENERAL NEGLEY DISCIPLINED 191

Generals Carlin, King, and Starkweather; in the second
under Colonel Morgan, General John Beatty, and Colonel
Daniel McCook; and in the third under General Turchin,
Colonel Van Derveer, and Colonel Croxton. Five division
commanders and fourteen acting brigadiers were thereby
rendered inactive. The changes in the sub-commands of the
army were thus very sweeping.

General Negley was separately dealt with, and far more
leniently than the two corps commanders. General Rose-
crans, though considering him deserving of the severest
punishment, allowed him to prepare a special defence
against the statements severely reflecting upon his case in
the reports of Generals Brannan and Wood. After receiv
ing and examining the papers from him, the Commanding
General came to the conclusion, as he wrote on October 14
to the War Department, that General Negley " acted ac
cording to his best judgment under the circumstances of
the case." He further gave him a leave of absence for
thirty days, but advised him to ask for a court of inquiry.
General Negley proceeded to Washington, and, on October
30, formally requested the Secretary of War by letter to
order a court of inquiry in his case. The Secretary not ac
ceding to this and advising him to return to the front, the
General telegraphed to Chattanooga for orders, and re
ceived a reply directing him to return to the army on expi
ration of his leave. The case now took a very curious turn,
worth relating in detail as it shows our military manage
ment in a peculiar light.

Having reached Nashville, he wired on November 10 to
Chattanooga for orders. He was told, in answer, to remain
in Nashville until further orders, and: "It is proper that
you ask for a court of inquiry. It would not be proper
to assign you to a command until an investigation has
been had." To this the General naturally replied that he
had applied for a court, and renewed his request for one
to the War Department, but heard nothing further from
any quarter until he received an order, dated Chattanooga,

192 HENKY VILLARD [1863

December 22, as follows: "Major-General J. S. Negley
having failed to demand a court of inquiry for the purpose
of freeing himself from charges affecting his usefulness
in this command, is hereby directed to proceed to Cincin
nati or to any point outside this military division and
report by letter to the Ad jut ant- General of the army for
orders." This he did promptly, only to be informed by
the Adjutant-General that the General-in-chief had no or
ders for him, as he belonged to General Thomas 's command.
Finally, the President on June 9 ordered a court of inquiry
for him (the same order directed courts for the corps
commanders also). The court found not only that " Gen
eral Negley exhibited throughout the second day of the
battle and throughout the following night great activity
and zeal in the discharge of his duties, ' ' and that there was
no evidence affording any ground for censure, but that
General Brannan's allegations were not sustained, and that
General Wood deserved stern condemnation for indulging
in severe reflections upon General Negley, and applying
coarse and offensive epithets to him, in the presence of the
army commander and some of his staff, while failing to sub
stantiate his charges on the witness stand. Thus ended this
curious "much ado about nothing. "

CHAPTER XXXII

CRISIS IN THE CONFEDERATE ARMY.— 1863

WHILE the removal of the generals and the reorgani
zation absorbed the attention of headquarters and
camps on our side, a similar crisis was occurring in the
Confederate army. Indications of it had reached us
through Southern newspapers. These came into our lines
almost as quickly as into the enemy's, thanks to the truce
arrived at between the respective pickets, without au
thority, but winked at by their superiors, and which led to
friendly talk and exchange of courtesies. One contained a
general order of Lieutenant-General Polk, in which he took
leave of his corps, and the announcement of the removal
of General Hindman from command. But no one was
aware of the extent and violence of the conflict then raging
among the rebel generals, nor was it suspected that these
internal quarrels had led to a most important event, of
which we learned from rebel papers and through the great
commotion on Missionary Ridge. It was nothing less than
a visit of Jefferson Davis himself to Bragg 's troops. The
President of the Confederacy arrived on the evening of
October the 10th and remained till the 13th. His
presence was signalized by artillery salutes and parades
and reviews, which could be clearly seen from Cameron
Hill. From our picket line the band music and cheers
with which the rebel soldiery responded to the speeches
he made to them were also distinctly heard. It is only
by the publication of the Official War Records that the con
nection between his visit and the squabbles of the generals
has been made apparent. I think it best to give at length
this interesting chapter in the history of the Rebellion,
is 193

194 HENRY VILLARD [1863

The opposition of Bragg 's lieutenants to his decision
simply to invest Chattanooga speedily found vent in active
demonstrations against him. The first of these on record
is a letter addressed by General Longstreet to the Secretary
of War at Richmond, full of complaint and criticism, in
which this passage occurs:

To express my convictions in a few words, our chief has done
but one thing that he ought to have done since I joined his army.
That was to order the attack upon the 20th. All other things that he
has done he ought not to have done. I am convinced that nothing
but the hand of God can save us or help us as long as we have
our present commander. Now, to our wants. Can't you send us
General Lee? . . . We need some such great mind. . . . You will
be surprised to learn that this army has neither organization nor
mobility, and I have doubts if its commander can give it them. . . .
When I came here, I hoped to find our commander willing and
anxious to do all things that would aid us in our great cause, and
ready to receive what aid he could get from his subordinates. It
seems that I was greatly mistaken. It seems that he cannot adopt
and adhere to any plan or course, whether of his own or of some
one else. . . . There is no exaggeration in these statements.

Nor was Longstreet content with this. He begged Colonel
James Chestnut, Jr., aide-de-camp of President Davis, then
on a visit to the army, to go to Richmond with all speed
and urge action upon him. In an official letter dated Oc
tober 4, to Lieutenant-General D. H. Hill, he entreated him
and Buclmer to see the colonel also for the same purpose.

Most of the other generals in command above the rank of
brigadier followed Longstreet 's example. They conspired
to make a direct appeal to President Davis for Bragg 's re
moval. Their action was hastened by the issue of an order
on September 29 by the Commander-in-chief, who had
learned of the cabal against him, relieving from their com
mands Major-General Hindman, for disobedience of orders
in the affair in McLemore's Cove on September 11, and
Lieutenant-General Polk, for the same offence, on the

1863] CABAL AGAINST BRAGG 195

morning of the second day at Chickamauga. A long letter
to the Executive, dated October 4 and understood to have
been prepared by Buckner and Breckinridge, was signed
by them and Lieutenant-General Hill and Generals Hind-
man, Cheatham, Preston, Brown, and others. Its character
may be judged from the following quotations:

Two weeks ago this army, elated by a great victory, which prom
ised to be the most fruitful of the war, was in readiness to pursue
its defeated enemy. That enemy, driven in confusion from the
field, was fleeing in disorder and panic-stricken across the Tennes
see River. To-day, after having been twelve da*ys in line of battle
in that enemy's front, within cannon range of his position, the Army
of the Tennessee has seen a new Sebastopol rise steadily before its
view. The beaten enemy, recovering behind its formidable works
from the effect of its defeat, is understood to be already receiving
reinforcements, while heavy additions to his strength are rapidly
approaching him. Whatever may have been accomplished hereto
fore, it is certain that the fruits of the victory of Chickamauga have
now escaped our grasp. The Army of the Tennessee, stricken with
a complete paralysis, will in a few days' time be thrown strictly on
the defensive, and may deem itself fortunate if it escapes from its
present position without disaster.

After urging the necessity of strengthening the army,
in view of the reinforcements of the enemy, the petitioners
continue: ''But . . . your petitioners would deem it a
dereliction of the sacred duty they owe the country, if
they did not further ask that Your Excellency assign to
the command of this army an officer who will inspire the
army and the country with undivided confidence." More
over, independently of other reasons, "the condition of
the health of the present commander totally unfits him
for the command of an army in the field. ' ' In conclusion :
' * In making these representations to Your Excellency, your
petitioners are aware that the proceeding is unusual among
military men, but the extraordinary condition of affairs
in this army, the magnitude of the interests at stake, and

196 HENRY VILLAED [1863

a sense of the responsibilities under which they rest to
Your Excellency and to the Republic, render this proceed
ing, in their judgment, a matter of solemn duty, from
which, as patriots, they cannot shrink." The petition
closed with a strong affirmation of their disbelief in the
possibility of success under the existing command.

The annals of modern warfare will probably be searched
in vain for a counterpart to this extraordinary perform
ance in the face of the enemy. Lieutenant-General Polk
had anticipated it by a letter of his own to the same effect,
to President Davis, dated two days before he was relieved
from command, by one of the same date and of a like tenor
to General R. E. Lee, and by another to the President,
bearing the date of October 6, in which he goes so far as
to say :

General Bragg . . . allowed the whole of the fruits of this great
victory to pass from him by the most criminal negligence, or, rather,
incapacity, for there are positions in which weakness is wickedness.
If there be a man in the public service who should be held to" a
more rigid accountability for failures, and upon the largest scale,
than another, that man is General Bragg, and I shall be happy to
go before a court of inquiry on charges preferred against me by
General Bragg, that I may have the opportunity not only of vindi
cating my own conduct, but of establishing the truth and justice of
what I have written of his lack of capacity as a commanding
general.

Longstreet's letter to the Secretary of War had effect.
The latter wired to General Bragg that his apparent inac
tion since Chickamauga was causing anxiety, and called
for an explanation. The General sent a full reply, setting
forth that to attack the entrenched enemy would be sui
cidal, and that he was making every effort to accumulate
sufficient supplies for a turning movement across the Ten
nessee River. But the demonstrations of the other gen
erals decided the rebel President to make a personal at-

1863] CABAL AGAINST BRAGG 197

tempt to heal the dissensions on the ground. It may
easily be imagined that his task was a delicate and un
pleasant one. It does not appear whether he gave hear
ings to both sides during his stay, but it is certain that
he determined to sustain Bragg at all points. The latter
offered to give up his command, but Davis would not listen
to the suggestion. He not only approved of the removal of
Generals Polk and Hindman, but, the day after his arrival,
authorized also that of Lieutenant-General D. H. Hill. He
consented the more readily to the latter as Hill had been
detached from Lee's army for the same reason, disobedi
ence of orders.

Formal charges were made by General Bragg against
Generals Polk and Hindman and sent to the War De
partment. The two generals, of their own accord, also ap
plied for courts of inquiry. General Polk addressed inter
rogatories regarding his conduct to all the commanders
under him, to which they all replied, mostly in his favor,
and he further secured the statements of all his staff. But
it never came to courts-martial or courts of inquiry in
either case. President Davis settled that of Polk by de
clining to authorize the appointment of a court, on the
ground that his personal examination into the causes and
circumstances of his removal had satisfied him that there
was nothing in them to justify further investigation, and
by appointing the Lieutenant-General to the command of
another department, "as the best evidence/' to quote from
his official notification, "of my appreciation of your past
service and expectations of your future career." General
Hindman received even more striking exoneration. In his
formal declination to order a court of inquiry, the Presi
dent gave as his reasons for it that his personal investiga
tion of the case had convinced him that, if the explanations
since given had been made at the proper time, General
Bragg 's order relieving him would never have been issued.
This snub direct was administered to Bragg, notwithstand-

198 HENRY VILLARD [1863

ing the recantation which he addressed to the President, no
doubt on his requirement, in this humiliating form, under
date of November 15 :

After your action in the case of Lieutenant- General Polk, which to
me has been entirely satisfactory, I feel it a duty as it is a pleasure
to request similar action on your part toward Major- General
Hindman. This officer, as will appear from the official reports,
was conspicuously distinguished at Chickamauga for gallantry and
good conduct, and nothing but the necessity for uniform discipline
prevented my overlooking the previous affair for which he was
suspended. From what I have heard unofficially, the General may
prefer not to serve under my command; but it is only just for me
to ,add that he possesses my fullest confidence as a most gallant
soldier and excellent disciplinarian.

The outcome was, that General Hindman returned to
duty under Bragg.

The narrative of the machinations against the latter
would not be complete without mention of the singular
controversy provoked by General Buckner with General
Bragg, within a week after the army had taken position
before Chattanooga, over the question whether the Com
mander-in-chief had the right to transfer to another gen
eral's command part of the troops which Buckner had
brought with him from East Tennessee. The correspond
ence between them, which fills many pages in the Records,
culminated in violent personal abuse and a reference of the
mooted point to the War Department, which overruled
Buckner, who seems to have been a conceited, carping, and
querulous egotist.

CHAPTER XXXIII

WHEELER'S RAID.— 1863

NEARLY all through September, dryness had pre
vailed and produced a veritable plague of deep dust,
most trying to troops and supply trains. At last, on Oc
tober 1, relief came in a good rainfall. At first it expe
dited transportation, but as rains gradually became fre
quent and heavier, the blessing was turned into another
affliction. By the time of my trip from Bridgeport the
roads were miry, and from day to day the reports regard
ing their condition grew worse. They soon spoke graphi
cally of the animals sinking in the mud up to their bellies
in the bottoms of the Sequatchie and along the Tennessee.
The rains proved very trying in another respect. They
filled the enclosed works and the ditches around them and
the connecting trenches more or less deep with standing
water, which it was found very difficult to drain off. The
work on the fortifications was naturally very much ob
structed. The steady rain made it almost impossible for
the troops to keep dry, although they were provided with
tents or had secured shelter in huts and dug-outs. There
was a consecutive downpour for thirty-six hours during the
first week of my stay. The pontoon bridge was broken on
the night of October 15 by the force of the current, but
fortunately the boats and timbers were saved and the
bridge restored after a few days. The rebels, taking ad
vantage of the elements, sent a number of rafts down
stream to destroy it, but these happily passed while it was
broken, and proper precautions subsequently taken neu
tralized all efforts in this direction.

I need not say that I too was made very uncomfortable

199

200 HENRY VILLARD [1863

and hampered in my work by the inclemency of the
weather. Owing to the increasing trouble in feeding
horses, I had concluded to try to get on without one, but,
under the circumstances, locomotion became steadily more
and more restricted, as every sally meant getting wet
through. Weather prognostications formed the main sub
ject of talk at the various headquarters. The flood from
above quickly swelled the rivers also, and their rise assumed
such proportions as to involve dangerous consequences and
render the condition of the army still more precarious.
By the middle of the month, the Sequatchie was so high
that it could no longer be forded at Jasper, and our supply
trains were compelled to come and go by a circuitous route,
lengthening the time of the round trip and entailing still
greater destruction of wagons and animals. The high water
in the Tennessee also did great mischief right under our
eyes. Of the two bridges by which Chattanooga was con
nected with the north bank, the trestle had to be given up.

The protracted wet spell acted as a damper on the rebels
as well as on our side. The hostile guns had not apparently
increased in number, and they were fired so desultorily at
long intervals that the enemy seemed to be under the re
straint of a scarcity of ammunition. The damage they did
to life and property was so insignificant, too, that we grew
entirely indifferent to them. Those were indeed dull and
gloomy days, not even enlivened by the regular arrival of
the mails. While the bridge was broken, not a letter or
newspaper reached the camps. Even the telegraphic con
nection was very irregular, and several times our only com
munication with the North was by couriers. Some slight
ripples of excitement were produced, however, by the Ohio
elections.

It must seem passing strange to foreign military men,
and even our present generation will find it difficult to un
derstand, that the discord and disintegration of party poli
tics were deliberately introduced in the armies in the field.
But party exigencies, in consequence of the really threat-

1863] GENERAL GARFIELD DEPARTS 201

ening character of the internal political situation in 1863
in the loyal States generally, and especially in Ohio, where
the bitter contest between Brough and Vallandigham for
Governor was waged, made the Republican leaders feel jus
tified in bringing about the passage of the State laws per
mitting their respective contingents in the national armies
to cast their ballots for State tickets wherever they might
be. No agitation by meetings and speeches among the
troops in behalf of the candidates of either party was al
lowed before the election, yet so many politicians were serv
ing in the rank and file that considerable quiet canvassing
went on nevertheless. The voting took place on October
13, with very satisfactory results to the loyal cause. Out
of nearly 10,000 votes, less than three per cent, were cast
for Vallandigham. General Garfield, having actually won
his seat in Congress, left for good on the 15th, under orders
to proceed to Washington and to deliver in person to the
War Department General Rosecrans's report of the Chieka-
mauga battles, and to make such verbal explanations re
garding the campaign as might be called for. I could but
lament his departure, for our relations had become so
friendly and even intimate that he was always ready not
only to give me all the army news, but to talk our situa
tion over with me in the frankest manner. I was but too
conscious that I should probably not again be able to form
such a genial and professionally profitable connection in
that army.

While the danger of being shelled out of Chattanooga
was no longer looked upon as great, the problem of prevent
ing our being driven from the place by starvation became
more and more difficult of solution. The troops had been
put on reduced rations before my arrival, but, notwith
standing this, the increasing difficulties of transportation
had so limited the additions to the supplies on hand that,
by the middle of October, there were not more than half-
rations for a week left for officers and men. All, from the
General-in-chief down to the privates, had nothing Hetter

202 HENRY VILLARD [1863

than the reduced regular ration without fresh meat. No
sutlers' stores could be drawn on to eke out the allowances
by extra eatables and drinkables. Money had lost its pur
chasing power. I wrote that it seemed to be impossible for
us to remain in Chattanooga. Dana had the same opinion
and wired it to Washington. On the 15th he telegraphed
that the scarcity of food would soon make it neces
sary for all persons other than soldiers to leave, and that
he desired instructions whether he should return to Wash
ington or make his way to Burnside in Eastern Tennessee.
The distress was still greater for beast than for man, as
forage grew more scant than provisions. Yet more work
had to be exacted from the poorly fed animals in hauling
trains, in consequence of the steady increase of mortality
among them. Hundreds fell daily en route, and the roads
were literally lined with dead horses and mules. The
weakness of the stock was such that teams had to double
up to get empty wagons over Walden's Ridge, and it took
as many as ten days for a trip only one way. Between the
foot of this ridge and the banks of the Sequatchie, hun
dreds of teams were reported to be stopped owing to the
exhaustion of animals. Artillery horses fell daily by scores.
Around us in Chattanooga, the sight of famished and fam
ishing beasts became a common one. Numbers of them
could be seen tied to trees and left by their owners to
starve. Many officers incurred losses in this way and had
to attend to their duties on foot. Nor did there seem to
be any prospect of an early alleviation of this discomfort
and suffering.

The chief cause of our sorry plight was the abandonment,
upon the retreat of our army into the town, of the northern
slope of Lookout Mountain, which commanded the direct
approaches to the town from the west, including the wagon
road around the face of the mountain. This important po
sition had been held by a brigade, but General Rosecrans
ordered its withdrawal, against the protest of his chief of
staff and General Granger, as I was repeatedly told by the

1863] WHEELER'S RAID 203

former. They argued with him that from 1500 to 2000 men
would suffice to hold the ground against any force of the
enemy, and distinctly warned him of the certain conse
quences of the other course ; but he would not be convinced,
and the hazardous step was taken. Military critics have
justly said that this was as great a mistake on his part as
the fatal order to General Wood in the second day's bat
tle of Chickamauga. It not only absolutely prevented our
utilization of the shorter and better land route from Shell-
mound on the south bank by way of Whiteside and Wau-
hatchie, but also the use on the river of the steamboats
which had fallen into our hands below and at Chattanooga,
and which, in the then favorable stage of water, would have
alone sufficed to supply all the wants of the army. More
over, it enabled the enemy to station sharpshooters on the
south bank within easy range of the road on the opposite
side over which our transportation had to pass for a dis
tance. From the second week in October on, their fire
proved a dangerous hindrance in the daytime to the move
ment of men and animals.

But the Confederates did not confine themselves to ob
structing our transportation from the secondary base at
Bridgeport ; directly after Chickamauga they resumed their
old game of breaking up our railroad connection with Nash
ville, so as to prevent the movement of supplies from the
North to the Tennessee. Their efforts were at first alarm
ingly successful. The chief raider, General Wheeler,
started from the rebel right on September 29, and on the
following day succeeded in crossing the Tennessee near
Washington, some forty miles northeast of Chattanooga,
with his own two divisions and three brigades from For
rest's command, amounting in all only to between 4000
and 5000 officers and men. A cavalry division of our own,
under General Crook, not over 2000 strong, had been
charged with the duty of watching the fords above Chat
tanooga, but his force was scattered over a distance of fifty
miles, and hence was unable to prevent the passage of the

204 HENRY VILLARD [1863

enemy. Wheeler reached the Sequatchie Valley over Wai-
den's Ridge on October 2. He divided his force, sending
the greater portion under General Wharton over the Cum
berland plateau, and proceeding himself down the Se
quatchie towards Jasper. Unfortunately for us, the whole
train of the 14th Corps, loaded with commissary, quar
termaster, and ordinary stores, sutlers' and medical sup
plies, numbering some 400 vehicles, including a number
of ambulances, was then strung out between the stream and
Walden's Ridge, and fell an easy and most rich prey to the
raiders. They loaded themselves up with all they could
carry; stripped the teamsters and other persons accom
panying the train (including a party of men and women
from the United States Sanitary Commission) of their
clothing and all their valuables; selected the best of the
animals to remount themselves and to be driven along ; shot
the rest of the horses and mules, or cut their throats
with their sabres, and finally set fire to the wagons and
ambulances.

Wheeler then started with his booty to rejoin Wharton,
but he was not to get away without some punishment.
When General Rosecrans learned from General Crook, on
October 1, of Wheeler's movement, he wired orders at once
to my friend Colonel Edward McCook, who was watching
with his cavalry division the crossings of the Tennessee
above and below Bridgeport, to move up the Sequatchie at
once in pursuit of the rebel cavalry. Although his three
brigades were scattered and he had only three regiments
and a section of artillery with him, he set out without delay
from Bridgeport. At noon on the 2d, he struck the rebel
rear guard near the scene of the destruction at Ander
son's cross-roads and at once charged and drove it before
him. He pressed closely after the enemy on the 2d and
3d, up to the summit of the Cumberland plateau. The
rebels repeatedly tried to make a stand, but gave way
each time under the attacks of our men. The result was
a considerable rebel loss in killed, wounded, and prisoners,

1863] WHEELER'S RAID 205

the release of a number of our men belonging to the train
escort, and the recapture of about 1000 mules.

General Crook, after collecting his command, followed
rapidly in the rebel track. He was too late to prevent the
capture of McMinnville ( garrisoned by only one small regi
ment) and the appropriation and destruction of large
stores of every kind; but he caught up with Wharton's
rear and had a severe brush with it between McMinnville
and Murf reesboro ', and compelled the rebels to abandon
their intended attack on the latter town. But they suc
ceeded in destroying the railroad bridges and track south
ward to the Duck River. Near Murf reesboro ' General R.
B. Mitchell came to Crook's aid with McCook's division,
which had made forced marches from the Sequatchie, and,
as chief of cavalry, assumed command of all the mounted
pursuers.

General Hooker had sent his chief of staff with an infan
try force northward by rail from Bridgeport, to assist in
the capture of the raiders. General Mitchell brought
Wheeler to a stand near the village of Farmington, between
Shelbyville and Columbia, a short distance south of the
Duck River, and put him completely to flight after severe
fighting. After this, it became a steady stern chase of the
rebels to the Tennessee River, which they managed to ford
between Huntsville and Florence, with about half of the
force they had started with, but "loaded down to the
guards," as General Stanley expressed it, "with their
plunder of dry goods, watches, jewelry, and greenbacks,
and hundreds of them dressed in our uniforms."

Another rebel cavalry force, under the notorious Gen
eral Roddey, was to have started simultaneously with
Wheeler from Northern Alabama to join him on the Duck
River, but for some reason it crossed the Tennessee at Gun-
tersville, Alabama, a whole week later than appointed —
that is, on October 7 and 8— and so failed to prevent, as
expected, the concentration of the Union troops against
Wheeler. Roddey reached Salem, Tennessee, on the 10th,

206 HENRY VILLARD [1863

but, learning there of Wheeler's defeat at Farmington,
turned right around and retraced his steps as fast as pos
sible to the Tennessee, and managed to reach Athens, Ala
bama, without having had more than a slight skirmish with
the Federals.

Wheeler 's raid was remarkable for the distance traversed,
the hardships endured, and the work accomplished by his
command. He was only eleven days under way, moved
at the rate of from 40 to 50 miles a day, and certainly
wrought as much damage as could be inflicted, on such a
flying expedition. On our side, General Crook and his divi
sion showed equal tirelessness in the pursuit, for which they
received well-deserved praise in a general order from Gen
eral Rosecrans. There was naturally the greatest solicitude
at the general headquarters regarding the extent of Wheel
er's depredations and the duration of the interruption of
our communications he would compass. The destruction
of the wagon train had a most embarrassing immediate
effect. Railroad connection was happily restored in four
days — another of the many demonstrations during the Civil
War that raids never succeeded in crippling railroads for
any length of time.

CHAPTER XXXIV

ROSECRANS KELIEVED FROM COMMAND.— 1863

4 MONG the negative traits of General Rosecrans's char-
J\. acter, not the least was the obstinacy with which he
clung to his own conclusions, in defiance of reason and facts.
His justification of the abandonment of the river route to
the enemy was, of course, the assumption that it would be
practicable to supply the army fully by way of the Sequat-
chie and Walden's Ridge. He stuck to it stubbornly
against all the arguments to the contrary of General Gar-
field and others, until Wheeler's newest exploits and the
steady decrease instead of increase of the available stores
of food compelled him to consider the problem how to undo
his mistake by re-opening the river line. The conclusion
was indeed forced upon him that without this it would be
equally impracticable to hold Chattanooga or to reach a
condition of readiness for the resumption of the offensive,
inasmuch as the food difficulty would not permit him to
draw the reinforcements under Hooker and Sherman near
enough for the latter purpose. Symptoms of his change
of mind were noticeable before General Garfield's depart-
ture. He commenced talking to him on the subject, to Gen
eral Smith, the new Chief of Engineers, to other generals,
to Mr. Dana and myself. He began, too, to study the topog
raphy of the surroundings of Chattanooga and to send out
engineer officers for the examination of particular points.
This led to the evolution of an ingenious plan for neutraliz
ing the obstructive effect of the hostile control of Lookout
Mountain, viz., to seize and hold the south bank from a
point beyond the range of the rebel artillery opposite the
western front of the narrow peninsula formed by the first

207

208 HENRY VILLARD [1863

great bend of the river below Chattanooga and known as
Moccasin Point. While it was ten miles by water around
the bend, it was not quite a mile across it in an air line
from the north end of the main bridge of the town. The
south bank being seized, supplies could be brought up the
river from Bridgeport, landed at Moccasin Point, and
thence hauled in wagons to the town. There were two
steamboats and some barges available for the water trans
portation. The success of the plan would reduce the time
from Bridgeport to one day each way, and thus solve the
problem of sustaining the army. To carry it out, it was
judged best that the initial attempt to effect a lodgment on
the south bank should be made from Chattanooga, but that
it should be supported by a simultaneous movement up the
river by General Hooker's command.

It was ordained that General Rosecrans should not him
self execute this clever plan. He had fully made up his
mind to carry it out, and had already issued preliminary
orders, including one to Hooker to concentrate his com
mand, when his powers as commander-in-chief were sud
denly cut off. A thunderbolt had been forging against him
in Washington and descended upon him on October 18, in
the form of a telegraphic Presidential order dated the 16th,
relieving him from the command of the Department of
the Cumberland, and directing him to proceed to Cincinnati
and report by letter to the Adjutant- General of the army.
By the same order, Major-General George H. Thomas was
appointed his successor. This summary dismissal came as a
stunning surprise to the doomed general. I can affirm
from personal knowledge that while he had been apprehen
sive of removal after the battle, the tone of President Lin
coln's subsequent despatches to him, and the fact that weeks
had gone by without any indication of other intentions
towards him, had led him to believe in his retention in com
mand. He was wise enough not to give utterance to his
feelings, and to leave at once for the North even before
the change of command became known to the army. When

1863] GRANT TAKES COMMAND 209

I Hade him good-bye, he only remarked: "This was to be
expected. ' '

The truth was, that his fate had been decided at the
national capital early in the month. On the 3d, a tele
graphic order was sent to General Grant at Vicksburg, re
quiring him to proceed at once with his staff and head
quarters to Cairo, and to report to the General-in-chief by
wire for orders on his arrival there. It was several days
in reaching him by boat, but, although he was lamed by an
accident at New Orleans, he obeyed at once, and tele
graphed from Cairo on October 16 for further instructions.
The answer came in the evening of the same day, to the
effect to proceed forthwith to the Gait House, Louisville,
where he would be met by an officer of the War Depart
ment, with orders and instructions. He was also told to
take his staff and headquarters with him, so as to be pre
pared to take the field immediately. This and the direc
tion of his movements made pretty clear to the General and
his military household what were the Government's inten
tions towards him. On reaching Louisville the next day,
the officer of the War Department turned out to be Secre
tary Stanton himself, who delivered to Grant an order of the
President constituting the military division of the Missis
sippi, with the three departments of the Ohio, of the Cum
berland, and of the Tennessee, and placing him in command
of the division, with headquarters in the field. The order
also authorized him to relieve General Rosecrans by Gen
eral Thomas, if he thought it best to make the change.

Before leaving Washington, the Secretary had wired to
Dana on the 16th to meet him in Louisville, in pursuance
of which the latter at once started for the North. As he
relates in his memoirs, he reached Nashville on the night
of October 20, and was intercepted at the station by a staff
officer of General Grant, who told him his chief was on a
train standing next to his and wished to see him. Dana
had heard nothing of the great changes in the military

commands, and his surprise when he learned what had hap-
u

210 HENRY VILLARD [1863

pened may be imagined. General Grant informed him also
that Secretary Stanton no longer desired him (Dana) to
come to Louisville, but to return to the front with himself.
Dana accepted the situation, and was directly on his way
again to Chattanooga. They reached Bridgeport the next
day, and set out for their destination the following morn
ing. Grant's foot troubled him so that he took two days
for the trip ; but Dana rode through in one. An officer who
passed Grant on the way told me that he presented a sin
gular appearance with his white cotton gloves, low shoes,
and white socks which were exposed for several inches.
Dana reported to Stanton on the 23d that the General ar
rived "wet, dirty, and well." Grant himself, in a letter
to Halleck, described the roads he had passed over as bad
almost beyond conception.

Rosecrans's retirement from active command was the
penalty for his loss of the battle of Chickamauga. Nor can
it be doubted that his removal was demanded by the in
terests of the service and of the country. His desertion of
the field alone afforded ample justification, and his conduct
after the retreat to Chattanooga furnished other good rea
sons for it. There was the withdrawal from Lookout Moun
tain, already discussed. Next he was guilty of the
presumption of despatching to the President on October 3
the senseless suggestion that he offer a general amnesty
to all Confederate officers and soldiers, which gave great
offence and raised suspicions of political aspirations on his
part, although Mr. Lincoln replied kindly. But the* great
est fault he showed was his indecision upon the question of
staying in Chattanooga, notwithstanding the strong and
repeated admonitions of the Government, and especially of
the President, to hold the place. This state of the General 's
mind is revealed in Dana's despatches to the Secretary of
"War, but I must in duty point out that the extravagance
of their language, in genuine reporter's style, unduly ex
aggerated the case. As Dana's denunciations were the only
information which reached the Government from an au-

1863] DANA AND ROSECRANS 211

thoritative source— even Rosecrans 's own report did not
reach the capital until after he was relieved— they proved
the determining factor (just as they did in the cases of
McCook and Crittenden) with Stanton and Halleck. Full
credit for this riddance was claimed by Dana himself in a
conversation with me some months later in Washington.
The President was inclined to exercise that weak clemency
towards the General which he manifested towards Mc-
Clellan and other disappointing commanders, but finally
yielded to the " categorical imperative" which Stanton on
this as on other occasions was obliged to address to the
Executive. I cannot help remarking, that, as my own eyes
observed at the time, Dana had intimate intercourse, day
and night, with General Rosecrans, and that he enjoyed his
personal hospitality, sitting at the same table and sleeping
in the same building. His reports also prove that he de
liberately drew the General into confidential communica
tions, the substance of which he used against him, and that
he held talks with general officers regarding Rosecrans
which were nothing less than insubordination on their
part. It can hardly be admitted that patriotic motives
were a sufficient excuse for such a course.

Just before starting for the North, in obedience to the
summons of Secretary Stanton, the Assistant Secretary
wired him that he feared Rosecrans would evacuate Chat
tanooga at once unless he was ordered to remain. It is
due to General Rosecrans to state that there was no foun
dation for this last accusation, and I am at a loss to under
stand how Dana could utter it, for I can personally bear
witness to the contrary. I saw the General daily, and knew
that the reopening of the Tennessee and the proposed move
ment of General Hooker absorbed his attention. Moreover,
I recollect clearly that Dana expressed regret to me, an hour
before his departure, that he was not to be present when
the attempt to seize Williams 's Island and the south bank
should be made; so that he had no real ground for enter
taining the fears he despatched to his chief. But his mes-

212 HENRY VILLARD [1863

sage was effective, in that in consideration of it Stanton
and Grant agreed to act at once by removing Rosecrans
and appointing Thomas in his place.

I had never considered Rosecrans qualified to lead a large
army. I can indeed claim that I took a correct measure of
his mental and moral calibre directly after I made his ac
quaintance at Murfreesboro'. As early as June 14, I
had written privately to the managing editor of the Tribune
from that place, in reply to a suggestion from him that I
should try to get into confidential relations with the Gen
eral Commanding:

My intercourse with him could hardly be more intimate than it
is. I always make it my object to secure the confidence and re
spect of others in my private character as well as in that of a repre
sentative of a leading journal, and am generally successful. As to
the mode of securing the confidence of the General proposed by
you, I must say that it could not be employed, in my opinion, with
out degrading me to a mere mouthpiece of him, as which my self-
respect and conception of professional dignity will never allow me
to serve. I refer to the recommended reading of my correspond
ence to him, with a view to its modification at his pleasure. Per
mit me to advise you, in connection with this, not to commit
the Tribune too strongly to the advancement of his military for
tunes. There are flaws in his moral as well as intellectual com
position and professional capacity ', which the future will surely develop
into prominent shortcomings, and may make too much previous com
mendation a source of contradiction, inconsistency and humiliation.

Personally and professionally the exit of General Rose
crans from the scene was, in one respect, a disadvantage, in
another a relief to me. On the one hand, while I knew his
successor well enough, his natural reserve, if not stiffness
of manner, his reticence and indifference to the press, pre
cluded such facilities at headquarters as I had enjoyed
under the previous regime. Thomas's staff followed his ex
ample, and was offish towards correspondents, whereas the
military family of Rosecrans, in accordance with his own

1863] DANA AND THOMAS 213

seeking of favor with the press, observed the opposite course.
On the other hand, Rosecrans constantly embarrassed me
by trying his best to induce me by special favors to defend
him in the Tribune. He went so far even as to let me not
only read but copy for publication the principal official
reports on the battle which came in before his departure,
with the result that the Tribune printed them in advance
of all other papers. In this connection I give a letter from
Mr. Dana to General Thomas, which appears in the War
Records and explains itself.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON CITY, March 9, 1864.
MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE H. THOMAS,

Chattanooga, Term.
GENERAL :

It is stated by a newspaper correspondent that, on the 19th of
January, you were serenaded by the Ninth Ohio Regiment, and on
that occasion declared to some of the officers of the regiment that
you had praised them in your official report of the battle of Chicka-
mauga, and then added : "I wanted to do justice to the regiment,
and I cannot understand why— I feel sorry— that the War Depart
ment saw fit to curtail my report so as to leave this out." I pre
sume that you are aware that the only copy of your report which
has yet been published was the rough draft furnished by you to
Major-General Rosecrans, that officer being in great haste to make
out his own report. General Rosecrans gave this rough draft which
you had sent him to Mr. Villard, the correspondent of the Tribune,
and it was published in that paper. The final report which you
sent to Washington was, so far as I am aware, never seen by Mr.
Villard. I am confident that you have not imputed to the War
Department the mutilation of any official documents ; but it seems
proper that you should be aware of a statement which pretends to
be made on the authority of your own language.
I am, General, with great regard,

Yours faithfully,

C. A. DANA.

This chapter may fitly be closed with a brief sketch of
the new commanding general. Thomas was a graduate

214 HENRY VILLARD [1863

of West Point, and had had more than twenty years of
active service, including the Seminole and Mexican wars,
in the artillery and cavalry, before the outbreak of the
Civil War. He had thus had longer military experience
than any other general officer in the Army of the Cumber
land. He held the rank of colonel of cavalry in the regular
army. Though a native of Virginia, he had never faltered
for a moment in his fealty to the flag. He had a command
ing presence, being nearly six feet high, and a soldier-like,
erect bearing, with an open countenance, but rather a stern
expression, full light-brown hair and beard tinged with
gray. On first acquaintance, he seemed of a stolid nature
and stiff and distant in manner, but on closer intercourse
would reveal himself as a sturdy, resolute character, with
the strongest sense of duty, and, altogether, a thorough sol
dier. He was not a genius, but was very intelligent, and
although he seemed at times not quick in perception and
too deliberate in execution, he could always be relied on to
do what was required of him to the best of his ability. His
even temperament gave him that coolness in action and
equipoise in success as in failure which he possessed in a
higher degree than any of his fellow- generals. He differed
creditably from most of them in another regard: he was
entirely unselfish and unambitious. He never made the
least effort for personal preferment, and rather shunned
than sought higher commands, from modest doubts of his
competency and consequent shrinking from great respon
sibilities. It will be remembered that he declined the com
mand of the army when Buell was superseded. In the same
spirit, he felt it his duty, when a report reached him that
Secretary Stanton had inquired how his appointment, in
stead of Rosecrans's, would be taken in the army, to
intimate to Dana his reluctance to be the successor. While
lie was not communicative or fluent and polished in speech,
he was by no means discourteous, and, as his reports show,
thought and expressed himself very clearly.

Feeling that I was no longer wanted at the general head-

1863] MESSING WITH WILLICH 215

quarters as a messmate, I looked about for another connec
tion. I received several offers to join other messes, but
finally decided to accept the invitation of Brigadier-
General Willich to share his tent and table. Of his
antecedents as a Prussian artillery officer I have spoken in
describing the campaign under Buell. He was forty-eight
years old, and was probably the most thoroughly trained
officer in the army. He possessed great general intelligence
and knowledge, and conversed well on almost any subject.
He had, however, pronounced socialistic views, which had
led to his participation in the revolutionary rising of 1849
in Germany and to his exile, and with these I did not at all
sympathize. We had many disputes over them, but they
left no irritation. He provided me with a camp bedstead,
and I partook regularly of such fare as he had. His one
servant, a private soldier, was a very smart man and of
general utility in cooking, washing, waiting at the table,
cleaning our clothes, blacking our boots, and taking care of
the general's horse. In apologizing for the meagre meals
he served, General Willich asserted that Fritz was a most
successful purveyor and had nearly always managed to
keep him in plenty, but that as there was now no chance to
forage and his cooking was confined to the treatment of the
reduced rations, he could not well do himself justice. Al
though the commissary department then distributed only
hard bread, bacon, and coffee, Fritz showed real genius in
evolving sufficient repasts out of this scant material and
some canned vegetables and fruit he had managed to save
from better days. I enjoyed Willich 's hospitality as long
as I remained in those parts, and I had nothing to complain
of but the dampness. We could keep up a log fire only in
front, not inside of, the tent, and when it rained, it was
impossible to feel either dry or warm. To counteract this,
our faithful attendant treated us at proper intervals to hot
punch, for which he had kept some bottles of cognac in
close reserve.

I became the guest of General Willich before I knew that

216 HENRY VILLAED [1863

General Grant was coming to Chattanooga to assume su
preme command; but as my chances of being allowed to
join his headquarters were no better than with General
Thomas, I concluded not to run the risk of a refusal, but
to content myself where I was. It was fortunate for me
that Mr. Dana returned, as he became my main reliance
for correct information relative to the plans of the Com
manding General, which he imparted and discussed with
me freely, knowing that I would not make improper use of
it. Next to him, General W. F. Smith, the engineer-in-chief,
whose acquaintance I had made at Fredericksburg, General
Meigs, the Quartermaster-General of the United States
Army, whom the Secretary of War had sent to Chatta
nooga immediately after the battle, and the old division
commanders of the Army of the Cumberland, were helpful
to me. The scene of current events was also so confined
that any occurrence of importance could hardly escape my
notice.

CHAPTER XXXV

THE REOPENING OF THE TENNESSEE RIVER.— 1863

THE very last order General Rosecrans gave to the
engineer-in-chief was to make a thorough reconnois-
sance of the south bank opposite the west side of Mocca
sin Point. General Smith carried out his instructions on
October 19. He found an opening low in the ridge bor
dering the river, through which a small creek discharged
into it, with Brown's Ferry at its mouth. This opening,
or gorge, offered a way for landing parties to gain by a
rush the first heights rising from 250 to 300 feet to the
right and left of it and commanding the narrow valley
between them and Lookout Mountain, and the roads run
ning through it towards the town from a lower ferry.
From that position the communications of the enemy up
the Lookout Valley and over Raccoon Mountain could
also be threatened. It was discovered further that the
ridge was occupied by only a thin chain of pickets, which
it seemed quite practicable to surprise. General Smith was
so well satisfied with the feasibility of the proposed lodge
ment that he immediately matured plans for effecting it
without delay. He submitted it to General Thomas, as the
new army commander, who laid it, with his approval,
before General Grant upon his arrival. The very next
morning, the two generals were conducted to the ground
by General Smith, who explained the topography and his
proposed coup de main. He convinced them of the sound
ness of his plan, and they authorized him on the spot to
proceed with the necessary preparations.

General Smith was assigned to the command of the ex
pedition to be formed for his purposes. The brigades of

217

218 HENRY VILLARD [1863

Generals Hazen and Turchin, numbering over 4000 men,
and three batteries under Major Mendenhall, were ordered
to report to him. The programme was to make the move
ment partly by water and partly by land. Fifty pontoons
built for another bridge were prepared, each to carry
twenty-five armed men and the rowers, together with two
flat-boats holding forty and seventy-five men respectively.
This flotilla would thus be manned by about 1600 men
drawn from both brigades, with General Hazen in com
mand, and was to pass down the river at night to the
selected points for landing, a distance of nearly nine miles
from Chattanooga. The remainder of the infantry and the
artillery were to march under cover of night to the proper
point on the east bank (the western front of Moccasin
Point), whence the infantry was to be hurried in over the
pontoons, directly after the landing of Hazen 's men, while
the guns remained to cover by their fire, if necessary, the
operations of the joint forces. Complete surprise was, of
course, the main condition of success.

General Smith invited me to accompany him on the ex
pedition, and I gladly accepted. The preparations were
pushed day and night, and with as much secrecy as possible.
Even the brigade commanders learned the real purpose
only the day before the expedition took place. As a num
ber of boats had yet to be built and nearly all the oars to
be made and the men instructed in rowing, it was not until
the evening of the 26th that everything was ready. I
was notified to join General Smith at midnight, and was
promptly on hand. He kindly furnished me with a mount
for the occasion. I had enjoyed a long sleep before starting
and felt fresh enough for the night's adventures. We
crossed over the bridge to the north side at about one
o'clock, and had a good deal of difficulty in finding our
way. Fortunately it did not rain, but it was very dark, and
the very bad road was blocked by Turchin 's command and
the artillery. But we reached the landing-place of the
ferry (which in ordinary times ran to the mouth of the

1863] THE NIGHT FLOTILLA 219

gorge opposite) by two o'clock, dismounted and stretched
on the ground, awaiting developments. Absolute silence
was enjoined in order not to excite the attention of the
enemy. No lights or fires were permitted. It was really
remarkable how quiet the 3000 men and hundreds of ani
mals, that bivouacked huddled together near the bank, were
kept for the next few hours. Not a sound was heard by the
rebel pickets, as was subsequently learned, though they
were only about a quarter of a mile from us,

The flotilla was manned by one o'clock, but did not get
under way until 3 A.M. The fifty-two boats moved noise
lessly out in long procession. It was found directly that
the current would carry them along without the use of
oars. After floating down for three miles, the boats came
in sight of the first rebel picket fires, but, by keeping well
up the east bank, were not discovered by the enemy until
the first boat touched the other bank, when a few shots,
which were returned from the flotilla, were fired at them.
This was the first sign to our party that the boats had
reached their destination. It was then nearly five o'clock.
I had fallen asleep leaning against a tree, but was aroused
by the stir about me. We saw nothing but the signal fires
just lighted by our side to indicate the landing-points, but
we heard the noises caused by the disembarkation, as well
as the commands of officers. In about twenty minutes,
sharp musketry was again heard and continued for some
time. We inferred that the rebel grand guard Avas attempt
ing to drive our men into the river. Our anxiety was re
lieved by the appearance of several boats which, having
discharged their loads, came to carry over Turchin's men.
More and more boats followed them, and the passage over
was affected with such regularity and rapidity that by
daylight all the infantry and even a section of artillery
were on the west bank. Towards dawn some rebel guns
had been brought up and threw a number of shells at the
boats, but without doing any damage or interrupting the
transfer.

220 HENRY VILLARD [1863

I crossed over with General Turchin on one of the last
boats, and soon ascertained that General Smith's plan had
been successfully carried out in every detail. We stepped
on the bank, a short distance to the right of the mouth of
the gorge at which the first landing was effected, and
near which stood the small house of the ferryman, the only
human habitation in sight. The gorge formed the bed of a
small creek then running so full that it could be crossed
only by a foot-bridge of a single log over which our men
had to pass in single file. The gorge was just wide enough
for the stream and an ordinary road hugging it closely and
running up and over the ridge, and the slopes on each side
were very abrupt and difficult of ascent. The summit was
sharp and but a few feet wide. These hills fringed a
valley over a mile wide, partially cultivated, and enclosed
to the west by the high parallel range of the Raccoon
Mountain.

Hazen and Turchin were to take the hills respectively to
the left and right of the gorge. Fifty men of the Twenty-
third Kentucky, led by Lieutenant-Colonel Foy of that
regiment, having landed first, quickly moved up the road
about a quarter of a mile to the crest, and commenced
building breastworks, after throwing out some skirmishers.
Shortly afterwards the latter reported the approach of a
force of the enemy. They turned our detachment and com
pelled it to fall back until they came upon more of our
troops under Colonel Langdon of the First Ohio. A stand
was then made, the enemy were checked and finally
driven off. It was ascertained that the rebel body charged
with guarding the river consisted of three small regiments
of Law's brigade of Longstreet's corps, with three pieces
of artillery ; but they were so scattered along the river that
only 150 men attacked Foy's men. They left six dead and
a number of wounded. We lost less than forty in all and
captured the rebel camp, some cattle and a lot of forage.
Our forces then occupied the ridge to the right and left,
according to programme, and fortified themselves as

1863] HOOKER'S ADVANCE 221

strongly as possible with breastworks and abattis. As
soon as the last troops had crossed over, the construction of
a pontoon bridge was commenced, and pushed so energeti
cally that it was completed before dark. I was one of the
first to recross on it and make my way back to Chatta
nooga, and reached my quarters very tired and hungry at
seven.

The good news I brought was sent by General Willich to
the regiments of his brigade and to the other brigade com
manders, and was welcomed with much joy in the camps.
The achievement at Brown's Ferry was a great step towards
the unlocking of the river route to Bridgeport, but it could
not bear the full desired fruit without such further move
ments on our part as would prevent the enemy from ren
dering the position gained useless by again obstructing
navigation from other points on the left bank, between the
Ferry and Bridgeport. The only way to accomplish this
effectually was to shut him out from the approaches to the
river by the valley of Lookout Creek, or, in other words,
by occupying it ourselves. This was to be Hooker's task.
It was intended that he should execute it simultaneously
with the other move. He was ordered to concentrate his
command for this purpose some days before General
Smith's expedition was authorized; but if Dana's report of
October 23 to Secretary Stanton can be believed, he was
laggard about this on the ground that his wagon trains had
not yet arrived. He did not commence the movement until
the morning of the 27th, the very time the expedition
was landing at the Ferry. Dana, who went to Bridge
port to accompany Hooker, wired thence on that day to his
superior that the General was in an unfortunate state of
mind towards the plan he was to execute, finding fault,
criticising, dissatisfied, and truculent. Hooker's force was
to consist of Schurz's and Steinwehr's divisions of the
Eleventh Corps, under General Howard, and Geary's
second division of the Twelfth Corps. He was strength
ened, moreover, by two brigades of General Palmer's di-

222 HENRY VILLARD [1863

vision, which started on the night of October 24 from
Chattanooga to join him by way of Rankin's Ferry.

Hooker's troops were ordered to move without wagons,
with three days' rations and forage, and sixty rounds
on their persons. They passed directly over and crossed
the Tennessee from Bridgeport by a pontoon bridge, with
Steinwehr's division in the lead, and followed the road
along the base of Sand Mountain to Shellmound, where
they entered the valley of Running Water Creek, up which
they marched to Whiteside, where they went into camp late
in the evening. The next morning, the column continued
up Running Water Creek to the watershed, and descended
through the gorge into the Lookout Valley. It pushed on
as far as Wauhatchie without meeting any opposition ; but,
a short distance from that place, near the junction of the
Brown's Ferry and Chattanooga road, the cavalry advance
suddenly received fire from rebels concealed in the under
brush on a hill close to the road. The column halted and
a brigade was deployed to the left and another to the right
of the location of the rebels, in order to cut them off; but
the enemy fled across Lookout Creek and set fire to the rail
road bridge over it. Resuming the march, our troops be
came exposed to the fire of the batteries on Lookout Moun
tain, which commanded that part of the valley; but the
shells they threw did no injury. Between four and five,
the mouth of Lookout Valley was reached and a junction
effected below it by Howard with the command of General
Hazen. The Eleventh Corps went into camp less than a
mile from Brown's Ferry, with its left resting on the
ridge occupied by Hazen, and its right at the base of
Raccoon Mountain. Geary's division was directed to en
camp near Wauhatchie, three miles from the Twelfth
Corps, in a position covering the two roads leading from
Lookout Valley to Kelley's Ferry, the first below Brown's.

We had lost but a few men so far, but the enemy did not
intend to yield the position of Lookout Valley so easily.
They had observed the division of Hooker's force and de-

1863] LONGSTREET'S ATTACK 223

termined to take advantage of it by a night attack. Gen
eral Hazen was said at the time to have been so strongly
impressed with this danger that he sought General Hooker
and urged him to concentrate, but without effect. Hooker
considered an attack improbable, and the control of the
roads to Kelley's Ferry too important for any risk. Gen
eral Geary's division consisted of three very weak brigades
numbering together not over 1500 men. This division
commander had noticed that his movements and numbers
were clearly observable from the rebel signal-station on
Lookout Mountain; moreover, very active signalling from
it made him apprehend that something was contemplated
against him during the night, and he therefore exercised
extra precaution in posting his pickets and grand guards.
But as Howard's corps had apparently cleared the valley
of the enemy to the north, he assumed that any move upon
him would come from the south, and he guarded against
surprise mainly from that direction. His men slept on
their arms, with their cartridge-boxes on. Their rest was
not disturbed until nearly eleven o'clock, when some picket
firing led General Geary to have the whole camp aroused.
All was quiet again until after midnight, when the dis
charge of the guns of our pickets to the north and east
gave warning of the approach of the enemy from the side
he was least expected. General Geary had barely time to
form a line when a heavy body fell upon his left, firing and
cheering.

Lieutenant-General Longstreet, commanding the left of
the investing army, was ordered on October 27 to dislodge
our troops from their new position at Brown's Ferry.
While observing it with General Bragg from Lookout
Mountain, he was apprised of the approach of Hooker's col
umn. Eepairing to a nearer point of observation, they
watched the march of Howard's corps down the valley and
saw Geary's division, which they took to be the rear guard,
come to a halt. They made a correct estimate of the
strength of both bodies, and saw in the long distance sepa-

224 HENEY VILLARD [1863

rating them their opportunity for swooping down upon
and destroying the smaller one. General Law's brigade, a
detachment of which had been encountered by Howard's
cavalry advance, already lay in concealment behind one of
the low short ridges traversing the Lookout Valley, half
way between Howard and Geary. General Longstreet di
rected the other three brigades of Jenkins's (formerly
Hood's) division, which were lying on the east side of the
mountain, to concentrate at its base, and to move around
it and join Law, who was ordered to advance close to the
road between our two bodies. Part of the division was
then to move upon Geary, the remainder to prevent the
Eleventh Corps from reinforcing him, by blocking the road,
and, if circumstances were favorable, to attack and stam
pede our troops over the river. Otherwise, Jenkins was to
withdraw after Geary's destruction. Jenkins moved with
three brigades, as ordered, but found it so difficult to work
around the mountain that he did not reach his destination
before midnight. Law's and Robertson's brigades were to
hold the position occupied by Law, Bratton's was to sur
prise Geary, and Benning's to be stationed within re
inforcing distance of Bratton. The main reliance was on
the panic which they expected to produce on our side by
the night surprise.

Bratton attacked with the Hampton Legion and Fifth
South Carolina on the right, and the First, Second, and
Sixth South Carolina and Palmetto Sharpshooters on the
left. His line advanced within short range before firing,
when a hot exchange of musketry ensued. The enemy tried
to force first our left, then our right and centre. Bratton
asserts that he drove part of our line through its camp and
beyond the trains behind it; but Geary insists that not a
foot was yielded at any point, and that every rebel forward
move was repelled. He admits, however, that the Hampton
Legion almost succeeded in gaining the road to Kelley's
Ferry in his rear, but they were caught in flank and driven
back with considerable loss in killed and wounded. The

1863] "BATTLE OF WAUHATCHIE" 225

enemy had no artillery, but our division battery kept up
an incessant shower of grape and canister upon the assail
ants at short range. The fighting continued till after three
o'clock, when our men's cartridge-boxes were nearly empty.
Fortunately, the hostile fire then slackened, and the rebels
gave up the struggle and withdrew from the field, leaving
their severely wounded behind. Geary naturally claimed
a decided victory, but it appears conclusively from the
rebel official reports that Bratton was ordered to retire by
General Jenkins in consequence of what had happened in
the meantime to the brigades of Law and Robertson.

The sudden and heavy firing towards Wauhatchie was
heard and its meaning at once understood by General
Hooker, who immediately sent a direct order to Schurz's
division, which was encamped close to his headquarters, to
hasten to the aid of Geary, and, at the same time, notify
General Howard of this order, with the further one to
double-quick Steinwehr's in the same direction. The two
divisions were promptly under arms. General Schurz,
after making sure that his three brigades were ready to
move, put himself at the head of the leading brigade under
Brigadier-General Tyndale. The corps commander joined
him and rode with him for a time. The column moved,
with flankers on each side, in bright moonlight. After
marching for half a mile, the left flankers were attacked,
and the head of the column received a heavy volley from
a hidden force, wounding one of Schurz's staff at his side
and several men. The leading regiment stopped and a
few shots were fired in return, when the march was re
sumed. Schurz then learned that his other two brigades,
which he had supposed to be following Tyndale 's closely,
had been halted some distance behind by order of General
Hooker. About the same time, he received an order from
the latter, by an aide-de-camp, to take from the enemy and
hold a height to his left, commanding the gap in the spur
of hills through which the main road to Chattanooga turns
to the east. Tyndale 's men were formed and climbed up

15

226 HENRY VILLARD [1863

the steep slope and speedily drove the rebels from the in
trenched crest after a short engagement, and remained in
that position. This encounter was with Robertson's bri
gade, which formed the left of the rebel line on the hills.

Meantime, Steinwehr's division had a similar experience.
After being under way for a short time, its head also re
ceived a volley from another hill flanking the Chattanooga
road on the north. Howard ordered the height to be
taken, and Steinwehr assigned the task to Smith's brigade.
A line of three small regiments, not exceeding 700 men in
all, made for the hill and ascended it under severe fire,
without returning it, trusting to their bayonets, as ordered.
As they reached the crest, the enemy fled, leaving their
intrenching tools and fifty prisoners in our hands. They
proved to be Law's brigade, outnumbering our force by
one-half. It was the capture of the two hills wyhich led
the rebel division commander to the conclusion that his
venture was hopeless, and to his order to all his brigades
to fall back beyond Lookout Creek.

After Tyndale's brigade was in position, General Schurz,
in order to ascertain why his other brigades were kept be
hind, rode back and found General Hooker, and, reporting
to him that the hill had been occupied, asked for further
instructions. The Commanding General asked him curtly
why he had not pushed his column to the support of Geary.
He answered very properly because only Tyndale's brigade
had been at his disposal and employed in taking the hill.
He was then ordered to reinforce Geary without delay, and
did so; but none of his troops reached the latter before
half -past five, over two hours after the rebels had given up
the fight with him.

The affair has become known as the " Battle of Wau-
hatchie," but hardly deserves to be designated as such,
considering the smallness of the number engaged and the
losses on each side. Our casualties were 420, of which
Geary lost 216 and Smith's brigade 164. We had eleven
officers killed, including the two of Geary's battery, which

1863] "BATTLE OF WAUHATCHIE" 227

also lost one-third of its men and half of its horses. The
rebel loss was much exaggerated in our reports. Even
General Thomas gave it as 1500 in his despatches to Wash
ington. In reality, it was not much over 500 ; that of Brat-
ton 's brigade alone was 356. But while this encounter was
of small importance in this respect, the effect of it was very
consequential for us, as it deterred the enemy from any
other attempt to recover control of the left bank, and put
our ability to hold the place beyond all doubt, and thus
gave us the undisputed use of the river route for supplying
Chattanooga. The rebel surprise was well planned, but
turned out only another of the many instances of night at
tacks (owing to the great difficulty of managing them prop
erly, especially in a broken and wooded country), becoming
more hurtful to the assailants than to the assailed. If
Law's and Robertson's brigades, which were very well
placed for preventing Howard from succoring Geary, had
attacked determinedly, instead of remaining more on the
defensive, the result would probably have been different.
Even as it was, they kept Howard's two divisions from
giving aid to Geary until he had saved himself by the
gallant struggle of his command. The passiveness of Ben-
ning's brigade, which does not seem to have fired a shot,
has never been explained.

General Bragg was bitterly disappointed by the failure
of his best division, numbering fully 5000 men, as he said
in his report to the War Department, and pitted, as they
were, against " parts of the llth and 12th Corps, troops
which have more notoriety for their want of steadiness
under fire than anything else. The officers do not seem to
have appreciated a night attack. It should have been made
with great vigor and promptness, and completed before
the enemy could have time to know our purposes. . . . The
reports of Generals Jenkins and Law conflict, each appar
ently claiming that the other was at fault." Bragg
ascribed the miscarriage directly to the jealousy of these
two generals.

228 HENRY VILLARD [1863

On our side, the affair had a painful sequel. As has been
seen, although General Hooker promptly issued orders, as
soon as the firing was heard, to reinforce Geary with the
whole of Howard's corps, not a man reached Geary until
long after his fighting was over. My narrative shows how
this happened. But, strange to say, General Hooker, who
was solely responsible for it, committed the outrageous in
justice in his official report of charging General Schurz and
one of his brigade commanders, by implication, with diso
bedience of orders in not going promptly to the relief of
Geary, as ordered. The censured generals did not see
Hooker's report until January, but then at once made ap
plication for courts of inquiry. General Schurz obtained
one, before which the facts were proved by the most con
clusive evidence to be just as I have related them. The
result of the investigation was a complete exoneration of
the division commander and his subordinate and a thorough
humiliation of Hooker, whose conduct was explained at
the time by his being under the influence of liquor during
the engagement. Another explanation is that he had hated
Schurz ever since the battle of Chancellorsville, and that
the utterly unfounded charge was probably due to vin
dictive malice.

CHAPTER XXXVI

PREPARATIONS FOR THE OFFENSIVE.— 1863

THE general headquarters learned of the fighting at
Wauhatchie within two hours after its commence
ment. The news caused great uneasiness, which was al
layed, however, before daylight by the tidings of the
repulse of the enemy. Generals Grant and Thomas set
out in the early morning for Lookout Valley, via Brown's
Ferry, after ordering two brigades to reinforce Hooker.
They returned after noon, satisfied that Bragg could not
recover the positions gained by us. They found the ap
proaches to Brown's Ferry already well protected by the
erection of connecting redoubts, under the direction of
General Smith, on the ridge held by Hazen and Turchin.
Hooker was also rapidly intrenching on a well-chosen line.
General Palmer's two brigades, which had been detained by
difficulties in crossing the river, were about to join with
them. The force available in Lookout Valley for meeting
a new attack numbered nearly 25,000, and was ample for
the purpose. Moreover, the rest of the army at Chatta
nooga was within supporting distance.

Reports of the night fight, more or less exaggerated,
spread rapidly through the camps around the town and
produced general rejoicing. It instantly revived the spirit
of the troops, as it was generally understood to mean
nothing less than the definite laying of the spectre of
famine and the quick restoration of full rations. This
general elation prevailed, in spite of the steady fire which
the enemy kept up all day, from four guns on Lookout
Mountain, as though to vent his anger at Jenkins's discom
fiture in the Lookout Valley. An ocular demonstration that

229

230 HENRY VILLARD [1863

a return to plenty might confidently be expected was made
that very day. One of the two disabled boats which had
fallen into our hands had been repaired, and was now got
ready to pass down the river in order to carry supplies
between Bridgeport and Brown's Ferry. As the rebel bat
teries upon Lookout Mountain completely swept the horse
shoe bend of the river by which Moccasin Point is formed,
the boat had to run the gauntlet of their shell and shot.
Midnight was therefore fixed for the daring attempt. I
went to the landing near that hour, to witness the start, and
found a crowd of officers already there. The boat was
manned by volunteers with experience in steamboating.
It got off soon after the appointed time, with our silent
good wishes. After it had been under way for about
twenty minutes, the stillness of the night was suddenly
broken by reports of single shots and volleys from small
arms, followed in less than a minute by the reverberation
of the fire of heavy guns. We thus knew the craft had
been discovered, and trembled for the crew. But in less
than an hour later, three whistles— the agreed signal-
told us that it was safe after all, when we broke out into
three grateful cheers. The boat was not hit by heavy mis
siles, but received a shower of bullets, one of which per
forated a steam-pipe. This did not, however, impede its
progress down the river, and the damage was easily re
paired. It took on a load at Bridgeport and started on the
up-trip the same day. We learned the next morning that
the boat which had been captured and repaired at Bridge
port had come up and landed a heavy cargo at Brown's
Ferry the evening before. The two boats and the barges
they could tow could bring up between 700 and 800 tons
a day, or more than the daily consumption of the army.
Notwithstanding the high stage of water, the natural ob
structions between Brown's and Kelley's Ferries caused so
much trouble and loss of time that the boats at first
ascended no higher than Kelley's, eight miles by wagon
road from Brown's. But the road became so bad by severe

1863] GENERAL W. F. SMITH 231

use and rain that the boats, after a few days, again ran to
Brown's. Complete relief of the army, however, remained
thenceforth assured.

The credit due for General Smith's achievement was
given him by General Thomas in a very complimentary
general order issued on November 1. General Hooker's
command also received special recognition in another, dated
November 7, in which this passage (rather overdone, con
sidering that we suffered scarcely any losses in taking the
hills) occurs: "The bayonet charge of Howard's troops,
made up the sides of a steep and difficult hill over 200
feet high, completely routing and driving the enemy from
his barricades on its top, and the repulse by Geary's di
vision of greatly superior numbers who attempted to
surprise him, will rank among the most distinguished feats
of arms of this war." In another respect, Generals Grant
and Thomas had so much ground for dissatisfaction with
the behavior of General Hooker that he would not have
been distinguished by that order if they could have helped
it under the army rules entitling the superior to a share
of the glory actually achieved by a subordinate.

As shown by his report of October 26 to the General-
in-chief, General Grant at first had some doubts of the pos
sibility of sustaining the army at Chattanooga, and
discussed the contingency of leaving the defence of the
place to part of it and moving the bulk nearer to regular
supplies. With a view to this, General Smith was ordered
to resume work on the fortifications, which had been allowed
to lag owing to the all but continuous rain, and push it to
completion, which he agreed to do within three weeks, so
that 10,000 men could hold the place against any hostile
force. In the same report, Grant gives expression to his
strong apprehension that the enemy would have a large
force up the river and cross it between Blythe's Ferry and
Cotton Port, thirty to forty miles northeast of Chatta
nooga, and then repeat Bragg 's former movement upon our
communications via McMinnville. In that case, the weak

232 HENRY VILLARD [1863

condition of our artillery horses and our deficient supplies
would prevent the army from following the enemy. This
fear led him to send orders to General Sherman to drop the
repair work he was doing on the railroad along the Tennes
see and push eastward with his troops as quickly as possible.
In explanation, he stated that the enemy was evidently
moving a large force towards Cleveland L(a railroad centre
twenty-five miles east of Chattanooga), and might break
through our lines and move on Nashville, in which event
his (Sherman's) troops would be the only available forces
that could beat them there. He added that, with Sherman 's
command at Chattanooga before the enemy crossed the
Tennessee, we could turn their position so as to force them
back and avoid the possibility of a northward move that
winter. General Grant was misinformed as to the alleged
rebel movement. Bragg had not stirred at that time, but it
turned out that soon afterwards he decided upon a diver
sion to the east.

The alarming news was brought to the army head
quarters by some of our spies from the rebel camps that
Longstreet had started with a large force for East Ten
nessee. As it was confirmed from other sources on the next
day, and as the movement doubtless threatened great
danger to General Burnside, General Grant at once con
sidered with General Thomas the possibility of either at
tacking Bragg 's position or moving against his communica
tions to the northeast, in order to bring about the recall of
Longstreet. Grant thought that Bragg had only 30,000
men left on our front, while Thomas's estimate was 40,000.
After carefully weighing all the circumstances, the two
generals came reluctantly to the conclusion that nothing
aggressive could be safely undertaken before Sherman's
advent. Renewed orders to hasten his movements were sent.

The regular flow of sufficient supplies for men and ani
mals, the fruit of our successes at Brown's Ferry and in
the Lookout Valley, freed the minds of Generals Grant and
Thomas from all doubts as to our ability to remain in

1863] GENERAL W. F. SMITH 233

Chattanooga. The approach of Sherman further promis
ing enough strength for the resumption of the offensive,
the two commanders now entered upon plans for raising
the siege. It was clear that to make Bragg withdraw by
long-distance strategic movements was out of the question,
owing to the nearness of the inclement season, the impossi
bility of accumulating sufficient supplies, and the condition
of our draft animals. There was no other way than to
drive off the enemy by direct aggressive operations. Per
ceiving this, the generals were receptive of suggestions
which General Smith was ready to make to this end. After
repeated and close observations of the ground, the engineer-
in-chief was convinced that the northern end of Missionary
Ridge, from the tunnel by which the Chattanooga &
Cleveland Railroad passes under it to Chickamauga Creek,
was not occupied by the enemy ; that a passage of the Ten
nessee could therefore be forced at the mouth of the creek,
the terminal heights of the ridge seized, and the rebel left
thereby turned. Having satisfied himself by a personal
reconnoissance that the topographical conditions were cor
rectly represented, General Grant resolved to attempt the
seizure of the position described, and directed all necessary
preparations to be made as quickly as possible. The opera
tion was not to be undertaken, however, before the advent
of the reinforcements under General Sherman, for whose
fine troops a leading part was reserved. With them there
would certainly be sufficient numerical power for a decisive
blow. According to the official returns, the effective
strength of the Army of the Cumberland, at the end of
October, was, without cavalry: 4th Army Corps, 19,781
officers and men on duty; llth Corps, 6152; 12th Corps,
9211; 14th Corps, 19,220; reserve artillery, 1219— or nearly
56,000 ; and fully half as many again were being led towards
Chattanooga by Sherman, making a total of between 85,-
000 and 90,000.

It is now time to speak in detail of Sherman's doings.
When General Grant received orders to send all the troops

234 HENRY VILLARD [1863

he could spare to the aid of Rosecrans, General John E.
Smith's division of General McPherson's Seventeenth
Corps was going up the Mississippi to join General Steele's
command, for an expedition up the Arkansas River. The
division was ordered to disembark at Memphis. Next,
General Sherman, whose Fifteenth Corps was lying along
the Big Black River about twenty miles east of Vicksburg,
was directed to send one of his divisions at once to that
town, for immediate embarkation. He detached the first
division, under General Osterhaus, and it marched imme
diately. The following day, the corps commander was
ordered to report in person to General Grant at Vicksburg.
He was there told that he and his corps would be sent to
Eastern Tennessee, except one division which was to remain
on the Black River; but, as a substitute for it, Smith's
division of the other corps, already up the river, would be
placed under his orders. His first division embarked on
the 23d, but the second and fourth were delayed some
days by the want of boats. General Sherman started on
September 27 and reached Memphis on October 2. He
found his instructions from General Halleck, according
to which he was to conduct the troops that had come up
the river and all others that could be spared from Western
Tennessee to Athens, on the Tennessee River, following the
railroad and repairing it as he moved. From Athens, he
was to report by letter for orders to General Rosecrans as
Commander of the Army of the Cumberland. Osterhaus 's
division had already been moved by rail to Corinth, and
Smith's was being moved to that point. Finding that,
owing to the limited supply of rolling-stock, it would take
weeks to get all the rest of his troops off by rail, General
Sherman shipped only his guns and wagons and made the
men and animals march. On the 16th, his whole force
was assembled at Corinth and reached luka on the 19th.
Here the railroad repairing commenced, making further
progress slow. The first and second divisions led, under
the command of F. P. Blair, Jr., and constantly skirmished

1863] SHERMAN ON THE MARCH 235

with mounted enemies. Being ordered to drive the rebels
beyond Tuscumbia, they had a considerable fight with them
at Cane Creek, and occupied the town on October 27.

On October 24, an aide-de-camp of General Grant per
sonally delivered to General Sherman despatches conveying
the first information that General Grant had been put in
command of the three departments and armies of the Ten
nessee, Cumberland, and Ohio, and that Sherman himself
had been appointed to the command of the Department
and Army of the Tennessee. He at once issued general
orders placing West Tennessee under General Hurlbut,
and Mississippi under General McPherson, and ordered
the former to select 8000 men from the best troops of the
Sixteenth Corps and send them under General G. M. Dodge
after him. While his fourth division was crossing the Ten
nessee at Eastport by the use of two gunboats and a scow,
a messenger arrived who had floated down the river in a
boat, and brought General Grant's order of October 24,
already mentioned. It had been sent to General Crook, who
had forwarded it by the water route— a rather risky ven
ture, it would seem, but successful in this case. The order
was executed instantly, the two divisions called back to
Eastport, the only practicable crossing, the railroad work
abandoned, and every nerve and muscle strained to expe
dite the further march to Bridgeport.

The leading division, with General Sherman at the head,
reached Florence on November 1. Marching on to Rogers-
ville and the Elk River, the column found the latter im
passable and was obliged to follow it up to Fayetteville.
Here, orders reached Sherman from Grant to march to
Bridgeport with the Fifteenth Corps and to leave General
Dodge's command at Pulaski, to guard the railroad from
Columbia to Decatur. Accordingly, General Blair was or
dered to march with the second and third divisions by way
of Newmarket and Bellefonte, while, of the other divisions,
the first moved by Decherd and Stevenson, and Smith's
by University Place and Sweesden's Cove. General Sher-

236 HENRY VILLARD [1863

man himself accompanied the latter, and, pushing on in
advance of it, reached Bridgeport on November 13. Hav
ing reported his arrival by wire to General Grant, he was
desired to come to Chattanooga at once. He took the up-
river boat the next evening and reported at the general
headquarters on the morning of the 15th. He received a
most hearty welcome. The proposed plan of operations was
fully explained to him. His four divisions were to come to
Chattanooga, three direct and the other after a diversion
to Trenton in the Lookout Valley, in order to create the
impression upon the enemy that the flanking movement of
Rosecrans in September was to be repeated. His troops
were not to enter Chattanooga, but to move past the town,
concealed as much as possible, up the right bank, to a posi
tion opposite the mouth of Chickamauga Creek, and there,
at the concerted time, cross the Tennessee on a pontoon-
bridge, seize the northern outrunners of Missionary Ridge,
and thence turn the rebel right. His command was to
perform the principal part in the proposed operations,
which were to be preceded and accompanied by supporting
movements by the Army of the Cumberland, as well as by
Hooker's column.

November 15 was mainly spent by the three commanding
generals in a discussion of the plan, with the aid of maps
and topographical sketches. The next day, they rode,
under the guidance of the engineer-in-chief, to several com
manding points, from which the visitor easily obtained
a very clear comprehension of the positions of friends and
enemies, spread out like a panorama before him. He was
made fully acquainted not only with the character of the
task assigned to him, but also with the anxious desire of
all he conferred with for its speedy accomplishment. He
could hardly help discovering a feeling that the approach
of his divisions had not been as rapid as it might and
should have been, and he took occasion to demonstrate that,
ever since he had received the order to push through with

18G3] SHERMAN ON THE MARCH 237

the least delay, he had done his best to accelerate their
movements. The prevailing impatience, as he himself de
scribed this feeling, was chiefly due to the great and grow
ing solicitude for the fate of General Burnside and his
command in Eastern Tennessee. All he saw and heard at
Chattanooga "inspired me," to use his own dutiful words,
"with renewed energy." He telegraphed immediately to
his fourth division, which had arrived at Bridgeport, to
prepare for the march via Shellmound to Trenton. A per
fect understanding having been reached with his fellow-
commanders, he started on the return trip on the morning
of the 16th. He rode to Kelley's Ferry, and was greatly
disappointed to find that he was too late for the day's
down-boat. Loath to lose precious twenty-four hours, he,
nothing daunted, embarked with his staff officers on a small
boat, with a steersman and four rowers, and started down
the river. It was a very hazardous venture, not only be
cause rebel scouts were still making their appearance on
the banks, but because neither the man at the helm nor the
oarsmen had had experience on the river. But the valuable
load was safely landed late in the evening at Bridgeport,
and thenceforth the General strove, day and night, for the
redemption of his promise to General Grant to have his
legions on the ground, ready for the struggle set for the
20th.

I was apprised of General Sherman's coming before his
arrival, but I made no effort to see him during his brief
stay. I knew that he had no time to spare for anything
else than his duties. I was certain, too, that he would
refuse to see me or any other correspondent. His hostility
to the press had become more and more pronounced, and,
in striking evidence of it, there were circulating at the time
some vehement outbursts from him against it. In one letter
to a publisher he had said that he thought praise from a
newspaper was contamination, and he would willingly
agree to give half his pay to have his name kept out of

238 HENRY VILLARD [1863

the public prints. In another, to the editors of the Mem
phis Bulletin, he expressed himself thus :

I don't think you can conceive the mortification a soldier feels at
the nauseating accounts given to the public as history. That
affair at Collierville [an attempt to capture the town of that name
by the rebel guerrilla Chalmers] should have been described in
these words: "Chalmers tried to take Collierville, and did not."
But ridiculous, nonsensical descriptions have followed each other
so fast that you ought to be ashamed to print Collierville. Now I
am again in authority over you, and you must heed my advice.
Freedom of speech and freedom of the press, precious relics of
former history, must not be construed too largely.

In the face of these fulminations, it naturally seemed
the part of discretion to keep away from the General.

The diversion of Longstreet naturally inspired our
commanders with confidence in the success of the impend
ing attempt to force the enemy from Missionary Ridge. By
it the Confederates themselves paved the way for our
eventual triumph. It seems the more incomprehensible
that they should have taken the false step of dividing
their army as they were fully aware, notwithstanding our
efforts to conceal the arrival of our reinforcements, that
Hooker's command had already joined us and that Sher
man's columns were rapidly approaching. They deter
mined, indeed, in spite of this knowledge, to hurry Long-
street to East Tennessee to crush Burnside, and get him
back before Sherman could reach Chattanooga. Their
hardihood became our opportunity. Here is the story of
their folly.

About November 1, a camp rumor reached Longstreet
that he was to be sent against Burnside. Two days later,
General Bragg summoned him to a council, at which Lieu
tenant-General Hardee and Major-General Breckinridge
were also present, for a general discussion of possible move
ments by their army. Various operations were proposed,
and finally one into East Tennessee came up for eonsidera-

1863] LONGSTREET DETACHED 239

tion. Longstreet pronounced in favor of it, provided it
could be executed secretly and with great rapidity and with
no less than 20,000 men, and provided further that the re
mainder of the army would be withdrawn to a strong
position behind the Chickamauga until the return of the
expeditionary force. (This is Longstreet 's version of what
occurred at the council, but General Hardee, when re
quested in writing, some months later, to confirm it, replied
that he did not recollect the suggestion of the temporary
withdrawal behind the Chickamauga.) It was decided to
try a coup against Burnside. Longstreet was to undertake
it with two divisions, against which he claims to have pro
tested as too small a force for quick success, but he was
overruled and yielded. Marching orders were issued, and
the two divisions, with an extra complement of artillery,
numbering not much over 16,000 men, were under way by
the 5th. But, owing to all sorts of unforeseen impediments
and unexpected delays, the march was not rapid, but very
slow, so that the rebels did not appear near Knoxville,
behind whose fortifications Burnside had concentrated most
of his command, until the 18th, and actually delivered the
famous unsuccessful attack upon the place only on the
29th.

A decided improvement had taken place in our life since
the raising of the blockade of the river. Mails and news
papers arrived again daily and banished the oppressive
feeling of isolation from the rest of the world. While the
mass of the army was, of course, ignorant of the plans of
the commanding generals, the presence of Grant and the
visit of Sherman were generally looked upon as sure indi
cations that something was up, and that action would soon
supersede our passiveness. Aware as I was of the recon
noitring of General Smith and his excursions with the
commanding generals to the north of the town, I could
guess their intentions without asking any questions. The
dread of being shut up maybe for the winter months in
Chattanooga, and the long continuance of the prevailing

240 HENRY VILLARD [1863

monotony, had greatly discouraged me, but the prospect of
stirring developments restored my buoyancy. The weather
in November, too, was more favorable. We had heavy fogs
instead of all but steady rain; and the sun shone now and
then in the middle of the day. I was lucky enough, in the
second week of the month, to secure the use of the horse of
a field officer during his furlough, so that I could get
necessary exercise and spend my time more agreeably in
making visits. The long evenings and the want of lights
were trying at first, but, with the reappearance of candles,
card parties helped to pass the time pleasantly. Within
a week after the coup at Brown's Ferry, not only were full
rations restored, but sutlers' stores were available to sup
plement them with solid and liquid luxuries. Even fresh
meat could occasionally He had. Fritz rejoiced in the en
larged opportunity for demonstrating his mastership in the
culinary art. Instead of three or four, he had now many
strings to his bow, and the sameness of fare with which
General Willich and myself had had to content ourselves,
was followed by a savory variety in our meals that would
have done credit to a first-class restaurant.

CHAPTER XXXVII

THE BATTLE ABOVE THE CLOUDS.— 1863

FT! HE preparations of the engineer-in-chief for the com-
JL ing reckoning with Bragg were of two kinds. One
was the completion of the defensive works at Chattanooga.
Heavy details of men were made and the work pushed day
and night, and, on the day fixed for the attack on the
enemy, the fortifications were pronounced in a sufficiently
advanced condition to defy any assault. The other was
the collection of enough material for two bridges. One
was to be thrown over the Tennessee, which was 1300 feet
wide at the selected point, and another across the Chicka-
mauga, at its mouth, of a width of 180 feet. The spare
pontoons scattered between Chattanooga and Bridgeport
were gathered together by strenuous efforts, and the two
sawmills of the town put in operation to furnish the rest
of the material wanted. It was decided, in order to screen
the movement from the observation of the enemy, to haul
the pontoons by land to a point opposite the mouth of the
North Chickamauga, some six miles north of Chattanooga,
and to float and load them there with the first landing
force and row them to the landing-point. On November 20,
the boats were in the river, provided with oars and crews.
Then a formidable obstacle to the laying of the pontoon-
bridges arose. The Tennessee in its actual swollen stage
brought down great quantities of heavy drift-wood, which
broke both the pontoon-bridges at Chattanooga and
Brown's Ferry. This naturally gave rise to the fear that it
would not be possible to throw the two bridges for Sher
man, or to maintain them, if thrown, long enough for the
passage of the troops.

i6 241

242 HENRY YILLARD [1863

General Sherman strove hard to have the whole of the
Fifteenth Corps opposite the mouth of the Chickamauga
in time to strike on November 20, but found it beyond his
power. General Ewing's division was the first to cross at
Bridgeport, but made the detour to Trenton. General John
E. Smith's followed next and reached its destination by
the above date. But Generals Morgan L. Smith's and Os-
terhaus's were then still struggling with the badly cut-up
and encumbered road between Shellmound and Brown's
Ferry. A serious oversight had been committed in allowing
the heavy division trains to follow each division, instead
of moving the infantry and artillery ahead of them all.
General Grant was greatly surprised when he learned of
the blunder, but generously assumed the responsibility for
it, though Sherman deserved the direct blame. Rain, too,
again set in and impeded the marching. General Sherman
reached General Hooker's headquarters on the afternoon
of the 20th, and there found General Grant's order to him
to make the attack the next day; but he was unwillingly
obliged to ask for a postponement, which was reluctantly
granted. The second division (Gen. M. L. Smith's) suc
ceeded in crossing at Brown's Ferry only on the 21st. Ew
ing's had marched down Lookout Valley from Trenton and
was to cross next, but, owing to the repeated breaking of
the bridge by the drift-wood, did not get over till the 23d.
So much damage was caused to the bridge after this that
it would apparently take several more days to get Oster-
haus's division on the other side. Hence, General Sherman
felt it his duty to offer to undertake the movement against
Missionary Ridge with the three divisions already over, and
to let the other operate under the orders of General
Hooker, provided a substitute was placed at his disposal.
General Grant sanctioned this proposition, and Osterhaus
acted under Hooker during the whole of the subsequent
operations. On the afternoon of the 23d, Sherman's
troops, reinforced by Jefferson C. Davis 's division, were
concentrated behind the hills opposite the mouth of the

1863] SHERMAN TO MOVE 243

Chickamauga, ready for action. It should be mentioned
here that the three divisions of the Fifteenth Corps were
under the direct orders of Major-General Blair through the
ensuing crisis. He had been appointed by General Sher
man to this command on October 25, and had exercised
it since, although Major- General Logan had been trans
ferred by order of the President on October 28 from the
command of the Seventeenth to that of the Fifteenth Corps.
The reason was that General Blair intended to take his seat
in Congress at the coming session, but continued at his
post in order to allow General Logan to take a furlough.

How much Sherman took the delay to heart, and how
clearly he appreciated the demands of the situation, is well
shown by the following passages from a despatch of his
to General Grant on November 23, from opposite the mouth
of the Chickamauga : " I need not express how I felt, that
my troops should cause delay. ... As you ask for positive
information, I answer : No cause on earth will induce me to
ask for longer delay, and to-night at midnight we move. . . .
Every military reason now sanctions a general attack.
Longstreet is absent, and we expect no more reinforce
ments; therefore we should not delay another hour, and
should put all our strength in the attack."

According to the plan of operation, all the available
force of the Army of the Cumberland, with the exception
of the number needed to man the fortifications on the
right and centre, were to be concentrated in line on the
left, so as to be within reach of connection with Sherman
after he had crossed the river. One division should consti
tute a mobile reserve, ready to move to the support of any
part of the line. In order to make up for the detachment
of J. C. Davis 's division, 7000 strong, placed under Sher
man's orders, General Howard was ordered to report to
Thomas, and marched on November 22, by the two pontoon-
bridges at Brown's Ferry and Chattanooga, into the latter
place, and took position behind the Army of the Cumber
land. This move was made as ostentatiously as possible,

244 HENRY VILLARD [1863

in order to lead Bragg to believe that Sherman's men were
crossing at the town, and render him doubtful as to the
real point of attack. This ruse proved effective. Our sig
nal officers, who had by long observation managed to
understand the rebel signals, read one from the station on
the summit of Lookout Mountain to Bragg that a large
force, apparently a whole corps, had passed over the bridge
into the town. Hooker's command consisted, up to Novem
ber 20, of the Eleventh Corps, Geary's division of the
Twelfth Corps, and the brigades of General Whitaker and
Colonel Grose of the first division of the Fourth Corps,
which had been sent to reinforce Hooker on his march to
Lookout Valley and had been stationed at Shellmound and
Whiteside. The two brigades had set out from Chattanooga
under General Palmer, but were now commanded by Briga
dier-General Charles Cruft.

The detachment of the Eleventh Corps chagrined and
irritated Hooker greatly. As I heard at the time from gen
eral officers, he openly charged that it was a deliberate
scheme to deprive him of all active share in the coming
battle and to throw its management entirely into the hands
of General Sherman. He asked leave of General Thomas
to accompany the Eleventh Corps, on the ground that it
was his duty to follow the part of his command going into
battle, and received permission to do so. But, before fol
lowing Howard, he received orders on November 23 to
remain in the valley and to make a demonstration as early
as possible the next morning against Lookout Mountain.
His anger at this was appeased before the close of the same
day by the assignment of Osterhaus's division to his com
mand. The three divisions thus placed under his orders
had never been united under one command before, and
their officers and men were total strangers to each other.
General Hooker himself knew only those of Geary's. His
total force was a little under 10,000 effectives. To cover
the advance of Hooker, the guns in the works on the
Brown's Ferry bluffs and a battery of eight Parrott 20-

1863] THE REBEL LINE 245

pounders established on Moccasin Point, directly opposite
Lookout Point, were ready to open a sweeping cross-fire.

Let us now glance at the situation on the Confederate
side. The removal of Lieutenant-Generals Polk and Hill
and Major-General Hindman (the latter 's restoration to
command did not take place until after the culmination of
events before Chattanooga) and the detachment of General
Buckner led to so many changes in the commanders and so
many reformations of commands as to constitute almost an
entire reorganization of Bragg 's army. There had been
numerous changes among the brigadiers, and some consoli
dations of brigades and transfers of regiments from one to
another. The cavalry corps under Major-General Joseph
Wheeler, with the four divisions of Wharton, Martin,
Armstrong, and Kelly, was mostly off on detached duty,
and no part of it became engaged in the coming conflict.
After Longstreet's departure with his two Virginia divi
sions, General Walker's division was attached to the corps
of Lieutenant-General Hardee, who assumed command of
the whole left, while that of the right was exercised by
Major-General Breckinridge. The division of Stevenson
was also withdrawn from the latter and transferred to the
former. Up to our resumption of the offensive, the rebel
lines included the crest of Lookout Mountain, and ex
tended from its western slope around the northern to the
eastern, and thence over the valley of Chattanooga Creek
to and along Missionary Ridge, to within three-quarters of
a mile of Tunnel Hill. The entire front was connected
and protected along Missionary Ridge by rifle-pits and
breastworks, with emplacements for batteries at suitable
points, while on the plain of the Chattanooga Valley,
towards Lookout Mountain, redoubts and redans formed
part of the defensive works. Stevenson's division lay on
the top along the crest of the mountain; next came, down
its western slope, Walker's, Stewart's, Bushrod Johnson's,
Cleburne's, Bate's; and last Anderson's at the extreme
right. The strength of the three rebel infantry corps, in-

246 HENRY VILLARD [1863

eluding artillery, was, on October 31, according to the
official report of the number present in effectives : Long-
street 's, 14,674 ; Cheatham 's, 15,181 ; Breckinridge 's,
16,309; Artillery Reserve, 332— making an aggregate of
46,496. Deducting the 16,000 Longstreet took away with
him, the force in our front was reduced to 30,000 men.

Longstreet 's expedition, however justifiable it seemed in
its inception, proved a great mistake in the light of after
events. It is almost beyond belief, but yet a fact, that a
further blunder in the same direction was deliberately
committed by Bragg on the very eve of our aggressive
movements. On November 22, he issued orders to Major-
General Cleburne to start at once with his own and Bush-
rod Johnson's divisions in the wake of Longstreet for East
Tennessee. The order was promptly obeyed, and two of
Johnson's three brigades embarked the same day by train
for Loudon. General Cleburne was superintending the
shipment of the other brigade of Johnson and of his own
division, the next morning, at Chickamauga Station, some
two miles west of Missionary Ridge, when he received an
other order from General Bragg, countermanding the
previous one, and directing him to stop on the way such
of the troops as had already left. He had succeeded in
halting Johnson's two brigades at Charleston Station,
when a third order reached him to return as quickly as
possible and to march the other brigade and his division
back to the front at once. As Johnson was preparing to
turn back, he received direct instructions from the army
headquarters to proceed, which he did, and joined Long-
street. This further diminished the enemy before us by
between 2000 and 3000 men. Cleburne was made to camp
on the night of the 23d on the eastern base of Missionary
Ridge, as a reserve to the army. Cheatham and Walker
were absent on leave, and their divisions were respectively
commanded by Brigadier-Generals Jackson and Gist; but
General Cheatham returned to duty at night on the 24th.

Even before the withdrawal of Longstreet, the Confed-

1863] THE REBEL LINE 247

erate line was altogether too extended for the available
force. Its length was fully six miles, and the difficulty of
maintaining it was augmented by its windings and ups and
downs on the left. Its further attenuation by the detach
ment of Cleburne's and Johnson's divisions had much in
creased its weakness. Cleburne's troops were eventually
employed in protecting an extension of it to the north.
Stewart and Bate were ordered to fill the gap caused by
Cleburne's and Johnson's withdrawal, by extending their
lines towards each other and drawing up their reserves.
But this left them still weak.

The orders to the Army of the Cumberland to get ready
for the offensive were already issued on November 18, but,
owing to the detention of Sherman, it remained inactive
till he was within striking distance. As its main object
was to be to second his efforts against the rebel right, the
first requirement was to insure communication with him
after he had reached the left bank. To this end, Citico
Creek, a deep, narrow stream following a crooked course
from Missionary Ridge to its confluence with the Tennes
see, about half a mile east of the town limits, was bridged
during the night of the 22d. Until then the first and
third divisions of Granger's Fourth Corps had formed the
left, extending from the Tennessee River, within the lines
of our advanced rifle-pits, to the Rossville road. The
second and third divisions of the Fourteenth Corps ad
joined them on the right, their line extending around the
fortifications to Chattanooga Creek. The latter corps was
now under Major-General John M. Palmer, who was pro
moted to that command when General Thomas vacated it,
not for his military merit, but through the pulling of po
litical strings, against the wish of General Grant and by
the partiality of the President, who was an old political
crony of the favored general. The two corps received
orders at 11 A.M. the next day to move into position for the
work expected of them. The infantry had been in good
enough condition for weeks for another trial of strength

248 HENRY VILLARD [1863

with their old adversaries, but the artillery could hardly
have stirred had not teams for the guns been borrowed from
Sherman and ferried over the river the day before— a tell
ing exemplification of the effect of the siege on the Army
of the Cumberland. The two corps advanced a short dis
tance and then formed with the Fourth Corps in the front
line, with Wood's division on the left, extending to near
Citico Creek, and Sheridan's on the right. Baird's di
vision of the Fourteenth, refused en echelon, supported
Granger's right. Johnson's division was held in readiness
under arms in the intrenchments as a mobile column to
reinforce any weak point. The Eleventh Corps was massed
behind Granger's centre. General Hooker stood still until
the next day. Although the accession of Osterhaus to his
command had been announced to him, it did not actually
take place till then.

General Willich, my host, and I had been in constant
expectation ever since the 18th of the order to break
camp, and had become very weary of waiting, but this
mood gave way to excited rejoicing when the command to
move was at last received shortly after 11 A.M. on Novem
ber 24. In less than half an hour the brigade was in motion.
It now consisted of nine regiments; the Eighth Kansas,
Sixty-eighth Indiana, Twenty-fifth and Thirty-fifth Illinois,
and Fifteenth Wisconsin having been added to it only a
short time before, to the General's great satisfaction. Yet
the nine regiments numbered not much more than 2000
effectives. Understanding that the two corps would only
make a demonstration that day, and that the serious work
would not come off till the morrow, I concluded to accom
pany General Willich, and it so happened that the main
task of the day fell to him.

The corps line was completed by half-past one. Wood's
division extended without our rifle-pits through the open
field in front of the casemated work named Fort Wood.
On its right, Sheridan's was posted along a railroad track,
with his right resting on another enclosed work. The

1863] ORCHARD KNOB SEIZED 249

troops moved into position as deliberately and regularly as
though they were forming for a parade. The day being
bright, they were in full view of the enemy, whose pickets
at a distance of less than a quarter of a mile could be seen
to watch them leisurely, with hands in their pockets, appar
ently wholly unapprehensive of our hostile intent. They
were soon undeceived. On our side, too, the grand spectacle
was watched from the ramparts of our forts. On those of
Fort Wood, Generals Grant, Thomas, Smith, Quarter
master-General Meigs, C. A. Dana, and scores of staff offi
cers were eager observers. At twenty minutes to two, the
order to advance was given by bugle signal. Our brigade
on the left and Hazen's on the right formed the division
front, Beatty's was in reserve in the rear of Willich. The
front brigades were preceded by double lines of skirmishers,
and advanced in two lines; the first deployed, the last in
double column in the centre, closed en masse. The Eighth
Kansas served as our skirmishers.

Shortly before the division started, I learned that some
thing more than a demonstration would devolve upon it.
Major-General Granger had been ordered to advance in
force to Orchard Knob, a hill rising boldly about 100 feet
above the plain northeast of the town and a little over a
mile from it and a mile from Missionary Ridge. It had
served as an outpost to the enemy since the beginning of
the investment. The object was to discover whether the
enemy was still in strength before us. On the 20th, General
Grant had received a notification under flag of truce from
General Bragg, as follows: "As there may still be some
non-combatants in Chattanooga, I deem it proper to notify
you that prudence would dictate their early withdrawal."
This was considered a mere piece of bluff, and no attention
was paid to it. But, on the night of the 22d, a rebel
private deserted to our lines and reported that Bragg was
falling back. This led to the theory at the general head
quarters that the quoted letter might be a ruse to mask his
real intention of retreating. The attack upon Orchard

250 HENRY VILLARD [1863

Knob was accordingly to test the presence or absence of
the enemy.

First some open fields, swampy and difficult to cross in
places, and next a wide stretch of heavy timber, intervened
between our starting-point and the Knob. Timber covered
the latter and a low rocky ridge separated from it by a
hollow, and running for nearly a thousand yards to the
southeast. Along the crest of this ridge the rebels had pro
tected themselves with rifle-pits and breastworks of logs
and stone. Rifle-pits extended also around the east and
north base of the Knob, and from it for a mile to Citico
Creek and beyond. These defences were concealed and pro
tected by the timber. As we got into motion, our guns in
Fort Wood and the next adjacent work, Fort Thomas,
opened on the Knob, and their roar inspired us all the way.
The rebels made no reply, as they had no artillery in that
position. The first shots from sm'all arms were heard within
a few minutes. Our skirmishers had come upon the rebel
pickets about half-way to the Knob. With their rapid ad
vance, a rattling fire developed, growing noisier as we
neared our objective-point ; but the brigade line never fired
a shot. We had orders to take the Knob proper; Hazen
the pits and breastworks on the ridge. Within twenty
minutes, we were at and over the pits at the base, and, in
a minute more, our men swarmed up the hill and cleared
it of the enemy. Our loss was only four killed and ten
wounded. Hazen had much harder work. His men re
ceived a destructive fire from the sheltered enemy, but,
without faltering or firing, rushed up to the breastwqrks,
and, leaping over them, captured nearly all the defenders,
consisting of nearly 150 officers and men of the Twenty-
eighth Alabama, of Manigault's brigade, with the regi
mental flag. Our loss was severe— two officers killed and
fourteen wounded, twenty-six men killed and 127 wounded
—and fell almost entirely upon the Forty-first and
Ninety-third Ohio as leading regiments. In the course
of the afternoon, the rifle-pits to the left of the Knob were

1863] ORCHARD KNOB SEIZED 251

cleared by two regiments of Beatty's brigade, with small
loss. Simultaneously, the two divisions of the Eleventh
Corps also advanced on Beatty's left, and their skirmishers
became briskly engaged as they moved forward. The rebels
were forced back beyond the Creek, and the new line desig
nated was occupied and intrenched. Schurz and Steinwehr
lost four killed and thirty-two wounded.

Thus, what was intended to be only a reconnoissance in
force, had accomplished a decided success in giving us pos
session of a very important position. The division and
corps commanders came up to it as soon as it was carried,
and, on recognizing its importance, asked General Thomas
for authority to hold it, which, being given, our men were
at once set to work intrenching it. The enemy's batteries
on Missionary Ridge opened a hot fire of shot and shell
upon us and kept it up till nearly dark, but we suffered
only one slight casualty. The two brigades labored all
night, in relief parties, and by morning a line of rifle-pits
and barricades was completed along the whole front of the
division. Our brigade also constructed an epaulement on
the top of the hill for a six-gun battery. As a rebel attack
might be made at any moment, and as it was generally as
sumed that we would resume the offensive in the morning,
I remained at the front for the night. I slept with Willich
in a hut quickly made for us by Fritz and the orderlies,
with a rubber blanket between me and the ground. Con
trary to expectation, we remained quietly in our new po
sition during the whole of the next day and night. A driz
zling rain had set in during the night and made our bivouac
rather uncomfortable.

General Sherman had kept his promise to begin the
crossing of the river during the night of the 23d. General
Smith's brigade of his second division marched up the
bank under cover of the hills to where the one hun
dred and sixteen boats lay. They were filled with thirty
men each, and at midnight the movement down the river
began. On nearing the mouth of the Chickamauga, a small

252 HENRY VILLARD [1863

force was landed first, to capture the rebel pickets, which
was smartly done, an officer and twenty men being taken
and only one escaping. The rest of the brigade was next
put ashore above and below the mouth. Then the pontoons,
a ferryboat, and another steamboat commenced the transfer
of the troops from the opposite bank, and by daylight fully
8000 men and one battery had been brought over and were
well intrenched. The work of laying the two pontoon-
bridges over the Tennessee and Chickamauga was com
menced, and pushed so energetically that both were com
pleted within less than seven hours, notwithstanding the
powerful current from the high stage of water. Long's
brigade of cavalry, which was to make a dash on the
enemy's communications, had passed over the bridge by
three o'clock. It succeeded in reaching and burning
Tyner's Station, on the Chattanooga and Cleveland rail
road, destroying the track and capturing one hundred wag
ons and two hundred prisoners. Another noteworthy ex
ploit was the seizure, immediately after effecting a landing,
of a number of torpedo rafts in the Chickamauga, which
the rebels were about to send down the Tennessee for the
destruction of our bridges.

General Sherman and staff passed over the bridge di
rectly after the last pontoon was put in, and were gratified
to be met on the left bank by General Howard, who had
come up along it unopposed, with Buschbeck's brigade of
Steinwehr's division, in order to open communication be
tween his corps (the extreme left of Thomas) and the Fif
teenth Corps. General Howard rode back to his command,
but, at the request of General Sherman, left the brigade
with him, and it shared the experiences of the Fifteenth
Corps.

By noon, Blair's three divisions, with all their artillery
and everything else, were on the left bank, and Davis 's
division was waiting at the east end of the bridge to follow
the cavalry. At one o'clock, the march from the river
towards Missionary Ridge commenced en echelon, with M.

1863] SHERMAN'S ADVANCE 253

L. Smith's division in the lead on the left, J. E. Smith's as
the centre, and Ewing's on the right, with the front of each
preceded by swarms of skirmishers. The northern end of
the Ridge extends from the railroad tunnel under it for
about a mile to the Chickamauga nearly north and south,
and forms with that stream and the Tennessee three sides
of a square, as it were. The ground enclosed within them
is mostly level and consisted at the time of a succession of
cleared fields through which the troops made the interven
ing distance of one and a half miles without much difficulty,
although a drizzling rain was coming down. No resistance
was met, and, at half -past three, the heights were attained
by our skirmishers and soon after occupied in force. Here
the Commanding General found that he had been in error
in assuming that Missionary Ridge was a continuous, un
broken range. He discovered that his troops had gained
only a fore-ridge, so to speak, about a third of a mile to the
northwest of and separated from the main ridge by a little
valley, and we were still half a mile north of the "Tunnel
Hill, ' ' our real aim.

Three brigades, one from each division, were pushed up
the fore-ridge. Brigadier-General Lightburn, commanding
the one to the left, perceiving that the main ridge had
not been reached, of his own accord ordered one of his
regiments to occupy the point on it directly in front of him,
which it did successfully. Half an hour later, the enemy
moved over the valley against our left flank. There was
then sharp firing of small arms and artillery for a time,
and General Lightburn 's advanced troops had to be re
inforced by three other regiments. Towards dark, the
rebels withdrew, leaving us in our positions, which General
Sherman then considered so important that he ordered them
fortified during the night. Our casualties were small, but
included Brigadier-General Giles A. Smith, a very efficient
brigade commander, who received a severe wound. The
corps bivouacked in several lines for the night. M. L.
Smith's division formed the left; G. A, Smith's brigade

254 HENRY VILLARD [1863

resting on the Chickamauga, and Lightburn's on the fore-
hill. Next came Alexander's brigade of J. E. Smith's divi
sion and CockerilPs brigade of Ewing's division as the cen
tre, and the other brigades of the latter 's division and
Buschbeck's and Steinwehr's on the right. The two other
(Brigades of J. E. Smith's lay in reserve behind the centre.
One of J. C. Davis 's brigades was moved up to the reserve,
another remained half-way between the front and the
bridge, and a third at the latter. The enemy did not molest
any part of Sherman's lines during the night. Luckily, it
stopped raining and grew clear and bracing before morn
ing. At midnight, orders arrived from General Grant to
make an attack at ' ' dawn of day, ' ' with notice that General
Thomas would also take the offensive early in the day.

Bragg learned of our passage of the river during the
morning, and directed Cleburne, then en route for East
Tennessee, to send one of his brigades to protect the rail
road bridge over the Chickamauga. When he was informed
of our advance upon Missionary Ridge, he at once ordered
Cleburne to occupy it, with his remaining three brigades,
from Tunnel Hill to its northern extremity. It was in
executing this movement that Cleburne 's leading brigade
of Texas regiments came in collision with Sherman's men.
Had our crossing been delayed twenty-four hours, or had
Cleburne been started a day earlier, Sherman would doubt
less have rushed Tunnel Hill unopposed and Bragg found
himself obliged to fight with 6000 less of his best troops.
I have searched the Official Records in vain for Bragg 's
reasons for detaching a second column for East Tennessee,
but have not been able to obtain any explanation of it.
The movement is likely to remain one of the insoluble mys
teries of the Civil War, none the less puzzling because, two
days before he issued the marching orders to Cleburne,
Bragg telegraphed to Jefferson Davis that Sherman had ar
rived, and on the strength of this asked for reinforcements.
There is good evidence, however, that the rebel Commander-
in-chief was under the delusion that a movement was eon-

1863J HOOKER'S TASK 255

templated against his left until he was undeceived by
Sherman's appearance on his right. Previous to extending
it with Cleburne's command, he had already taken other
measures to strengthen his threatened flank by transfer
ring Walker's division (temporarily under General Gist),
during the night of the 23d to the 24th, from its position
in the Chattanooga Valley to the right, and by putting
Lieutenant-General Hardee in command of all the forces
on the right.

General Hooker's part in the programme of action for
the 24th was to be by far the most dramatic and
important. For the better comprehension of the unique
performance of his force, which has found its place in
history under the original but appropriate name of ' ' Battle
above the Clouds," a description of Lookout Mountain and
of the rebel positions upon it is needful. The name "Look
out Mountain" applies not only to the huge headland rising
abruptly between the mouths of Chattanooga and Lookout
Creeks, but to the entire range running south and south-
westwardly from it for a distance of nearly fifty miles,
dividing the valleys of the streams mentioned, and afford
ing communication between them through numerous depres
sions or gaps, by means of mere trails or roads. The
mountain in its narrower sense presents three phases, to the
north, west, and east. The northern and western are very
abrupt and rocky, but furrowed; the eastern is less steep
and broken. At the height of 1000 feet above its base, it
becomes partially truncated, the recession of the upper por
tion forming a plateau of cleared and arable land. A
mile southward, the "Palisades" tower straight up from 75
to 150 feet, a huge, cliff-like mass of rocks, above which
rises the flat peak forming the highest point. There was
then a farm on the plateau; the long frame house known
from its owner as the White or Cravens house stood near
where the western and eastern slopes meet in a sharp angle
and form the abrupt northern edge of the mountain, making
a conspicuous landmark. Roads came down the valley on

256 HENRY VILLARD [1863

both sides of Lookout Creek and passed around the base of
the mountain, but only paths led up to the plateau from the
northwest; a zigzagging wagon road from Chattanooga
Valley ran up the east side to the summit.

On the morning of the 24th, there were six bri
gades— Walthall's, Jackson's, and Moore's of Cheatham's
division, and Pettus's, Brown's, and Gumming 's of Steven
son's division— distributed over Lookout Mountain for its
defence. Major-General Stevenson had assumed command
of both divisions when Lieutenant-General Hardee was
ordered to the right. Pettus's brigade was on the summit,
Brown's guarded the passes from the top to Nickajack Pass
ten miles off. Jackson's and Gumming 's brigades were sta
tioned along the eastern base. Walthall's and Moore's
brigades lay on the western and northern slope, below the
Cravens house, on the left and right respectively, and they
provided the picket line about two miles long up the east
bank of Lookout Creek, in front of Hooker's line.

Hooker's first instructions, "to demonstrate only against
the mountain," were changed so as to require him to take
the mountain if his demonstrations proved it practicable.
He decided to deliver his main assault directly up the west
ern slope against the rebel left. To climb not far from a
thousand feet up the steep, broken, rocky mountainside
against the well-sheltered enemy looked like a most for
midable task of doubtful issue, but the plan to strike in one
direction with all the available force brought success, owing
to the scattering of the defenders over the summit and the
three sides of the mountain at different heights, which made
succor from any one of the rebel positions to any threat
ened point slow and difficult. On October 31, the present
effective strength of Stevenson's division was 3102, and of
Cheatham's 5467, or a total of 8569, while Hooker's infan
try, after deducting train guards and other detachments,
did not much exceed 7500. Hence, if it had been possible
to concentrate the Confederates on the west side, the out
come would probably have been different. As it was, the

1863] GEARY LEADS 257

assailants had opposed to them only Walthall's and Moore's
brigades of the last-named division— that is, about half
their number ; according to official returns, only 2694 effec
tives. General Stevenson having been assigned to higher
command, they were led by Brigadier-General J. K. Jack
son as division commander.

The line into which our troops moved for the operations
of the day extended opposite the western slope behind the
hills along the left bank of Lookout Creek. Geary's di
vision was on the ground, but Osterhaus 's division marched
up from Brown's Ferry that very morning and reported
for duty at 7:30 A.M. Whitaker's brigade of Cruft's di
vision had marched on the day before twenty-one miles
from Shellmound, and Grose's brigade thirteen miles from
Whiteside over bad roads and in heavy rain. They reached
the valley in a very fatigued condition, and bivouacked for
the night near Hooker's headquarters. During the night,
Cruft was ordered to send Whitaker's brigade to Geary,
to whom it reported at 6 A.M. and remained under his
orders all day. Geary was to work from the right, Cruft
with Grose's brigade from the left, and Osterhaus from
the centre. The rain ceased during the night, and, as it
grew light, the summit of the mountain was found to be
entirely concealed in drifting dark clouds, while heavy
mists lay like thick veils over its sides. These conditions
continued all day. They were a favor of nature, and of the
greatest service to us, as they prevented the enemy from
discovering any of our movements until we were nearly
upon them.

Geary's command was marched up the valley to a point
about two and a half miles from the mouth of Lookout
Creek, where it was massed behind a mill soon after seven
o'clock. The creek was found too deep to be forded. The
pioneers were ordered to bridge it under cover of two com
panies. By a skilful manoeuvre the rebel pickets on the
other bank, with their reserve to the number of forty-two,
including an officer, were surprised, and surrendered with-

17

258 HENRY VILLARD [1863

out firing a shot. A small detachment was sent up a trail
bearing to the southwest, in order to mislead the enemy as
to the real direction of our attack. It soon skirmished with
the enemy. The bridge was finished by half-past eight, and
the four brigades crossed rapidly. They were formed in
three lines, somewhat en echelon, with eight regiments in
front, four regiments about 350 yards to the rear as the
second line, and two regiments as the third at a further
distance of about 100 yards. Whitaker's brigade formed
and followed as the reserve. The distance to be traversed
from the starting-point to the plateau on the mountain was
not less than three miles. At nine o'clock, the whole line
moved forward, preceded by a heavy chain of skirmishers.
For a mile and a quarter, no enemy but the most serious
difficulties of ground were encountered. The mountainside
sloped at an angle of nearly forty-five degrees, and was
deeply furrowed by a succession of ravines of almost per
pendicular ascents and descents. The troops not only had
to do hard climbing, but, time and again, were creeping
on all fours. Before ten o'clock, the hostile pickets were
encountered and driven back for a mile upon their supports
and Walthall's brigade, which awaited our attack in a po
sition on the plateau protected naturally by thickly scat
tered rocks, and artificially by abattis and breastworks of
sand, stone, and logs. As our line neared the enemy, it
received a heavy musketry fire, to which reply was made
with a few volleys, followed, as the fog lifted, by a rush
with defiant cheers over the obstructions right upon the
rebels, most of whom, after a brief resistance, threw down
their arms and surrendered. Many of their dead and
wounded were lying about the ground. Four flags and con
siderable equipment were taken. Sending his prisoners—
the bulk of Walthall's brigade— to the rear, Geary con
tinued his toilsome advance over great obstacles along tho
plateau towards Cravens house and the Palisades. Near
the house, part of his line was checked and thrown into
some disorder, but the reserve under Whitaker, which,

1863] WALTHALL BEATEN BACK 259

owing to the course of its ascent, had brought up on the
right flank of the front line next to the Palisades, gave
support and the advance was soon resumed. The house
was reached about noon and two pieces of artillery cap
tured near it. Pushing on around the Palisades, our right,
in approaching them, became exposed to the fire of rebel
shooters and to hand-grenades thrown from the crest of the
Palisades, but got up to their lower bench, when orders to
stop and fortify the position gained were received from
General Hooker.

At this time, Osterhaus's command also appeared, and
relieved some of Geary's regiments at the front. Of the
former, Colonel Williamson's brigade had a bridge over
Lookout Creek ready by ten o'clock, and General Wood's
brigade another half a mile further up the creek by eleven.
But both brigades did not move, according to orders, until
Geary's fire was heard at the last-named hour. Our artil
lery opened vigorously to cover their passage of the creek.
The crossing and the movements beyond were made so rap
idly that Williamson got undiscovered to the rear of the
picket line and grand guard of Moore's rebel brigade, and
captured the whole of them. Osterhaus accomplished the
ascent without meeting resistance.

General Cruft, on arriving, with his one remaining bri
gade under Colonel Grose, at the bridge which he was to
repair and cross, found it held by the enemy, and that it
would take too much time to refit for the passage of troops.
General Hooker also observed this, and ordered him to
leave two regiments at the bridge and move on with the
remaining four to the one where General Wood was pre
paring to cross. After getting over the stream, Grose's
regiments worked up the mountain between Osterhaus's
brigades and reached the plateau about the same time.

The rebel force beaten back by Geary was Walthall's
brigade. About the time Whitaker and Osterhaus appeared
on the front, an offensive attempt was made against them,
but was easily repulsed. It came from Moore's brigade,

260 HENEY VILLARD [1863

which lay on the right of Walthall's brigade before the
action. When the firing commenced in front of the latter,
General Jackson ordered Moore to move his command into
the trenches next to Walthall's, but the latter was not
found in position, as he had decided to accept fight in
front of his trenches. Before Moore reached them, he dis
covered that Walthall had been driven away to the rear of
them on the left, but he claims to have occupied and held
his side of them, in spite of exposure to an enfilading
fire and repeated attacks, till between three and four
o 'clock, when he fell back about a quarter of a mile. Here
he found support in General Pettus's brigade of three Ala
bama regiments, numbering about 1000 men, of Stevenson 's
division, which had been sent down from the summit ridge
in response to a call from General Jackson for assistance.
Later, Walthall placed on the latter 's left such remnants
of his brigade as he had been able to gather together.
Moore took position on the right of Pettus. The Confed
erates claimed to have held this line against repeated at
tempts from our side to drive them away. These alleged
attacks were in reality nothing more than feelers from our
front for the enemy, whose presence even at a distance of
only 100 feet could not be detected on account of the fog.
General Carlin's brigade of the Fourteenth Corps, which
had been ordered to reinforce Hooker from Chattanooga,
reached the mountain at five o'clock, and was ordered to
relieve Geary and Whitaker near the White House. It
underwent a most trying experience in scaling the moun
tain in the darkness. The day closed with irregular firing
along our front, which also continued till long after mid
night. Carlin's front was threatened twice by offensive
demonstrations, which were easily warded off.

The main work of the day was naturally done by our in
fantry. But while neither cavalry nor artillery could
accompany it in the ascent, the latter arm played a very
useful part by maintaining from two full field batteries
and a section of howitzers and another of Parrott twenty-

1863] BATTLE ABOVE THE CLOUDS 261

pounders an enfilading fire upon the lower parts of the
mountain, which thoroughly demoralized the enemy occu
pying them. The Parrott in position at Moccasin Point
on the farther bank of the Tennessee also joined in this
roaring concert. Our missiles reached the rebel camps in
Chattanooga Valley as well as the roads on the east side of
the mountain. The artillery played most of the forenoon,
but ceased firing after our troops were known to be on the
plateau.

During the forenoon, there was a lifting and falling of
mist and fog on the mountain, like the rise and drop of
a stage curtain. There were spells when our climbing col
umns could be plainly seen, only to be suddenly and wholly
shut from sight. The struggle culminated literally in a
"battle above the clouds" at about two o'clock. Then the
cloud cap of the summit spread and sank down its slopes
into the valley, wrapping the entire mountain in a mantle
of dense vapors. An eclipse-like darkness settled upon the
scene. For a time only the sounds of musketry told of the
progress of the strife. After a while, rifts in the cloud
would bring ever and anon confirmation of growing success
by passing views of our flags and men. During the inter
vals of obscurity, there was racking suspense among the
anxious observers in the group of the Commanding General
and his staff below, which at once yielded to intense joy as
light was successively thrown upon the situation above. It
was felt that while the atmospheric conditions had been an
advantage in the ascent, they might be such to the enemy
after they had come to close quarters. But the glorious
achievement of the Union forces was fully accomplished
without untoward incident from either the confinement of
vision or the difficulty of maintaining order and regularity
of movement over such encumbered, broken, and slanting
ground. This heroic exploit cost us comparatively very
small losses. They did not exceed 300 killed and wounded,
and this mercy we owed to the fog.

General Hooker could well indulge in the paean of his

262 HENRY VILLARD [1863

congratulatory order of the following day, and say to his
command that "the triumphs of yesterday . . . will be
remembered as long as the giant peak of Lookout shall be
their mute but eloquent monument." A contrary mood
was naturally induced in the mind of the rebel Commander-
in-chief by the events of the day. Although he knew from
the firing that a struggle was going on for the control of
Lookout Mountain, he learned of the reverse to his left only
about 4 P.M., when he immediately started for General
Stevenson's headquarters. Arriving there at sunset, he
soon understood that the position on the mountain was
lost, and determined to withdraw his troops across Chatta
nooga Creek to Missionary Ridge, and gave orders accord
ingly, which were carried out between midnight and day
break, and so quietly as to be undiscovered. In his official
report, Bragg tries to throw the blame for the disaster upon
General Stevenson, and the reports of the three brigades
engaged ascribe it to neglect of duty by the division-
commander Jackson. But the truth probably is that the
difficulty of communication and observation caused by the
fog was chiefly responsible for the defeat.

The losses of the three rebel brigades reported in their
official reports are utterly at variance with the statements
of the Union generals. Walthall admits only 8 killed,
111 wounded, and 853 missing ; Moore 9 killed, 39 wounded,
and 206 missing; Pettus 9 killed, 38 wounded, and 9 miss
ing ; or a total of 26 killed, 188 wounded, and 1068 missing.
Geary alone, on the other hand, claimed to have found 125
killed and 300 wounded rebels on the field and to have
captured 1940 prisoners, to which latter several hundred
taken by Osterhaus and Cruft must be added. The Records
afford no means of explaining the discrepancies.

The object of our assault upon the Mountain was not
only to complete the security of our lines of communication,
but also to threaten the left flank and line of retreat of the
enemy in support of the finishing blows to be struck by our
left and centre on the morrow, If the Confederates sue-

1863] BATTLE ABOVE THE CLOUDS 263

ceeded in holding Hooker at bay, he would be foiled in this
aim on the one hand, but, on the other, the hostile line
would remain weak by reason of its excessive length and
less capable of resisting the proposed general attack. Gen
eral Grant felt certain anyway that our partial success on
the Mountain would keep Bragg from strengthening his
right, against which, according to programme, our next
attack was first to be delivered by Sherman; hence he or
dered the latter to ''attack at dawn," with simultaneous
notice that Thomas would also strike from the centre early
in the day.

[Here the narrative of military operations ends abruptly.
From this point the Autobiography is, as explained in the
Preface, continued to the close in the third person.]

MEMOIRS OF HENRY VILLARD

BOOK EIGHT
FINANCIAL CAREER

.

OF THE * X

UNIVERSITY )

l_ i"J t

CHAPTER XXXVIII

WASHINGTON, BOSTON, GERMANY.— 1863-1873

MR. VILLARD was compelled, by the return of his
fever, to give up field work with the army in No
vember, 1863. He spent the winter in Washington, where,
early in 1864, with Horace White, who represented the
Chicago Tribune in that city and held the clerkship of
the Senate Military Committee, and Adams S. Hill, then
in charge of the Washington bureau of the New York
Tribune and now for the last thirty years Professor of
Rhetoric at Harvard University, he organized the first
news agency in competition with the Associated Press. By
personal visits to the managers and editors, he succeeded
in winning the Chicago Tribune, the Missouri Democrat,
the Cincinnati Commercial, the Rochester (N. Y.) Demo
crat, the Springfield (Mass.) Republican, and the Boston
Advertiser for the new undertaking, which was bitterly
attacked by the Associated Press for disturbing its mo
nopoly. But he was successful from the start. As the
representative of this news agency, in May, 1864, he joined
the Army of the Potomac under the chief command of
General Grant at Culpepper Court House. He was the first
correspondent to reach Washington with the news of the
bloody drawn battles in the Wilderness. He returned to
the army after it reached the Peninsula, and crossed the
James River with it, witnessing the siege of Petersburg
until after the explosion of the mine (July 30, 1864), when
he responded to an urgent summons to Germany from his
family.

He reached his native town of Speyer Hut a short time
before the death from consumption of his elder sister

267

268 HENRY VILLARD [1864-66

Anna, which was preceded only a few days by that of
her infant child. Mr. Villard's mother had died five years
before. Most of the winter was spent in Munich with his
father and with his remaining sister, who was married to
an army officer stationed at Nuremberg. On the last day
of March, 1865, he sailed from Liverpool, expecting to
arrive in time to witness the final struggle between Grant
and Lee, and was overcome with surprise on hearing, after
landing in Boston on April 15, simultaneously the astound
ing tidings of the fall of Richmond, the surrender of Lee,
and the assassination of President Lincoln.

Mr. Villard's friend, Horace White, having, in the mean
time, assumed the chief editorship of the Chicago Tribune,
offered Mr. Villard the position of regular Washington
correspondent of the paper, which he accepted and filled
for a year. Early in January, 1866, he married the only
daughter of William Lloyd Garrison, and took his bride to
Washington. In June, he received an invitation from the
New York Tribune to go to Europe as one of two special
correspondents, the other being George W. Smalley, to
report the impending war between Prussia and Austria.
He went gladly, and sailed for England with his wife early
in July. There was no Atlantic cable at that time, and,
according to the latest news received up to his departure,
hostilities had not broken out. On landing in Southamp
ton, he was amazed to learn that the battle of Sadowa had
been fought, that the Prussians were advancing on Vienna,
that peace negotiations were under way, and that, in short,
the war was practically over. Nevertheless, he proceeded
to Bohemia, and visited the several battlefields, followed
in the wake of the Prussian armies through Bohemia and
Moravia, and reached Nikolsburg, where the Prussian
headquarters with King William, Crown Prince Frederick,
and Bismarck were established after the cessation of hos
tilities. Mr. Villard subsequently spent some time at Vi
enna, where he was very kindly treated by the United
States Minister, Mr. J. L. Motley.

1866-70] SOCIAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION 269

The winter of 1866-7 Mr. Villard passed at Munich
with his wife and her youngest brother. His sister had
moved there in the meantime. In pursuance of his engage
ment with the Chicago Tribune as its special correspondent
for the World's Exhibition of 1867, Mr. and Mrs. Villard
went to Paris in March. They remained there until the
following February, with the exception of a short visit to
England, where they met Mr. William Lloyd Garrison,
who was then being feted in Great Britain. Mr. Villard
also spent some weeks at the bedside of his father, who died
in his presence early in September, 1867. In February,
1868, he and his wife set out from Paris for their first tour
in Italy. On the way thither they paid a visit to John
Stuart Mill at Avignon, of which Mr. Villard wrote an
account for the Chicago Tribune. To the same paper he
likewise contributed a description of a violent erup
tion of Mount Vesuvius, for which the well-known
Professor Palmieri allowed him the privileges of his ob
servatory.

Mr. and Mrs. Villard returned to the United States in
May, 1868, and lived at the Garrison home in Eoxbury, a
suburb of Boston, till the fall of 1870, during which time
their only daughter and eldest son were born. Mr. Villard
became a contributor of editorial and other matter to the
Boston Daily Advertiser and other newspapers, and also
wrote an article on Bismarck for the North American Re
view. In the fall of 1868, he was elected Secretary of the
American Social Science Association, with an office in Bos
ton, which position he filled for two years. Through
this connection he came in contact with leading men
throughout the country, and was instrumental in promot
ing public interests in various ways. Among his labors,
the most noteworthy was his pioneer work in civil-service
reform, for he helped to organize the first societies for its
furtherance in Boston, New York, and Philadelphia. The
first public meetings in its behalf in the two former cities
were arranged chiefly by him, in order to obtain a hearing

270 HENRY VILLARD [1870-1

for the first Civil Service Reform Bill, which had been
laid before Congress. It was personally elucidated by its
author, Thomas A. Jenckes, a member of the House from
Rhode Island.

Mr. Villard's Social Science secretaryship led him to
enter upon the investigation and study of public and cor
porate financiering, including that of railroads and banks.
The subject of railroad securities especially interested
him, and the knowledge acquired in this respect prepared
him in a measure for his later business career, though he
did not then dream that he would soon enter into that
field. His attention was also attracted to the so-called
"mortgage banks/' so common on the continent of Eu
rope, but as yet unknown in the United States, and he pre
pared and published a paper advocating their adoption.

The climate of Boston did not agree with him, and
he suffered so much from catarrh that, in the fall of 1870,
he decided to seek medical advice in Germany. During his
stay there, he submitted to the management of a large bank
in Berlin a project for the establishment of mortgage-
banks in the United States. It was favorably received,
and the institution agreed to raise the necessary capital
in the Continental way, provided a special charter could
be obtained for it in one of the older States. On his return
to Boston early in 1871, he interested parties there in the
plan, and it was decided to apply to the Massachusetts
Legislature for a charter. The application failed, and no
thing ever came of the scheme, but the relations into which
it had brought him with financial circles in Germany
proved subsequently of great value to him.

Mr. Villard's health began to fail during 1871, and he
decided in the fall to go to Germany with his family, in
order to recuperate. While passing the following winter
at Wiesbaden, he was called on by some acquaintances
from Boston to assist in the negotiation of a large railroad
loan at Frankfort-on-the-Main and Berlin, and this busi
ness still further extended his circle of acquaintance
among German financiers. The family, augmented by the

1872-3] OREGON AND CALIFORNIA RAILROAD 271

.birth of a second son, spent the summer of 1872 in Swit
zerland, and the winter, of 1872-3 in Heidelberg, where
he had a number of relatives. Soon after going there, he
had an apoplectic stroke, which was so serious that his
physicians opined he would never be able to undertake
mental labor again without great risk. But they themselves
did not live long enough to see their predictions falsified.
While recovering from his severe illness, he received one
day in February, 1873, a call from a gentleman residing
in the place, with whom he was acquainted. His visitor
asked Mr. Villard 's opinion regarding an unfortunate in
vestment he had made in American railroad bonds, and
said that he had bought a considerable amount of the seven
per cent, bonds of the Oregon & California Railroad Com
pany of Oregon, on the strength of the statements made
by the banking-house which had offered them for public
subscription. Knowing nothing about the railroad com
pany and but little of Oregon, Mr. Villard could not give
the desired advice. At his suggestion, the gentleman ob
tained from the Protective Committee for the bondholders
at Frankfort such information as it had regarding the
company and the road. The material was ample, and in
the light of it Mr. Villard gave an unfavorable opinion,
and this led the chairman and another member of the com
mittee to visit him and consult with him about the matter
and to a subsequent invitation to join that body, to which
he agreed after some hesitation, on the assurance that little
work would be required of him. Such was the beginning
of his business career. As shown in the preceding record
of his first twenty years in America, he had never had any
training for finance ; but the determination and energy
developed in him by his experience as a pioneer in Colo
rado and as a war correspondent, his extensive observation
of and practical judgment in regard to national affairs,
his wide acquaintance in the United States, the part he
took in the mortgage-bank project and the bond negotia
tions just mentioned, all helped to prepare him for the new.
occupation upon which he was now to enter.

CHAPTER XXXIX

THE OREGON EAILEOADS.— 1873-1879

Frankfort Committee had sent a delegation to Ore-
JL gon, during the summer of 1873, for a thorough inves
tigation of the railroad and the prospects of the State, and
it was only after it had returned and made a report, and
default had actually taken place in the payment of inter
est, that the labors of the committee began' in October.
There had been nearly eleven millions of the Oregon &
California bonds sold at a little over 70 per cent, in Ger
many and England, of which the former country had ab
sorbed by far the greater portion. The report of the dele
gates showed that only half of the nominal amount of the
bonds had been received by the company in money; that,
instead of 375 miles from Portland to the California State
boundary, only 200 miles had been completed and were in
operation, and that, owing to the small population and
limited development of western Oregon, the road was pro
ducing only about one-third of the interest charge and could
not well be expected to yield more for some time to come.

The first question before the committee was whether it
should exercise the rights of the bondholders under the
mortgage and take possession of the road by foreclosure
'proceedings, or compromise with the company, which was
'controlled by Ben Holladay, well known to the past gen
eration as the owner of overland stage lines to California
•and of steamship lines on the Pacific coast. The latter
course was decided upon after long deliberation. This
necessitated the preparation of an agreement with the
company for funding the interest and other purposes. As
none of the other members of the committee knew Eng-

272

1873-4] FIRST VISIT TO OREGON 273

lish well, Mr. Villard soon found that the principal part
of the work devolved upon him. All through the winter
of 1873, he had to spend much time in Frankfort, and the
outcome of it was that he was commissioned to go to the
United States as the representative of the committee, in
order to have the agreement put in form by American
counsel, and to attend in person to its proper execution
in Oregon. He sailed for this purpose for New York with
his family in April, 1874.

He there met Ben Holladay, with whom and his lawyer, j
S. L. M. Barlow, and United States Senator Mitchell of M
Oregon, Mr. Villard, with his counsel, Professor James B.
Thayer of the Harvard Law School, had a protracted tus
sle over the details of the compromise. Holladay proved
a genuine specimen of the successful Western pioneer of
former days, illiterate, coarse, pretentious, boastful, false,
and cunning. Mr. Villard soon discovered also that Hol
laday 's reputed great wealth was fictitious, and that he was,
on the contrary, in financial extremities. That a man of
such character should have found it so easy to command
millions of foreign capital was quite a puzzle and shock
to him. The explanation of this, he afterwards discovered,
lay in the bad faith which the business men on the Pacific
coast had shown to the European bankers who placed the
bonds.

Mr. Villard set out for Oregon in May, accompanied
by Richard Koehler, a German railroad engineer, who had
been appointed resident financial agent of the bondholders
at Portland under the articles of agreement, and who has
remained there ever since and is now (1900) the general
manager of the Southern Pacific Railroad Company for its
Oregon lines. Mr. Villard spent some weeks in California,
investigating the physical and financial condition of the
California Pacific lines built independently of the Central
Pacific with the proceeds of securities also marketed in
England and Germany. He discovered that one of these
lines, against which $3,000,000 seven per cent, bonds had

18

274 HENRY VILLARD [1874

been sold, had not been built at all, and that the same com
pany's ten per cent, income bonds, which were held by
bankers abroad as prime securities, were really worthless.
The discovery of this fraud added much to his standing in
financial circles in Europe.

Mr. Villard started with his companion from San Fran
cisco about the middle of July for Oregon, via the over
land route, which then involved several hundred miles of
stage travel. He was met at Roseburg, the terminus of the
Oregon & California, by Ben Holladay and staff. " What
he saw of the scenery of Oregon on the way to Portland
in the California, Yoncalla, and Willamette valleys, filled
him with great enthusiasm. He was much impressed also
with the evidences of agricultural wealth along the route.
The picturesque situation and surroundings of Portland
were an agreeable surprise to him, as was the unusual
number of large and solid business buildings and of hand
some private residences, together with the commercial ac
tivity of the place. He remained only long enough for the
completion of his business, and for some short excursions
into the interior of western Oregon. He did not dream of
what was in store for him, and thought he should never see
the town again. Soon after his return to the Atlantic
coast, he sailed for Germany, to report in person as to the
success of his mission. His lengthy printed report to the
committee contained favorable accounts of his impressions
of western Oregon, and expressed his belief in the promis
ing future of the country and consequently in the certain
improvement in the prospects of the bondholders. The
1 greatest assurance of this lay in increase of population,
with reference to which he made a proposition to the com
mittee for the establishment of a bureau in the Atlantic
States for the promotion of immigration to Oregon. His
plan was approved, and he was commissioned to carry it
out.

There was another reason for Mr. Villard 's return to
America before the close of 1874. Early in the preceding

1874] KANSAS PACIFIC RAILROAD 275

winter, he had joined, upon urgent invitation, another
committee, formed for the protection of the bondholders
of the Kansas Pacific Railroad Company, which had been
obliged by the severe crisis of that year to ask for the
funding of two years' interest on three classes of bonds,
representing a total of $12,000,000, most of. which were
held in Germany. He was chosen the delegate of this com
mittee to conclude the funding arrangement with the com
pany in the United States. On reaching New York, he
found a despatch from the financial agent, Koehler, at
Portland, reporting that an open conflict had already
broken out between him and Ben Holladay about thS exe
cution of the compromise contract. It turned out that
the latter, both because of bad faith and because of in
ability from want of means to make certain cash payments
for which he had personally obligated himself, had vio
lated the contract in several respects, and, moreover, that
he was unwilling and unable to carry it out at all. It was
discouraging to Mr. Villard thus to have a whole year's
hard work so quickly brought to naught, but he resolutely
exerted himself to find a way out of the complicated situ
ation that had been created. It being out of the question
to conduct litigation for the enforcement of the bond
holders' rights at a distance of 7000 miles from Ger
many, on account of the great inconvenience and ex
pense and long delay, he devised another compromise plan,
under which Holladay would, for a certain consideration
involving but a small sacrifice on the part of Mr. Villard 's
employers, peacefully surrender the control not only of
the Oregon & California Railroad, but of two other trans
portation companies. One of these was an unproductive
railroad, the Oregon Central, running fifty miles south
westerly from Portland, and the other a line of steamers
of the Oregon Steamship Company, running between Port
land and San Francisco, which formed the only regular
connection that Oregon had with the rest of the world.
Holladay had obtained from the same syndicate of for-

276 HENRY VILLARD [1875

eign bankers that took the Oregon & California bonds an
advance of a million dollars against Oregon Central bonds,
with which money the unproductive mileage had been
built, and also a large loan of $800,000 against the proper
ties of the Steamship Company, not worth a quarter of the
amount loaned. As in the Oregon & California case, Hol-
laday accomplished all this through the dishonest collu
sion of the San Francisco agent of the German syndicate.
Holladay came East for the winter, as was his wont,
and agreed to the proposition, holding out for a time for
better terms than offered. As not only the consent of the
Oregon & California, but of the two sets of creditors men
tioned, was necessary for the new compromise, Mr. Vil-
lard went to Europe once more, in the spring of 1875, to
procure it. He had to labor strenuously all summer and
most of the fall, and journeyed repeatedly between Frank
fort and London before the approval of all parties in in
terest could be secured. According to the agreement as
finally formulated, Holladay was to retire entirely from
the management of the three corporations, and surrender
all his interest in their share capital to the bondholders
and the two classes of creditors respectively. There was to
be friendly cooperation in the management of the compa
nies between the former and the latter. Though the Steam
ship Company showed fine earnings, its wooden vessels were
old, small, slow, expensive to run, and fast wearing out,
and it was evident that, in order to preserve its business,
the line would have to be re-stocked with modern steamers.
To this end, the plan provided that the bondholders
should furnish the necessary new steamers, in considera
tion of which they were to become the owners of the en
tire steamship stock upon the extinction of the creditors'
claim, out of the earnings with which a considerable part
of the debt had already been paid off. The bondholders
also obtained an option to acquire the creditors' claim
against the Oregon Central for one-quarter of the amount
of their loan.

1875] IMMIGRATION BUREAU FOR OREGON 277

The combination was based on the theory that the three
transportation interests could, by working together, by in
creasing their earning capacity by new outlays of capital
for improvements and extensions, and gradually coming
under the single ownership of Mr. Villard's employers,
be so developed as to make good the greater part of their
losses. The ways which he proposed to follow in order to
reach this result were to attract immigration to Oregon,
to extend the Oregon & California to a connection with the
Central Pacific system, to add to the mileage of the Oregon
Central sufficiently to make it a paying investment, and
to equip the steamer line with larger, faster, and more
economical vessels.

His faith in the future of western Oregon was so great
—greater, as it turned out, than its resources warranted —
that he fully believed in the possibility of the satisfactory
solution of the difficult problem he had set for himself.
In pushing his scheme, he found a general disposition, both
in England and in Germany, to condition its acceptance
upon his consent to make himself responsible for its execu
tion by assuming the management of the companies.
There was no escape for him from this, and he expected to
have to remove to Portland with his family and to reside
there for a number of years; but it happened otherwise.
He was back in New York by November, 1875, and imme
diately began to carry out the new programme. Having
already opened an Eastern immigration bureau for the
Oregon & California in the preceding spring, and from it
carried on a vigorous agitation for immigration to Oregon
by advertisements in the press and the wide circulation
of pamphlets descriptive of the State, written by himself,
he began to look about for the purchase of a new steamer,
and, early in the spring, bought the George W. Elder from
the Old Dominion Steamship Company, and started her
for San Francisco. Holladay had come East again to close
the deal with him, but various informalities caused delays,
so that Mr. Villard could not leave for the Pacific coast

278 HENRY VILLARD [1876

before the end of April, 1876. He arrived at Portland
two weeks later, and was at once elected president of the
Oregon & California and Oregon Steamship companies,
and assumed charge of them and, indirectly, of the Oregon
Central. He remained several months in Oregon, making
himself thoroughly acquainted with the business of the
companies, and gaining the confidence of the community
at Portland and of the public of the State at large by a
number of reforms in the management of the railroads,
and especially by proclaiming his determination that they
should no longer be used, as they had been under the
Holladay regime, as instruments for political party pur
poses. He devoted all his spare time to seeing as much as
possible both of the western and eastern parts of the State,
and came away confirmed in his conviction of the great fu
ture of Oregon, and inspired by the fine opportunities his
new position seemed to open to him.

Mr. Villard intended to settle in Portland with his
family in the fall of the same year, but was detained at
the East by unexpected complications in the affairs of the
Kansas Pacific Company. Owing to the utter failure of
the crops in Kansas for several successive years, there had
faeen a further decline, instead of an improvement, in that
railroad's earnings, so that the company was unable to
comply with the terms of the funding agreement. With
the consent of the Frankfort committee of bondholders,
it was decided to place the property under a receivership.
As the representative in America of the bondholders, Mr.
Villard was proposed as one of the two receivers to be ap
pointed. He was reluctant to accept in view of his newly
assumed responsibilities in Oregon, but, as it was mainly
through his influence that the temporary funding of in
terest had been conceded in Germany, he could not well
decline, and, accordingly, his appointment as receiver was
made by the United States District Court for eastern Kan
sas on November 3, 1876. One of his first duties was an
inspection of the main line and branches in company with

1876] DENVER REVISITED 279

the officers of the railroad, which took him to Denver, as the
western terminus of the road, for the first time since he
had left the place in 1859. It was a strange turn of for
tune that he who, only seventeen years before, had started
from a town of perhaps a hundred frame shanties and
log-houses containing not over one thousand inhabitants,
to cross the Plains in a very humble way with an ordinary
team, should now return riding on a special train behind
a steam locomotive to a fine city of between thirty and forty
thousand inhabitants. Another striking evidence of the
wonderful change in that short span of time which he
noticed on this trip was that, whereas in the summer of
1859 he had passed enormous herds of live buffaloes on his
way to the Rocky Mountains, he now found that they were
entirely extinct, and that their bones were being hauled
eastward by the train-load for manufacturing purposes.

The proper care of the Oregon and Kansas Pacific in
terests kept him hard at work in the East during the fol
lowing winter and the spring of 1877. In pursuance of his
Oregon programme, he continued the propaganda for im
migration, and kept pressing his European employers for
capital for more new steamers and for extending the Ore
gon Central. But, notwithstanding all his arguments,
based on the rapidly increasing ocean traffic and the grow
ing unseaworthiness of the ships in service, he succeeded
only in securing two additional steamers, one by purchase
and another by construction— the latter only by contract
ing individually for it. He failed to obtain anything for
railroad construction. As for Kansas Pacific matters, ow
ing to the continued bad earnings, nothing could be done
beyond organizing a strong American committee of bond
holders to support him, and for cooperation with the Ger
man committee in formulating a plan of reorganization
later on.

Early in the summer of 1877, he started with his family
for a stay in Colorado, to be followed by one in Oregon.
After 'passing some weeks in the former State, the party

280 HENRY VILLARD [1877-8

continued on. to San Francisco. On arriving there, Mr.
Villard found a despatch from the War Department ad
vising him that a regiment of infantry was being hurried
overland by fast trains on account of the outbreak of the
Modoc war, and that his Steamship Company was desired
to hold a ship ready for the immediate shipment of the
regiment to Portland on its arrival on the coast. Mr.
Villard himself superintended the necessary preparations,
and crossed the bay to Oakland to receive the regiment, in
one of the cold fogs peculiar to the California coast in
the summer. He had caught a severe cold while in Colo
rado, which the exposure at Oakland developed the same
day into pneumonia. He was able to dine with his family
in the evening, but was unconscious before midnight.
(Shortly after, there were fearful nights, in which Kear
ney's " sand-lot" anarchists tried to fire the city.) The
disease attacked both lungs, and in a week his life was de
spaired of, and his wife had finally to telegraph her rela
tions that the physicians gave no hope and did not expect
her husband to live an hour. Skilful treatment and his
strong constitution saved him, but he was so reduced by the
long illness that the contemplated sojourn in Oregon had
to be given up, and the family returned to New York.

While he was struggling for life, an opposition steamer
was put on the line to Portland, with the result that there
was a great falling off in the earnings of the Steamship
Company, which greatly discouraged his foreign sup
porters, and made his task of obtaining additional capital
from them much more difficult. His principals at first
approved of the vigorous policy he adopted in meeting the
competition, but, after the struggle had lasted six months,
they required him to make a compromise with the opposi
tion, which went into force in the spring of 1878. This
clouding of the prospects of the Steamship Company led
to friction between the Oregon & California bondholders'
committee and the foreign Steamship creditors over the
payments for the new steamers, which culminated in the

1878] CONTEST WITH JAY GOULD 281

termination of the union of interests under the second
Holladay arrangement of 1876. A dissolution of the rela
tions established at that date was effected by mutual con
sent, the Steamship creditors assuming exclusive control
of the line. The bondholders, however, exercised their
option for the Oregon Central and raised money for its
extension for fifty miles. Mr. Villard remained president
both of the Oregon & California and of the Steamship
Company, but it was clear to him from the beginning that
these new relations would not long be maintained.

Unexpected complications also arose from his connection
with the Kansas Pacific. This company had been trying
for years, ever since its junction with the Union Pacific
by its branch line from Denver to Cheyenne, to get a share
of the Utah, Nevada, and California business, to which
it asserted a title under the Act of Congress subsidizing
both roads; but the Union Pacific had steadily refused to
pro-rate with it. The Kansas Pacific then sought relief
both in Congress and in the courts, and made such a
strong fight that the stockholding interests controlling the
Union Pacific, of which Jay Gould held by far the largest
part, adopted the plan which he had conceived of getting
control of the rival company. Jay Gould and Sidney Dil
lon, the Union Pacific president, commenced negotiations
to that end with the group of St. Louis men who owned
a majority of the Kansas Pacific stock, and with Mr. Vil
lard as representative of the bondholders, but proposed
such a reduction of the principal and interest of the
bonds that their offer was rejected by the committee.
Gould vainly tried to win Mr. Villard over by the guar
antee of a profitable participation in the syndicate to be
formed for the reorganization of the Kansas Pacific.
After a pause, Gould reopened negotiations, and, after
many conferences, formally accepted the terms agreed on
by Mr. Villard and the New York committee of bond
holders. He even went so far as to form a reorganizing
pool for the securities of the company other than the first-

282 HENRY VILLAKD [1879

mortgage bonds, including, most of the stock, and, as a
pledge of good faith, made Mr. Villard custodian of the
deposited values, worth, according to the market quota
tions, over ten millions of dollars. Notwithstanding this,
Gould changed lys mind, went back on the bargain, and
tried to force the bondholders to submit to his former terms
by opening an offensive campaign, in which the St. Louis
directors, who had at first stood by the bondholders, now
joined him.

In order to frighten the bondholders, he caused the con
struction of a new line from Cheyenne to Denver, by which
he could compel the Kansas Pacific to share its mainstay,
the Denver traffic, with the Union Pacific. He made the
company apply for the removal of Mr. Villard as receiver,
on the ground that he acted partially as the representative
of the mortgage-bond interest, and he was successful in
this move, as Mr. Villard could not and would not deny
that he had favored the bondholders in every possible
way, having been appointed their representative. Gould
also got the portion of the press which he influenced to
heap slander and abuse upon Mr. Villard and the New
York committee. But they and the German committees
stood firmly together and ordered foreclosure proceedings
to be commenced. Gould's ulterior object was, as he had
repeatedly avowed to Mr. Villard when he tried to win him
over, the consolidation of the Kansas Pacific with the Union
Pacific by exchanging stock for stock, and issuing con
solidated Kansas Pacific mortgage bonds against the other
securities in the pool. As he had bought many millions of
Kansas Pacific stock from the St. Louis directors and
in the market below 12%, and the Union Pacific stock
then ranged in the market between 60 and 70, and
as the issue of the new bonds would also yield him a large
profit, he played really for a harvest of millions. Upon
the setting in of the great boom in Wall Street in 1879
with the approaching resumption of specie payments, Gould
saw the great opportunity it offered for floating new secu-

1879] CONTEST WITH JAY GOULD 283

rities, and, loath to lose it, made up his mind to come to
terms with the bondholders.

One day, early in 1879, he appeared in Mr. Villard's
office and told him that he was tired of fighting, and that
he was ready to accept the committee's conditions. This
time he was true to his word, and the result was, as he had
anticipated, an extraordinarily rapid rise in Kansas Pacific
securities. Under the terms of the settlement, two of the
three first-mortgages were recognized in full, and of the
third only the interest was reduced from seven to six per
cent, When the receivers were appointed, the bonds under
the former were selling at 50, and those under the latter
below 30. They bounded up in jumps to above par; the
last-mentioned bonds, with nearly six years' unpaid back
interest, rose even to 140. Gould having purposely let his
intention to consolidate the Kansas Pacific with the Union
Pacific be known, the stock of the former, which had sold
as low as 3 less than four years before, was quickly quoted
as high as the latter and followed it far above par. Gould,
not long after the consolidation, sold all his stock. He
was understood to have cleared more than ten millions of
dollars by the operation, which was one of the principal
episodes in that speculative time. The triumphant issue
of Mr. Villard's contest with that most unscrupulous and
most dreaded machinator, and his fidelity to his employers,
raised him to a position of influence in American financial
circles, while it added greatly to his reputation abroad.

CHAPTER XL

THE OREGON- RAILWAY AND NAVIGATION COMPANY

1879-80

THE peaceful relations thus established between Mr. Vil-
lard and the Union Pacific leaders bore important fruit
in another direction. Ever since his first visit to Oregon,
he had conferred from time to time with the parties con
trolling the Central Pacific, in both San Francisco and New
York, regarding the possibility of a joint scheme for the
connection of the Oregon roads with the Central Pacific
system. The Central Pacific people were willing to build
to Oregon, provided they could obtain a subsidy from the
State, and had submitted a formal proposition to that ef
fect in 1876. It had not met with a satisfactory response,
and the plan was dropped. As it was a self-evident propo
sition that direct railroad communication between Oregon
and the rest of the country would be of the greatest advan
tage to the local transportation lines, it occurred to Mr.
Villard to make an effort to induce his new Union Pacific
friends to build from Ogden to the Columbia Kiver. The
time was most propitious for new railroad enterprises, as
the appetite of the public for new securities seemed in
satiable. The Union Pacific had years before made a pre
liminary survey of a line from its western terminus to the
Columbia under the direction of General Grenville M.
Dodge. Mr. Villard studied the report of this expedition,
and, with the material it contained and his own knowledge
of the Upper Columbia country, prepared a formal project
and submitted it to Jay Gould and Sidney Dillon. They
were both favorably impressed with it, and, after several

284

1879] OREGON STEAMSHIP COMPANY 285

meetings, it was agreed in writing to form a construction
company for carrying it out, to the capital of which the
Union Pacific people should contribute one half and Mr.
Villard and his friends the other half. On Mr. Villard's
recommendation, they authorized him, as the first step, to
acquire a controlling interest in the Oregon Steam Navi
gation Company, a flourishing company with its seat at
Portland, which had a monopoly of the traffic of the Upper
and Lower Columbia and Snake River through its owner
ship of the portages by short railroads around the obstruc
tions to navigation on the Columbia at the Cascades and the
Dalles. With this special object, he left New York in
April, 1879, on his usual spring visit to Oregon.

In the meantime, new trouble had sprung up for the Ore
gon Steamship Company. The pooling arrangement with
the first opposition had been in force only about seven
months when a new competitor appeared on the Portland-
San Francisco line. Some California speculators had
bought the Great Republic, a laid-*up old side-wheeler of
great carrying capacity, put her in repair and on the route,
evidently for blackmailing purposes. The cutting of pas
senger and freight rates to losing figures soon followed.
The European creditors, who for a long time had received
nothing on account of the principal and interest of their
original advance, owing to the payments for the new steam
ers and the losses from the first competition, now became
hopeless, and early in the year 1879 Mr. Villard was ad
vised that they were willing to sell out at a large sacrifice.
He urged them not to do so, but, as they persisted, he made
his first effort to form a syndicate in New York to buy them
out. He easily accomplished his object, and the transac
tion was closed before he went West. It ended his depend
ence on the creditors, much to his relief, as the duty of
satisfying a group of disappointed foreign bankers had
gradually become very irksome. The success of the new
venture of himself and his friends depended upon the ces
sation of the opposition. He was surprised on his way

286 HENRY VILLARD [1879

overland ]5y the news that, the Great Republic had run
ashore at the mouth of the Columbia and was completely
wrecked, but fortunately without loss of life. These tidings
led him to consider the practicability of forming, under the
auspices of the new Construction Company, an ocean and
river navigation company out of the Oregon Steamship
and the Oregon Steam Navigation Companies, and he
made up his mind, before he reached Portland, to try to
accomplish this object. This was the germ of his remark
able creation, the Oregon Railway & Navigation Company.

The Oregon Steam Navigation Company was formed in
1862 with a capital of $2,000,000 by a combination of indi
vidual owners of steamboats running on the Willamette and
Columbia Rivers. Subsequently the stock capital was in
creased to $5,000,000 after considerable additions to the
properties of the company, paid for out of earnings. It
was a close corporation, a large majority of the stock being
held by five leading men of Portland, who formed the
Board of Directors and exercised actual management. In
1871 these, met the party, representing the Northern Pacific
Railroad, which had come to the Pacific coast to locate the
western terminus of the line and to arrange for the com
mencement of construction in Washington or Oregon. The
directors of the Navigation Company, being alarmed by the
prospect of railroad competition with their boats on the
Columbia, tried to induce the Northern Pacific delegation
to buy them out, and the latter took a proposition with
them to the East for the sale of the whole of the Navigation
stock for $2,000,000 or forty per cent, of the nominal value
of $5,000,000. A deal was consummated in Philadelphia
some months later with the purchase by Jay Cooke & Co.,
for account of the Northern Pacific, of three quarters of the
$5,000,000 at forty per cent., half cash and half in North
ern Pacific bonds at 90. The Portland directors retained
the other quarter of the stock and continued in the man
agement.

Jay Cooke & Co. held the three-quarters of the Naviga-

1879] OREGON NAVIGATION COMPANY 287

tion stock as collateral for their advances to the Northern
Pacific when they failed in 1873, and the stock became part
of their bankrupt estate and was distributed by the trus
tees managing it, mostly in small lots among the numerous
creditors of the firm in part settlement of their claims.
The recipients knew nothing about the Navigation Com
pany, and the stock came into the market at very low
figures. The Portland directors were not slow in improving
this opportunity to buy back the control of the company,
and they and their friends held again, in the spring of
1879, over four-fifths of the stock.

On his arrival in Portland late in April, Mr. Villard im
mediately asked J. C. Ainsworth, the president of the Navi
gation Company, whether he and his associates were will
ing to sell their holdings. After some deliberation, they
informed him that they were disposed to sell, but they
wanted a high price, and suggested that, before beginning
formal negotiations, he should inspect all their properties,
and to that end visit the Upper Columbia and Walla Walla
country once more. Accompanied by one of their number,
he spent ten days in doing this. His previous highly favor
able impressions of the Upper Columbia country and off
the present and future business of the Navigation ConW
pany were fully confirmed. On his return to Portland^
an inventory of the company's properties was produced,
aggregating $3,320,000, including a fleet of side- and stern-
wheel steamers and the twenty-one miles of portage rail
roads. A statement of earnings for several years was sub
mitted, with an offer to sell 40,320 shares at par. The direc
tors thought that it was too big a deal for Mr. Villard, but,
as the earnings showed twelve per cent, on $5,000,000 for
the past year, with a certain large increase for the current
year, he considered it a fine bargain and one well worth
securing. They readily entered into a plan he had matured
on the Upper Columbia, after seeing the difficulties of hand
ling the large and fast-growing grain traffic owing to the
natural obstructions to navigation, which involved breaking

288 HENRY VILLARD [1879

bulk three times and the use of three sets of boats. It was
to form a new company, which should absorb both the
Oregon Steamship Company and the Oregon Steam Navi
gation Company, and which should be provided with capi
tal enough to build a narrow-gauge railroad from the Lower
Cascades up the left bank to a connection near the mouth
of the Snake River with the existing narrow-gauge road
Jto the town of Walla Walla. This railroad would secure,
/in his judgment, by the safe occupancy of the Columbia
IVaUey, the only outlet of eastern Oregon and Washington
jto the Pacific, against both river and railroad competition
— a far more important matter than the economical trans
portation of wheat.

After days of negotiation, it was agreed that the new
company should be organized under the name of the Oregon
Railway & Navigation Company, with a capital of $6,000,-
000 stock, and issue $6,000,000 six per cent, bonds. Mr.
Villard secured for $100,000 cash an option till October 1,
to call for 40,320 Navigation shares at par, paying for
them fifty per cent, in cash, twenty per cent, in the bonds,
and thirty per cent, in the stock of the new company. He
was allowed $1,000,000 stock and $1,200,000 in bonds for
the acquisition of all the Oregon steamship properties and
for a fourth large new steamer; $2,000,000 stock and $2,-
500,000 bonds to raise the cash required for Ainsworth and
friends, leaving $1,800,000 stock and $1,500,000 bonds for
the purchase of the thirty-five miles of the Walla Walla
railroad and the construction of the new railroad along the
Columbia. For $10,000 he obtained an option, also till Oc
tober 1, to buy the Walla Walla line at a satisfactory price.
The Navigation people did not think it possible for Mr.
Villard to raise so much cash, and considered him a_reckless
fool to put up the stake of $100,000, which they felt certain
of pocketing. He left Portland at the end of May in a high
state of elation at what he had achieved, and reached New
York on June 8. The scheme he brought with him dif
fered from that agreed on with the Union Pacific people;

1879] OREGON RAILWAY & NAVIGATION CO. 289

but as it contained so much of immediate promise, he was
confident that they would gladly accept it. He submitted
it at once to Jay Gould, but the latter received it coolly,
and within a few days sent a note to Mr. Villard saying
that he and his associates preferred not to participate. No
thing daunted, but rather glad at this parting of their
ways, Mr. Villard invited his financial friends to join in
exchanging the new Oregon Steamship for Oregon Railway
& Navigation securities, and to subscribe for the required
cash payments for bonds at 90 with a bonus of seventy per
cent, in stock. He met with such prompt response that
within ten days he was able to telegraph to the Portland
parties to send on their Navigation stock for delivery on
July 1, when all the cash, bonds, and stock due on it would
be ready to be paid and delivered to them. This was ac
tually done, and in addition the balance due to the foreign
creditors for the Steamship Company was remitted and
enough cash left in the treasury of the new company for
the fourth new steamship and for beginning construction
on the Columbia River railroad line, which was being sur
veyed as rapidly as possible. This quick work caused as
tonishment in American as well as in European financial
circles, and the achiever of it received far more public
notice than he ever expected or cared to have. It would
seem a trifling operation in these later years, in which scores
of millions have often been raised by syndicates for the
reorganization of railroads and the formation of indus
trial combinations, but in those early days it was an un
exampled performance.

The reception of the securities of the new company by
the public also made an extraordinary " record," best
shown by the following incident. Mr. Villard was over
worked, and, after setting up the Oregon Railway & Navi
gation Company, embarked for Europe with his family,
early in July, for a rest of some months. The shares were
listed at the New York Stock Exchange during the sum
mer. He did not return until late in November, and, on

19

290 HENRY VILLARD (1879

reaching the dock, he noticed one of his counsel in the crowd
waiting, waving a piece of paper at him. It turned out
to be a broker's report of a sale at 95 of the stock
that had been given five months before as a bonus. This
rapid rise was due to the fact that the net earnings of
the two constituent river and navigation companies were
sufficiently large to warrant the payment of bond interest
and eight per cent, dividends on the stock, payment at
which rate had already been commenced. This astonishing
increase naturally raised Mr. Villard to a still more com
manding position in Wall Street. Yet it was but the begin
ning of a series of like successes.

The vast region drained by the Columbia and its tribu-
aries formed a very empire in its extent. Its material
development was entirely dependent upon the present and
future transportation facilities within its limits. Mr. Vil
lard 's rule over these and, through them, over the whole
future of that promising part of the country was rendered
all but absolute by his personal success. He was fully
conscious of the duties his great task imposed upon him to
the new corporation and to the people of Oregon and Wash
ington. He devoted himself to their fulfilment with all the
energy at his command. Before going to Europe, he had
closed a contract for the construction of the fourth steamer,
named the Columbia, which was the finest in every respect
that had left the yards of John Roach, the well-known ship
builder. Having become interested in the incandescent
electric lighting as perfected by Edison, he insisted upon
having the Columbia provided with it. Roach was strongly
opposed at first to the innovation, but yielded, and the first
electric plant ever placed on a sea-going vessel went into
the new boat and gave perfect satisfaction. The novel illu
mination was also at first objected to, strange as it may
now seem, by the marine underwriters.

The shipment of railroad material for the Columbia line
also occupied his attention. It having been decided to
formally consolidate the two constituent companies with

1880] NORTHERN PACIFIC NEGOTIATIONS 291

the controlling one, the acquisition of the outstanding
minority of the Oregon Steam Navigation stock devolved
upon Mr. Villard, and proved a troublesome undertaking.
Last, but not least, a contingency arose in the resumption
of construction activity by the Northern Pacific in Wash
ington Territory, which threatened the monopoly of the
Oregon Railway & Navigation Company on the Upper
Columbia. The former company had succeeded in raising
enough capital to build that part of the main line from
Lake Pend d'Oreille to the confluence of the Columbia and
Snake rivers, known for a time as the Pend d'Oreille
Branch. The continuance of this line down the right bank
of the Columbia, parallel to the Oregon Railway & Navi
gation Company's line on the opposite bank, was a menace
to the latter, whose location really constituted an indispu
table encroachment, moreover, on the right of the Northern
Pacific to build on either bank. Mr. Villard entered into
negotiations with the Northern Pacific early in 1880 to ob
tain, in consideration of a liberal traffic contract, a conces
sion of the right of way on the left bank to his company,
and an agreement on their part not to build on the other
bank. It was then merely agreed, however, that he should
meet the late Joseph D. Potts, of Philadelphia, one of the
directors, on the Pacific coast, and with him go over the
ground and find a basis for a mutually satisfactory ar
rangement. They met, travelled together, and joined in
recommendations to their respective corporations, and
early in the fall the preparation of a contract embodying
the above suggestions was begun in New York. Mr. Villard
spent the greater part of the summer on the coast, and ex
pedited the construction work on the different lines as
much as possible. In view of the negotiations with the
Northern Pacific for using his company's Columbia River
line, and of the surprising increase of the river traffic, it was
decided to abandon the narrow for the standard gauge. An
exploration trip which Mr. Villard made with Messrs.
George M. Pullman and William Endicott, Jr., of Boston,

292 HENRY VILLARD [1880

through eastern Oregon and southeastern Washington led
to the determination to commence at once the construc
tion of a number of branch lines as feeders to the river line.
During this tour he met and addressed gatherings of set
tlers at different points, explaining his purpose to give them
railroad communication, and urging them to increase their
wheat planting. He made it a point to ask his hearers what
rate on wheat to tide-water would be satisfactory, and was
able to promise them lower rates than they asked. He
defined his policy as that of a beneficent monopoly, and his
executive action bore him out, for, upon the completion
of the Oregon Railway & Navigation Company's railroad
system, the cost of transporting grain to the sea was at
once reduced forty per cent, and more.

To provide the additional capital required by the change
of gauge and for the construction of feeders, the capital
stock of the Oregon Railway & Navigation Company was
increased by $6,000,000, which was offered to the stock
holders at par, who took it readily, as the market price
of the shares had risen to above 180 before the new issue.
In his first annual report as president, published in the
summer of 1880, Mr. Villard announced that 115 miles of
the river line were about being completed, and that the
grading on the branch lines in southeastern Washington
was done.

During his sojourn on the Pacific coast in 1880, a project
for another company matured in his mind, the object of
which should be the development of the natural resources,
mineral, agricultural, and otherwise, of Oregon and Wash-
I ington, and the North Pacific coast generally, in cooperation
';, with the Oregon Railway & Navigation Company. The
name of Oregon Improvement Company was adopted for it,
and it was authorized to issue five millions of stock and
five millions of bonds. The latter were offered at par with
the full amount of stock as a bonus, and were eagerly sub
scribed for by Mr. Villard 's followers. His success was
even more immediate than with the Oregon Railway &

1880] OREGON IMPROVEMENT COMPANY 293

Navigation Company, as the subscriptions sold at a pre
mium of from forty to fifty per cent, before the lists
were closed, and the shares reached 91^ at the New
York Stock Exchange within a few months. The new
company bought and worked a coal railroad and mine
in western Washington, and purchased a large body of
select agricultural lands from the Northern Pacific in the
so-called Palouse country in eastern Washington; brought
out three large new coal steamers from the Atlantic coast;
erected a great coal dock at San Francisco, and eventually
acquired the capital stock of the Pacific Coast Steamship
Company, which had pooled its earnings with the Railway
& Navigation Company for the San Francisco-Portland
line. As the last-named company had a good many dealings
with the Improvement Company, Mr. Villard decided not
to assume the presidency or be a director of the latter, but
he directed all the investments of its capital elsewhere re
ferred to.

Early in the summer of 1880, a change occurred in his
relations to the Oregon & California. During his visit to
Germany in 1879, he had informally agreed with the
Frankfort committee of bondholders to bring a proposition
before the Oregon Railway & Navigation Company to buy
all the interest of the bondholders in the two Oregon rail
roads for a guarantee of principal and six per cent, interest
on half their nominal holdings of Oregon & California
bonds. A committee of Navigation directors, consisting
of Messrs. Pullman and Endicott, was charged to examine
the roads and report upon the proposition. But Mr. Vil
lard himself withdrew it when a Scotch company com
menced the construction of a competitive narrow-gauge
system in the Willamette Valley. As the Navigation Com
pany operated boats on the Willamette which affected the
traffic of the railroads, he deemed it his duty to resign as
president of the Oregon & California and as a member of
the committee, which he did at the time stated. But the
severance of his relations with that company did not con-

294 HENRY VILLARD [1880

tinue long. During 1879 and 1880, the control of the ma
jority of the Oregon & California bonds had gradually
passed from German to English holders, who started a
movement in London for the reorganization of the roads.
A plan was perfected, and, with Mr. Villard's knowledge
and sanction, was unanimously approved at a special bond
holders' meeting.

In order to provide capital for the completion of the
Oregon & California to the California boundary, where its
junction with the Central Pacific was expected, the issue
of new six per cent, bonds, at the rate of $20,000 a mile and
$12,000,000 preferred and $7,000,000 common stock to be
given in exchange for the old seven per cent, bonds, was au
thorized. Under the direction of the Improvement Com
pany, with Mr. Villard's assistance, an underwriting syn
dicate for $6,000,000 of the new bonds was successfully
formed, after which he was reflected president of the Ore
gon & California Company, which had absorbed the Oregon
Central. The work of continuing the main line southward
from Koseburg was at once started and pushed energeti
cally.

CHAPTER XLI

COMPLETION OF THE NORTHERN PACIFIC RAILWAY
1880-3

THE negotiations with the Northern Pacific were re
sumed in September, 1880, by Mr. Villard, assisted by
Thomas F. Oakes, whom he had induced to resign as gen
eral superintendent of the Kansas Pacific and assume the
functions of vice-president and general manager of the
Railway & Navigation Company. The Northern Pacific par
ties were lukewarm and hard to satisfy, but a contract was
signed on October 20. Mr. Villard 's side secured in it
all the essential points it had been striving for except a
covenant by the other party not to build down the north
bank of the Columbia, which it could, however, hardly
make without risking a forfeiture of a large portion of its
land grant in Oregon and Washington. The Northern
Pacific recognized the other company's right of way on the
southern bank and its title to the station grounds, and
waived all claims for damages, and, most important of all,
agreed to a division of territory, with the Snake and Colum
bia as the dividing line, except that it consented to the
construction of a line into the Palouse country by the Rail
way & Navigation Company. In consideration of all these
concessions, the latter agreed to complete a standard-gauge
road within three years from the western end of the Pend
d'Oreille division at the mouth of the Snake River to
Portland, and to grant the Northern Pacific the right, with
out the obligation, to run its own trains over it at a fixed
charge per train mile. It also agreed to carry Northern Pa
cific construction material at reasonable and fixed rates, and
to effect the sale at $2.50 an acre of three hundred thousand

295

296 HENRY VILLARD [1880

> I acres of Northern Pacific land along the Palouse line to
\the Oregon Improvement Company.

Mr. Villard and his friends were exultant, and the Navi
gation stock rose considerably on the announcement of the
signing of the contract, to which the Northern Pacific
would not have assented if the negotiations had been pro
tracted a little longer. Its management had not found it
easy to raise money for the resumption of construction east
and west, and would not have Been able to command the
means to build along the Columbia. Moreover, it had
shrunk from a contest with a young and vigorous concern
like the Oregon Railway & Navigation Company, with ap
parently unlimited financial resources, under a bold and
aggressive leadership. Its defensive position was entirely
changed within a month of the execution of the contract
by the sale of $40,000,000 of its first-mortgage bonds to a
powerful syndicate headed by Drexel, Morgan & Co., Wins-
low, Lanier & Co., and A. Belmont & Co. The transaction,
then unparalleled in its magnitude, assured to the company
$36,000,000 of money, which was then generally assumed
to be sufficient for the completion and equipment of the
entire main line.

Mr. Villard heard of this portentous operation only a few
days before its consummation. He now understood why
his own offer during the negotiations with President Bil
lings to raise $10,000,000 for the Northern Pacific against
its mortgage bonds was at first warmly received but after
wards declined. He perceived at once distinctly what dam
aging consequences the great financial strength thus secured
- to the other company might have for the interests repre
sented by him. The fear, indeed, was justified that his
company would be struck in its vital part by the continu
ance of the Northern Pacific main line down the Columbia.
He knew that the mere threat of this would greatly affect
the market value of his company's securities, and much im
pede the raising of additional capital for it. In a short
time he decided upon the adoption of a radical remedy for

J

1881] THE BLIND POOL 297

these threatening consequences. He formed the boldest ,
resolution of his whole business career. It was nothing
less than the acquisition of a sufficient amount of Northern
Pacific shares to influence the direction of Northern Pacific
affairs, to which stock interest should be permanently
joined the large majority of Oregon Railway & Navigation
stock held by himself and his followers, so as to insure last
ing harmony between the two corporations.

In pursuance of this object, he conceived the plan of
forming a new company which should purchase and hold
a controlling interest in the Northern Pacific as well as in
the Oregon Railway & Navigation. Foreseeing that a regu
lar supply of capital would be needed for years for the
development, by branch lines and otherwise, of the enor
mous stretches of wild country tributary to the two com
panies, he enlarged the scheme so as to make the new
corporation also a financiering company for the two others.
He had gained enough experience in Wall Street by this
time to know that, if his intention to form such a company
for such a purpose became public, he would never be able
to secure his main object— the purchase at reasonable
figures in the open market of the large amount of the two
stocks he needed. He therefore determined to begin by
buying as secretly as possible all that his private means
and credit permitted. Only a few of his most intimate
friends were aware of his operations. Having gone as far
as he could on his own account, he decided, in February,
1881, to call on his supporters generally for further funds
in such a manner as not to disclose the object he sought to
accomplish. With his absolute faith in the soundness of his
project, he felt justified in taking large responsibilities,
and did not hesitate to make the boldest possible appeal to
personal confidence by asking his followers to intrust their
money to him without being told what use he intended
to make of it. Accordingly, he issued a confidential cir
cular to about fifty persons, informing them that they
were desired to subscribe towards a fund of $8,000,000, to

298 HENRY VILLARD [1881

which he himself would contribute a large part, in order
to enable him to lay the foundation of a certain enterprise
the exact nature of which he would disclose on or before
May 15, 1881. Payments were to be made in three instal
ments.

The effect of the circular was astonishing. The very
novelty and mystery of the proposition proved to be an
irresistible attraction. One-third of the persons and firms
appealed to signed the full amount asked for before the
subscription-paper could reach the other two-thirds. Then
a regular rush for the privilege of subscribing ensued, and,
within twenty-four hours of the issue of the circular, more
than twice the amount offered was applied for. The allot
ments were made as fairly as possible, but hardly one of the
subscribers was satisfied with the amount allowed him. All
wanted more, and Mr. Yillard's offices were crowded with
persons pleading for larger participations, including some
of the first bankers of New York, of whom several pro
tested angrily when refused. The subscriptions com
manded twenty-five per cent, premium at once, which rose
to forty and fifty per cent.; in other words, people were
willing to pay fifteen hundred dollars for every thousand
they were permitted to contribute. The eight million dol
lars was promptly paid, notwithstanding the great strin
gency of the money market at the time.

The subscribers received a personal receipt from Mr. Vil-
lard, reading as follows:

Received this day from the sum of

dollars, as his contribution to, and which entitles the holder hereof
to a proportionate interest in, the transactions of a Purchasing
Syndicate to be formed with a capital of $8,000,000, by agreement
in writing of the parties in like interest, for the acquisition of
properties, real, personal and mixed, for the purpose of the sale
thereof to and the consolidation with the Oregon Railway & Navi
gation Company or the Oregon Improvement Company or both, or
to serve as the basis for the formation of a new Company. It is
understood and agreed that the undersigned shall account to the

1881] OREGON & TRANSCONTINENTAL CO. 299

holder hereof for the use of the moneys for which this and like
receipts are given on or before May 15, 1880, but not sooner, and
that the holder hereof shall participate equally in all the profits
and benefits of every description with all other persons in like
interest in proportion to said contribution. This receipt is not
transferable except with the written consent of the undersigned.

The promised accounting was postponed until June 24,
when the subscribers met by invitation of Mr. Villard in
his offices, and received for the first time full explanations
of his plan to form a new company for the double object
already explained. The project was so well received that
his simultaneous invitation to subscribe $12,000,000 more
was generally responded to. The new company was or
ganized immediately in Oregon, under the name of the
Oregon & Transcontinental Company, with an authorized
capital stock of $50,000,000, of which $30,000,000 was issued
and distributed among the subscribers for the $20,000,000
cash paid in.

This unique financial feat, without precedent or parallel,
gained for Mr. Villard much of the kind of reputation
which he least coveted. Wall Street dubbed it the "blind
pool," and the newspaper exaggerations and fictions in
dulged in throughout the country regarding it gave him a
most distasteful notoriety. The new corporation was the
first of the companies, now called "proprietary," which
have since become numerous. Its conception was consid
ered by eminent bankers as a stroke of genius, and the
belief in its practicability by men of the highest standing
was evidenced by the composition of the company's
board of directors and the list of stockholders. Yet the
company was destined to prove a grievous disappointment
and the greatest possible trial to its originator. Even be
fore the purchasing syndicate was wound up, unexpected
troubles were born with the new company. In forming it,
the founder had no intention of ousting the existing man
agement of the Northern Pacific, but only to bring about a

300 HENRY VILLARD [1881

close alliance between it and the Oregon Railway & Navi
gation Company. But President Billings rejected his ad
vances, and would not even listen to his request for a small
representation in the Northern Pacific board. Thereupon
he offered to purchase the stock holdings of Mr. Billings
and his fellow-directors, but this offer was also declined.
The Northern Pacific directors, knowing that this would
result in their displacement at the next annual election, then
tried to fortify themselves by the sudden distribution of
the $18,000,000 of common stock still in the treasury. Mr.
Villard got wind of this and sued out an injunction against
the issue. After some litigation, a compromise was effected.
A new board of directors was agreed upon, with a ma
jority of representatives of the Oregon & Transcontinental,
and elected at the annual meeting in September, with Henry
Villard as president, T. F. Oakes as first vice-president, and
Anthony J. Thomas, an officer of the Oregon & Transcon
tinental Company, as second vice-president. Thus, in a
little over two years from the birth of the Oregon Railway
& Navigation Company, Mr. Villard had assumed the bur
den of forging a new rail chain across the continent, twenty-
seven hundred miles long, by connecting the existing links.
The new management considered its most important duty
the pushing of the construction of the main line of the
Northern Pacific with the utmost energy. It found a
balance of no less than $34,000,000 from the sale of the
$40,000,000 first-mortgage bonds available for this pur
pose. Yet, in spite of this seeming abundance, serious
financial embarrassments arose during the first year of
the new administration from two sources. In the first
place, large expenditures were incurred for grading, bridg
ing, and tunnelling at points in Montana, a long distance
from the two ends of the track; but no money could be
drawn from the building fund for outlays not resulting in
finished road. Under the terms of the mortgage, the pro
ceeds of the bonds became available only upon the comple
tion and acceptance by the United States Government

1881-3] COMPLETING NORTHERN PACIFIC 301

of the main line in 25-mile sections of road. In the
second place, there was serious trouble owing to the lin
gering illness of President Garfield and the refusal of his
successor, President Arthur, to appoint commissioners to
inspect completed sections because bills forfeiting the com
pany's land grant were pending in Congress. Although
Mr. Villard induced one Republican leader after another
to appeal to the Executive on behalf of the company for
the appointment of commissioners, President Arthur re
mained immovable until September, when he yielded to the
arguments of Roscoe Conkling. For more than a year,
the company had been obliged to meet requirements for
construction and equipment at the average rate of over
$2,000,000 a month without reimbursement from the pro
ceeds of the bonds. It was a period of most harassing anx
iety for Mr. Villard. More than once the situation seemed
desperate, and he prevented a breakdown only by the un
hesitating use of his personal credit and by assistance from
the Oregon & Transcontinental Company, the availability
of which fully demonstrated the practical value of its crea
tion. Notwithstanding these financial hindrances, the prog
ress of construction was not delayed an hour.

During the whole of 1882, and up to midsummer of 1883,
Mr. Villard devoted himself unceasingly to the double duty
of meeting the money requirements for construction and
equipment and of accelerating the grading, bridging, tun
nelling, and track-laying by the several companies under
his presidency. He sought to inspire the engineers in
charge and the contractors with determination to do their
utmost to complete the main line of the Northern Pacific
and the river road of the Oregon Railway & Navigation
by the end of the summer of 1883. Construction was also
proceeding on the Oregon & California. Moreover, Mr.
Villard, through the Oregon & Transcontinental, in accord
ance with its programme, had taken in hand in 1883 the
building of nearly five hundred miles of Northern Pacific
branches in Minnesota, North Dakota, Montana, and west-

302 HENRY VILLARD [1883

ern Washington, including the important Yellowstone Park
branch. The forces employed by the several companies
formed a total of over twenty-five thousand railroad men,
mechanics, and laborers, including fifteen thousand China
men, and the total disbursements on all accounts reached
fully four millions of dollars a month. He aimed at an
achievement the like of which had never before been at
tempted in the civilized world— nothing less than the com
pletion of not far from two thousand miles of new road
in two years, or nearly three miles a day, including scores
of miles of tunnels, bridges, and trestles. No man in this
country, indeed, had ever before at one time had supreme
charge of such gigantic operations, extending from the
Upper Mississippi to the Pacific Ocean, and from Puget
Sound to the northern boundaries of California.

After protracted negotiations with the Union Pacific
officials in the early part of 1883, Mr. Villard finally in
duced them to agree definitely to construct their Oregon
Short Line to the Snake River as fast as possible, in con
sideration of which he undertook to continue the Baker
City branch of the Oregon Railway & Navigation Company
to a junction with their extension. The enlargement of the
construction programme of the latter company had called
for another issue of $6,000,000 stock in 1882, and the agree
ment with the Union Pacific now led to a third issue of the
same amount, so that the total outstanding stock capital
was $24,000,000. As the net earnings of the company had
risen in the first three years of its existence from less than
a million to nearly three millions, the successive issues of
* stock were readily absorbed. The company was then the
only one in the United States that met all its pecuniary
requirements without putting out a single additional bond
after the first issue, of which fact its president was justly
proud.

Mr. Villard spent many months, both in 1882 and in
1883, on the road in personal visits to the principal con
struction columns. In April, 1883, occasion arose for him

1883] OREGON & CALIFORNIA EXTENSION 303

to be in Portland by a certain date, which he could only do
by making an accelerated trip across the continent. Owing
. to the courtesy of the lines between Chicago and San Fran
cisco, he was able to arrange for a special train running
through without stopping anywhere except for a change of
locomotives about every two hundred miles. The run was
watched by the whole Western public, and the newspapers
reported regularly the progress of his train. Everywhere
along the route, people turned out to see it fly past and
cheer its occupants. It went through in less than half the
time of the regular passenger trains, being the fastest trip
hitherto made.

Mr. Villard's sojourns in Portland had always been
times of hard work, but the one following the flying jour
ney overland was an extraordinarily busy one. He worked
out the details of a lease of the Oregon & California lines
by the Oregon & Transcontinental Company on what
seemed advantageous terms to the latter; the lease was
subsequently submitted to and approved by the stock
holders of the two companies. The construction of the
extension from Roseburg had far exceeded the estimates,
and the proceeds of the new bonds were exhausted before
the very costly lower end, crossing the Siskiyou Moun
tains, was reached. The lease therefore provided for the
completion of the line by the lessee for the remainder of
the authorized Oregon & California first-mortgage and all of
the second-mortgage bonds. Mr. Villard also closed a lease
of the narrow-gauge system built with Scotch capital in
the Willamette Valley. Next, he perfected the organization
of a separate Terminal Company, which was to create the
terminal facilities, including a large passenger station, a
bridge over the Willamette, machine-shops, freight-houses,
round-houses, docks, etc., required for the three railroad
systems, the Oregon & Transcontinental Company, Oregon
Railway & Navigation, and Northern Pacific, which would
terminate at Portland. The estimated outlay of the Ter
minal Company was nearly $3,000,000, which was pro-

304 HENRY VILLARD [1883

vided for by the issue of bonds to be guaranteed by the three
railroad companies. As Portland did not have a single de
cent hotel at the time, Mr. Villard also purchased a suitable
for a large modern one, and gave a leading firm of
New York architects charge of its erection. Its completion
was delayed for some years, but "The Portland" stands
to-day, as planned by him, the finest establishment of the
kind on the Pacific coast north of San Francisco.

Oregon had an institution which went by the name of
.University, of which it represented, however, but a very
small beginning. It had received little support either from
the State or from the public, and was so embarrassed by
indebtedness that it would probably have been obliged to
close its doors, had not Mr. Villard come to its relief by
paying its floating debt in response to an appeal from the
Board of Regents. He also presented it with the nucleus
of a library. In May, 1883, he offered to donate fifty thou
sand dollars to it on condition that the State would levy a
tax sufficient for its maintenance on a moderate scale. This
being done, he paid over the promised sum, in recognition
of which gift a hall was named after him. About the same
time, he intervened to save the Territorial University of
Washington from suspension by the failure of the Terri
torial Legislature to make an appropriation for it.1 He
also helped various local charities on the North Pacific coast.

Before leaving for an overland trip to St. Paul along the
finished and unfinished parts of the Northern Pacific main
line, he delivered a speech to a large audience at Portland.
Referring to the fact that construction on the Oregon Rail
way & Navigation lines had progressed more rapidly than
had been expected, as shown by the completion of the Co
lumbia River line the previous November, three months
ahead of time, and in view also of the advanced state
of the work on the Northern Pacific, he said he hoped the

1 This " intervention" meant the imbursed for this outlay by the
support of the institution for two Legislature,
years. Mr. Villard was never re-

1883] THE NORTHERN PACIFIC TRAVERSED 305

announcement he was about to make without hesitation
would find credence— that he would come to Portland again
early in the fall, and be the first passenger to alight .from
the first through-train from St. Paul to that city. He
further announced the terms of the understanding he had
reached with the Union Pacific regarding the coming junc
tion of the Baker City branch of the Oregon Railway &
Navigation Company with the Oregon Short Line. Thus
he could promise them not only one but two railroad con
nections with the East within a short time. In response
to this, the enthusiastic audience gave him a great ovation.
He was able fully to redeem his promise regarding the
time and manner of his next arrival in Portland.

Accompanied by a party of railroad officials, he set out
for the eastward land journey. At that time there was still
a gap of four hundred miles between the eastern track end
on the Upper Missouri near Gallatin and the western on
Clark's Fork of the Columbia, which he traversed by
vehicle and on horseback. At one time he drove in a buggy
over a grass-covered height, rising in less than half a mile
about three hundred feet, which divides the source of the
Columbia from that of the Missouri. His observations
impressed him greatly with the agricultural richness of the
company's lands in eastern Washington and the timber
value of those in Idaho and Montana. The immense unex
plored region he traversed gave rise in his mind to a desire
to start a thorough scientific exploration of the entire un
known portion of the Northern Pacific land grant ; this was
subsequently carried out by the organization of a transcon
tinental survey under Professor Raphael Pumpelly. The
hearty welcome which Mr. Villard received in all the towns
and settlements cheered him, but cause for depression also
arose on this journey. His conferences with the superin
tendents of construction and contractors, and what he him
self saw of the local difficulties that had already arisen and
that had still to be grappled with, led for the first time
to apprehension on his part that there would be a large
20

306 HENRY VILLAKD [1883

excess of actual outlay over the estimates of the chief en
gineer. On arriving at St. Paul, after having spent nearly
three weeks on the way, having also inspected the work on
the new branch lines in Dakota and Minnesota, he imme
diately ordered the chief engineer to make a special report
to him as to the money requirements for the completion
of the main line that summer, of the possibility of which
his tour had satisfied him.

In St. Paul he was occupied chiefly with the formation
of a terminal company in the interest of the Northern
Pacific. The company had insufficient grounds in St.
Paul, and as good as none in the sister city of Minneapolis,
yet there was urgent need of ample facilities in both places
in view of the approaching change of the Northern Pacific
from a local into a transcontinental line. The reason was
that its line connecting the main line at Brainerd with
the Twin Cities was only partially owned by the Northern
Pacific. He conceived and carried out the project of ac
quiring the connecting line entirely, through a reorganiza
tion of it under the name of St. Paul & Northern Pacific
Company; a new bond issue providing for the necessary
acquisition of real estate and other improvements. He con
cealed his plan until the large grounds needed had been
quietly bought up by third parties for his private account
without attracting attention, as publicity would at once
have resulted in such a rise in prices that the purchase at
reasonable figures would have been impossible. When he
had secured all that was needed, he turned the whole over
to the St. Paul & Northern Pacific Company at cost and
interest. The properties acquired cost about $300,000, but
became worth several millions, and without them the
Northern Pacific would have been simply strangled in the
two cities. This disinterested action was especially recog
nized and commended by resolution of the Northern Paci
fic board. The St. Paul & Northern Pacific Company was
very successfully financiered by the same syndicate that
had taken the Northern Pacific first-mortgage bonds.

1883] THE COST UNDERESTIMATED 307

Mr. Villard also received at St. Paul a deputation of offi
cials of the Canadian province of Manitoba, with whose
Government he had been in communication for some time
regarding the breaking up of the Canadian Pacific's statu
tory monopoly of the through east-and-west business from
the province. As, under Dominion law, in order to pre
vent American lines from being extended into the province,
no railroad competing with the Canadian Pacific could
.be built within fifteen miles of the international boundary,
a plan was adopted to build a Northern Pacific branch from
the main line to the boundary and another from Winni
peg, the capital of the province, down to the forbidden belt,
and to carry passengers and goods across the interval by
ordinary vehicles. It proved an impracticable scheme, and
had to be abandoned after the construction of the line to
the boundary from the south had been commenced, and Mr.
Villard regretted the mistake he had made in entering into
it. The enterprise was sold to the St. Paul, Minneapolis &
Manitoba Railroad Company, which was allied to the Cana
dian Pacific at that time.

The report of the chief engineer on the cost of the new
part of the main line reached Mr. Villard soon after his
return to New York late in June. It contained the start
ling admission that the actual requirements for the comple
tion of the main line would exceed the estimates by more
than fourteen millions of dollars. This revelation was a
doubly staggering blow to him, because it discredited all
his confident statements to his associates and followers
based on the original estimates and confirmed time and
again to him as true by the engineering department,
that the cash resources in hand were ample for all wants,
and because it imposed new financiering burdens on
him. It was certain, too, to affect unfavorably the secu
rities of his several companies. At this time, there became
perceptible, indeed, the first signs of a reaction from the
great rise in prices which had continued almost uninter
ruptedly, especially in railroad shares, since the resump-

308 HENRY VILLARD [1883

tion of specie payments. The shares of his companies had
followed the general upward tendency and more than led
the market. The Northern Pacific preferred stock rose
above par and the shares of the Oregon & Transcontinental
almost to par in September, 1882, with enormous transac
tions in both, aggregating some days seventy thousand
shares for the one and thirty thousand for the other.1
Both stocks were believed, even by cautious bankers, to
hold out promise of much greater appreciation. They as
sumed that the gigantic land grant would yield a great deal
more in money than the principal of the first-mortgage
bonds, that upon the completion of the line the preferred
stock would receive a full eight per cent, dividend, and
therefore rise far above par and be quickly retired out of
the lands especially pledged for its redemption. Asser
tions that this assured extinction of the prior securities
made the common shares more certain of a greater rise than
any others on the list, were frequently heard, and the most
sanguine prophesied that it would double and triple their
nominal value.

While made anxious by the construction deficit and the
premonitions of the approach of a period of decline, Mr.
Villard kept up his courage, and tried to infuse it into the
minds of the doubters beginning to appear among his fol
lowers. He strengthened himself and others with the seem
ingly indisputable proposition that the Northern Pacific
could certainly be expected to earn much more as a through
transcontinental line than as one operated in disconnected
sections, and he looked -forward to the completion of the
main line as the end of all his present troubles and the
dawn of halcyon days. Buoyed up also by the renewed
affirmation in the report of the chief engineer that the two
ends of the track would be united before the end of Sep
tember, he overcame the remaining difficulties with his
usual resoluteness and fertility of resource.

1 On December 17, 1883, the day of Mr. Villard's resignation from the
O. T. presidency, there were sold 113,800 shares of O. T. stock.

1883] NORTHERN PACIFIC CELEBRATION 309

With a view to attracting European attention to his '
enterprises, he thought it well to make the opening of the
Northern Pacific as a new transcontinental route the occa
sion for an international celebration. At his instance, the •
company extended invitations to the members of the United
States Government and the governments of the seven States
traversed by the road, to leading members of the United
States Senate and House of Representatives, to over a hun
dred representative men from all parts of the country, and
to the leading newspapers, to be present at the driving of
the last spike. The whole diplomatic corps was also in
vited, as well as several score of prominent Englishmen and
Germans. As nearly all those invited accepted, it was nec
essary to arrange for four special trains from the East and
one from the Pacific coast. For the benefit of the Company 's
guests, he had had printed a history of the Northern Pacific
Company, forming a large volume,1 together with a guide
book descriptive of the cities, towns, and the country along
the line, as well as a small pamphlet with special instruc
tions for the trip. The preparations for the excursion
across the continent added much to his labors, but they ,
were all completed, so that it got under way from the '
East on August 28.

Mr. Villard led it himself, accompanied by his whole
family, including his baby boy, Henry Hilgard, who was
only three months old. Two special trains started from
the Atlantic; one was added at Chicago, and another at
the Twin Cities. The Ministers of Great Britain, Germany,
and Austria were of the party. From England, Lord
Justice Bowen, Charles Russell (the late Lord Chief -Jus
tice), James Bryce, Judge (afterwards Lord) Hannen, Hor
ace (now Lord) Davey, Lord (now Earl) Carrington, Al
bert H. G. Grey (now Earl Grey), Earl and Countess of

1 ' History of the Northern Pacific Villard's presidency was dictated

Railroad. By Eugene V. Smalley. by him to the compiler. It has

New York : G. P. Putnam's Sons, been partly drawn upon in the

1883.' The chapter relating to Mr. foregoing narrative.

310 HENRY VILLARD [1883

Onslow, Sir W. Brampton Gurdon, Hon. St. John Brod-
rick, and a dozen others had come over to join the party.
The German guests were Professor Dr. Gneist, Professor
Dr. A. W. Hofmann, the great chemist, Professor Zittel,
the famous geologist, Georg von Bunsen, Dr. Paul Lindau,
the novelist, official representatives of the cities of Ham-
[burg, Bremen, Berlin, Stettin, and Frankfort-on-the-Main,
General Robert von Xylander, his wife ^(only surviving
sister of Mr. Villard), Colonel (now Lieutenant-General )
Emil von Xylander, several well-known financiers, in
cluding Dr. Georg Siemens of the Deutsche Bank and
Otto Braunfels of the Jacob S. H. Stern firm of Frank
fort-on-the-Main, several correspondents of leading news
papers, and some old personal friends of the host. Among
the Americans were General U. S. Grant, several mem
bers of President Arthur's Cabinet, several ex-secretaries,
seven governors, distinguished judges, United States Sen
ators and Representatives, mayors of Western cities, and
over a score of journalists.

The movement of the special trains over the continent
formed a leading daily topic in the American and foreign
press. The first formal reception given to Mr. Villard and
his guests took place at Chicago, and was arranged by the
municipal authorities and the Board of Trade. From there
on they had a triumphal procession, the people all along
the route turning out in vast numbers to give them an en
thusiastic welcome. These popular tributes far exceeded
Mr. Villard 's expectations, and often embarrassed and bur
dened him as the central figure in the demonstrations.
"With their traditional rivalry, St. Paul and Minneapolis
had striven to outdo each other with decorations, triumphal
arches, salutes, parades, and entertainments. Military and
civic associations more than twenty thousand strong passed
in review before Mr. Villard and his guests in the morning
in St. Paul, and over thirty thousand in the afternoon in
Minneapolis. President Arthur, who was travelling in the
West, and General Grant were also present.

There were other noteworthy incidents on the journey to

1883] THE LAST SPIKE 311

the coast, One was the laying of the cornerstone of the
State Capitol of Dakota at Bismarck by Mr. Villard in the
presence of a great multitude. His address was followed
by remarks made by the famous Indian chief, Sitting Bull,
who had been brought there for the occasion from his place
of captivity. Another was the gathering, by permission
of the Secretary of the Interior, in eastern Montana, right
on the line of the railroad, of a tribe of Crow Indians num
bering two thousand warriors, squaws, and pappooses,
with wigwams and fifteen hundred ponies. The men ap
peared in full war array, and performed war dances for the
benefit of the excursionists. So weird a spectacle, the like
of which will never be seen again in the United States,
naturally appealed very strongly to all the European
guests. The act of driving the last spike (not a golden one,
as the press had it, but the very first one driven in 1872
on the Minnesota Division) was performed in the waning
light of September 3 in western Montana, at the point
where the train with guests from the Pacific coast was
met. It was preceded by addresses by Mr. Villard and
Mr. Frederick Billings, his predecessor as president, an
oration by William M. Evarts, and short speeches by the
seven governors and United States Senator Nesmith of Ore
gon. A thousand feet of track had been left unfinished in
order to give the guests a demonstration of the rapidity
with which the rails were put down. This having been done,
amidst the roar of artillery, the strains of military music,
and wild cheering Mr. Villard hammered down the "last
spike." He had his family next to him, as also the head
chief of the Crows, who formally ceded their hunting-
grounds to the railroad after the baby Hilgard had touched
the spike with his little hands. Mr. Villard 's emotions at
that moment may be imagined. Speedy relief from the
load of anxiety which the gigantic task had imposed upon
him seemed to be promised. What wonder that he felt
indescribably elated at this consummation of his peaceful
conquest of the West ?
During the passage of the trains over the new track in

312 HENRY VILLARD [1883

Montana, Idaho, and Washington, Mr. Villard realized to
the full the serious responsibilities he had assumed in pro
viding for the comfort and safety of his guests. There
were as yet no stations on hundreds of miles of the line,
which rendered the direction of the movement of the trains
most difficult. This devolved upon him. There were no
supplies to be had for half the distance, and the different
trains had to be stocked daily from a special provision-
train. Mr. Villard was in constant trepidation, too, lest
accidents should upset the schedule of the trains. Several
minor ones did occur, indeed, east of the Rocky Mountains,
but they caused no injury to persons, and but little delay.
In descending the western slope, after passing over the
switchback road above the Mullen tunnel, not then com
pleted, he was much alarmed by the breaking into two parts
of his own train, owing to a defective coupling. A collision
ensued, the end of the car occupied by the British Minister
and six other prominent guests being smashed, without,
however, doing injury to any of the inmates.

The closing receptions at Portland, Tacoma, and Seattle
were not- surpassed by those at the eastern end of the
Northern Pacific in lavishness of hospitality and in enthusi
astic popular participation. In Tacoma, Mr. Villard put
himself at the head of his guests, and, preceded by a mili
tary band, marched them from the station to Commence
ment Bay, where they first saw the waters of the Pacific
Ocean, and where they embarked for Seattle. The mag
nificent giant of the Cascades, Mount Tacoma, rose right
before them, covered with an alpine glow wonderful to
behold, for the sun was setting just as they reached the
shore. Seattle was reached with an escort of more than
a score of steam vessels. The last scene of the transconti
nental celebration was fittingly enacted in the grounds of
the University of Washington, which Mr. Villard had re
lieved from distress. An address to him, the most eloquent
and most moving of all, was delivered by the daughter of
the president.

CHAPTEE XLII

THE WHEEL OF FORTUNE.— 1883-1890

MR. VILLARD returned to New York, where his pres
ence was urgently needed, after an absence of only
six weeks. The decline in his stocks had continued, and
worried him so much while away that he could only at times
forget, during the festivities of the opening of the road,
the dangers that threatened him. The Northern Pacific
construction deficit had assumed still larger proportions.
The Oregon & Transcontinental Company was carrying a
very heavy debt, incurred partly by the assistance given
the Northern Pacific and by further purchases in the pre
ceding summer of the stocks of the companies he controlled,
for which it expected to pay by means of another issue of
its own stock. This had been rendered impracticable by its
decline in the market. Some relief was obtained by the
creation of a second mortgage on the Northern Pacific and
the issue of twenty millions of bonds under it. The wis
dom of inviting the foreign guests to the opening of the
road was now demonstrated, the German bankers being
so much impressed with the vast regions tributary to the
road that they promptly undertook to market the greater
part of the new Bonds in Germany. The financial connec
tion of the Deutsche Bank with the company, which was
of such great help to it in after years, dated from that
negotiation. The sale of the second-mortgage bonds re
lieved both the Northern Pacific from the embarrassment
of the construction deficit, and the Oregon & Transconti
nental to some extent through the repayment of its ad
vances. But the placing of another mortgage ahead of the
stock inevitably depressed the Northern Pacific shares, and

313

314 HENRY VILLARD [1883

with their fall those of the proprietary company went still
lower. Mr. Villard hoped for a counteracting effect from
the expected large increase of earnings from through-busi
ness. But though he eagerly watched from day to day and
week to week for better figures, the receipts showed, after
a short spurt, not only no gain, but an actual loss, from the
stoppage of the transportation of construction material.

With these unfavorable developments, the burden of car
rying the great floating debt of the Oregon & Transconti
nental grew heavier and more fraught with danger of a
collapse during the latter part of the autumn. Mr. Vil
lard learned then the lesson taught him so often in Wall
Street, that the throng of people which follows with alac-
rity the man who leads them to profits, will desert him just
as quickly when he ceases to He a money-maker for them.
He soon found that many of his most trusted friends, who
formerly visited his offices regularly, had sold out their
holdings and stayed away. He even discovered downright
treachery among his confidential advisers, two of the Ore-
' gon & Transcontinental directors using their private know
ledge of the condition of the company for enormous
" short" sales of its shares. The press, too, that had sung
Mr. Villard 's praises hitherto, contained criticism of his
companies, became more and more hostile, and gradually
even vented bitter attacks upon his management and his
personal character. His unshaken faith in his enterprises
and his naturally sanguine disposition led him to make the
double mistake, in the first place, of assuring anxious stock
holders that the downward movement in his securities was
the result of bear operations, and that an upward reaction
was bound to set in directly, and advising them to increase
their holdings at the lower prices ; and, secondly, of trying
to sustain his shares by large purchases for his own ac
count. He utterly failed to perceive that, besides the spe
cific reasons for the fall of his stocks, the financial markets
generally were already showing the first symptoms of that
sweeping and wide-spread crisis which had been brought on

1883] THE BREAKDOWN 315

by overspeculation during the preceding years, beginning
in the fall of 1883 and extending all over the civilized world
for many years. His personal embarrassment was much
increased by the collapse of the West Shore (New York)
Railroad enterprise, in which, to oblige friends, he had taken
a large interest, the greater portion of which was lost.

Mr. Villard struggled on, using all his mental and pecu
niary resources; but, in the latter part of November, he
lost courage and became conscious that neither he himself
nor the Oregon & Transcontinental could be saved. His
physical powers of endurance were fast being exhausted,
and sleeplessness threatened him with nervous pros
tration. The desertion of friends became more and
more frequent, the abuse of the press more and more vio
lent, and the pressure of his own and the Oregon & Trans
continental creditors harder to meet. He was finally in
such desperate straits that he called a council of his most
faithful and influential friends and disclosed to them his
condition, with an appeal for advice and help, pledging
himself in advance to accept any decision they might reach
as to himself, no matter what consequences it might have
for him personally.

These friends, Messrs. Fabbri, Endicott, and Rolston, at
once began their investigation, and worked day and night
in examining his books and accounts, as well as those of
the Oregon & Transcontinental Company. On December
16-17, Mr. Villard was aroused by one of the number after
midnight at his hotel, and then informed of their findings
and conclusions. He was told that he was practically in
solvent, and that the Oregon & Transcontinental Company
was on the verge of bankruptcy. A syndicate had been
formed ready to advance to him, on pledge of all his real
and personal property, a sufficient amount to meet all his
individual liabilities, and to take care of the indebtedness
of the Oregon & Transcontinental Company, provided he
resigned the presidency of it and of the Oregon Railway &
Navigation Company, Although he had often thought of

J

316 HENRY VILLARD [1883

his possible retirement from the management of his com
panies, this sudden declaration was, nevertheless, a terrible
shock to him, for he saw at once that his deposal as
president of the former company meant also his loss of the
Northern Pacific presidency. Knowing his own helplessness,
remembering his pledge, and deeming no personal sacrifice
too great for the salvation of his companies, Mr. Villard
immediately accepted the terms proposed to him. The next
day (December 17) the afternoon papers announced his
resignation from the two companies founded by him; and
the news of his downfall, like that of his triumph, went
everywhere.

His fate was certainly tragic. Within a few years,
he had risen from entire obscurity to the enviable position
of one of the leaders of the material progress of our age.
But a few months before, he had reached the pinnacle of
contemporaneous fame, and received on his transcontinen
tal journey such homage as few men have ever received
in this country. But his fall from might to helplessness,
from wealth to poverty, from public admiration to wide
condemnation, was far more rapid than his rise, and his
brief career was everywhere used to point a moral. At
first, journalistic vituperation of him continued more ve
hemently than before. Hostility towards him was fanned
by the untoward circumstance that, shortly after his resig
nation, he had moved with his family into his large private
residence behind the cathedral on Madison Avenue, which
he had begun to build a year before, when his fortune
warranted its erection. He was loath now to occupy it, but
he did so for reasons of economy, as the house was fur
nished and the family had no other city home. The house
formed part of an imposing block, the whole of which
he had built, and which presented the appearance of a pal
ace, though it really consisted of six residences. Mr. Vil
lard was attacked by a portion of the press for occupying
a princely edifice in defiance of public sentiment and in
mockery of the many who had suffered losses in his stocks,

1883] ABROAD FOR REST 317

and was charged with having saved his own fortune while
sacrificing that of his followers. When, however, the com
mittee of investigation announced that he had turned over
all he possessed for the benefit of his creditors, and that no
thing had been found to throw a doubt on his honesty of
purpose in the management of the companies, a reaction
quickly set in. Defence of him appeared in the press under
the signatures of leading men, many expressions of sym
pathy and praise from public bodies in the West and from
prominent individuals all over the country reached him,
and many persons of high standing called to express their
admiration of his conduct. Some offers of financial aid
were also made to him, but were not accepted.

The fearful strain to which he had been subjected for
months ended in nervous prostration. His physical con
dition would not have permitted him to discharge his
executive duties any longer. For months he had had but
little sleep, and was in such a state of exhaustion that
he could not perform any mental work. His retirement
from the presidency of the Northern Pacific followed by the
end of the year. He continued to hold that of the Oregon
& California, however, in accordance with the wishes of his
London friends, but he was not expected to do any work in
connection with it until he had recovered his health. What
he needed, and secured, was relief from all responsibil
ities and complete rest. As freedom from disturbance could
not be had in the city, the family removed to their country
home on the Hudson early in the spring of 1884. They
bade farewell to their grand city abode without regret, and
they never returned to it.

After Mr. Yillard had recovered sufficient strength, he
considered it due to himself, to his family and friends, in
view of the wide misrepresentation to which he had been
subjected, to prepare an authentic record of his adminis
tration of the Northern Pacific. To this he devoted himself
in the country, and his statement was published in pam
phlet form in English and in German,

318 HENRY VILLARD [1883

It was apparent that Mr. Villard's complete restoration
to health could not be brought about as long as he remained
near the scene of his rise and fall. The sense of the false
ness of friends and the outrageous vilification he had
undergone remained in his mind, and the family concluded
that he could recuperate better in different surroundings.
Accordingly, he sailed for Europe on June 4, 1884, ac
companied by one of his brothers-in-law, in order to select
a temporary place of residence for the family in Germany.
On his way there, he was presented in London by his Eng
lish guests with a rich testimonial of their ^appreciation of
the good care he had taken of them on the overland excur
sion, in the shape of a gold loving-cup.

In response to pressing invitations, he also visited his
native province. It was the first time he had been there
since his public benefactions to it. These embraced foun
dations for the support of the libraries and poor students
of the two Latin schools (gymnasia) at Zweibriicken and
Speyer, followed by two other gifts, one for scholarships
to promising graduates from these two institutions to pro
vide for their university education, and another for the
support, at the Academy of Fine Arts in Munich, of young
men of pronounced artistic talents from his native prov
ince. He had presented Zweibriicken with a fund for small
loans to deserving mechanics, and built an American work-
ingman's home there to serve as a model for others, which
it has done; had helped the Provincial Industrial School
and Museum at Kaiserslautern out of pecuniary difficulties ;
and had given freely to the Improvement and Historical
Societies of Rhenish Bavaria for their respective purposes.
When the Eastern Palatinate was devastated by a flood of
the Rhine, he collected in this country by his personal ef
forts a large sum for the relief of the sufferers. At the in
stance of a schoolmate, Pastor Scherer, he gave the money
for the erection of a hospital and training-school for nurses
(deaconesses) in his native town, which has since grown
into one of the largest institutions of the kind in Germany,

1883-6] WINTERS IN BERLIN 319

with over two hundred nurses, who nurse the sick all over
Rhenish Bavaria. He had responded further to a great
many minor appeals for charitable and other purposes. Es
corted by the Governor and a reception committee, on a spe
cial train, Mr. Villard was honored like a king in the three
principal towns of the Palatinate. The streets were deco
rated, the authorities received him formally, and banquets,
serenades, and torchlight processions awaited him. Speyer
and Zweibriicken each presented him with the freedom of
the city. These ovations were entirely unexpected by him,
and formed a most' soothing and flattering compensation
for the bitter trials he had passed through.

Having decided to make his new home in Berlin, he re- i
turned to America in August, embarking again with his j
family two weeks later. By October, they were fully in- !
stalled in commodious apartments. He had purposely
selected lodgings near the home of his old friend Fried-
rich Kapp (who played a prominent part in the United
States between 1850 and 1870) , in order to enjoy his com
pany as much as possible. To his great disappointment
and sorrow, Mr. Kapp died suddenly after Mr. Villard
had seen him only once. With this exception, the two years
in Berlin proved to be most gratifying to the family in
every respect. Mr. Villard 's sister and brother-in-law had
lived there for years, and they, together with other relatives
and his German guests of 1883, made him acquainted with
official society and with the leaders in science, art, litera
ture, and finance, and their families. It seemed as if his
misfortunes excited real sympathy, and that people were
glad to have an opportunity to manifest it.

The family spent the winters in Berlin and the summers
in southern Germany and Switzerland. Mr. Villard 's
presidency of the Oregon & California Railroad made fre
quent journeys to London necessary during the year 1885,
and the consequent long separations from his family led
him to resign the position at the end of that year. In the
winter cf 1885-6, two singular propositions to resume

320 HENRY VILLAED [1886

railroad work were made to him. One was contained in a
letter from Oscar Straus, then United States Minister to
Turkey under President Cleveland, conveying an invitation
from the Sultan to go to Constantinople and take charge
of the proposed construction of a system of railroads
through Anatolia in Asia Minor. To one who had thrown
open a vast wild region in the New World to civilization,
there was something tempting in the opportunity to instil
new life into the ancient regions of Asia Minor. However,
the thought of settling with his family for years in the
Orient was utterly repulsive to him, and he declined the
proposal. He called the attention of the Deutsche Bank
to the scheme, and found that the institution was already
working for a concession to build roads in Anatolia, which
it eventually obtained and under which a main line and
branches, representing a large aggregate mileage, have
since been constructed. The other offer was of an even
stranger kind, it being nothing less than a proposition to
take in hand the financiering and building of a long nar
row-gauge line from the coast of German East Africa to
the interior. He felt, of course, even less inclination to
enter upon that venture than upon the other.

His stay in Berlin really led, however, to his return to
business life, not in foreign parts, but in his former Amer
ican field. He was frequently consulted by the managers
of the Deutsche Bank regarding American affairs gen
erally and their own transactions with their correspond
ents in New York. The close relations thereby established
gave rise to the consideration of the advantages of a regular
representation of the Bank in New York City, for the
purpose of enlarging its American business. After due
consideration of the matter, it was agreed that he should
undertake that duty for the Deutsche Bank and another
powerful banking-firm at Frankfort-on-the-Main. Not be
ing a trained banker, Mr. Villard was not to do general busi
ness for them, but to confine himself to transactions in good
public and corporate securities— chiefly, indeed, to Ameri-

1886] DEUTSCHE BANK AGENT 321

can railroad securities. As his reappearance in the finan
cial sphere of New York under such auspices would be tan
tamount to his complete rehabilitation, he hailed such a
prospect with profound satisfaction.

The family started for England at the end of Septem
ber, 1886, on their way to America. While in London,
Mr. Villard received, a few days before sailing from Liver
pool, a cable offer from Whitelaw Keid for his residence
on Madison Avenue, which had been vainly offered for sale
during the intervening years. After the exchange of some
despatches, a sale was effected. This was a great relief to
the owner, as the price received discharged his last obliga
tions resulting from the breakdown of 1883, and left him
with sufficient capital for a new start in business. On his
arrival in New York during the following month, he at
once opened offices at his old place in the Mills Building.
With the letters from his new constituents accrediting him
as their representative, he was sure of the respectful re
ception he afterwards met from the leading houses in Wall
Street, and he found them very glad to do business with
him. The press, as a rule, announced his return to finan
cial activity in a kindly tone. The welcome which the
family received in private circles, too, left nothing to be
desired.

Mr. Villard resolved not to engage at once in active work,
but to content himself for some time with a careful ob
servation of the general investment field, and a thorough
study of the railroad and other enterprises with which it
might be desirable to do business. He was inactive for so
long a time that his German friends began to show signs
of disappointment. The first opportunity that commended
itself to Mr. Villard 's judgment came only in the follow
ing spring of 1887, when he bought the entire issue of sev
eral millions of prime mortgage bonds of a Western road,
and resold them within a few days at a handsome profit.
In the course of the summer, a marvellous turn of affairs,

almost stranger than fiction, occurred, which, with all but
21

322 HENRY VILLARD [1887

magic suddenness, raised him once more to his former
position before the public. The Oregon & Transcontinental
Company had remained inactive, though holding its own,
after the crisis of 1883; but its management, although it
represented so large an interest in Northern Pacific shares,
had not been able to come to a satisfactory settlement of
its former financial relations with the Northern Pacific.
The board of directors of the railroad company also refused
to recognize its legitimate demand for a representation in
that body. The parties in control of the Oregon & Trans
continental Company thereupon formed a combination to
change the directory of the Northern Pacific at the next
annual election in the fall. For this purpose, they largely
increased the company's holdings of Northern Pacific
shares and thereby its floating liabilities. The Oregon
Railway & Navigation Company, in which the Oregon &
Transcontinental Company still held a controlling amount
of stock, had created after 1883 $5,000,000 seven per cent,
debentures, due April 1, 1887. To provide for their pay
ment, the company issued $5,000,000 five per cent, consoli
dated mortgage bonds. The firm of Chase & Higginson,
of New York, had purchased in November, 1886, on time,
$4,000,000 of them at 102 plus accrued interest, which
Mr. Villard had vainly tried to secure for his German sup
porters. The firm named made a public issue, but failed to
dispose of more than $700,000. Chase & Higginson not
calling for more bonds before the maturity of the deben
tures, the Oregon Railway & Navigation Company bor
rowed $3,300,000 on the remainder of the bonds from the
Oregon & Transcontinental Company, which in turn nego
tiated loans on them. The tight-money spell which set
in in the latter part of August made it impossible for the
latter company to renew its loans then maturing. Its fail
ure was imminent, and would have involved that of Chase
& Higginson, as they were liable for the remainder of
the purchase price of the bonds, and would have embar
rassed the Oregon Railway & Navigation Company as a

1887] NORTHERN PACIFIC REGAINED 323

borrower from the Oregon & Transcontinental Company.
Mr. Villard was called on for help on August 27, 1887, by
Elijah Smith, president of the Oregon & Transcontinental
and of the Oregon Railway & Navigation Companies, and
a representative of the imperilled firm. After explaining
the threatening situation, they asked him for immediate
assistance to the extent of not less than $5,000,000, for
which they offered the Oregon Railway & Navigation bonds
not taken by Chase & Higginson at 94, and twenty thou
sand shares of Oregon Railway & Navigation stock at 85
less 4^4 commission. They appealed strongly to his loyalty
to save the two companies created by himself, and coupled
with their terms an offer not only to turn over to him the
management of both the Oregon & Transcontinental and
Oregon Railway & Navigation Companies, but to place
in his hands, unconditionally, sufficient proxies for the next
Northern Pacific election of directors to put it in his power
to elect to the board of that company any one he liked.

What a revolution of the wheel of fortune! But his
first duty was to his foreign clients, and, after obtaining
the best possible conditions, he cabled them the details of
the proposed transaction,1 laying particular stress on the
necessity of an immediate decision which meant nothing less
than the cable transfer of the full amount of $5,000,000,
He did not himself believe that this sudden large call
would be responded to, but, to his great surprise, his friends
accepted, and the entire sum was at his disposal in New
York within thirty-six hours. So sudden a transaction
had never before taken place in the financial dealings be
tween Europe and the United States. Its direct effect in
Wall Street was to completely upset the exchange market.
The press proclaimed the event with sensational comments,

1 In order to put an end once for the election of boards for the two

all to the squabbles between the Pacific Companies, in each of which

Northern Pacific and Union Pacific, both companies should be repre-

threatening so much harm to each, sented ; but this could not be at-

he tried to bring about, in connec- tained.
tion with the transaction described

324 HENRY VILLARD [1887

and with positive inference that it meant nothing less
than Mr. Villard's immediate resumption of the control
of the three companies. He was hailed as the railroad king
restored to his reign. Congratulations by telegraph and
mail at once poured in upon him.

Seductive and overpowering as this sudden reelevation
was, it left him sober and with a clear perception of what
the acceptance of his old position would signify to him
self. He had received too severe a lesson as to the fleeting
character of quickly-acquired wealth and the fickleness of
public favor to be very eager to expose himself again to
a like fate. After several days' reflection, he concluded
not to accept any of the positions offered to him, but to re
main entirely independent, and not even to allow himself
to be reflected a director in any of the three companies,
but to continue to act simply as a financier. But when he
made his decision known, a great pressure was brought to
bear on him from all sides to induce him to change it. His
nearest friends argued with him that it was his duty to him
self .and to the corporations not to shrink from resuming
his post, and that it would be to his lasting discredit if he
failed to do so. Some of the Northern Pacific directors,
who had before not been friendly to Mr. Villard, sought
him and urged him to at least allow himself to be reflected
a director, so that the company, which was in a bad wa&
financially, could get the benefit of his advice and help.
He finally yielded so far as to agree to reenter the Northern
Pacific board, but only after he had submitted the case
to his German friends and received their consent. He had
the satisfaction of voting at the annual meeting of the
company nearly one-half of the share capital ,(365,799
out of 754,193), although he did not himself own a single
share of it. Mr. Villard's own judgment never approved
the step, and he always looked upon it as the greatest mis
take he ever made to burden himself again with corporate
responsibilities. Subsequent events showed that he was
right, and made him rue it bitterly.

1888] ELECTRIC LIGHTING 325

He found the Northern Pacific in serious financial embar
rassment, mainly owing to the excess, over estimates, of the
cost of building the extension of the main line over the
Cascade range to Puget Sound, as well as to the approach
ing maturity of the preferred-stock dividend scrip issued
in 1882, and to the adoption of a badly conceived plan for
the construction of a number of branch lines to mining
camps in Montana. From these causes a large floating
debt had accrued, measures for the funding of which were
urgent. Against his advice, the board voted to issue, for
this purpose and the current requirements, twelve millions
of bonds under a third general mortgage. He considered
this issue altogether too small, and advocated the creation
of a large consolidated mortgage for present and future
wants, but was outvoted. He took, however, most of the
new bonds for his German friends, who placed them in their
home market. Next, he thought out a scheme for the for
mation of a new company that would absorb all the Mon
tana branches and issue uniform bonds at a fixed rate
against them all. It was approved by the board and car
ried out in the following summer. Mr. Villard took all the
branch bonds that could be issued for Germany, but resold
them at a large advance in this country.

Mr. Villard took a strong interest in electric lighting
from its earliest stages. He was one of the first stock
holders and a director of the original Edison Light Com
pany, which had acquired the patents for the incandescent
lamp. His faith in the incalculable value of the invention
was, like that of most of his fellow-stockholders, so great
that he did not dispose of his holdings even when the shares,
on the par value of one hundred dollars of which only
thirty per cent, had been paid in, rose to four thousand. In
Berlin he had become acquainted with Werner Siemens,
the' eminent German discoverer and inventor in the electri
cal field, and head of the great firm of Siemens & Halske,
and also with the parties managing and controlling the
General Electricity Company of Berlin, which has since

326 HENRY VILLARD [1889

grown into the principal electrical manufacturing and con
tracting company in Germany. He proposed to them and
to his syndicate, before his return to New York, that they
should join with him and enter the electrical business in the
United States by an alliance with existing American in
terests. In conjunction with leading New York firms, and
helped by the invaluable counsel of the late C. H. Coster,
he matured a scheme for the absorption of all the Edison
Light and Manufacturing Companies into a new corpora
tion, with sufficient fresh capital for manufacturing elec
trical apparatus on a large scale. Out of this grew the
Edison General Electric Company, organized in April,
1889, with a capital of $12,000,000, of which he and the
German parties named held over one half. He became
president of it, and remained such until the summer of
1892. In that time, the capital of the company was in
creased to $15,000,000. The German friends made a hand
some profit by the sale of their holdings before his retire
ment from the presidency owing to the consolidation of the
Edison General Electric Company with the Thomson-Hous
ton Electric Company as the General Electric Company,
of which he disapproved. His judgment against uniting
with the Thomson-Houston Electric Company was fully
borne out by the collapse of the General Electric Com
pany within a year and a half.

It is in place to mention here that Mr. Villard was a firm
believer from the outset in the availability of electricity
as a motive power for transportation. Just as he was the
first to introduce an electric light plant on an ocean
steamer, it was under his presidency that electric street
and other railroads obtained considerable development.
He was also convinced that the certain progress in the art
of using the electric current for power and traction pur
poses would, sooner or later, lead to its substitution for
steam even in factories and on standard railroads, and, as
early as January, 1892, he convened a conference of electri
cal and railroad experts in New York to consider the prob-

1889] ELECTRIC LIGHTING 327

lem of operating the Northern Pacific terminal lines in
Chicago, as well as some of the branches of the main line,
by electricity. The practicability of this at that time was
negatived, but the growth of electric traction in the mean
time has certainly rather confirmed than gainsaid his
theory of the ulterior prevalence of current over steam.
One of his transactions was the acquisition of all the street
railway lines in Milwaukee, their change from animal to
electric power, and their consolidation with the local elec
tric lighting interests into one corporation, resulting, for
the first time in the United States, in the distribution of
electrical energy for light, power, and traction purposes
from one central station. This combination has since
grown into one of the largest and most successful light,
traction, and power companies in this country.

Some very serious and complicated questions pending be
fore the Northern Pacific board at the time of his reelection
were its traffic relations with the Union Pacific, and the
competition arising from the extension of the Montana Cen
tral system, now known as the Great Northern, into Mon
tana. By means of the Utah & Northern line, the Union
Pacific had enjoyed a monopoly of the Montana business
until the completion of the Northern Pacific main line,
and naturally opposed any encroachment upon its terri
tory. The building of a Northern Pacific branch to Butte,
where the bulk of the Utah & Northern's traffic originated,
led to hostilities between the two roads in that quarter.
Another bone of contention between them was the eastern
Oregon and eastern Washington business. The managers
of the Oregon & Transcontinental Company w^ho succeeded
Mr. Villard had abandoned his purpose of making the Ore
gon Railway & Navigation Company the outlet to the Pa
cific Ocean of the two transcontinental lines, and leased
its system to one of them, the Union Pacific. This pro
duced great friction; and actual hostilities, such as the
building of new branch lines into each other's territory
north and south of the Snake River, resulted. As to the

328 - HENRY VILLARD [1888

Montana Central, Mr. Villard looked upon it as a grave
danger, especially in view of the openly announced inten
tion of James J. Hill to build on to Spokane Falls and
Puget Sound. But the executive officers not only made
light of the effect of the completion of the Montana Cen
tral to Helena, but even contended that the loss from it
would be made up by its furtherance of the growth of
northern Montana. Their contention was borne out by the
earnings at the time, but Mr. Villard, upon a close inves
tigation of the case, became convinced that it was most
important to prevent the completion of the rival line to the
Pacific coast, or, if this could not be done, to forestall pos
sible harm to the Northern Pacific in some other decisive
way. It will appear hereafter what he did in this direction.

At his instance, in pursuance of his purpose to utilize
the transaction with Chase & Higginson to bring about
permanent peace between the Northern Pacific and Union
Pacific, committees were appointed by the two boards to
find a basis for a settlement of all the differences, but the
negotiations were conducted mainly by Charles Francis
Adams, then president of the Union Pacific, and by Mr.
Villard. They extended from the fall of 1887 to the fol
lowing spring, during which time many personal con
ferences were held and a voluminous correspondence was
conducted by the chief negotiators. After considering a
number of propositions from both sides, a formal agree
ment was finally reached which was to be submitted to the
boards for ratification.

Mr. Villard went to Germany for the double purpose of
trying the cure at Karlsbad for his gout, and of having
personal consultations with his financial backers. The
principal subject discussed with the latter was his rela
tion to the Oregon & Transcontinental Company. While
he had declined a reelection to the presidency or even to
the board, he was being steadily urged to reconsider his
declination and to again take charge of the company. He
deemed it incumbent upon him to submit the question to

1888] UNION PACIFIC BACKS OUT 329

his principals, as there were indications that the advan
tages of the combination suggested by himself for the joint
control of the Union Pacific and Northern Pacific for their
common good had so impressed the managers of the Union
Pacific that they themselves contemplated acquiring control
of the Northern Pacific through the Oregon & Transconti
nental. As the Deutsche Bank had already made itself
morally responsible for the introduction of nearly thirty
millions of Northern Pacific and Oregon Railway & Naviga
tion bonds into the German market, this prospect was a seri
ous matter, since the Union Pacific would surely manage the
other companies mainly for its own benefit. It would also
mean the loss to the Bank of the current business of the
two companies, and of the steadying financial influence
over them which the German bankers wished to and were
entitled to exercise. The conclusion was reached that Mr.
Villard should resume the Oregon & Transcontinental
presidency, and that, in order to give him a proper back
ing, a syndicate should be formed to buy and hold 75,000
shares of the company's stock. Accordingly, he was cho
sen president on June 28, 1888, some weeks before his re
turn from Germany.

From Berlin, Mr. Villard went to Karlsbad for treat
ment. While walking there on the principal promenade
one day, he was surprised to meet Mr. Gardiner M. Lane, as
sistant to President Adams, who said to him : ' ' I came here
by special order of President Adams to deliver an impor
tant message to you by word of mouth." Mr. Villard
suspected at once that he had changed his mind regard^
ing the settlement between the two companies, and so
it turned out. The message was, in substance, that the con
tract could not be ratified by the Union Pacific unless cer
tain modifications of it were conceded. As these seemed to
him unimportant, he cabled at once to the Northern Pacific,
recommending the concession. The reply came that it had
already been made, but that the Union Pacific had backed
out of the agreement altogether.

330 HENRY VILLARD [1889

On resuming the reins in New York, Mr. Villard found
himself reluctantly obliged to resort at once to offensive
measures when he ascertained that there was no hope left
of coming to a peaceful understanding with the Union Pa
cific, and that the latter had already resorted to open hos
tilities by inducing the management of the Oregon Railway
& Navigation Company to begin the construction of new
lines into Northern Pacific territory. To stop this, legal
proceedings were instituted to restrain the president and
board of directors of the Oregon Railway & Navigation
Company from the "misuse of the funds of the company
in wasteful construction." But this injunction suit did not
bring the building of the roads to a halt. The Northern
Pacific retaliated by encouraging the duplication of the
Oregon Railway & Navigation branch lines in southeastern
Washington, and starting the construction of a line in
Montana to break up the other company's monopoly of
the Butte and Anaconda mining traffic. This state of
things led to a determination on the part of Mr. Villard
and his party to keep control of the Oregon & Transconti
nental at the annual stockholders' meeting in June, 1889,
and through it of the Northern Pacific, and to oust the
hostile management of the Oregon Railway & Navigation
Company, which defiantly refused to surrender, although
the other side represented the majority of the stock. The
Union Pacific party, on the other hand, resolved also to
secure possession of the Oregon & Transcontinental at any
cost for the better protection of its lease of the Oregon
Railway & Navigation Company, and to put a permanent
end to all harm from the Northern Pacific by making them
selves masters of it. Mr. Villard received early warning
that a most formidable combination was forming against
him, consisting not only of the Union Pacific people, but of
James J. Hill and his followers and some of the largest
financial corporations and leading brokers' firms. Mr. Vil
lard too was openly supported by strong institutions and
firms, and both parties published calls for proxies, that

1889] WARRING INTERESTS 331

of the opposition being signed by Sidney Dillon, Elijah
Smith, John H. Hall, and Samuel Thomas.

Wall Street was divided into two camps, and the contest
between them absorbed its attention for the time. Both
sides strengthened themselves by purchases of Oregon &
Transcontinental stock in the open market. As is usually
the case, the crowd of speculators also became eager buyers,
and the result of the scramble was the rise of the shares,
with enormous transactions, from below 30 to 64, and
a regular "corner," which came very near producing
a crisis. The excitement grew from day to day with
the approach of the closing of the books. It was the bit
terest fight Mr. Villard ever had to engage in, and he had
not only constantly to watch the market, but to conduct
a protracted controversy in the press. A great deal of
slander and vituperation was aimed at him, and he had
also to meet injunction proceedings begun by the other
side. It was the severest strain ever put upon him. He
was victorious, and elected his ticket by an absolute ma
jority of the stock; but the triumphant outcome was no
compensation to him for the unenviable notoriety which the
battle had once more given him. It was but proof to him
how well founded his fears had been of the disagreeable con
sequences to himself personally of his return to power, and
he could not help upbraiding himself, even after the strug
gle was over, for not having followed his own better judg
ment and remained a private business man.

Mr. Villard proceeded to Portland, accompanied by
counsel, in order to be personally present at the annual
stockholders' meetings of the Oregon & Transcontinental
and Oregon Railway & Navigation Companies; travelling
over the Canadian Pacific. On reaching Seattle, than which
no community on the Pacific Northwest was more friendly
to him, he found that the whole business part of the city
had been reduced to ashes the day before. The great con
flagration had destroyed all supplies of food, so that the
whole population had to be fed from public tables for sev-

332 HENRY VILLARD [1889

eral days— a very sad sight. On reaching Portland, he
learned that an injunction would be applied for to prevent
the holding of the Oregon Railway & Navigation election.
This led to negotiations which culminated shortly in the
sale of all the holdings of Oregon Railway & Navigation
stock of the Oregon & Transcontinental Company to the
Union Pacific, at a satisfactory price. Mr. Villard came to
the conclusion that this solution was the best one for his
side, as he was advised by counsel that the lease of the
Oregon Railway & Navigation system could not be broken,
and as he knew, further, that the hostile branch lines north
of the Snake River were completed and would have to be
recognized as existing factors. In other words, the Oregon
Railway & Navigation stock no longer embodied the power
to protect the Northern Pacific, and, therefore, its principal
value to the Oregon & Transcontinental Company was lost.
From that time on, Mr. Villard never had anything to do
with the management of the Oregon Railway & Navigation
Company, whose creator he had been.

After the annual Northern Pacific election in September,
1889, Mr. Villard held for a month the chairmanship of
the Finance Committee, and then, yielding once more to
the importunities of his friends, consented to take the
chairmanship of the board, a new office especially created
in order to facilitate the more efficient supervision of the
general affairs of the company other than the actual opera
tion of the system, of which the president and the heads of
departments had charge. The growth of the earning power
of the road had been very satisfactory during the three
years from 1886 to 1889, the earnings rising from $12,789,-
448.10 to $19,707,467.95 gross, and from $5,884,831.30 to
$7,843,926.48 net, while the mileage had increased only
from 2876 to 3419. With this favorable showing and the
restoration of the company's credit by the financial relief
Mr. Villard had obtained for it, the new chairman looked
upon his task of providing for coming needs as a not very
difficult one. According to the reports of the president

1889] THE GENERAL MORTGAGE 333

to the board, a steady yearly gain in gross and net of from
fifteen to twenty per cent, could be surely relied on, and
this prediction was made good during the next few years.
Encouraged by this prosperity, the executive department
came before the board with one recommendation after
another for the improvement of the track, the replacement
of wooden by metal bridges, additional motive power and
rolling-stock, the enlargement of terminal facilities, and the
purchase and construction of new branch lines. It was
but a repetition of the general experience of all Western
roads developed under like conditions. A progressive
spirit animated the board, and they yielded, no doubt too
readily, to the arguments of the operating and engineering
officers. But it was evident that a new departure in the
financial policy of the company would have to be taken in
order to supply the means for the proposed large new expen
ditures. The financiering of it had been only a desultory
one, so to speak, since the creation of the first mortgage,
which was expected to meet present wants but which had
no reference to the future. Three separate general mort
gages had already been made on the main line, and there
existed three other mortgages on parts of it, besides nearly
a dozen special ones on branch lines. Mr. Villard de
voted himself to the problem of devising a financial scheme
comprehensive enough to provide not only for the current
requirements, but also for the gradual absorption of all
the securities issued under existing liens into one form
of indebtedness. A general mortgage large enough for
both purposes seemed to him to offer the only practicable
solution, and was finally decided upon. The details were
worked out by himself together with the finance and ex
ecutive committees, and the project was then placed in the
hands of the several counsel of the company. Several of
the legal questions involved were very intricate, and the
lawyers spent many months in solving them. The plan
was considered at several meetings of the board and de
finitively approved on August 21, 1889. It authorized the

334 HENRY VILLARD [1889

issue of no less than a -total of $160,000,000 of consolidated
five per cent, bonds, of which $75,000,000 were to be re
served to refund first-, second-, and third-mortgage bonds;
$26,000,000 were to be issued against existing branch lines ;
$20,000,000 were to be reserved for additional roads and
extensions; $20,000,000 were to be reserved for terminals,
etc. ; $10,000,000 were to be reserved for premiums on bonds
exchanged or refunded; $9,000,000 were to be issued for
general purposes of the company.

It was by far the largest mortgage ever created up to
that time on any American railroad, and its size excited
much wonderment and varied comment, but its reception
upon the whole was rather favorable. Its author became the
subject of a good deal of banter in the press and in social
circles. At a reception given to the late James G. Blaine,
with whom Mr. Villard had been well acquainted for
nearly thirty years, Mr. Blaine inquired after his health,
and, on being told that he suffered a good deal from rheu
matism, replied that it was not to be wondered at that a
man who could float a $160,000,000 mortgage was afflicted
with rheumatic pains.

His German friends had approved of the consolidated
mortgage, and once more showed their faith in him and
the Northern Pacific by purchasing immediately $6,000,000
of the new bonds and acquiring thereafter $4,500,000, all
of which were introduced in the German market. His and
their confidence was fully borne out by the gratifying
growth in the earnings of the road from the figures of 1888-
1889 to $25,151,544.09 gross and $10,211,141.91 net. This
great gain was the more hopeful as it was earned notwith
standing the fact that the mining branches in Montana had
begun to show a loss of traffic, owing to the decline in the
market value of silver bullion. It even justified, in the
judgment of the board, the distribution of a dividend at
the rate of six per cent, on the preferred stock. Alto
gether, up to the spring of 1890, Mr. Villard was carried up
ward again by the high tide of success, and the prospects
before him seemed never more serene and promising.

1889-90] JAMES J. HILL BACKS OUT 335

Notwithstanding the apparent clearness of the horizon,
Mr. Villard judged that the gravest danger the Northern
Pacific had encountered up to that time was the extension
of the Great Northern transcontinental line to Spokane
Falls and Puget Sound, for which, it was announced early
in the winter of 1889-90, the necessary capital had been
secured. In spite of all the reassuring arguments of the
operating officers of the company, Mr. Villard was per
suaded that the Northern Pacific would be put at a great
disadvantage by a competing through-line which, owing to
the decline in the cost of labor, material, and equipment,
could be built for about half the cost of the Northern
Pacific. The danger was all the greater because, since the
rupture with the Union Pacific, President Charles Francis
Adams had formed an alliance with James J. Hill, under
which trackage rights over the Union Pacific line from Spo
kane to Portland were granted to the Great Northern. This
alliance shut the door even to a compromise traffic arrange
ment. One way, however, for the prevention of serious con
sequences to the Northern Pacific remained open, and that
was to acquire a majority interest in the stock of the St.
Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba, which controlled all its
western extensions. After ascertaining, through intimate
friends of James J. Hill, that he was disposed to sell his
own holdings with those of his group of friends at a
reasonable figure, Mr. Villard matured a plan for raising
the necessary funds, estimated at $20,000,000, by the crea
tion of collateral trust bonds guaranteed by the Northern
Pacific and secured by the stock to be purchased. Good
dividends had been earned on the latter, exceeding the pro
posed rate of interest on the collateral trust bonds. The
plan was approved by his German friends, who were will
ing to market the bonds in Europe. Formal negotiations
for the purchase were then opened. Several sets of James
J. Hill's friends failed to come to conclusions with him.
Finally, Calvin S. Brice, General Samuel Thomas, and
Frederick P. Olcott undertook the task. The last two ap
peared late one evening at Mr. Villard 's residence in the

HENRY VILLARD [1890

Tiffany House, New York, to announce that they had dined
with James J. Hill and that he had positively agreed to
sell a majority of shares at 120, and that they were all to
meet at Mr. Villard 's office the next morning to sign the
papers. Mr. Villard told his visitors that he was very glad
to hear the news, but he still doubted, in view of past vacilla
tions of Mr. Hill, whether the bargain would go through.
The callers protested against this, and insisted that Mr. Hill
could not back out of his promise, and that he had positively
agreed to sell. An appointment was made for ten o'clock
the next morning, but Mr. Villard was the only one who
kept it. After waiting an hour in vain, he called up Mr.
Olcott by telephone and learned that Mr. Hill had slipped
away again. In the light of the collapse of the Northern
Pacific on the one hand and the great success of the Great
Northern on the other, it is certainly not too much to say
that, if this scheme had been carried out, it would have
constituted the most important achievement in Mr. Vil
lard's whole career, and the Northern Pacific would have
had a record of unbroken and growing prosperity instead
of passing a second time through insolvency.

Besides the consolidated mortgage, another very impor
tant proposition came before the Northern Pacific board
at its meetings in the years 1889 and 1890. The parties
who had been elected directors with Mr. Villard in 1887,
in recognition of the claims of the Oregon & Transconti
nental for representation, controlled the Wisconsin Central
Railroad Company and the ownership of the terminal
company that had been formed in order to secure an inlet
into Chicago for that railroad. The terminal company
had acquired a large body of real estate for right of way
and for a passenger and freight station near the business
centre of Chicago, for which the necessary buildings were
near completion. The directors in question brought the
subject of a lease of the Wisconsin Central and the ter
minal by the Northern Pacific before the board, which re
ferred it to the chairman, the executive committee, and the

1890] WISCONSIN CENTRAL LEASED 337

executive officers, for investigation and report. This
brought up the general question whether it would be wise,
with regard to other roads, for the Northern Pacific to es
tablish its principal eastern terminus at Chicago instead
of St. Paul. There were strong reasons for and against
the change. In the board, too, opposition was shown at
first, but, after the operating and legal advisers of the
board had, upon long consideration of the subject in all
its bearings, recommended the lease of the Wisconsin Cen
tral and the terminals, it was authorized by resolution of
the board on April 1, 1890, and executed. The terminals
were organized and leased as a separate company under the
name of Chicago & Northern Pacific. In its organization,
the chairman followed the same plan that had proved
so successful in the case of the St. Paul & Northern Pa
cific Company, so that the Northern Pacific received one-
half of the stock as part of the consideration of the lease.
It was expected that this stock would, as in the other case,
become valuable assets. These consequential steps, which
were believed to be a great advantage to both lessor and
lessee, turned out to have been grave mistakes, and were
corrected in the reorganization of the Northern Pacific.

CHAPTER XLIII
THE GUEST OF BISMARCK.— 1890

ME. VILLAED'S financial successes with the Kansas
Pacific and the Oregon Eailway & Navigation had
made him in a few years a rich man, although his accumu
lations were by no means so great as they were reputed to
be. As soon as he had an abundance, he bethought himself
of ways of benefiting others. What he then did for the
Fatherland has already been related. He was equally de
sirous to use his means for the benefit of his adopted coun
try. Having been a journalist, he knew well the power
of the press for good or evil, and that led him to the
idealistic conception that he could render no better public
service than by founding, or getting control of, a news
paper of absolute independence and outspokenness on pub
lic matters, one devoted to the discovery and advocacy of
truth, regardless of party and of all other considerations,
and with such recognized ability in editorial management
as would secure for it not only a local but a national influ
ence. The idea ripened into a fixed purpose when the co
operation of his friend Horace White was assured by the
latter 's removal to New York, and when Mr. Villard as
certained from Carl Schurz that he would be glad to be
one of the editors, upon the expiration of his term of office
as Secretary of the Interior, and that Edwin L. Godkin
was willing to enlarge his sphere of journalistic activity as
editor of the Nation by joining the two other eminent
men.

Having accidentally learned in 1881 that the Commer
cial Advertiser was for sale in New York, he authorized
Horace White to enter into negotiations for its purchase;

338

1881] "EVENING POST" ACQUIRED 339

but, while these were progressing, he was informed that
the half-interest of Parke Godwin in the New York Even
ing Post could be bought. This proved to be true, and a
purchase was soon effected for his account by Mr. White,
who took part of the stock. Not long afterwards, the in
terest of Isaac Henderson was also acquired by Mr. Villard,
and the stock of the Nation exchanged for Evening Post
stock. A new business management was installed, and
Messrs. Godkin, Schurz, and White took charge of the edi
torial department. Mr. Villard was prouder of this com
bination of journalistic ability than of any of his business
triumphs. He was confident that, under such auspices, the
Evening Post would prove not only equal to the mission
he desired it to fulfil, but also a good investment. Con
vinced, however, that his purchase of the controlling in
terest in the paper would become known, and that, owing
to his prominence in Wall Street, the paper would surely
be accused of being his personal organ and of being used
for the promotion of his financial interests, and thus find
it difficult to establish a character for entire independence,
he determined upon an unusual step. He decided to take
away from himself all power over the paper as a stock
holder, by creating a trust with his entire holding for the
benefit of his family, with full authority to the three trus
tees to protect the editorial department from all interfer
ence. This abdication of the right of ownership and prac
tical self-effacement has continued to this day, and not a
line of the editorial writing has ever been dictated by Mr.
Villard. Every reader of the Evening Post, the whole
American press, and in fact the American people generally,
know that the paper has ever been true to those high aims
for which he was ready to make many sacrifices when he
purchased its control.

Once more, in 1890, Mr. Villard was the possessor of
wealth. The joint operations with his German clients in \J

railroad and electrical securities and other fortunate in
vestments had enabled him to recover in a few years what

340 HENRY VILLARD [1890

he had lost in 1883. As soon as he was able to do so, he
resumed his practice of using his spare means for the bene
fit of others, and made good the promise of a donation to
the Law School of Harvard University, which his misfor
tunes had prevented him from completing. He contributed
largely to the building fund of the Bed Cross Hospital and
Nurses' Training School at Munich, Bavaria. He also
added to his previous gifts to the hospital at Speyer and to
the Industrial Museum of his native province, and made
a large subscription towards the Protestant Memorial
Church at Speyer in honor of the famous Protest of 1529
at the sitting of the Imperial Diet in that city. Mr. Yillard
had a documentary history of Speyer compiled and printed
at his own expense, and paid for the publication of an
historical work on the Palatinate by the historian Professor
Friedrich Menzel, of Bonn, a native of the province. At
the request of the historian Von Sybel, he paid the salaries
of two of his assistants pursuing special studies in Ger
many and Italy. On this side of the water, he provided
the means for three years for an archaeological exploration
of the antiquities of Peru by A. F. Bandelier, and presented
the collections resulting from it to the American Museum
of Natural History in New York. He furthermore again
became a regular contributor to numerous public charities
and other enterprises for the public good.

While his business interests were thriving, Mr. Villard
did not overlook the danger which menaced the whole coun
try from the introduction into Congress of the Sherman
silver-purchasing act. He saw at once that, if it became
a law, the substitution of the silver for the gold standard
would be but a question of time, and that very short.
Hence, he tried to arouse the most influential bankers to
realize the threatening prospect, and to urge them to an
active agitation against it in the press and at Washington,
but with only limited success. He found hardly any one
willing to go with him to the capital to work against the
passage of the measure. Indeed, Mr. Villard had, years

1890] NORTH AMERICAN COMPANY 341

before, formed the opinion that there was a great lack of
foresight and too much of a happy-go-lucky disposition
among most Wall Street men, and this impression was now
fully confirmed. His predictions that a general crash was
bound to come in the wake of that law were simply sneered
at. The head of one of the greatest houses even expressed
the opinion that a little more currency would do no harm,
but would on the contrary help the bankers to relieve them
selves of the stocks and bonds they had been obliged to carry
for want of a good market.

The detachment of the Oregon Railway & Navigation
Company from the Oregon & Transcontinental Company,
and the financial independence secured to the Northern Pa
cific by the creation of the consolidated mortgage, had ren
dered unnecessary the pursuit of one of the two principal
purposes for which the Oregon & Transcontinental Com
pany was organized, viz., to extend financial aid to the com
panies controlled by it. It was therefore decided, on Mr.
Villard 's recommendation, to absorb it by making a new
company, after paying off the outstanding Oregon & Trans
continental bonds issued against Northern Pacific branches.
The absorption was effected in a remarkably quick time by
the exchange of share for share of Oregon & Transconti
nental stock for North American Company stock in the early
summer of 1890.

In the spring of 1890, a great domestic grief came upon
Mr. Villard's family. The youngest son, a handsome, gifted
lad of seven, passed through a long illness, and, after appar
ent convalescence, had a relapse and died. The whole fam
ily felt the affliction deeply. His friends urged Mr. Villard
to seek diversion by a long stay abroad, and he decided to
sail for Europe with his family early in July. After
travelling some weeks in Ireland, England, and France,
they went to St. Blasien in the Black Forest, and subse
quently to Freib'urg in southern Baden.

Suddenly, cable news of a most alarming character from
America plunged Mr. Villard into the gravest anxiety. He

342 HENRY VILLABD [1890

had taken the greatest pains to arrange his own private
affairs as well as those of the Northern Pacific, North
American, and Edison General Electric Companies so that
he should not be disturbed by business cares while abroad,
and he felt the more assured of unbroken peace of mind
as he knew that the absorption of the Oregon & Transcon
tinental by the North American by the exchange of shares
had succeeded with unparalleled rapidity. The cable in
formed him that, owing to the passage of the Sherman Act,
a very severe stringency had set in in the money market,
in consequence of which the North American Company
found it impossible to renew loans maturing to the extent of
$2,000,000, so that forced sales of securities at heavy loss
were inevitable unless he could raise that amount at once
in Germany on the assets of the company. The message
burst upon him like a thunder-clap from a clear sky, but
he promptly started for Frankfort and Berlin to appeal
to his supporters for the money. He was successful, and
made telegraphic transfer of the amount within forty-
eight hours of the receipt of the cablegram. This was his
sorry first act as president of the North American Company,
to which place he had been elected after his departure. He
heard at Berlin the first mutterings of the severe financial
volcano that later affected the whole civilized world through
the suspension of the great house of Baring Brothers. Be
ing assured by cable that the remittance would make every
thing snug and safe, he went back to Freiburg, but his
hope of unbroken quiet proved an illusion. No sooner
was Barings' failure announced, a few weeks later, than
there was flashed to him across the Atlantic another even
more peremptory call for several more millions, as the only
means of preventing the bankruptcy of the North Ameri
can Company. Coupled with it was a most pressing sum
mons to return to New York at once. This second danger
was even more of a staggering surprise than the first, but
there was no escape from immediate action. Mr. Villard
summoned his German friends to a conference at Frank-

1890] NORTH AMERICAN COMPANY 343

fort, where they promptly met him. As he expected, it was
for him a most trying and embarrassing meeting, owing to
the positive assurances he had given on the strength of his
own advices that the loan already made would relieve the
North American Company of all difficulties, and he at first
found very unwilling listeners to his proposition for a fur
ther and larger advance. But, after two days of hard plead
ing, the desired help was granted once more. He was con
scious, nevertheless, that the trust of his financial friends in
him was shaken and that nothing more could be expected
from them.

He declined, however, to follow the summons to New
York, and offered his resignation as president of the North
American Company, when the message was repeated every
few days. He refused to go solely on account of his daugh
ter's health. In other respects it would have been a boon to
him to start for the other side, thereby ending the harass
ing condition of mind he endured day and night, as he had
not a single person to advise with at Freiburg, and as the
reports regarding the conditions in Wall Street grew more
and more ominous from day to day. An all but crushing
blow fell upon him finally when the news came of the fail
ure of Decker, Howell & Co., who had been for years his
principal brokers, for twelve millions of dollars, on No
vember 11, 1890. Press despatches of the same date an
nounced that it was generally expected that his own bank
ruptcy would follow that of the firm. There was not the
remotest danger of this, as he was a large creditor of theirs,
and not a debtor; but he knew that the collapse of the
house imperilled the North American Company, for which
it had carried loans of millions. This culmination of trou
bles really left him no choice but to cross the Atlantic.
This he did after another visit to Berlin, during which
an unusual incident worth recording occurred.

Mr. Villard received a call at his hotel from the aide-de
camp of the Imperial Chancellor, General Count Caprivi.
The aide stated that the Chancellor, although he had never

344 HENRY VILLARD [1890

met him, knew that he was an authority on all American
matters, and hence was desirous of conferring with him
on an important subject affecting Germany and the United
States. Mr. Villard at once offered to pay his respects
to the Chancellor, and met him by appointment, the even
ing of the same day, at his official residence. He found
Count Caprivi a truly imposing personality in every way,
of commanding physical presence, most polished manners,
and a ready conversationalist. He impressed one at once
as every inch a gentleman, with a superior mind, of strict
integrity, natural frankness, and quick and correct judg
ment, all of which qualities he really possessed. The Chan
cellor told Mr. Villard that he wished to consult him confi
dentially regarding a serious problem that had come before
him within a few days. The passage of an extreme protec
tion measure by the American Congress (the first McKinley
tariff) had moved one of the Continental Powers to suggest
to the others that the time for a retaliatory policy against
the United States had come, and to propose a conference
for the consideration of joint offensive measures. He
wished to know Mr. Villard 's opinion as to the course Ger
many ought to pursue regarding the matter. His own judg
ment was against the proposed action.

Mr. Villard replied that he thought the Chancellor's con
clusion the correct one. As for himself, he was a radical
free-trader, and therefore his judgment might be biassed,
but he was confident that the very extreme to which the
new tariff bill had gone, and the suspicious circumstances
under which it was passed, would immediately produce
a reaction in the United States. He believed, too, that
this reaction w^ould find expression in the election of a new
Congress in the following month. He could but urge the
Chancellor to await the result of that election, which would
no doubt of itself put a stop to the suggested demonstra
tion of the Powers. Mr. Villard offered to cable to good
judges of the political situation as to the outcome of the
election and advise him of their answer. The Count ac-

1890] INTERVIEW WITH CAPRIVI 345

cepted the offer, and another interview took place the next
day, at which Mr. Villard produced the answers to his tele
graphic inquiries confirming his views. The Chancellor
then told him that he would remain passive and thanked
him warmly for his courtesy. As Mr. Villard was still on
the Continent at the time of the election, he telegraphed
its result to the Chancellor, who was then on a visit to the
King of Italy at Monza, and who, in acknowledgment of
his despatch, said that he had proved to be a true prophet.

Mr. Villard had not made the personal acquaintance of
Caprivi's predecessor, Prince Bismarck, during his two
years' residence at Berlin in 1884-6. Although as willing
as any German to render grateful homage to him as the
creator of national unity, and to recognize the power of his
giant mind, he still held to the unfavorable opinion of Bis
marck's personal character, and his political methods before
the Franco-German war, to which he had given expression
in an article in the North American Review in 1869, then
under the editorship of James Russell Lowell and Charles
Eliot Norton. His prejudices against the Chancellor had
been strengthened, too, by the latter 's return in 1879 to
a reactionary policy in the internal affairs of Germany,
and especially by his openly proclaimed purpose of aban
doning the revenue tariff for a protective one.

Early in the summer of 1890, a few months after the ac
ceptance of Bismarck's resignation, while discussing that
great event one day with the late Ludwig Bamberger, the
well-known liberal leader in the Reichstag and the princi
pal advocate of the gold standard in Germany, Mr. Vil
lard mentioned incidentally that he had never met the
Prince. "What," exclaimed Bamberger, "how has that
happened?" On being told that it was from want not of
opportunity but of inclination, Bamberger rejoined that he
had made a great mistake in avoiding an introduction,
and went on to say: " You know, I fully share your views
of Bismarck's character and as to the vacillations of his
policy, which I am opposing strongly in the Reichstag.

346 HENRY VILLARD [1890

Moreover, I have not only public but private reasons for
finding fault with him, because he has treated me badly,
although I have never shrunk from any sacrifice of time
and labor when he called upon me for service in the interest
of the public. You may not be aware that I went to Ver
sailles at his summons, and remained there a long time as
one of his advisers in the peace negotiations with the Thiers
Provisional Government. Nevertheless, although he is both
selfish and unprincipled, he is at the same time, in my de
liberate judgment, the greatest man of our age, and one
of the most interesting. Why, I believe that as a conver
sationalist he is unequalled, and to listen to him for an hour
would alone be worth a voyage from America. Be sure not to
leave Europe again without having made his acquaintance.
That is my urgent advice." Mr. Villard decided to follow
it. It so happened that the very next day he was introduced
by General von Xylander, his brother-in-law, who was also
in Berlin, to Professor Schweninger, the Prince's medical
adviser, who, after numerous medical authorities had failed,
had successfully treated him for rheumatism and neural
gia by simply opposing and conquering the patient's will
power and making him restrain his inordinate appetite
for food and drink. It occurred to Mr. Villard to ask
the professor what the chances were of being received at
Friedrichsruhe. "Why," he answered, "the Prince will
bid you welcome at once. He knows all about you, and
likes nothing better than to meet men who have accom
plished something in the world. Just ask leave by letter to
pay your respects to him and you will get a prompt reply.
I expect to be with him myself in a few days, and I hope
you will come while I am there. ' ' Mr. Villard wrote to the
Prince on the same day, and, receiving a cordial invitation
to come at any time that suited him and spend a few days
with him, set out within forty-eight hours.

Professor Schweninger and a servant in livery received
him at the station, which was only a few hundred yards
from the mansion. The latter proved to be a very plain

1890] VISIT TO BISMARCK 347

building, being really but an enlarged country inn, and
neither the exterior nor the interior revealed the splen
dor which the fame and wealth of the owner led one, not un
naturally, to expect. The guest was shown into a commodi
ous chamber on the second floor, and was just making his
ablutions when he heard heavy steps approaching his door,
and immediately there appeared in it the erect form of the
Prince, dressed in black, with a slouch hat of the same color,
— the same costume in which Lenbach painted his best por
trait of him— with a heavy stick in his right hand, and fol
lowed by two large Danish dogs. The Prince welcomed Mr.
Villard heartily, and, when the latter apologized for being
in his shirt sleeves and for not offering his wet hands, the
Prince said: "Just go on with your toilet. I will sit down
and we can talk while you wash and dress. " One of the
dogs, encouraged, no doubt, by his master's friendly words,
now approached Mr. Villard, standing up before him and
putting his paws on his shoulders and trying to lick his
face. "There is another hearty greeting for you," the
Prince remarked, calling the animal off. ' ' I am really glad
you came," he said, "first, because you are a German who
has gained a high position in a foreign country, a sort of
success which I have always especially admired, because I
know how difficult it is to achieve ; and, secondly, because I
like company, and you are the only visitor I have had in a
week except Schweninger. " On Mr. Villard 's expressing
astonishment at this, he said : ' * Yes, it is just as I state it.
The fact is that I am under a regular boycott. Ever since
I lost my position, everybody is afraid to have anything to
do with me from fear of displeasing the young chap who
discharged me. Why, formerly my trouble was to keep peo
ple away from here. Everybody wanted to come, especially
the officials who needed my good will. Now, none of the
latter dare come lest their names should appear in the news
papers as my visitors and be seen by the new man on the
throne. I know that men travel by here every day who, a
few months ago, would have no more dared to pass this

348 HENRY VILLARD [1890

place without paying their respects than they would have
ventured to pass me on the street in Berlin without saluting
me. But I ought not to have expected anything else, for
hounds follow those who feed them." This outburst was a
clear indication of what was uppermost in the Prince's
mind, and prepared his hearer for what was to follow on
the same line during his stay.

Mr. Villard's toilet being finished, the Prince and the
dogs led the way to the rear of the mansion, where the two
took seats on a sort of veranda. Professor Schweninger
joined them, followed by Bismarck's private secretary, the
Princess, her married daughter, Countess Rantzau, and the
latter 's children. The Prince, noticing the gouty forma
tions on his visitor's hands, said: "I see you are suffer
ing from gout. How long have you had it?" When told
for nearly twenty years, he pointed to the Professor : ' l That
is the man to help you. But for him I should have been
obliged to retire from office long ago. Perhaps it would
have been better for me if I had done so. All the medical
professors had practised their arts upon me without doing
me any good. He alone gave me relief and made life toler
able for me. You had better try him, although he is a great
tyrant and exacts strict obedience. I found it hard to
change my habits of life, but he made me do it. I now eat
and drink only what he sees fit to allow me. See how gentle
he looks. But I tell you he can be as rough [grol}] as any
old Bavarian [Alfbaier] , of which stock he comes."

The Prince then began to question his guest regarding
himself, about his early life in Germany, how long he had
been in the United States, and about the course of his career
there. He wanted to know how many miles of railroad
he had built, in what time it had been done, how many
steamships had been under his control, how many men he
had employed, being very much surprised that fifteen thou
sand Chinamen had been among them, and saying : ' ' Why,
you had a whole army corps under your command!" He
asked how much capital Mr. Villard had been obliged to

1890] VISIT TO BISMARCK 349

raise and how it was raised, and about the relative value of
white and Chinese labor. He inquired whether he had
named Bismarck, the capital of Dakota, after him, to which
his guest had to reply that the place had been founded and
baptized before he had anything to do with the Northern
Pacific. Bismarck remembered that he had received thence
telegraphic greetings from the German participants in the
Northern Pacific opening excursion, and asked whether it
had a future. In reply, Mr. Villard had to confess that
it was not then very prosperous, and he explained that
all the capitals of the several American States were as
a rule of slow growth. This the Prince could not under
stand in the light of the contrary European experience. He
remarked that what his guest had accomplished in a foreign
country he never could have done in the Fatherland, owing
to tradition and to the clinging to accustomed ways so
characteristic of old countries. Did he not encounter a
great deal of prejudice among native Americans against
him as a foreigner in the pursuit of his undertakings?
To this Mr. Villard replied that, on the contrary, he had
found his chief financial backing and his main support
among them, and that there was no people on earth among
whom enterprise and energy prevailed to a greater extent,
or that more readily appreciated those who possessed such
qualities. To this the Prince said that he was well aware
that the Americans were the most progressive people in the
world, for which he admired them, but it was new to him
that they were so free from national jealousies in appreciat
ing merit.

An early dinner ended this first talk. The Prince sat at
one end of the table, the Princess at the other. On his right
sat Mr. Villard, on his left Professor Schweninger. The
secretary and the Rantzau family formed the rest of the
party. Behind the host at a distance of about six feet lay
the two dogs next to each other, watching the proceedings
eagerly, but not stirring until towards the end of the re
past, when, upon a sign from their master, they approached

350 HENRY VILLARD [1890

and sat on their haunches on each side of him. Then from
time to time the Prince threw morsels into their open jaws.
The table talk was of an ordinary kind, but one amusing
incident is worth remembering. The Prince had one glassful
of light Rhine wine, and then called for another. Schwe-
ninger at once interposed, saying: "Your Highness, you
have had your allowance for one meal, and you can't have
any more." The Prince looked at Mr. Villard quizzically,
and remarked, "Now, you see how I am treated. I have to
submit, but at times when the censor is not here I jump
the traces. He does n't know, but I will tell him now [and
he chuckled heartily] that I celebrated my last birthday
by enjoying several bottles of wine and several glasses of
beer." "Yes, you did," retorted the doctor, "and when I
came here a few days afterwards, you growled dreadfully
over fresh neuralgic pains. ' '

After dinner, the Prince excused himself for his afternoon
nap, after inviting Mr. Villard to go with him on his usual
four o'clock drive. Punctually at that hour, the two set
out for a tour of the "Sachsenwald," or Saxon Forest, as
the extensive woods adjoining the mansion grounds are
called. They consist largely of grand old oak-trees free
from all undergrowth, under the canopy of which the car
riage passed, now following roads, now regardless of them.

After describing his estate, the Prince began speaking
English— "so that that fellow," pointing to the coachman,
"may not understand us," and surprised his companion
by his fluency, his command of idiomatic expressions, and
his very slight accent. He began with these words : ' ' Since
I have been kicked out of office," which so astonished his
hearer that he begged pardon for interrupting him and
said: "Prince, that is an Americanism; where did you pick
it up?" He answered that he did not remember where,
but the expression fitted his case exactly, for the manner of
his dismissal was but the equivalent of an application of
the toe of a boot. He then proceeded to tell the story of his
forced resignation. Such a rapid flow of keen wit, of cut-

1890] VISIT TO BISMARCK 351

ting sarcasm and bitter denunciation as followed for half
an hour Mr. Villard never heard before and never again. It
was a strange mixture of eloquence and loquaciousness. Bis
marck 's voice seemed not as deep and strong as his stature
led one to expect, but it had a pleasant sound. A most in
tense sense of the wrong and ingratitude he claimed to have
suffered made itself manifest. As an example of his unjust
treatment, he recounted what he had done to unify the na
tion and to aggrandize the Hohenzollern dynasty. There
was not only an unhesitating assertion of his own deserts
as the founder of the German Empire, but an almost sneer
ing and even contemptuous depreciation of other perform
ers in the historic drama of his time, including even the
old Emperor William, the unfortunate Emperor Freder
ick, and the Empresses Augusta and Frederick. His lan
guage became a perfect diatribe when he referred to the
present Emperor and some of his ministers, whom he held
responsible for his removal. His expressions regarding
them were not only amazing but embarrassing to his hearer,
who had close social relations with the ministerial objects
of his scorn. To quote but one phrase: "Some of those
rogues I picked out of the very gutter. " Fortunately, he
did not stop for any word of assent, but went right on until
his pent-up wrath was expended. As he remarked, when
it was all spent : ' ' It was quite a relief to me to have this op
portunity to speak without restraint to a gentleman who
I am sure will honor my confidence. ' ' Even were it not for
this restriction, some of the sayings the visitor heard and
noted down at the time were so extraordinary that, if they
were repeated, their reality would probably be doubted,
and certainly the lese-majesty they involved would render
it unsafe for one who repeated them to venture again on
German soil.

The Prince's countenance during the excited delivery of
his philippic was a study. The working of every vein and
muscle of the face showed his intense feelings. The play of
his great eyebrows was also very remarkable. Most impres-

352 HENRY VILLARD [1890

sive of all were the spirit and light shining from his won
derful eyes. No one ever felt the presence .of the Chancellor
without a deep sense of the mind-power reflected from
those large grey-blue orbs. Their flashing brilliancy and
the piercing penetration of the glances shot from them were
never to be forgotten. They seemed incapable of expressing
affection, and their steel-like hardness only inspired awe for
the towering intellect, the irresistible will, the defiant cour
age, the fiery energy of their owner. To watch the light
ning changes of expression mirrored in them, reflecting the
strong emotions evoked by humbled pride, wounded ambi
tion, and thwarted selfishness, and above all by the loss of
his absolute sway, was, indeed, an enviable privilege.

The Prince himself turned to other subjects when the
' ' fumes of ire ' ' had passed from him during the rest of the
two hours' drive. He dwelt upon the marvellous rapidity
of the material growth of the United States, and mentioned
that he had felt a desire for a long time to see it with his
own eyes. Before his retirement it was, of course, out of the
question, but now he seriously thought of accepting the in
vitation of the Hamburg Line and crossing the Atlantic on
the steamer named after him. He would have to overcome,
however, the strong opposition of the Princess and of Dr.
Schweninger to the voyage. "When Mr. Villard assured him
that his visit would be hailed with general enthusiasm by
Americans as well as Germans, he said: "This is just the
reason of the opposition of my wife and doctor to it, and
I own that I myself dread the pressure and fatigue of pub
lic attention, and should much prefer to travel in strict
privacy. " He asked his companion whether he believed
that the Union could be permanently held together notwith
standing its vast territorial extent, the rapid swelling of the
population to enormous proportions, the free admission of
large masses of foreigners, and the diversity of climate and
local interests. He looked upon the many millions of ne
groes, whose number was fast increasing, and the preva
lence of strong racial prejudices against them, as a grave

1890] VISIT TO BISMARCK 353

and permanent danger. He was answered that no man
could foretell the fate of the American Republic in the
course of the coming generations or centuries; but so far
it must be admitted that the experiment of Building up
a federation of commonwealths under absolutely democratic
institutions had been, upon the whole, a great success in
both a political and a material respect. The problem of
government was no doubt growing more and more compli
cated and difficult, both in the Union and in the several
States, and might get beyond solution when the population
should number hundreds of millions. There were even then
symptoms of decadence, not material but moral; but the
world had witnessed several serious popular aberrations
which were followed by a return, sooner or later, to correct
ways. Certainly, much could be expected of a people that
successfully cut the cancer of slavery out of its body politic,
at the cost of a million lives and of thousands of millions of
dollars.

The Prince agreed to this and said that, for America,
the existing democratic form of government was just as
natural as a monarchy for Germany, and, indeed, the only
feasible one. "I should be a devoted Republican, too, if
I lived in America, " he remarked. Mr. Villard ventured
the inquiry whether Bismarck was satisfied with the work
ings of universal suffrage, the immediate adoption of which,
upon the formation of the German Empire as the political
basis of national life, was thought one of the boldest
strokes, if not the very boldest, in his career. The Prince
answered : l i It cannot be said that the results of universal
suffrage have been altogether satisfactory, but I always
looked upon it as a just concomitant of, and compensation
for, the general liability of our people to military service.
Moreover, its adoption was indispensable as a sort of cement
in the construction of the edifice of the Empire, as well
as a means of overcoming the traditional centrifugal ten
dencies of some of our smaller potentates and tribes. ' ' The
worst outgrowth of general suffrage he considered the So-

23

354 HENRY VILLARD [1890

cial Democrats, and he expressed the conviction that the
State would some time be compelled to extirpate this evil
by force.

It was very pleasant for Mr. Villard to have the Chan- *
cellor bring up the subject of their mutual friend, Carl
Schurz. The Prince said that not only his great public
career in America, but the personal attractions he discov
ered in him at their several meetings, excited his admiration.
It was a great pity that such a man served a foreign and
not his own country. Just that type of man was needed in
Germany to supplant the Geheimrat (privy councillor)
species which had given him so much trouble. Bismarck
said that he could not understand, and it was not easy to
explain to him, why such men as Schurz were not kept in
public life. He pronounced it a great shortcoming in the
American polity that the eligibility of Senators and Repre
sentatives was conditioned on their residence in the States
and districts they represented. This inevitably tended to
develop champions of local instead of national interests,
while the privilege the English and German voters en
joyed of electing any of their countrymen otherwise quali
fied, regardless of residence, insured the election of the
elite of the nation to the parliamentary ranks.

At the end of the drive, the Prince retired to his working-
room with his secretary to attend to his correspondence
until supper-time. After the evening meal, the whole fam
ily gathered around him in the spacious sitting-room. He
seated himself in a large easy-chair, and was handed one
of the old-fashioned long German pipes. It was lighted
for him with a paper taper, and from it he sent forth clouds
of tobacco-smoke with evident great enjoyment. He sat like
a patriarch, listening to the telegraphic news of the morn
ing and evening papers, which was read to him, and he
accompanied and followed the reading with free comments
on current events. Their frankness, clearness, and point-
edness afforded another rich treat to Mr. Villard. The
Chancellor's remarks led to no discussion, as he did not

1890] VISIT TO BISMARCK 355

invite it, and everybody was content to listen to him.
Something that was read led him to make interesting refer
ence to the relations of Germany to Kussia, to the pains
he had always taken to keep on the best possible terms
with the latter power, as of the most vital importance
to his own country, and the fears he entertained that a
change for the worse in this direction would come about
under the new regime at Berlin. Schweninger broke up
the evening's entertainment all too early by announcing
to the Prince that his time for retiring had come. The
doctor accompanied him to his bedroom to give him some
treatment. He was the first one, too, to see him on waking.
In fact, there never was a more faithful, self-sacrificing
medical attendant than Schweninger. He did not reside at
Friedrichsruhe, but had his office at Berlin. Owing to his
success with the Prince, he had obtained a very large prac
tice, extending all over Europe. Among his patients were
some crowned heads, including the Sultan, a number of
princes, and members of the highest aristocracy of birth
and finance, so that he passed two-thirds of his time on
railroad trains; but, no matter where he was, he never
failed to look personally after the Chancellor at least once
a month, and to pass from two to three days with him.
While at Berlin, he was constantly at his beck and call, and
often visited him once a week. Moreover, he would never
accept any compensation for his services, but the Prince,
who improved every opportunity to praise his fidelity and
acknowledge his indebtedness to him, rewarded him in
other ways by securing him a professorship at the Berlin
University, together with titles and decorations.

Having suffered from neuralgic pains during the night,
the Prince was ordered to stay in bed during the forenoon
of the next day, but he worked with his secretary. About
noon he appeared on the veranda, seemingly as well as the
day before and as ready for conversation. Mr. Villard's
second day was a repetition of the first; that is, lunch
was followed by another drive, and dinner by another even-

356 HENRY VILLARD [1890

ing in the sitting-room. On the drive as well as at home,
the Prince's conversation was again pregnant with sub
stance, and original and fascinating in form. He also fa
vored his guest with reminiscences of the Prussian- Austrian
and Franco-German wars, and dwelt upon his memorable
long sojourn at Versailles during the latter war, his peace
negotiations with Thiers and Jules Favre, and the pains
that accompanied the birth of the German Empire; on
the profound humiliation of the French by the proclama
tion made in the grand palace of Louis XIV. — which was
his ^(Bismarck's) conception. All this he narrated in
his inimitable way. But, as the same incidents have been
published in his own memoirs, they need not be repeated.
Bismarck's experience, however, with the adjacent city of
Hamburg, "his biggest and best neighbor," he called it,
he related with great gusto, and it may well be told. When
he proposed to bring Hamburg within the custom-lines of
the German Empire, he became the worst-hated man in that
city, for the people thought that if it lost its prestige as
a free port it would be ruined. But the status of a free
port with a custom zone within its limits not only did not
diminish its prosperity, but multiplied it. Then the sup
posed oppressor became the recognized and worshipped
benefactor of the old Hanseatic commonwealth.

Mr. Villard took his leave of the Prince on the second
evening, as he was to start for home in the morning before
the Prince would be up. He assured his host of his last
ing gratitude for the generous hospitality received, and
was told in return that he would be welcome again at
any time. He left Bismarck with the fixed impression that
the Prince never would or could forget or forgive those who
caused his compulsory abdication from power, that he
felt nothing less than implacable hatred towards them,
that any apparent reconciliation on the Prince 's part to the
new regime that might follow would be only a stage-show
and not a reality, and that his thirst for revenge would not
be quenched as long as he lived.

CHAPTER XLIV

LAST YEARS.— 1890-1900

MR. VILLARD arrived in New York early in Decem
ber, 1890. The North American Company had prac
tically become insolvent by the suspension of Decker, How-
ell & Co., but actual bankruptcy had been avoided by the
action of its principal creditors, who formed a committee
which secured speedy repayment of the loans by a sale
of the company's assets in the open market. He found
the indebtedness of the company reduced to two millions,
but it had been stripped, by the forced sales, of the great
bulk of its assets at a heavy loss, and was prostrate and
reduced to inactivity for years to come. There was really
nothing for him to do but to try and keep alive what
little there was left of the concern. He was not surprised
to find that the collapse of the North American had af
fected his prestige hardly less than the crisis of 1883. His
absence in Europe left him free from all responsibility for
the new catastrophe, but he suffered just as much abuse as
though he had been directly instrumental in bringing on
the disaster, instead of having strained every nerve to save
the company. This second breakdown utterly disheartened
him, and he made up his mind then to resign all his cor
porate positions and absolutely retire from all business pur
suits just as soon as possible. He was confirmed in this
resolve by his conviction that the operation of the Sher
man law would before long plunge the whole country into
general disaster, and he determined to protect not only
himself but also his German friends from the coming ca
lamity. He addressed to them a letter in January, 1891,
stating fully the reasons for his fears of the early advent

357

358 HENRY VILLARD [1891

of the silver standard, advising and urging them to abstain
from all long engagements, and to keep their investments
in the United States in as liquid a form as possible. He
gave them formal notice at the same time that, holding his
opinion of a rapid approach to the silver standard, he
could no longer take any responsibility for the investment
of German capital in this country, and hence should con
sider their business relations as terminated. The letter
was looked upon at the time as exaggerated, but after the
crisis of 1893 had set in he was often complimented on
having written it.

The Northern Pacific had securely passed through the
months of stress before his return, but, as its position would
be rendered much safer by turning its short loans into
long loans, Mr. Villard set about accomplishing this, and
succeeded in forming an international syndicate for that
purpose. By the end of February, all he could do for
the several corporations having been consummated, he re
joined his family at Cannes late in March, remaining in
Europe until midsummer, and was not further disturbed
by untoward developments, nor did any such take place
after his return. On the contrary, the Northern Pacific
continued to show increasing strength right along. Its
gross and net earnings for the year 1890-91 were respec
tively $25,151,544.09 and $10,211,141.91, being the best
showing since the completion of the main line, and more
than double the gross, and nearly double the net, of the
year 1884-85. On the 27th and 28th of April, Mr. Vil
lard and his family, with the exception of his younger son,
were in Zweibriicken, to lay the corner-stone of an orphan
asylum that was to be Mr. Villard 's memorial to his lost
boy.

In the fall of 1891, accompanied by his wife, he made
what he meant and what proved to be his last official tour
of inspection of the main line and principal branches of the
Northern Pacific. He was everywhere very well received,
and invited to address public bodies at different points on

•

\

1891] PACIFIC COAST REVISITED 359

the business situation of the country, much as in former
years. In his speeches, as well as in published interviews,
he did not hesitate to warn his audiences, in the strongest
language, of the evil fruits the Sherman law was certain
to bear. He told them that the blackest clouds were gath
ering fast, and would burst before long and sweep like
a devastating tornado over the whole land, and exhorted
them to put their houses in order, and especially to keep
out of debt and new ventures, and prepare for the worst.
From St. Paul to Tacoma and Portland, he got nothing
for his pains except newspaper ridicule of him as a croaker
and pessimist, and not a little abuse in the centres of silver
sentiment. But he had the doubtful satisfaction, after the
catastrophe of 1893, of being told by a number of his hear
ers that his predictions had proved but too true, and that
they paid dearly for not having followed his advice. Scores
of his acquaintances, among them the wealthiest men in
St. Paul and Minneapolis and in the Pacific coast cities,
were actually impoverished.

The journey depressed him not only because of the popu
lar silver hallucination, but also because of his observation
of ominous factors in the Northern Pacific situation. First
and most threatening of all was the loss of business by the
competition of the Great Northern line to Spokane. There
was also the paralyzing effect of the great fires at Spokane
and Seattle. The decline of silver production in Montana
and the Creur d'Alene regions in consequence of the steady
depreciation of that metal in the market also portended
more and more loss of traffic. But the most alarming im
pression of all made upon him was the revelation of the
weight of the load that had been put upon the company
by the purchase and construction of the longer branch lines
in Montana and Washington, which he then discovered for
the first time. There was the Missoula Branch to the Coeur
d'Alene mines; the Coeur d'Alene Railway & Navigation,
a mixed system of steamboats and rail lines; the Seattle,
Lake Shore & Eastern; and the roads built into western-

360 HENRY VILLARD [1891-2

most Washington, representing a total investment in cash
and bonds of not far from $30,000,000, which together
hardly earned operating expenses. The acquisition and
building of these disappointing lines had in a few years
absorbed the large amount of consolidated bonds set aside
for construction purposes, which had been assumed to be
sufficient for all needs in that direction for a long time.
Under these circumstances, Mr. Villard came back to New
York with increased apprehension as to the future of the
Northern Pacific.

In his mind, there was but one way of saving the country
and the road from a ruinous catastrophe, viz., by the earliest
possible repeal of the Sherman Act, and the election of a
President in 1892 who could be relied upon to exert ex
ecutive influence for the repeal of the Act as well as for the
establishment of the gold standard. All through the win
ter of 1891 and 1892, he devoted most of his time and
his best energy to the pursuit of those two aims. He made
several stays in Washington, and by incessant efforts with
the leaders of both parties helped to bring about the in
troduction, reference, and report to the House of a repeal
bill which failed to pass by only a few votes, owing to
the jealousy entertained by certain Western Republican
members towards Speaker Reed, who favored the measure.
Mr. Villard had obtained promises from nearly two dozen
New York political leaders, lawyers, and financiers to re
spond at any time to a summons from him to Washington
to bring their personal influence to bear upon members in
favor of the repeal. Of all these prominent men only one—
Mr. William Brookfield— kept his word and appeared; so
little even then did the elite of the professional and business
community recognize the perils of the situation.

Although Mr. Villard had always taken an active interest
in civil-service and tariff reform— for he had belonged to
the Manchester School ever since he had read Adam Smith,
Bastiat, and John Stuart Mill— he had never had anything
to do with active party politics. His resolution to do

1892] EENOMINATING CLEVELAND 361

all in his power for the election of a sound-money and tar
iff-reform candidate now drew him against his wish into
the political whirlpool. The force of circumstances turned
him, indeed, for a time, into a hard-working politician.
Benjamin Harrison having signed both the first McKinley
tariff bill and the Sherman bill (the price paid by the
protectionists for the former's passage through the Senate),
his candidacy for reelection called for the most earnest op
position. The whole Republican party was so impregnated
with protectionism and silverism that there was not the
remotest hope for salvation from that quarter. Only a
Democrat, entirely sound on what seemed to Mr. Villard
to be the two main issues, could meet the emergency. The
record of Grover Cleveland pointed to him as the only avail
able Democrat. There was, however, great opposition to
him among the professional politicians of his own party,
and most of them looked upon United States Senator D.
B. Hill (who early in 1892 was receiving ovations in the
South) as the rising star. It seemed, indeed, hopeless to
renominate Mr. Cleveland, but Mr. Villard decided to try
it. He first sounded Mr. Cleveland, and found him very
reluctant to become a candidate, and obtained his consent
to allow the use of his name only after several interviews.
His next step was to win over the leading Democratic
Congressmen to his plan. He went to Washington, and
induced Speaker Carlisle to invite them to meet him at
his house, and twenty-eight responded. Mr. Villard ex
plained to them at length, and as forcibly as he could, the
reasons for his conviction that the needs of the times called
for the candidacy of Mr. Cleveland, and that he was the
only Democrat who could be elected. Mr. Carlisle and Wil
liam L. Wilson followed, expressing their full agreement
with his views, while others expressed the belief that it
was impossible to secure Cleveland's nomination, as Sen
ator Hill was all But certain of being presented as the
candidate of the Democracy of his own State to the nom
inating convention. Mr. Villard then announced that he

362 HENRY VILLARD [1892

and the other Independents and Democrats who were op
posed to the machine controlling the Democratic organiza
tion of New York, would bring Mr. Cleveland forward at
the national convention in spite of Hill's candidacy, and
were confident of his nomination. Most of those present
received this confident assertion with smiles, but it was
made good to the letter.

Mr. Villard gave up most of his time during the Presi
dential canvass to campaign work at the National Demo
cratic headquarters in New York, in conjunction with Don
M. Dickinson, William C. Whitney, Josiah Quincy, and
others. He raised money for the executive committee, and
organized and conducted a German-American Cleveland
Union with ramifications throughout the States. A few
days after the election, he gave a large dinner-party to
the President-elect and leading Independents and Demo
crats from all parts of the country. In his opening speech,
he complimented Mr. Cleveland on his great triumph, and
expressed his firm faith that the new Administration would
meet the highest expectations of its supporters. He added
that Mr. Cleveland was vouchsafed the finest opportunity
since Washington and Lincoln of bestowing great benefits
upon the Republic by insisting upon currency and tariff
reform, which he would surely do much to further. Mr.
Cleveland replied in what was generally said to be the
most feeling utterance that he had ever made, and which
moved the gathering deeply. The other speeches were
also pitched in a very high key. The occasion attracted
general attention, and the press immediately teemed with
stories that Mr. Villard was to be a member of the new
Cabinet, and otherwise play an important part under the
new regime. The truth was that he had taken occasion
to notify Mr. Cleveland immediately after his election
that all he asked was leave to discuss pending public
issues freely with him, which was readily granted and ex
ercised up to the inauguration. The President-elect con
sulted him regarding Cabinet and high diplomatic ap-

1892] NO EXTRA SESSION 363

p ointments, but he confined himself to urging Mr. Cleve
land persistently, all through the winter, to call an ex
tra session of Congress immediately after March 4, for
the repeal of the Sherman law, and to make his intention
to do so known without delay. For he perceived clearly
the portentous signs of a financial hurricane, and felt
sure that if it came without an effort on the part of the
new administration to prevent it through Congressional
action, Mr. Cleveland would be held responsible for it,
and its ravages would make the success of his adminis
tration impossible. He told Mr. Cleveland many times that,
if he rode into power on the eve of a panic, nothing could
save him from failure.

His efforts to persuade the President to call an extra
session were faithfully seconded by other close friends,
and by none more so than by Don M. Dickinson, of Michi
gan. One morning in February, the latter came into his
office with a beaming countenance, waving a piece of paper
and exclaiming: "We are all right now." He had spent
the night with Mr. Cleveland at Lakewood, and, after hours
of argument, got him finally to agree to the extra session.
The paper contained the announcement in Mr. Cleveland's
own handwriting that the President-elect had decided
to call an extra session directly after his inauguration, for
the repeal of the silver-purchasing act, and that members
of Congress might take notice that appointments for office
would not be considered by the Executive until they had
done their duty and abolished the obnoxious law. The an
nouncement was to be made in the afternoon papers. Mr.
Villard was overjoyed, and at once telephoned the glad
news to a number of friends. In less than an hour, he was
obliged to recall it in consequence of the reappearance of
Mr. Dickinson with the disappointing message from Mr.
Cleveland that he had changed his mind and would do
nothing before the 4th of March. Some other friends,
who were opposed to an extra session, had talked him out
of his purpose in the meantime.

364 HENRY VILLARD [1893

"When it seemed impossible in January, 1893, to overcome
Mr. Cleveland's reluctance to summon an extra session,
Mr. Villard and Don M. Dickinson got the President's con
sent, indicated by letters from him to leading Democratic
members, to try to secure the repeal of the Sherman Act
by the expiring Congress. They labored hard to this end
for some weeks in Washington, and got the Democratic side
ready for action, but the attempt failed on account of the
unwillingness of certain influential Republicans to smooth
the way for the incoming administration. Mr. Villard spent
the last afternoon with the President-elect before his de
parture for Washington, and made a last plea for an
extra session. But hours of talk only resulted in an in
vitation to come to Washington to repeat his arguments
to the new Cabinet, and a promise that, if it voted in favor
of an extra session, one should be summoned at once. He
did as desired, witnessed the inauguration, and met all the
Cabinet members except Mr. Olney in a parlor at the Ar
lington House. He presented his case as strongly as he
could, but in the discussion that ensued after he had
made his argument, it became evident that only the Secre
tary of Agriculture was unconditionally for the gold stand
ard, and that the rest either were bimetallists or did not
understand the subject sufficiently to express an opinion.
So, the next morning, he told Mr. Cleveland he was satis
fied that the Cabinet would vote against an extra session,
and therefore he considered his mission ended and should
go home. Once more, he had the sorry satisfaction of see
ing all he had feared and prophesied as to the impending
panic and its effect upon the fate of Mr. Cleveland's admin
istration come to pass.

The campaign work in 1892 and Mr. Villard 's labors for
the gold standard withdrew him so much from his cor
porate duties that he felt their burden but lightly. This
led him to postpone his intended retirement from his ex
ecutive positions ; but early in 1893 he announced his settled
purpose to resign them. The last thing he did as chairman

1893] DEFAULT OF NORTHERN PACIFIC 365

of the Northern Pacific was to devise a collateral trust mort
gage for funding the floating debt, of which he himself held
a large part. His formal resignation was accepted by the
Northern Pacific board only at its meeting on June 21, 1893,
to take effect on July 19, when, as on his first retirement,
his services to the company were acknowledged by the pas
sage of a gratifying series of resolutions. His resignation
from the North American board was accepted only in June,
1893.

He was fully conscious that, in obtaining this release
from official cares, he did not free himself from the heavy
burden of anxiety with which the growing certainty of
a catastrophe to the Northern Pacific oppressed him. The
accelerated decline in the earnings, the increasing paral
ysis of silver-mining, and the fast-spreading stagnation
of general business, convinced him that the breakdown of
the company would come inevitably with the general crisis
which he expected would befall the country in 1893. It
was perfectly clear to him, too, that the collapse of that
company would again mean for himself discredit, calumny,
and abuse. It seemed a hard fate indeed that he should
have to pass twice through the same ordeal and receive such
severe punishment for once more loyally uniting his per
sonal fortunes with the same ill-starred company. Con
sidering default unavoidable, he advised making it as early
as April, but the officers still believed in the possibility of
early recuperation and managed to pay the April coupon.

Early in 1893, a new temporary occupation fell to his
lot which proved far more arduous, while it lasted, than he
had anticipated when he accepted it. On his motion, the
Chamber of Commerce of the State of New York appointed
a committee, of which he was chosen chairman, to make
suitable provision for the proper entertainment in New
York of the foreigners who had been invited by the United
States Government as guests of the nation in connection
with the Columbian World's Fair. They included the
Princess Eulalia, as the representative of the Queen of

366 HENRY VILLARD [1893

Spain, and the Duke of Veragua, a lineal descendant of
Columbus, and family, and the officers of foreign squad
rons that participated in the great international review in
New York harbor. On entering upon his duties, he dis
covered that, although Congress at its first session had
extended formal invitations in the name of the nation,
which had been accepted, no appropriations for the expense
of entertaining the guests had been made. As the Dem
ocrats were to assume power both in the Government and
in Congress in March, the appropriation committees, con
trolled by Republicans, apparently out of sheer partisan
spite were doing nothing to enable the new administration
to redeem the pledge of hospitality made by its prede
cessor. Mr. Villard called the attention of Mr. Cleveland
to the awkward predicament in which his Government
would be placed by being left without money to take care of
the guests of the nation. At Mr. Cleveland's request, he
went to Washington with letters from the latter to prevent
such a disgrace. He begged Secretary of State Foster to
remind the appropriation committee of the urgency of the
matter, which Mr. Foster did; and also exerted himself
personally with the committee. But the shortness of
time, and political prejudice, prevented any action, and
Congress actually adjourned without having voted a dollar,
so that the new administration had only the contingent
fund of the State Department, really intended for other
objects, to draw from for the purpose. Mr. Villard be
thought himself of two ways of avoiding an international
scandal, viz., the raising of a considerable fund by private
subscriptions, and the financial help of the City of New
York. The former he successfully undertook himself, and
the latter was obtained to the extent of $100,000, with the
help of some Democratic friends who engineered the neces
sary special act through the State Legislature in the nick
of time. Thus the expense of the great street parade, the
banquet at the Waldorf, the ball at the Madison Square Gar
den, and the other entertainments was provided for. As is

1893] DEFAULT OF NORTHERN PACIFIC 367

usually the case on such occasions, the chief burden of re
sponsibility fell upon the chairman, and he literally had
to labor day and night for weeks to prevent the failure
of the programme which he had proposed. One thing
he was taught very thoroughly by this experience, viz.,
that Americans, however hospitably inclined they may be,
do not care to bother with foreigners who do not speak
their own language.

Mr. Villard went to Chicago to see the World's Fair.
He was filled with the greatest admiration for this mar
vellous achievement of American genius, which had never
been equalled before and, in his opinion, never would be
thereafter. For weeks he spent every day and many even
ings in the Exposition grounds, without being satiated by
their great attractions ; but his stay was terminated by an
urgent summons to New York, in the middle of June, from
the Northern Pacific's president, to which he responded at
once. As he anticipated, the occasion was the question
of the payment of the July coupon. The panic had in the
meantime broken out in full force in Wall Street and
throughout the country. There was a very tight money
market, and extraordinary commissions— at rates often ex
ceeding one hundred per cent.— were charged for loans.
Mr. Villard argued against the payment, which could be
made only by borrowing a large part of the required
amount at a heavy extra cost, as only a short makeshift, but
he was not heeded, and the payment of the coupon began
with little over one half of the $1,500,000 needed in hand.
As was to be foreseen, default was postponed for only a few
weeks, and, by mid-August, receivers were appointed for
the whole system.

The Deutsche Bank, which had placed in Germany the
IBulk of the junior bonds most to be affected by the sus
pension of interest payments, was morally bound to do
its utmost for the protection of the holders. As Mr. Vil
lard shared in its responsibility, he deemed it his duty
to do all in his power to bring about the appointment of re-

368 HENRY VILLARD [1893

ceivers whose character and experience offered a guarantee
that the company would be extricated from its difficulties
as early as possible ; and in this he was successful. The im
portance of an immediate and effective organization of the
majority of the bondholders in Germany under the guidance
of the Bank was also perceived by him, and with the timely
cabled notice to the institution of the inevitable default
he sent an urgent appeal to lose no time in forming a strong
and friendly committee, which should at once send a dele
gation with full power to this country, with a view to the
formation of an American committtee willing to cooperate
with the German. These recommendations were promptly
acted on, and, in October, the delegation, headed by Dr.
Georg Siemens, the principal director of the Bank, arrived
in New York. The first thing Mr. Villard had to do was
to demand a formal revocation of and an apology for an
offensive circular issued by the Bank in hot haste to the
bondholders, full of glaring misstatements, unjust criti
cism of the railroad management, and an evident attempt
to make a scapegoat of himself. This was conceded, and
the correction given even wider publicity in Germany than
the circular. Mr. Villard informed the delegates, after
he had fully posted them concerning the situation and the
measures it called for, and initiated the organization of an
American committee, that, having done all that was possi
ble for him to do in the interest of the bondholders, he
should withdraw altogether from Northern Pacific affairs
and go abroad for several years. The delegation was much
taken aback by this announcement, protested against his
purpose, and insisted that he must remain in the country
and take an active part in the reorganization of the com
pany. He replied, however, that, owing to his failure in
1883 and the present crisis, his usefulness as a financial
adviser and leader was obviously entirely gone, and that
it was his firm belief that, in view of the bitter attacks upon
him which had already begun, it would positively injure
the work of the committees if he played a leading part in it.

1893-4] MEDITERRANEAN TOUR 369

After some exciting scenes, his proposed course was ap
proved, provided a proper substitute for him could be
found who would serve as chairman of the American com
mittee of bondholders, and constitute the connecting link
between the latter and the German committee and also act
as confidential adviser to the Bank. He recommended
Edward D. Adams, and, after some delay, the delegates
voted to authorize him to offer the position to the man of
his choice. Mr. Adams hesitated at first, but was finally
persuaded to accept. The main share which he had in
the extraordinary success of the reorganization of the com
pany made a splendid record for him, and the managers
of the Bank subsequently expressed to Mr. Villard at Berlin
their great sense of obligation to him for having recom
mended Mr. Adams. The outcome of the reorganization
was such that none of the holders of the company's se
curities, who held on to them, lost anything in the end.
This result compensated Mr. Villard for the personal an
noyances which, as he had foreseen, grew out of the North
ern Pacific collapse. As men with similar experiences
necessarily do, he made a number of bitter enemies, who
then saw their opportunity for revenge. He and his as
sociates in the formation of the Chicago & Northern Pacific
Railroad (Terminal) Company were charged in the press
with having made millions for themselves out of it, and
a small stockholder was even procured to bring suit for
the recovery of these alleged ill-gotten gains. In his an
swer to the bill of complaint, Mr. Villard made an absolute
denial of every one of the charges, and so completely that no
further move was ever made in the case.

He sailed with his family, except the elder son, in No
vember, 1893, direct for Gibraltar. The party first trav
elled in Spain and then passed over to northern Africa.
They visited Melilla, Oran, Blida, Algiers, Philippeville,
Constantine, Biskra, the famous oasis in the Sahara; and
reached Tunis by the middle of January, 1894. Thence
they crossed to Sicily, and, at the end of the month, took

24

370 HENRY VILLARD [1894

steamer at Naples for Egypt, where they spent two months,
during which they made the usual tour of the Nile. From
Egypt they went to Greece and thence to Constantinople.
In April, they reached Vienna, where their stay was some
what protracted. The summer was spent in the Austrian
Tyrol, on Lake Constance, and in Central Switzerland and
on Lake Geneva. In October, the rest of the family went
to Italy over the Mont Cenis, and visited the principal
places from Turin to Naples. While in Florence, in the
first week in December, Mr. Villard received a letter from
his associate in the Northern Pacific management, Thomas
F. Oakes, one of the three receivers, advising him of his
arrival in Paris and his desire for a meeting with him.
It was decided that Mr. Villard should proceed thither.

Since Mr. Villard 's departure, developments had taken
place in Northern Pacific affairs which affected him per
sonally, and regarding which it was very desirable he should
learn more details than he had received while travelling.
Control of the Northern Pacific had been obtained, at the
annual election held after the appointment of receivers, by
parties bitterly hostile to the former management. They
brought about the filing, early in 1894 in the United States
Circuit Court, which had appointed the receivers, of a series
of charges against Mr. Oakes and Mr. Villard, accusing
them of having derived large personal profits out of the
construction of certain branch lines, and moved for an
investigation. This the court granted, without giving Mr.
Villard an opportunity to be heard, and appointed a master
to take testimony.

Mr. Villard heard of this only after arriving in Vienna,
and he immediately by cable and by letter asked to be sum
moned by the master, but no summons ever reached him.
Instead of the naturally expected report against further
proceedings, to Mr. Villard 's great surprise and indig
nation he learned in Switzerland that the master had ex
onerated Mr. Oakes, but recommended that the court order
a suit to be brought against Mr. Villard for the recovery

1894] LAW SUITS 371

of alleged illegitimate profits in connection with the build
ing of the Northern Pacific & Manitoba branch line to
Winnipeg. It was assumed that the court would order the
suit, and it was regarding this trouble that he wished to
confer with Mr. Oakes.

He rejoined his family at Munich on his return from
Switzerland on December 17. His sister and her husband
resided there, together with several other relatives and a
large circle of old personal friends. Mr. Villard had caused
the receivers to be informed that he was ready to return
and respond at any time to any summons in any suit against
him, and in answer had received official information that
they had been ordered to bring suit, but thought it proper
to call on him first for certain explanations. He concluded
to respond to this in person, and was able to notify the
receivers early in May, 1895, that he was back and held
himself at their disposal. Some correspondence with the
receivers followed, but nothing further was done in the
case until the following winter, when the court renewed
its order to bring suit, which was then commenced. But
the suit never passed beyond the first stage— that is, the
filing of the complaint and the defendant's answer. The
case remained there until after the completion of the re
organization of the Northern Pacific Company and the
discharge of the receivers. Mr. Villard received then the
fullest possible vindication by a dismissal of the suit with
out his solicitation, and a certification from the principal
conductors of the reorganization, E. D. Adams, Francis
Lynde Stetson and C. H. Coster, that no evidence what
ever had been found to sustain the charges against him.
This is the place in which to mention also that it was
proved, through a most searching investigation of the
Northern Pacific accounts made by order of the court, that
not a dollar of the corporate funds had ever been improp
erly used.

When Mr. Villard announced his settled determination
before his departure for Europe in 1893 to withdraw from

372 HENRY VILLARD [1895

all business pursuits, most of his friends did not believe
that a man accustomed to such extraordinary activity could
be content to live in retirement. These sceptics expected
him to resume his role in Wall Street upon his return in
1895. But they did not know the man. Although he kept
a small office in the financial quarter, and retained his inter
ests as a security-holder in the North American Company
and some other corporations in which he had been inter
ested for years, he resolutely declined to become again
responsible for their management as director or officer. He
was always found ready, however, to help them with
money and advice. He had three reasons for this retire
ment: one was his growing deafness, and a second one his
unwillingness, in the light of past lessons of ingratitude
from others, ever again to be responsible for the use of
other people's money, directly or indirectly. The third
reason was the sacrifices he had made as a consequence of
his practice, out of kindness and generosity, to assist in
experienced relatives and friends of both sexes in their in
vestments. He always looked upon advice given to such
as involving a moral obligation, and never shrank from
the personal consequences of this view, as is proved by
the fact that he made good losses to numerous sufferers
from his counsel, to the extent of hundreds of thousands
of dollars, especially from losses in Northern Pacific
bonds.

He was rendered proof against Wall Street temptations
by another fact. In spite of his all-absorbing material
occupations for so long a period, he had never lost his
preference for a life devoted to what he considered higher
and nobler objects, such as he had followed before he became
a business man. With the attainment of freedom from all
obligations to others, this feeling grew stronger, and he not
only never had a moment's regret because of the obscurity
which he had deliberately sought, but he rendered thanks
every day for the abundance of leisure it had secured him
for extensive reading, literary labor, reform work, and the

1895-1900] STUDY OF THE CIVIL WAR 373

philosophic contemplation of the momentous events follow
ing each other so rapidly in our time.

He had chosen two fields for literary occupation. One
he had entered upon long before his withdrawal from
business life. Nearly twenty years before, during periods
of rest, he began to write his personal memoirs. As soon
as he had command of his time, from the summer of 1895 till
the winter of 1899-1900, when his health began to be se
riously affected, he devoted himself steadily to their prep
aration. As a means of reviving and fixing his recollections
as a war correspondent, he made a careful study of the Offi
cial War Records so far as they related to the campaigns of
the Civil War on land and sea which he had witnessed.
This work proved very fascinating to him, as the Govern
ment publications contained the documentary history of
the operations not only of the Northern but also of the
Confederate armies. It revealed to him for the first time
the whole, instead of but one side, of the bloody pictures
of the battle-fields of the great struggle. He found it most
absorbing work to test the accuracy of the statements of
the loyal commanders By those made by their antagonists,
and to unite their separate accounts into one complete, con
sistent, and comprehensible description. The flood of new
light radiating from this double source led him to enlarge
the scope of the narrative of his own observations of the
great collisions of the war into full battle descriptions. He
was untiring in the collation, sifting, and testing of his ma
terial from all available sources, and took the greatest pains
to be impartial and accurate. It required many months
to bring some of his battle stories into a shape that satisfied
him. When he was obliged to stop work, he had got no
further than the second day's fighting at Chattanooga. The
next subjects would have been Grant's battles in the Wil
derness and the siege of Petersburg. He was very anx
ious to describe these later episodes, and had revisited both
scenes in 1897, going over the ground carefully with the
Official Records and accounts of war historians in hand.

374 HENRY VILLARD [1898

His other literary scheme was to write a history of the
Franco- German war of 1870-71. He had for some years
employed two young German historians, trained Hy Pro
fessor von Sybel, to collect material for him, but gave up
the project on finding that the French material procur
able was altogether too scanty for as full and accurate a
history of the part played by the vanquished as the abun
dant German sources permitted to be written of the part of
the victors.

Although he was no longer a working participant in cur
rent affairs, it was not in his nature to be simply an in
different observer of passing events. His sympathies were
moved as quickly and deeply as ever 15y all good causes,
and his indignation stirred as readily by public and private
wrongs. It remained a standing grief to him, as a free
trader, that the prospect of tariff reform had grown so
apparently hopeless in these latter years. The thought
that, through his instrumentality, it was rendered possible
to wage an incessant war against public abuses of every
kind through the Evening Post's relentless championship
of political reform, was a source of just pride to him ; but
it did not surprise him that praise of this championship
was followed by denunciation when the Evening Post had to
oppose popular delusions, as in the case of the unjust war
against Spain. That national frenzy roused his strongest
antagonism, for he clearly foresaw all the moral decadence,
all the blighting effect upon all reformatory movements,
which that fatal aberration was certain to bring in its train.
He and his wife could not stand the war-racket which broke
out in the spring of 1898, and went to Europe, not returning
until after the conclusion of peace.

"With the exception of this absence, Mr. Villard passed
his winters with his family in their apartment in New
York, and his summers at their beautiful country-seat at
Dobbs Ferry, on the Hudson, until the summer of 1899,
when he made what he felt to be his last tour over the
Northern Pacific system. The journey was extended to

1899] ALASKAN TOUR 375

Alaska, which, though the Oregon Steamship Company had
opened commercial intercourse with it under his original
administration, he had never found time to visit. As he
had not been over the road for eight years, he was pre
pared to be, if not forgotten, at least only slightly remem
bered. It was therefore an agreeable revelation to him
to find that he and his work were well remembered all
the way from the Lakes to the Pacific Northwest. He was
heartily welcomed everywhere and by all classes, and met
a great number of old acquaintances. The most pleasing
reception given to him was at Eugene City at the State
University of Oregon, of which he had been a benefactor.
It interested him, of course, very much to compare what
Oregon and Washington were when he first made his ad
vent on the coast twenty-five years before, with their present
stage of development. The two Territories in 1874 had to
gether a population of only 100,000; now each of the two
States claimed about half a million. Portland's had risen
from 15,000 to 90,000, Tacoma's from 5,000 to 45,000, Se
attle 's from 6,000 to 65,000, and Spokane 's from a few hun
dred to 40,000. Marvellous changes in one-third the length
of a human life !

Mr. Villard was of such a fine physique that he was gen
erally supposed to enjoy perfect health, which was not, how
ever, the case. He had been for more than thirty years
troubled with rheumatism and gout, and had passed
through several dangerous diseases. After 1896, he had
some attacks of heart disease and a slight apoplectic stroke.
His real decline began in 1899. 1

No American citizen of foreign birth could have had a
higher appreciation than Mr. Villard of the privileges of
American citizenship, and of the incomparable advantages
arising from the free play of the human faculties enjoyed
in this country. He never forgot that he was himself a
living illustration of the benefits of these conditions, and
never failed to acknowledge his indebtedness to them. Yet,
1 Mr. Villard died at Thorwood, November 12, 1900,

376 HENRY VILLARD [1900

with all his faithfulness and gratitude to his adopted coun
try, he also remained loyal to the land of his birth. Not
withstanding his residence of nearly half a century in
the United States and all the American infiltration and
engrafting he underwent in that long time, he always re
mained and was proud to be a true German. He sought
to have his native language acquired by all the members
of his family, and to make them personally acquainted with
his relatives and friends in the Fatherland. The family
altogether lived nearly twelve years at different times in
Germany, and Mr. Villard visited his native province on
an average every two years. He considered it a sacred
duty to do all he could for the welfare of his countrymen
in America, and for the promotion of close friendly rela
tions between the two countries. He enjoyed the personal
friendship and confidence of all the diplomatic representa
tives of Germany in the United States from the days of
Lincoln, and was ever ready to give them the benefit of his
long and varied experience and wide acquaintance on this
side of the water. He always believed that the two coun
tries ought to know more of each other's special characteris
tics, and this induced him to provide for sending thirty-
three young German artisans, artists, and literati to the
World's Fair at Chicago in 1893. The same motives led
him to entertain at Thorwood the officers of the German
squadron that was ordered over to join in the international
naval review in the spring of that year.

END OF SECOND AND LAST VOLUME.

INDEX

INDEX

(This does not profess to be complete, but probably -will bi
found adequate. )

Adams, Charles Francis, Jr., 2 : 328,

329. 335-

Adams, Edward D., 2: 369, 371.
Advertiser, Boston daily, V. writes for,

2 : 269.
Advocate, Racine (Wis.) daily, V. writes

for, 1 : 68.

Ainsworth, J. C., 2: 287.
Alaska, V. 's visit to, 2 : 375.
Allabach, Peter H., in Fredericksburg

campaign, 1 : 373, 374.
American Social Science Association,

2 : 269.
Anderson, Robert, in command of Fort

Sumter, 1: 159; mission to Kentucky and

Virginia, 205; headquarters at Louisville,

207 ; relinquishes command, 209.
Andrew, John A., 1 : 164.
Arthur, Chester A., attitude towards

Northern Pacific, 2 : 301 ; at opening of

the road, 310.

Baird, Absalom, roughly handled at
Chickamauga, 2 : 115, 122, 133, but stands,
136; again hit, 161.

Balatka, Hans, 1 : 49.

Baltimore, cut off from Washington, 1:
163-170.

Bamberger, Ludwig, 2: 345.

Bandelier, Adolph F., 2 : 340.

Beatty, John, at Chickamauga, 2 : 131-133 ;
in attack on Missionary Ridge, 251.

Beauregard, Pierre G. T., commands
rebel troops at Manassas Junction, 1 : 181,
190, 191 ; illness, 261 ; at Corinth, 235; plan
to annihilate Grant's army, 254; explains
his failure, 260 ; report better than Grant's,
262; asks for reinforcements, 267; force at
Corinth, 268 ; evacuates, 277 ; retreat, 279 ;
in command at Charleston, 2 : 18.

Bennett, James Gordon, attacks Greeley
about gold-mining, 1:126; summons V.

to New York, 161; puts Herald on Union
side, and wants favor for his son, 162.

Bickham, W. D.t 2 : 67.

Bigelow, John, 1 : 79.

Billings, Frederick, declines cooperation
with V., 2:296; will not admit him to
Northern Pacific Board, nor sell out to
him, but compromises, 300 ; at opening of
the road, 311.

Birney, David B., in Fredericksburg cam
paign, 1: 362, 380.

Bismarck, Otto von, seen by T. at Nikols-
burg, 2 : 268; V.'s article on him in North
A merican Review, 345 ; visit from V. , 346 -
356; praise of Carl Schurz, 354; idol of
Hamburg, 356.

Blaine, James G., 2: 334.

Blair, Francis P., 1 : 173.

Blair, Francis P., Jr., 1: 173; at Chatta
nooga, 2 : 243-245, 252.

Blair, Montgomery, characterized, 1:
172; talk with V., 339.

Blenker, Louis, German revolutionist, 1 :
56; New York truck farmer, 57; colonel
in Civil War, 174; at Bull Run, 195.

Blind Pool, 2 : 298.

Bragg, Braxton, in the Shiloh campaign,
1 : 254, 256 ; on rebel demorali7ation, 261;
supersedes Beauregard and directs flank
ing movement against Buell, 292 ; at Chat
tanooga, 293, 296; takes Munfordville,
303; retires upon Kirby Smith, 304, 312;
sets up rebel government at Frankfort, 313 ;
initiates fight at Perryville, 313, 314, 323;
retreats, 326, 330; threatens Nashville, 2:
60; attacks Rosecrans at Stone's River,
62 ; retreats, 63 ; position on Duck River,
72; forced out of Middle Tennessee to
Chattanooga, 78 ; leams of Rosecrans's ad
vance, 84 ; forced out of Chattanooga, 88 ;
prepares ambush for Rosecrans, 91; first
move in Chickamauga fight, 92; orders

379

380

INDEX

to Hindman, 94, 95, 99 ; to Polk, 99; gen
eral order of battle, 102; does not wait for
Longstreet, 109 ; orders night attack on first
day, 121; results of first day, 124; night
council and plan, 127 ; second disappoint
ment in Polk, 128, 130, 1 60; ignorant of
victory, 163; abstains from following (he
Federals, 164 ; congratulates troops, 169 ;
comparison with Rosecrans, 170; forces
before Chattanooga, 182 ; decides to in
vest Chattanooga, 182 ; opposition of his
lieutenants, 193-198 ; relieves Polk and
Hindman for disobedience, 194 ; prefers
charges, 197, but eats humble pie, 198;
chagrin at Wauhatchie defeat, 227; de
taches Longstreet to crush Burnside, 238,
246; calls for reinforcements, 254; feigns
attack on Chattanooga, 249 ; meets Sher
man's attack, 254; retreats from Hooker's,
262.

Brannan, John M., opens Chickamauga
fight, /8: 113; overborne, 115, but checks
the enemy, 116; first to be attacked on
second day, 139 ; joins Wood in defence of
Horseshoe, 150, 151 ; censure of Negley,
191, 192.

Breckinridge, John C., movements about
Nashville, 3: 60; in battle of Stone's
River, 62; attack at Chickamauga, 132;
defeat, 134 ; seeks Bragg's removal, 195.

Brookfield, William, 2 : 360.

Brown, B. Gratz, 1 : 138.

Browne, Junius H., with V. at Cairo, 1:
263; at Memphis, 283.

Brownlow, William G., 1 : 233.

Buckner, Simon B., invades Kentucky,
1 : 206, 208 ; reinforces Fort Donelson,
221; captured there, 222; leads cabal
against Bragg, 55 : 195 ; controversy with
him, 198.

Buell, Don Carlos, succeeds Gen. Sherman
in Kentucky, 1 :2i3; slow to move, 214-216;
prodded by McClellan, 214, 216, and Lin
coln, 215; his forces and commanders, 219,
220 ; plan of campaign, 220 ; follows up
Grant's victory at Forts Henry and Donel
son, 222 ; enters Nashville, 223, 228 ; ad
vance under Halleck's command, 236; in
touch with Grant, 240 ; at Savannah, 241 ;
at Pittsburg Landing, 243-245 ; in pursuit
of rebels after Corinth, 279 ; northern cam
paign with Army of Ohio, 282-305 ; differ
ence with Halleck, 288 ; mistakes Bragg's
intentions, 293, 297; races him to Louis
ville, 301 ; odium incurred by rebel invasion

of Kentucky, 307; ordered relieved, but
saved by Gen. Thomas, 308; reorganizes
army, 310; disabled on eve of Perry ville,
315 ; tardily sends succor to Gen. A. McD.
McCook, 321, 325; inquiry as to Gen.
Gilbert's rank, 324 ; pursuit of Bragg, 326;
succeeded by Rosecrans, 331, 2 : 59 ; mili
tary qualities, 1: 331,332; discussed by
Lincoln, 340 ; reluctance to move into East
Tennessee justified, 2 : 60.

Buell, George P., 2 : 141.

Buffalo herds on the Plains, 1: no, xix;
extinct, 2 : 279.

Bull Run, Federal advance on, 1:183;
first shots, 184 ; the rout, 192-198.

Burnside, Ambrose E., in rout at Bull
Run, 1 ; 197 ; North Carolina campaign,
337 ; succeeds McClellan, 335 ; plan against
Lee, 342, 343; recognizes army, 346;
camp at Falmouth, 347; conference with
Lincoln, 347 ; plan of attack on Freder-
icksburg, 353 ; orders to Franklin, 377, 382 ;
fatuous resolve to renew attack on Lee,
384, 2:3; responsibility for disaster, 1 :
393; commands Department of the Ohio
and arrests Vallandigham, 2 : 59, 82 ; occu
pies East Tennessee, 82; does not assist
Rosecrans, 108 ; abortive attack from Long-
street, 238, 239.

Butler, Benjamin F., 1: x8x.

Butterfield, Daniel, early life, 1 : 349; in
Fredericksburg campaign, 346, 349, 369,
370, 372-

Cameron, Simon, characterized, 1:172;
rewards political followers with military
office, 177; interview with Gen. Sherman
at Louisville, 211; doubts his sanity, 212;
succeeded by Stanton, 339.

Capri vi, Georg Leo von, requests inter
view with V. , 2 : 343-345-

Carlin, William P., 1 : 322, 323.

Carriere, Moritz, 1 : 7.

Case, Zophar, 1 : 36-41.

Central Pacific R. R., negotiations with
V.,2:284.

Charleston forts, Dupont's attack on, 2:
28-51.

Chase & Higginson, 2: 322, 323.

Chase, Salmon P., Secretary of the
Treasury, 1: 162; characteristics, 171; his
daughter marries Gov. Sprague, 175 ; offers
V. a captaincy, 177 ; gets Major McDowell
promoted to brigadier, 179; friction with
President, 340 ; organizes freedmen at Fort

INDEX

381

Monroe, 58 : 8 ; letters of introduction to V.,
n.

Chatrian, Alexandra, 1 : 6.

Chattanooga, siege of, 9 : 180-263.

Cheatham, Benjamin F., attack at Chick-
amauga, 2: 117, 118; before Chattanooga,
246.

Cherry Creek (Denver and Auraria), gold-
mining settlement, 1: 104-136.

Chicago & Northern Pacific R. R.,
founded by V., '2 : 337; suit against V. , 369.

Chickamauga, battle, preliminaries, 2: 91-
112; opposing forces, 109-111; first day,
113-125 ; second day, hour of opening, 129,
contest, 126-173; casualties, 171 ; merits of
Bragg and Rosecrans, 170; V. collects
material for an account of it, 184.

Cleburne, Patrick R., in Chickamauga
fight, 8:92; leads night attack, 121;
second day's attack, 132 ; defeat, 135 ; re
called from accompanying Longstreet to
Knoxville, 246, 247; defends Missionary
Ridge, 234.

Cleveland, Grover, V.'s efforts to renom-
inate, 2 : 361, 362 ; gives dinner to him after
election, 362, and urges calling extra ses
sion of Congress to repeal Sherman Act,
363 ; help from him in getting money
to entertain foreign World's Fair guests,
366.

Coffin, Charles CM 1 : 386, 387.

Colburn, Richard T., 1 : 263.

Columbian World's Fair, reception of
foreign guests arranged for in N. Y. by
T., 2: 365; Fair visited by him, 367, and
visit of German artisans provided for, 376.

Commercial, Cincinnati, employs V. as
legislative reporter, 1 : 98 ; as Pike's Peak
correspondent, 99; as Lincoln campaign
correspondent, 138; as Washington corre
spondent, 153, 154; Rosecrans's organ, 2:
67.

Conkling, Roscoe, 2 : 301.

Cooke, Jay & Co., invest in Oregon Steam
Navigation Co., 2: 286; failure, 287.

Corinth, Miss., rebel advance from, 1 : 256;
Halleck's advance against, 268-275 ; evacu
ation, 275; occupation, 276.

Coster, C. H., 2 : 326.

Crittenden, Thomas L., under Buell in
Perryville campaign, 1 : 289, 291, 302, 310,
326; under Rosecrans, 2 : 61 ; in advance on
Chattanooga, 90 ; confronted by Polk, TOO,
101 ; position on the Chickamauga, 103,
104; lends aid to Gen. Thomas, 116; posi

tion on second day, 126; cut off from his
command, 143 ; follows Rosecrans to Chat
tanooga, 147, 148, 165 ; returns to field, 168 ;
holds left at Chattanooga, 168, 181; under
public censure, 186, 187 ; relieved of com
mand, 187-189 ; vindicated by court of
inquiry, 190.
Crook, George, 2 : 203-206.

Dana, Charles A., V.'s first meeting with,
1:71, 72; sends V. to Minnesota, 74;
Secretary Stanton's emissary to Western
armies, 2 : 166; misreports first day's fight
at Chickamauga, 166; corrects it, 167;
part in punishing McCook and Crittenden,
188, and in removal of Rosecrans, 211 ; his
reports to Secretary Stanton, 189, 202, 210;
meets Grant at Nashville, 209 : returns to
front, 210; useful to V., 216; watches ad
vance on Missionary Ridge, 249 ; letter to
Gen. Thomas, 213.

Davis, Jefferson, at Bull Run, 1 : 190 ;
petitioned for Bragg's removal, 2 : 194-196 ;
visits Bragg's army, 193-198; sustains
him, but spares Polk and Hindman, 197.

Davis, Jefferson C., kills Gen. Nelson,
1 : 308, 309 ; in Rosecrans's campaign, 2 :
60; at Chattanooga, 242, 243, 252, 254.

Decker, Howell & Co., 2: 343.

Denver, mining stage, 1 : 115-133; in 1876,
2 : 279.

Deutsche Bank, director, Georg Siemens,
2:310; builds railroad in Anatolia, 320;
makes V. its N. Y. representative, 320;
markets Northern Pacific and Oregon R.
R. & Navigation Co. bonds, 329, 334, 367 ;
censure of V., and apology, 368.

Dickinson, Don M., 2: 362-364.

Dillon, Sidney, 2: 281, 284, 331.

Douglas, Stephen A., visited by V., in
Washington, 1 : 54, in Chicago, 92 ; Sen
atorial campaign and debate with Lincoln,
91-96 ; at Freeport, 92 ; his wife, 92.

Draper, Simeon, 1 : 58, 59.

Drexel, Francis M., 1 : 56.

Dupont, Samuel F., gathers fleet at
Hampton Roads, 2:5; V.'s introduction
to him, 12; orders attack on Fort McAllis
ter, 25 ; shares attack on Charleston forts,
35-51 ; censured by press for failure, 49-51.

Edison General Electric Co., founded

by V., 2:326.
Electric light, power, and traction, V.

a pioneer in, 9 ; 325-3271

382

INDEX

Ellet, Charles, Jr., 1 : 285, 286.
Endicott, William, Jr., 2 : 291, 293, 315.
Engelmann, Adolf, son of Friedrich, 1:

31-

Engelmann, Friedrich (son of Theodor
Erasmus), head forester, 1 : 27 ; removes to
Belleville, Illinois, 31 ; farm and family
31 ; daughters, Mrs. Decker, Mrs. Scheel,
27, Mrs. Koerner, 33; son, Theodor, 32,
33. 36-

Engelmann, Georg, son of Julius and
grandson of Theodor Erasmus, 1 : 12.

Engelmann, Theodor, son of Friedrich,
1 : 32 ; career, 33, 36.

Engelmann, Theodor Adolf, brother of
Friedrich and of Margarete, second wife of
Georg Friedrich Hilgard, 1 : n.

Engelmann, Theodor Erasmus, father
of Friedrich, 1 : i.

Evarts, William M., 2 : 311.

Evening Post, N. Y., V.'s approaches to,
1 : 79 ; bought by him, 2 : 338, 374.

Forrest, Nathan B., raids Buell's com
munications, 1 : 230, 292, 293 ; 2 : 61 ; re
pulse and successes, 69 ; at opening of
Chickamauga fight, 113, 115; on second
day, 151.

Fort Donelson, taken by Grant, 1 : 222 ;
viewed by V., 224.

Fort McAllister, naval attacks on, 2: 17,
18, 25.

Foster, John G., arrives at Port Royal, 2 :
19 ; disputes seniority with Hunter, 20.

Fox, Gustavus V., characterized, 1:172,
173 ; introduction of V. to Admiral Dupont,
3: 12.

Fox, J. M., l:us, 117, 118.

Frank Leslie's Illustrated Weekly, Y.
writes for, 1 : 73.

Franklin, William B., in Fredericksburg
campaign, 1 : 346, 362, 368, 370, 377, 382 ;
controversy over his conduct, 382, 383.

Fredericksburg campaign, 1 : 342-393.

Freedmen of Sea Islands, 2: 15-17, 19, 21-
24.

Fremont, John C., serenaded in New
York, 1 . 59 ; Presidential campaign, 2 :
52; in command in Missouri, 1 : 207; arbi
trary and extravagant, 211 ; superseded by
Halleck, 220.

French, William H., in Fredericksburg
campaign, 1 : 359, 361 ; at the front, 363.

Fry, James B., McDowell's chief of staff,
1:182; at Bull Run, 195, 199; assistant

adjutant-general to Gen. Anderson at
Louisville, 207; chief of staff to Gen.
Buell, 213, 228, 306 ; at Pittsburg Landing,
243-
Fuchs, John P., 1 : 70.

Gage, Frances D., 2: 15.

Gamage, Quartermaster to Gen. McCook's
division, 1 : 264, 287.

Garfield, James A., Rosecrans's chief of
staff, 2: 66; character, 68; favors advance
on Bragg, 70; courtesy to V., 73; retires
to Chattanooga with Rosecrans during
Chickamauga fight, 147, 157; returns to
field, 156; hopeful of issue, 158, 165, 167;
tries to induce Rosecrans to return, 167;
welcomes V., 179, 184; confidences to
him, 185, 186, 201; not responsible for
punishment of McCook and Crittenden,
188; elected to Congress, 186, 201 ; retires
from army, 201 ; assassination, 301.

Garrison, Fanny (Helen Frances), future
wife of V., 2 : 55 ; marriage, 268.

Garrison, Francis Jackson, 2 : 53, 54.

Garrison, George Thompson, 2 : 54.

Garrison, Helen Eliza, 2 : 53.

Garrison, William Lloyd, abolitionist,
% : 52 ; appearance, 53 ; feted in England,
269.

Garrison, William Lloyd, Jr., 2: 52, 53.

Gay, Sydney H., directs V. to Boston, 2:
52 ; recalls him for Rosecrans's campaign,
54-

Geary, John W., part in battle of Wau-
hatchie, 2 : 222-228, 231 ; in attack on
Lookout Mt., 257-262.

Geibel, Emanuel von, 1 : 7.

Gibbon, John, in Fredericksburg campaign,
1 : 378-380.

Gilbert, Charles C., original appointment,
1 : 324 ; division commander under Buell,
310; in Perryville fight, 315-322; incom
petence, 320, 328, 329 ; removal, 325.

Gillmore, Quincy A., 2 : 7.

Godkin, Edwin Lawrence, 2 : 338.

Gold Fever in Colorado, 1 : 99-136; history
of discovery on Cherry Creek, and found
ing of Denver, 104, 105.

Goll, Hermann, 1 : 69.

Gould, Jay, contest with V. and Kansas
Pacific, 2 : 281 ; dislodges V. from K. & P.
receivership, 282 ; gives up fight, 283 ; ap
proves V.'s plan of extension of Union
Pacific to the Columbia, 284.

Granger, Gordon, position at Chicka-

INDEX

383

mauga, 2: 127; joins in defense of Horse
shoe, 151 ; praise from Rosecrans, 151 ;
opposes abandonment of Lookout Mt,
202 ; takes over McCook's and Crittenden's
corps, 187; in advance on Missionary
Ridge, 247-291.

Grant, Ulysses S., takes Forts Henry, 1 :
221, and Donelson, 222 ; moves on Nash
ville, 224, 231; calls on Mrs. Polk, 231;
reprimanded by Halleck, 232; army dan
gerously misplaced at Pittsburg Landing,
255 ; at Savannah, on Tennessee River,
235> 258 5 under Halleck's command, 236 ;
at Pittsburg Landing, 237; hears from
Buell, 240; unsuspicious of attack, 240, 257;
joins his engaged army, 241 ; appeals for
help, 242 ; poor report of battle, 262; sharp
instructions from Halleck, 264 ; relieved of
command of Army of Tennessee, 266;
headquarters under a cloud, 270; V.'s im
pressions of him, 273 ; besieges Vicksburg,
2 : 67 ; accident at New Orleans, 209 ;
sends aid to Rosecrans, 177; put in com
mand of Department of Mississippi, comes
North, 209 ; at Chattanooga in command,
217 ; opposed to Gen. Palmer's promotion,
247; doubts as to holding out, 231 ; orders
up Sherman, 232 ; plan to seize Missionary
Ridge, 233; joined by Sherman, 236; in
dulgent of his delay, 242 ; directs attack on
Missionary Ridge, 254, 263 ; at opening of
Northern Pacific R. R., 310.

Greeley, Horace, visits Denver and Greg
ory Gulch, 1 : 122-126 ; attacked by buffa
loes, 123; adventures in Denver House,
124, 125; upset in Clear Creek, 125; re
ports accident to V., 126 ; certifies to gold-
mining, 126; for peaceful separation of
Union, 155; for "On to Richmond," 180;
praise of V. for Charleston report, 2 : 49.

Gregory, John H., mining pioneer, 1:
118, 119, 121.

Gregory's Gulch and Mine, I:n8, vis
ited by V., 119-122, with Greeley and
Richardson, 125.

Halleck, Henry W., succeeds Fremont,
1 : 220 ; lets Grant and Foote attack Fort
Honry, 221 ; reprimands Grant for absence,
232; commands Buell and Grant's armies,
236, in person, 264; orders Grant to reor
ganize command, 264 ; strengthens his
army, 265 ; makes Grant second in com
mand, 266; asks for reinforcements, Lin
coln remonstrates, 267, 268; overestimates

enemy, 268 ; distrust of newspaper corre
spondents, 269; deceived before Corinth,
275; misled by Pope's reports, 279-281;
difference with Buell, 288, with Burnside,
342; confutes Rosecrans's arguments for
inaction, 2 : 68 ; orders him forward, 70 ;
still urges, 80 ; final order, 81 ; illusions as
to rebel movements before Chickamauga,
108; orders Grant to send aid to Rosecrans,
177; abused by Rosecrans, 184.

Halpine, Charles G., 2: 4, 10.

Halstead, Murat, news editor Cincinnati
Commercial, 1 : 98; employs V. as re
porter and correspondent, 98, 99 ; misuses
his private letter about Gen. Sherman,
212.

Hancock, Winfield S., soldierly appear
ance, 1 : 348, 351 ; in battle of Fredericks-
burg. 359. 361, 366, 367.

Harker, Charles G., at Chickamauga, first
day, 2: 120; second day, 140, 149.

Harvard Law School, V.'s benefactions
to, 2: 340.

Hay, John, Lincoln's biographer, 1:141;
accompanies him to Washington, 150.

Hazen, William B., in expedition to
Brown's Ferry, 2: 218-220; part in battle
of Wauhatchie, 222, 223; in attack on
Missionary Ridge, 250.

Hecker, Friedrich Karl Franz, leader of
Badenese Revolution of 1848, 1:4; farmer
in Illinois, 35.

Heintzelman, Samuel P., division com
mander under McDowell, 1: 182; at Bull
Run, 187, 190, 191, 197.

Herald, N. Y,, V.'s first approaches to, 1 :
71, 72 ; accepts his articles, 140, and makes
him correspondent at Springfield, 111. , 140,
and Washington, 153, 154, 163; flatters
Seward, 171 ; sends V. to Kentucky, 200.

Hexamer, Dr., 1 : 57, 58.

Higginson, Thomas W., colonel of ist
S. C. colored regiment, 2:g; at review,
16; expedition, 19, 21.

Hilgard family and connection, 1 : 1-3 ;
colony at Belleville, 111., 29-35.

Hilgard, Anna, 2 : 268.

Hilgard, Ferdinand Heinrich Gustav.
See Henry Villard.

Hilgard, Qeorg Friedrich, 1 : i, 2.

Hilgard, Gerhard Samuel, 1 : i.

Hilgard, Gustav Leonhard, father of
Henry Villard, 1 : i ; education, 2 ; mar
riage, 3; legal functions, 2, 3; disaffected
toward Revolution, 4, 5 ; a strict parent, 4,

384

INDEX

5, 7, 8 ; support for V. in America, 35, 59 ;
death, 8:269.'

Hilgard, Jacob, 1 : i, 2.

Hilgard, Robert C. (1832-), son of
Friedrich by second marriage, at Frank
fort, 1:4; seeks V. out in Chicago, and
takes him to Belleville, 25-27.

Hilgard, Theodor (1808-72), second son
of Friedrich and brother of Gustav, 1 : 2 ;
farm at Belleville, 111., 28-32.

Hilgard, Theodor Erasmus (1790-1873),
son of Jacob, removes to Belleville, 111.,
1:4; aids his grandnephew, Henry Vil-
lard, 16; revisits Germany, 33.

Hill, Adams S., newspaper correspondent
with V., 1: 339: 3:267.

Hill, Daniel H., misunderstanding with
Polk at Chickamauga, 3: 128-130.

Hill, James J., railroad rival of Northern
Pacific, 2 : 328 ; party with Union Pacific
to control Oregon & Transcontinental,
330; refuses to sell St. Paul, Minneapolis
& Manitoba to Northern Pacific, 335, 336.

Hindman, Thomas C., in Chickamauga
fight, 3 : 92-95 ; charged with disobedience
by Bragg, 99; in second day's fight, 153,
154; relieved of command, 193, 197; charges
preferred, overruled by Davis, 197.

Hitt, R. R., 1: 95, «4»-

Holladay, Ben, controls Oregon & Cali
fornia R. R. Co., 8:272; first meeting
with V., 273; again in Oregon, 274;
fails to execute contract, 275; dishonesty
to creditors of Oregon S. S. Co., 276;
accedes to V.'s compromise, 276.

Hood, John B., brings division to Bragg,
8: 118; replaces Bushrod Johnson at
Chickamauga, 114; last order to Johnson,
142; loses leg, 145.

Hooker, Joseph, first meeting with V.,
character, 1 : 347 ; in Fredericksburg cam
paign, 347, 362, 368-370, 372, 375 : failure
at Chancellorsville, 3 : 178 ; sent to Chatta
nooga, 177; leaves Cincinnati with V.,
178 ; checks Wheeler's raid, 205 ; opera
tions in opening up Tennessee River, 221-
228 ; finds fault with Gen. Schurz, 226-228 ;
force before the attack on Lookout Mt.,
244 ; attacks, 255-263 ; exults in victory, 261.

Hooper, Edward W., 8: 15.

House, Edward H., 1 : 185, 195.

Howard, Oliver O., at Fredericksburg, 1:
358, 360, 367, 370; sent to Chattanooga,
2: 177; part in battle of Wauhatchie, 222-
224, 231 ; under Thomas, 243, 252.

Hudson, Frederic, V.'s first meeting with,
1 : 71, 72 ; kind services from, 140, 163.

Humphreys, Andrew A., in Fredericks
burg campaign, 1 : 373-375.

Hunter, David, with Lincoln from Spring
field to Washington, 1 : 150; at Bull Run,
182, 187, 188, 190; wounded, 191 ; at Port
Royal, 8:4, 7 ; Emancipation Proclama
tion overruled, 7, 8 ; first recruits freedmen
as soldiers, 8, 9 ; reviews ist S. C. Volun
teers, 15, 16; seniority disputed by Gen.
Foster, 20 ; address to his command, 27;
confers with Dupont, 30.

Hurlbut, Stephen A., at Shiloh, 1: 257-
259; cordiality to V., 272.

Jackson, James S., in Perryville campaign,
1:311; in battle, 315, 319, 323; killed,
316.

Jenckes, Thomas A., 8: 270.

Johnson, Andrew, pleads for East Ten
nessee loyalists, 1 : 214 ; military governor
of Tennessee, 233.

Johnson, Bushrod, relieved by Hood at
Chickamauga, 3: 114; action in battle,
118, 120, 141; routs Van Cleve, 142; hot
pursuit of Federals, 146; attacks Horse
shoe, 153; recalled from Longstreet's ex
pedition to Knoxville, 246, 247.

Johnson, Richard W., 8: 73-75.

Johnson, Samuel, 3: 52, 53.

Johnston, Albert S., confronts Buell, 1:
220; falls back on Nashville, 221, and
evacuates it, 229; concentrates at Corinth,
235 ; joins Beauregard in attack on Grant,
237; in command, 254, 256; killed, 261.

Johnston, Joseph E., commands rebel
troops at Harper's Ferry, 1 : 181 ; at Bull
Run, 190-192 ; at Vicksburg, 8 : 67, 70.

Kaiserslautern, V.'s benefactions to, 8:
318-

Kansas emigration societies, 1 : 52-59 ; con
sequent settlements along the Missouri,
100-103.

Kansas Pacific R. R. Co., defaults, 2:
275; a second time, V. made a receiver,
278; contest with Jay Gould and Union
Pacific, 281 ; makes a fortune for Gould,
283.

Kapp, Friedrich, German Republican
lawyer in New York, 1 : 57, 58 ; death, 8:

3i9-

Kearney, Denis, 8 : 280.
Kelley, William D., kindness to V., 1:

54> 55*

INDEX

385

Kershaw, Joseph B., attack on Horseshoe
at Chickamauga, 2 : 155, 156.

Knox, Thomas W., with V. at Cairo, 1:
263 ; at Memphis, 283.

Koehler, Richard, agent of German bond
holders, 2 : 273 ; conflict with Ben Hoik-
day. 275.

Koerner, Gustav, career, 1:32; aid to
V., 42, 44.

Lamon, Ward Hill, biographer of Lin
coln, 1:97, 150; accompanies him to
Washington, 150.

Lane, Gardiner M., 2: 329.

Lebanon County [Pa.] Courier, V. writes
for, 1 : 85.

Lee, Robert E., defeats Pope, 1 : 336,
and Burnside, 391 ; surrender, 2 : 268.

Lewis, Diocletian, 2 : 52.

Lincoln, Abraham, his biographers, 1 :
97, 141, 156; Senatorial contest and debate
with S. A. Douglas, 91-96; at Freeport,
93 ; first meeting with V., 93; his oratory,
93 ; his broad humor, 94, 143, 144, 149 ; his
ambition, 96; freight-car interview with
V. , 96 ; defeated by Douglas, 97 ; meets V.
on the prairie near St. Joseph, 134; nomi
nation at Chicago, 137; election, 138;
friendly reception of V. at Springfield, 141 ;
receptions and trials, 142-148; his wife's
weakness, 148, 157; reticent about his
policy, 145; prey of office-seekers, 146,
156; journey eastward and to Washington,
148-152; farewell to Springfield, 149; dis
appoints the crowds, 1 52 ; prepares his in
augural, 156-158; for holding Forts
Sumter and Pickens, 159; call for volun
teers, 161 ; anxiety at isolation of capital,
170; his wife's visits to camps about Wash
ington, 175; interest in East Tennessee
loyalists, 214; prods Gen. Buell, 215;
welcomes Parson Brownlow, 234; expos
tulates with Halleck, 267; relieves Buell
and reinstates him, 308 ; talk with V. about
Buell, 340; prods McClellan, 341; dis
suades Burnside, 342, 347; receives V.'s
report of Fredericksburg defeat, 390, 391 ;
directs naval operations against Charleston,
2:5; overrules Gen. Hunter's Emancipa
tion Proclamation, 7, 8 ; his own circulated
by colored troops in Sea Islands, 19 ; cen
sure of Rosecrans, 71 ; puts aside his sug
gestion of amnesty, 210; partiality for
Gen. Palmer, 247; assassination, 268.

Longstreet, James, at Fredericksburg, 1;
25

392; at Chickamauga, 58: 127; forms his
line, 136; attacks Federals while shifting
their line, 139 ; praises Kershaw, 155 ; his
own laurels, 171; holds left at siege of
Chattanooga, 182 ; opposes the siege and
calls for Bragg's removal, 194, 196; attacks
Hooker's advance at Wauhatchie, 223-226;
sent against Burnside in East Tennessee,
238, 239, 246.

Lookout Mountain, battle of, 2 : 255-263.

Louisville, Ky., at opening of war, 1 : 203.

Lytle, William H., in Perryville fight, 1:
316, 321 ; made prisoner, 320, 322.

McClellan, George B., recommends Gen.
Buell, 1 : 213 ; urges him forward, 214, 216 ;
prodded by Lincoln, 341 ; removed from
Army of Potomac, 335, 336; opposed to
Emancipation Proclamation, 337.

McClernand, John A., at Shiloh, 1: 257-
259 ; cordiality to V., 272.

McCook, Alexander McD., division com
mander under Buell, 1 : 219 ; accompanied
by V. in advance against Johnston, 236 ;
reaches front at Shiloh, 246; engaged,
247-249 ; at siege of Corinth, 274 ; claimed
first entrance, 276; at luka, 288 ; march
of his division to Louisville, 290-305 ; com
mands corps in Perryville campaign, 310;
in fight, 315-323; new command, leads
march to Nashville, 2: 60; life at head
quarters, 65; in advance on Chattanooga,
91 ; encounters enemy in Chickamauga
engagement, 96; roundabout joining with
Thomas, 98, 105, 107; failure to hold
Wood in line, 138, 139; follows Gen. Rose
crans to Chattanooga, 148, 165 ; returns to
field, 1 68 ; commands right at Chattanooga,
168, 181; under public censure, 186, 187;
relieved from duty, 187-189 ; court of in
quiry's decision, 190.

McCook, Anson G., Union general, 1 : 287.

McCook, Daniel, brother of A. McD. Me-
cook, 1 : 314 ; lawyer before the war, 328 ;
at Perryville, 321, 322, 329; at Chicka
mauga, 2: no, 113, 151; killed in Atlanta
campaign, 1 : 329.

McCook, David, 1 : 320.

McCook, Edward M., brother of A. G.
McCook, 1:287; scouting, 298-301, 329;
in pursuit of Bragg, 329, 330; with Rose-
crans's adrance on Chattanooga, 9 : 87 ;
checks Wheeler's raid, 204, 205.

McCcok, John J., brother of A. McD. Mc
Cook, 1; 322; 2; 1 68,

386

INDEX

McCook, Robert L., colonel of the 9th
Ohio, in fight at Mill Springs, 1:219;
death, 300.

McCullough, David, 1 : 45.

McDowell, Irvin, in command of troops
defending Washington, 1 : 179 ; character
istics, 179, 1 80; plan of attack, 181; dis
trust of it, 182; at Bull Run, 186-190;
defeat, 190, 195.

Manning & Merriman, 1 : 44, 45, 50.

Marshall, Humphrey, 1 : 306.

Meade, George G., in Fredericksburg
campaign, 1 : 363, 378.

Meagher, Thomas Francis, swell colonel,
1: 175; on the road to Bull Run, 183; in
Fredericksburg campaign, 351, 366 ; retreat,

37*-

Meigs, Montgomery, 1:179; 8:216,
249.

Memphis, taken by Federal fleet and army,
1 : 284-286.

Menzel, Friedrich, 9 : 340.

Miles, Nelson A., in Fredericksburg cam
paign, 1 : 366.

Mill, John Stuart, visited by V., 55 : 269.

Miller, Silas, Kentucky loyalist, 1:203;
friendly to V., 224.

Missouri Democrat, St. Louis, employs
V. as correspondent, 1 : 138.

Mitchel, Ormsby M., 1 : 291.

Modoc War, 2 : 280.

Morgan, John, raids Buell's communica
tions, 1 : 292, 294, 307 ; /8 : 61 ; Ohio raid,
76; captured, 77.

Motley, John Lothrop, 2 : 268.

Munich, V.'s studies at, 1:7; benefactions
to, 2 : 318, 340.

Nashville, Tenn., abandoned by rebels,
1 : 223, 229 ; panic, 230 ; Federal occupa
tion, 223, 228.

Nation, New York weekly, bought by V.
and consolidated with N. Y. Evening Post,

»: 339-

Negley, James S., in advance on Chatta
nooga, 2: 91; in Chickamauga engage
ment, retires before Hindman, 95 ; goes to
Thomas's support, 121 ; in second day's
fight, 131 ; supports Bran nan instead of
Baird, 137; retires with artillery to Ross-
ville, 152; censured by Rosecrans, 185;
curious punishment, 191, 192.

Nelson, William, naval officer, recruits
for army in Kentucky, 1 : 205 ; division
commander under Buell, 219 ; at Fort Don-

elson, 224 ; at Nashville, 226 ; fords Duck
River, 238; speeds to Grant's relief, 240,
242 ; stems the retreat at Pittsburg Land
ing, 244, 245, 259 ; orders gunboats to fire
incessantly, 246 ; advance on second day,
247; dispute as to first entry in Corinth,
276 ; order to clear Kentucky of Morgan,
295, 307; defeat, 301, 307; killed by J. C.
Davis, 308, 309.

Nesmith, James W., 2 : 311.

Neue Zeit, New York weekly, V.'s corre
spondence with, 1 : 63, 64, 68, 73.

New Ironsides, appearance, 2 : 33 ; pre
pared for attack on Charleston forts, 35-40;
under fire, 41; beyond control, 41, 42;
damages, 44.

Nicolay, John G., Lincoln's secretary,!:
141, and biographer, 141, accompanies him
to Washington, 150.

North American Co-founded by V., 2:
341 ; his presidency, 342 ; succors it, 343 ;
collapse, 357 ; V. resigns from board, 365.

North American Review, V. writes for,
2 : 269, 345.

Northern Pacific & Manitoba R. R.,
founded by V., 8:307; suit in connection
with it, 370, 371.

Northern Pacific R. R., threatens V.'s
Oregon system, 2 : 291 ; negotiations with,
291, 295 ; sells its first-mortgage bonds,
296; control acquired by V., who becomes
president, 297-300 ; extension pushed, 300-
308; cost underestimated, 307; stock above
par, 308; ceremonies of completion, 309-
312; V.'s History of the road, 309; second
mortgage placed, stock falls, 313; V. re
signs presidency, 317; reenters board,
324; competing roads, 327,330; agreement
sought with Union Pacific, 328, 329; V.
chairman of board, 332; plans general
mortgage, 333; failure to buy St. Paul,
Minneapolis & Manitoba of J. J. Hill, 335,
336; lease of Wisconsin Central, 337;
conversion of short loans, 358 ; last inspec
tion by V., 358; expensive branches, 359 ;
collateral trust mortgage, 365 ; goes into
hands of receivers, 367; V.'s last tour over
road, 374.

Oakes, Thomas F., general manager Ore
gon Railway & Navigation Co., 2: 295;
vice-president Northern Pacific, 300 ; sued
with V. in connection with N. P. short
lines, 370.

Olcott, Frederick P., 9 : 335.

INDEX

387

Oregon & California R. R. Co., de
faults, 2: 270; extension proposed by V.,
277; V. becomes its president, 278; re
signs, 293; bonds pass from German to
English holders, V. president again, 294 ;
extension, 301; leased to Oregon &
Transcontinental Co., 303.

Oregon & Transcontinental Co., founded
by V., 2: 299; leases Oregon & Cali
fornia lines, 303; rise in shares, 308; dis
tress, 314, 315; V. resigns presidency,
316; leases Oregon system to Union
Pacific, 327; rescued by V. from bank
ruptcy, 323 ; his new presidency, 329 ;
holds control against Union Pacific and
J. J. Hill, 330; absorption in North Amer
ican Co., 341.

Oregon Central R. R., 2: 275, 276; pro
posed extension by V., 277, 281.

Oregon Improvement Co., founded by
V., 2: 292.

Oregon Railway & Navigation Co.,
founded by V., 2: 288, 289; T. F. Oakes
general manager, 295; V. resigns presi
dency, 315; leased to Union Pacific, 327;
V. rescues it, 322, 323 ; injunction against
it, 330; stock sold to Union Pacific, 332.

Oregon Steam Navigation Co., 2: 285,
286; sells out to V., 289.

Oregon Steamship Co., 2: 275; V. presi
dent, 278; creditors take possession, 281 ;
sell out to V., 285; V. resigns presidency,

293-

Oregon University, succored by V., 2:
304 ; last reception, 375.

Orr, James L., 1: 77.

Ottendorfer, Oswald, employs V. as can
vasser, 1 : 89.

Pacific Coast Steamship Co., 2 : 293.
Palmer, John M., 2 : 247.
Palmieri, Luigi, 2 : 269.
Perryville, battle of, 1 : 313-325.
Pfeiffer, Franz, grandfather of Henry Vil-

lard, 1 : 3, 6.
Pfeiffer, Lisette, marries Gustav Hilgard

and becomes mother of Henry Villard, 1 :

3 ; death, 2 : 268.
Phillips, Wendell, 2:54.
Pierce, Edward L., 2 : 8, 9.
Pike's Peak, gold fever and settlements, 1 :

99-136.
Pillow, Gideon J., invades Kentucky, 1 :

206 ; reinforces Fort Donelson, 221.
Pittsburg Landing, after the rout of

Grant's army, 1 : 243-246 ; second day's
fight, 247-251.

Polk, Leonidas, in the Shiloh campaign,
1 : 254, 256 ; under Bragg in Perryville
campaign, 313, 314; at Stone's River, 2:
62 ; at Chickamauga, disappoints Bragg,
99, 100 ; mistake on second day, 128-130;
repulse, 135; delayed advance, 160; holds
right in investment of Chattanooga, 182 ;
works for Bragg's removal, 196 ; suspended
from command, 129, 130, 193, 197; charges
preferred, overruled by Davis, 197.

Pope, John, with Lincoln from Springfield
to Washington, 1: 150; operations on
Mississippi, 264; ordered to join Halleck
before Corinth, 265; commands Army of
Mississippi, 266; renews acquaintance
with V., 272; at siege of Corinth, 274; de
ceived by rebels, 275 ; awarded honor of
first entering Corinth, 276; pursuit of
Rebels, 278 ; misleading reports of success,
279-281; succeeds McClellan and fails,
336.

Potts, Joseph D., 2 : 291.

Prentice, George D., 1 : 203.

Prentiss, Benjamin M., at Shiloh, 1 : 257-

259-

Press, Philadelphia, V. writes for, 1 : 91.
Preston, William, 2: 158.
Pullman, George. M., 2 : 291, 293.
Pumpelly, Raphael, 2: 305.

Rawlins, John A., 1: 270.

Raymond, Henry J., 1: 71.

Reid, Whitelaw, V.'s first acquaintance
with, 1: 253; buysT.'s house, 2: 321.

Richardson, Albert D., accompanies
Greeley to Denver, 1: 122, 126; army
correspondent, meets V. again at Cairo,
263, and at Memphis, 283.

Roach, John, 2: 290.

Roddy, Philip D., 2 : 206.

Rodgers, Christopher R. P., chief of staff
to Admiral Dupont, 2 : 12 ; in attack on
Charleston forts, 49-51 ; defence of Dupont,
commendation of V., 49-51.

Rosecrans, William S., V.'s first ac
quaintance with, 1 : 272 ; pursuit of rebels
after Corinth, 279; succeeds Buell, 331, 2:
59; reorganizes army, marches against
Bragg, 60, 61 ; plan of battle at Stone's
River, 62 ; shaken by losses incurred, 63 ;
fortifies Murfreesboro', and will not budge,
64 ; receives V. cordially, 64 ; seeks to use
him, 65; appearance and conversation, 66,

388

INDEX

67; fails to hold Bragg together, 69; or
dered to advance, 70, 71 ; censured by
Lincoln, 71 ; strategy against Bragg, 72 ;
forces him to Chattanooga, 78 ; pursues,
79; justifies delay at Murfreesboro", 80;
forced to advance, 81 ; plan of campaign,
86; elation over forcing Bragg out of
Chattanooga, 89 ; fancies him in retreat,
96; disillusion, 104 ; attempts to concentrate
his army, 97 ; anxiety, 108 ; achievement
on first day of Chickamauga engage
ment, 124 ; report, 125 ; night council, 126 ;
sends help to Thomas, 131, 137; orders
army right to retire behind left, 137; fatal
order to Wood, 138, 139; cut off from
army, flees to Rossville, 147, 165 ; allows
Garfield to return, 157, but will not him
self, 167; does not send McCook and Crit-
tenden back, 165; report of second day,
166; fatal order to abandon Lookout Mt.,
202; confidence restored, 168; empty
proclamation, 169; comparison with Bragg,
170; proposes amnesty to Lincoln, 210;
welcomes V., 179, 184; resentment at
Washington authorities, 184 ; censures
Wood, McCook, Crittenden, and Negley,
184, 185 ; not a party to their punishment,
188 ; favors to V., 213 ; vague plans, 185;
scheme to open safe communications with
down-river, 207, 217; relieved from com
mand, 208 ; review of his downfall, 210-213.

Rousseau, Lovell H., lawyer before the
war, 1 : 328 ; recruits loyal Kentuckians,
205; division commander under Buell, 220 ;
at Shiloh, 247-249; in Perryville campaign,
311, 315-323 ; cheered by ist Wisconsin,
317; inquires into Gilbert's appointment,
324; denounces him, 328; military qualities
and appearance, 328 ; under Rosecrans, 55 :
61, 168.

Russell, Majors & Waddell, stage line
to Cherry Creek, 1 : 106, 115, 130.

St. Paul & Northern Pacific Co.,

founded by V., 3 : 306.
Saxton, Rufus, in charge of Sea Island

freedmen, 8:9; character and appearance,

14; administration, 22.
Scheel, Johann, brother-iu law of Theodor

A. Engelmann, 1 : u; forester and register

of deeds, 27; kindness to V., 42.
Schoepf, Albin, German Hungarian sol
dier, 1: 296; in Perryville fight, 320.
Schurz, Carl, in Lincoln campaign, 1 : 138;

takes his division to Bridgeport, 2 : 178 ; in

battle of Wauhatchie,J225-228 ; vilified by
Hooker, 226-228; in attack on Missionary
Ridge, 251 ; editor of N. Y. Evening Post,
338 ; praised by Bismarck, 354.

Schweninger, Ernst, arranges visit to
Bismarck from V., 2: 346; care of Bis
marck, 350, 352, 355.

Scott, Winfield, safeguards Lincoln's in
auguration, 1: 158; for abandoning Forts
Sumter and Pickens, 159; decrepitude,
168, 178; failure to get military intelligence,
169 ; shelved, 179 ; against offensive move
ment, 180, 181.

Severance, Theodoric C., collectorat Port
Royal, JJ : ii ; his family in Boston, 52.

Seward, William H., loses nomination
for Presidency, 1 : 137 ; belief in peaceful
solution of rebellion, 160 ; flattered by N.
Y. Herald, 171; talk with V., 339.

Shaw, Robert Gould, 8 : 54.

Sheridan, Philip H., appearance, 1: 329;
in Perryville fight, 314, 320-322; talk with
V., 329; command under Rosecrans, /8:
61 ; at Chickamauga, 120; engages Hind-
man, 144 ; rejoins Thomas, 145, 146 ; in
advance on Missionary Ridge, 248.

Sherman Silver Act, causes stringent
money market, 2 : 342 ; catastrophe pre
dicted by V., 359; his efforts to repeal the
act, 360, 363.

Sherman, William Tecumseh, V.'s first
talk with, 1: 183; at Bull Run, 183, 188,
190, 195; under Gen. Anderson in Ken
tucky, 207, 208; succeeds him, 209; aver
sion to newspaper correspondents, 209;
habit as a talker, 210 ; forecast of magnitude
of conflict, 210, 21 1 ; interview with Secre
tary Cameron, 211; mind reported un
balanced, 211, 212; relieved of command,
213; at Shiloh, not suspecting attack,
257; position, 257; driven back and
wounded, 250, 251 ; in the pursuit to Cor
inth, 252, 271; gruff to V., 272; at siege
of Corinth, 274, 278; press-censorship at
> Memphis, 2 : 238 ; ordered to Chattanooga,
232; movement north from Vicksburg,
234-236; joins Grant, 236; bold river trip
to Bridgeport, 237; delayed in getting
iSth Corps to mouth of Chickamauga,
242; advance on Missionary Ridge, 251-
254-

Shields, James P., 1 : 77.
Shiloh, rebel preparations for battle, 1:
254» 255-257; attack, 258; Federal rout,
243-246; second day's victory, 247-251;

INDEX

389

aspect of battle-field, 252 ; casualties,
262.

Sickles, Daniel £., in Fredericksburg
campaign, 1 : 362, 381.

Siemens, Georg,' director of the Deutsche
Bank, 9 : 310, 368.

Siemens, Werner, 2: 325.

Sill, Joshua W., 1: 311, 327, 329.

Sitting Bull, 2: 311.

Small, Robert, 3: 13.

Smalley, Eugene V., 2: 309.

Smalley, George W., N. Y. Tribune
correspondent and editor, 1 : 335, 345, 348 ;
succeeded at Washington by V., 335; de
fends Admiral Dupont, 2 : 49 ; letter from
Capt. Rodgers, 50; introduces V. to
Wendell Phillips, 53; Tribune's corre
spondent for Prusso-Austrian war, 268.

Smith, Edmund Kirby, invades Kentucky,
1: 306; routs Nelson, 307; in Perryville
fight, 313. 3i4-

Smith, Elijah, 2: 323.

Smith, William F., in Fredericksburg
campaign, 1: 347, 381, 383; chief of engi
neers to Rosecrans, 2 : 207 ; helpful to V.,
216; opens way to Brown's Ferry, 217-
221; praise from Thomas, 231; fortifies
Chattanooga, 231.

Speyer, birthplace of V., 1: j; schooling
there, 6; his benefactions to it, 2:318;
gives him freedom of the city, 319, 340.

Sprague, William, 1 : 175.

Staats-Zeitung, N. Y., V.'s first connec
tion with, 1 : 72, 73, 85 ; canvasser for, 90;
reports Lincoln-Douglas campaign for, 91.

Stanton, Edwin M., succeeds Cameron as
Secretary of War, 1 : 339 ; misled by Pope's
despatches, 279, 280; prods Rosecrans, 2:
80; uses C. A. Dana as emissary to West
ern armies, 166; abused by Rosecrans,
184; praise of Thomas, 186; meets Grant
at Louisville, 209.

Staples & Sims, 1 : 50, 52.

Stedman, Edmund Clarence, 1 : 185, 195.

Steedman, James B., with Gen. Granger
at Chickamauga, 2: 151; defends Horse
shoe, 155.

Stewart, Alexander P., successes at Chick
amauga, 2: 116; opens second day's
fighting, 139; occupies Reynolds's breast
works, 162.

Straus, Oscar, 2 : 320.

Sumner, Edwin V., with Lincoln from
Springfield to Washington, 1:150; plan
of crossing the Rappahannock, 343; in

Fredericksburg campaign, 345, 368, 369;
reception of V., 348; dissuades Burnside
from second attack on Lee, 384.

Swinton, William, 2: 47, 48.

Sybel, Heinrich von, 2 : 340, 374.

Thayer, James B., 2: 273.

Thomas, Anthony J., 2: 300.

Thomas, George H., serves under Gen.
Anderson, 1:207, 208; defeats Zollicoflfer
at Mill Springs, 218; division commander
under Buell, 219; commands Army of
Tennessee under Halleck, 265 ; centre
commander under Rosecrans, 2 : 61 ; in
advance on Chattanooga, 91 ; position on
the Chickamauga, 105 ; shifted to Critten-
den's left, 107 ; position at Kelly's Farms,
112; opens battle, 113; position on second
day, 126 ; calls for reinforcements, 131,
132 ; holds his own, 136; directs the after
noon fight, 149; joined by Garfield, 156;
ordered to retir* to Rossville, 157 ; begins
movement, 160; advises concentrating at
Chattanooga, 168 ; holds centre there, 168,
181 ; succeeds Rosecrans, 208 ; praises
Hooker's command, 231 ; complains of
garbling of his report on Chickamauga,
213; his character, 213.

Thomas, Samuel, 2: 331, 335.

Tittmann, Rosa, Clara, and Theresa, 1 '.
34-

Tribune, Chicago, makes V. Washington
correspondent, 2: 268, and special at
Paris Exposition of 1867, 269.

Tribune, N. Y., V.'s first approaches to,
1 : 71 ; first commission from, 74 ; employ
ment in Lincoln campaign, 136; as Wash
ington correspondent, 153, 154 ; in Perry
ville campaign, 319, 331 ; to succeed G. W.
Smalley, 335 ; to review campaigns of Army
of Ohio, 335 ; to correspond in Burnside's
campaign, 339, in Rosecrans's, 2: 54, in
Prusso-Austrian campaign, 268.

Trumbull, George, 1 : 42, 43, 54,

Trumbull, Lyman, his brother, 1 : 42, 54;
U. S. Senator, visited by V., 54.

Turchin, John B., in expedition to Brown's
Ferry, 2 : 218-220.

Tyler, Daniel, partin Bull Run, 1: 182-189.

Tyler, Robert O., 1 : 374.

Tyndale, Hector, 2 : 225, 226.

Tyndale, Sharon, 1 : 33.

Uhl, Mrs. (afterwards Mrs. Ottendorfer),
owner of Staats-Zeitung, kind reception of

390

INDEX

[Villard

V., 1: 72; employment as canrasser and
correspondent, go, 91.

Union Pacific R. R., contest with V. and
Kansas Pacific, 2 : 281 ; negotiations with
him for Columbia River connection, 284;
assent, 302; leases Oregon system, 327;
futile negotiations with Northern Pacific,
328, 329 ; contest for Oregon & Transcon
tinental, 330; buys stock of Oregon R. R.
& Navigation Co., 332.

Utassy, Colonel d', 1 : 174.

Vallandigham, Clement L., 2 : 59, 201.

Vaughan, John C., 1 : 103.

Villard, Henry (1835-1900), Birth and bap
tismal name, 1 : i ; ancestry, 1-3 ; boyhood
home, 3 ; effect of Revolution on his edu
cation, 4, 5 ; schooling at Phalsbourg, 6 ;
university studies, 7 ; runs away to Amer
ica, 8 (1853) — Lands in New York, n;
starts West, 16; experiences in Philadel
phia, 17; in Pittsburg, 19; in Cincinnati,
20-22 ; in Indiana, 22, 23 ; in Chicago,
23-26; in St. Louis, 26, 27; reaches Belle
ville, 111., 27; sojourns there with relatives,
28-35 (1854-55) — Lawyer's clerk at Car-
lyle, 111., 37-41 ; reads law in Belleville,
42, 43, and in Peoria, 111., 44-47; writes for
the Belleville Zeituttg, 46 (1855) — Book
canvasser in Milwaukee, 47-50 ; real-estate
salesman in Chicago, 50-52 ; interest in
local election, 51 ; scheme for German free-
soil colony in Kansas, Eastern mission, 52-
59 ; interviews with Senators Trumbull and
Douglas in Washington, 54, 55 ; with W.
D. Kelley and Francis M. Drexel in Phila
delphia, 55, 56; acquaintance with Col.
Blenker, Dr. Hexamer, and Friedrich Kapp
in New York, 56, 58 ; meets John C. Fre"-
mont, 59 ; edits Republicanized Volksblatt
in Racine, Wis., 59-67 ; organizes German
Republican club and speaks in Presiden
tial campaign, 63 ; becomes Western politi
cal correspondent of N. Y. Neue Zeit, 63,
64, 68, 731; assumes ownership of Volksblatt,
65; fails, 66 (I85&-57) —Writes for Racine
Daily A dvocate, 68 ; obtains new land
charter at Madison, 69; makes acquain
tance, in New York, of Dana, Raymond,
and Hudson, 71, and of Mrs. Uhl of the
Staats-Zeitung, 72; writes for that paper
and for Frank Leslie's, 73 ; Western mis
sion for Tribune, with aid from Thurlow
Weed, 73-78 ; pleasure journeys in Minne
sota, 76, 77, and visit to Senator Shields,

77; district teacher in Jonestown, Pa., 80-
89 (1857-58) — Western subscription can
vasser for Staats-Zeitung, 89-91, and
correspondent in Lincoln-Douglas cam
paign, 91-98; interview with Douglas, 92 ;
introduction to Lincoln, 93 ; acquaintance
with Horace White and R. R. Hitt, 95 ;
freight-car talk with Lincoln, 96 (1858) —
Legislative/eporter for Cincinnati Commer
cial, 98 ; expelled from floor of Indiana
Legislature, 99 ; special Pike's Peak gold-
fields reporter for Commercial, 99-132; by
first stage from Leavenworth to Cherry
Creek, 106-114; excursion to Fort Scott,
107; encounters buffalo herds, no; canni
bal emigrants, 112; at Cherry Creek (Den
ver), 115-133; visits Gregory Gulch, 119-
122 ; joined at Denver by Horace Greeley
and A. D. Richardson, 122, and accom
panies them to Gregory Gulch, 125 ; wit
nesses growth of Denver, 128-131 ; journey
eastward, 132-135; meets Lincoln on the
prairie, 134; prepares Guide to Pike's Peak,
132, 135 (1859) — Reports Chicago Repub
lican Convention for Cincinnati Commer
cial, 136-138; campaign reporter for it and
for Missouri Democrat and N. Y. Tribune,
138 ; reporter near Lincoln at Springfield,
111., for N. Y. Herald, 140-149 (1860-61)—
With Presidential party journeying to New
York, 149-152 ; meets Nicolay and Hay,
141; study of Lincoln, 142-148, 152; re
ports his farewell to Springfield, 149; re
porter in Washington for Cincinnati Com
mercial and Chicago Tribune, 153, and
telegraphic reporter for N. Y. Herald, 153 ;
witnesses Lincoln's inauguration, 157;
summoned to New York by James Gordon
Bennett, 161-163; return to Washington
obstructed by rebel bridge-burning in
Maryland, 163-166; news-getting from
Cabinet officers, 171-173; visits to the
camps, 173-175; offered a military commis
sion, 177; preparation for field correspon
dent, 178; interviews with Gen. Scott, 178;
at McDowell's headquarters, Capt. Fry,
182 ; joins advance on Bull Run, 183 ;
under fire with Stedman and House, 185 ;
back to Centreville, 186, 192-196; in the
rout to Washington, 196-198; sends first
despatch of disaster to N. Y. Herald, 198,
199; sent to Kentucky by the Herald, zoo;
intercourse with Gen. W. T. Sherman,
209-212 ; private letter about him misused
by Cincinnati Commercial, 212; obtains

Villard]

INDEX

391

supply of Southern papers, 217 (1861) —
With Nelson's command to Fort Donelson
after surrender, 224 ; to Nashville, 225-228 ;
first sight of Gen. Grant, 231, of Andrew
Johnson and Parson Brownlow, 233 ; ac
companies Gen. McCook in Shiloh cam
paign, 236 ; at Pittsburg Landing, 243 ; in
second day's fight, 247-250 ; to Cairo with
Whitelaw Reid, 253 ; meets A. D. Richard
son, T. W. Knox, J. H. Browne, and R. T.
Colburn, 263 ; return to Pittsburg Landing,
264 ; with the advance to Corinth, 269 ; a
pass from Grant, 270, 271; favors from
Gens. Lew Wallace, McClernand, Hurlbut,
and Pope, 272 ; impressions of Grant, 273;
enters Corinth, 276 ; from Corinth to Mem
phis, 283 ; back to Corinth, 287; in north
ward march to luka, 287, Florence, 289,
Huntsville and Battle Creek, 291-293; up
the Sequatchie, 296; scouting with Col.
McCook, 298; at Murfreesboro', 300; to
Nashville, 302 ; to Bowling Green, 303 ; to
Louisville, 304; witnesses death of Gen.
Nelson, 308; with Gen. McCook's advance
to Chaplin River, 311 ; with Rousseau at
battle of Perryville, 315-319, 325, 326;
surveys the field, 327, 328, 331 ; accom
panies Col. McCook again, 329 ; returns to
Louisville, 330; to New York, 331; be
comes N. Y. Tribune correspondent with
Army of Potomac, 335; in Washington, 337,
339 ; reviews campaigns of Army of Ohio,
335> 339 I talks with Secretary Chase and
Lincoln, 340; to Falmouth, Va., via Acquia
Creek, 344, 345; visits Burnside's head
quarters, talk with Gen. Hooker, 347; re
ceived at Gen. Sumner's headquarters, re
lations with Gen. Butterfield, 349 ; meets
Burnside, 350; views preparations for cross
ing river, 354-358 ; crosses with troops,
360; recrosses, 362; to the front with
French, 363-371 ; shelled in Fredericks-
burg, 372; with Hooker, 372-375 ; recrosses
river, 376; to Acquia Creek, 385-387;
boards a steamer on the Potomac and
reaches Washington, 388 ; reports Freder-
icksburg defeat to Senator Wilson, 389,
and to President Lincoln, 390, 391 (i86a) —
To Port Royal on the A rago, 8:4; at
Hilton Head, 10 ; introduction to officers of
fleet, 12; visit to Beaufort, 13; meets Gen.
Saxton, 14; witnesses review of colored
troops by Gen. Hunter, 15 ; visits Fort
Pulaski, 17; visits the freedmen under Gen.
Saxton, 22; with Gen, Ferry to North

Edisto Harbor, 28; with the fleet to
Charleston harbor, 33; sole newspaper
correspondent on the New-Ironsides, 35 ;
in the attack on the rebel forts, 41-45;
praise from Capt. Rodgers, 49, 51; to
Washington on the Bibb, 47 ; to Boston,
52 ; introduction to family of William Lloyd
Garrison and to future wife, 52-55, and
to Wendell Phillips, 53, 54; visits colored
regiments at Readville, 54 ; to Cincinnati
and Murfreesboro', 56 ; well received by
Gen. Rosecrans, 64; estimate of this gen
eral, 212 ; joins Gen. McCook's family, 65 ;
confidential relations with Rosecrans and
Garfield, 66-68; joins Gen. Johnson in
the advance against Bragg, 73-75 ; pros
trated with fever and sent back to Mur
freesboro', 75 ; Louisville and Cincinnati,
76; fresh prostration, 77; accompanies
Gen. Hooker to Chattanooga, 178-180;
witnesses the bombardment, 183 ; gathers
material for an account of the battle of
Chickamauga, 184-187, 213; intercourse
with C. A. Dana, 188, 189, 216 ; privations
of the siege, 200, 202, 215; joins Gen.
Willich's mess, 215 ; accompanies Gen. W.
F. Smith on Brown's Ferry expedition,
218-221, and Gen. Willich in the advance
on Missionary Ridge, 248, 251 (1863) —
Establishes news agency in Washington,
represents it with Army of the Potomac,
and witnesses the battles in the Wilderness
and siege of Petersburg, visits his family in
Germany, 267 (1864) — Returns to become
Washington correspondent of the Chicago
Tribune, 268 (1865)— Marries Fanny Gar
rison, goes to Germany as the N. Y.
Tribune's correspondent in Prusso-Aus-
trian war, 268 (1866) — In Paris as Exposi
tion correspondent of the Chicago Tribune,
visit to John Stuart Mill at Avignon, 268 ;
loses his father, 269 (1867) — Home with the
Garrisons in Roxbury, Secretary of the
American Social Science Association, 269
(1868-70) — To Germany, mortgage-bank
plan, 270 (1870-71) — First railroad nego-
tiationsin Germany, 270 (1871-73) — Serious
illness in Heidelberg, 271 (1872-73) — Joins
committee of bondholders of Oregon & Cali
fornia R. R. Co., 271, and of Kansas Pacific
R. R. Co., 275 (1873) — Delegate for both
to U. S., first visit to California and Ore
gon, 273, 275; to Germany to report and
return, 274 ; compromise with Ben Holla-
day, 275 (1874) — To Frankfort and Lon-

392

INDEX

[Villard

don for confirmation, 276; opens Oregon
immigration bureau in New York, 277
(1875) —To Oregon, elected president of
the Oregon & California R. R., and Oregon
S.S. Co., appointed a receiver of the Kansas
Pacific, 278 ; revisits Denver, 279 (1876) —
To Colorado and California, 279 ; desperate
illness in San Francisco, 280 (1877) — Con
test with Jay Gould and Sidney Dillon
over Kansas Pacific, 281 ; dislodged by
Gould from his receivership, 282 (1878) —
Triumphs over Gould, 283; negotiations
with Union Pacific, 284; buys out credi
tors of Oregon S. S. Co., 285; conceives
Oregon Railway & Navigation Co., 286;
buys out Oregon Steam Navigation Co.,
289; builds first steamship lighted with
electricity, 290 (1879) — Negotiations for
traffic division with Northern Pacific R. R.,
291 ; builds feeders to his Oregon system,
founds Oregon Improvement Co., 292;
buys the two Oregon railroads, 293, 294;
contract with Northern Pacific, 295 (1880)
— Acquires New York Evening Post and
Nation, 338; scheme to control Northern
Pacific, 297; the blind pool, 298; founds
Oregon & Transcontinental Co., 299;
elected president of Northern Pacific,
pushes its completion, 300 (1881) — Builds
branch lines, 301 (1882-83) — Fast trip
across the continent, 303; organizes Ter
minal Co. at Portland, Oregon, 303 ; builds
"The Portland" hotel, supports and en
dows the State University, and saves the
University of Washington Territory, 304;
eastward overland j ourney, transcontinental
scientific exploration under R. Pumpelly,
305; forms Terminal Co. at St. Paul, and
organizes St. Paul & Northern Pacific Co.,
306 ; builds branch line to Canadian boun
dary, learns of underestimates of N. P.
engineers, 307; publishes history of the
Northern Pacific, leads international excur
sion to witness completion of the road, 309 ;
lays cornerstone of Capitol at Bismarck,
Dakota, hammers down the last spike
(September 3), 311 ; by the waters of the
Pacific, 312 ; efforts to avert catastrophe of
Northern Pacific, 313; hostile comments of
the Street and the press, 314; losses from
collapse of West Shore R. R. , practical in
solvency, 315 ; resigns presidency of Ore
gon & Transcontinental and Oregon Rail
way & Navigation Co. (December 16),
316, and of Northern Pacific, 317; nervous

prostration, 317 (1883) — To Germany:
ovations for former public benefactions,
318; residence in Berlin, 319 (1884)— Re
signs presidency of Oregon & California
R. R., 319 ; invitations to build railroads in
Asia Minor and German East Africa, 319

(1885) — To New York as financial repre
sentative of the Deutsche Bank, 320 ; sells
his New York home to Whitelaw Reid,32i ;
saves Oregon & Transcontinental Co., 322

(1886) — Reenters Northern Pacific board,
324; efforts towards understanding with
Union Pacific R. R., 328, 329 (1887-88) —
Founds Edison General Electric Co., 326;
contest with Union Pacific for control of
Oregon & Transcontinental, 330 ; final re
tirement from Oregon Railway & Naviga
tion Co., takes chairmanship of finance com
mittee of Northern Pacific, 332 ; effects
consolidated mortgage, 333 (1889) — Fails
to buy St. Paul, Minneapolis & Manitoba
R. R. of J. J. Hill, 335; effects lease of
Wisconsin Central, 337 ; renewed benefac
tions abroad and at home, 340; founds
North American Co. to absorb Oregon &
Transcontinental, death of Hilgard Villard,
to Germany, 341; trouble over danger to
North American Co., 342, and his brokers'
failure (Decker, Howell & Co.), 343; invi
tation to call on Chancellor Caprivi, 343;
urged by L. Bamberger to visit Bismarck,
345, and by Dr. Schweninger, 346; the
visit, 346-356 ; return to New York, 357

(1890) — To Germany: lays cornerstone in
Zweibriicken of orphan asylum, memorial
of Hilgard Villard, 358 ; last official tour of
Northern Pacific, 358; warns the people
against disaster from Sherman Act, 359

(1891) — Efforts for repeal of the Act and
establishment of gold standard, 360, and
for renomination of Cleveland, 361, and re
election, 362; dinner to the President
elect, 362; vain efforts to induce him to
call an extra session of Congress, 363;
conference of engineers looking to electric
locomotion, 326 (1892) — Retires from
Northern Pacific and North American
boards, chairman of New York committee
to receive nation's World's Fair guests,
365; visits World's Fair, 367, and sends
over German artisans to visit it, 376 ; op
poses postponing default of Northern Pa
cific, 367 ; designates receiver on behalf of
Deutsche Bank (E. D. Adams). 369;
family tour of the Mediterranean, 369

Villard]

INDEX

393

(1893) — In Africa, 369 ; summer in Europe,
suit against him in connection with North
ern Pacific, winters in Munich, 371 (1894)

— To New York, suit dismissed, 371; re
imburses losers by his financial advice, 372 ;
literary occupations in retirement, 373, 374
(1895) — Study of Civil War and preparation
of his memoirs, 373 (1895-1900) — To
Europe during war with Spain, 374 (1898)

— Last tour over Northern Pacific system,
374, and to Alaska, 375; declining health,
375 (1899) — Death (November 12), 375
(1900).

Villard, Henry Hilgard, at opening of

Northern Pacific R. R., 8:309, 311;

death, 341 ; memorial orphan asylum in

Zweibrucken, 358.
Volksblatt, edited by V. at Racine, Wis.,

1 : 59-67.

Wallace, Lew, Senator in Indiana, 1:
271 ; position on eve of Shiloh, 257 ; in the
fight, 260; in advance on Corinth, 270;
cordiality to V., 272.

Walthall, E. C., defeat at Lookout Mt.,
8 : 256-262.

Washington, cut off from rest of country,
1 : 166-170; first military aspect, 168-171 ;
in 1862, 338.

Washington University, supported by
V., 2: 304 ; gratitude, 312.

Wauhatchie, battle of, 2: 221-228.

Weber, Max, N. Y. hotel-keeper, 1 : 13 ;
colonel in Civil War, 174.

Weed, Thurlow, befriends V., 1: 74; for
peaceful division of Union, 155.

Welles, Gideon, characterized, 1: 172.

Wenzel, F., 1 : 46.

West Shore R. R., 2: 315.

Wheeler, Joseph, raids Buell's communi
cations, 8 : 61 ; repulsed, 69 ; raids Rose-
crans's, 185, 203-206.

White, Horace, first acquaintance with

V., 1 : 95 ; joins him in Washington news
agency, 8 : 267 ; editor of Chicago Tri
bune, 268 ; becomes one of the editors of
N. Y. Evening Post, 338.

Wikoff, Henry, 1 : 157.

Wilder, J. T., 8:145.

Wilkeson, Samuel, N. Y. Tribune cor
respondent, 1: 211, 339; interview with
Sherman, 211-213.

William, Prince of Prussia, suppresses
Revolution in the Palatinate, 1 : 5.

Willich, August von, Prussian artillery
officer, commands 32d Indiana, 1: 237; at
Shiloh, 248; at Liberty Gap, 8; 74; bay
onet charge at Chickamauga, 116; drills
his troops under fire, 123 ; receives rebel
night attack, 122 ; brilliant charges, 136,
161, 162 ; brings up rear, 163 ; takes V.
into his mess, 215, and with him in ad
vance on Missionary Ridge, 248, 251.

Wilson, Henry, 1 : 389.

Winser, Henry J., correspondent N. Y.
Times, 8: n.

Wisconsin Central R. R. Co., 3 : 336.

Wood, Thomas J., at Chickamauga, 8:
100, 120 ; fatal order from Rosecrans to sup
port Reynolds, 138, 139 ; brigade suffers,
140 ; takes strong position on the Horse
shoe, 150 ; censured by Rosecrans, 184 ; cen
sure of him, 157, and of Negley, 191, 192.

Worden, John L-., at Hilton Head, 8 : 12 ;
attack on Fort McAllister, 17, 18 ; destroys
Nashville, 24.

Xylander, Emil von, 8: 310.
Xylander, Robert von, 8; 310, 346.

Zeitung, Belleville (111.), V. writes for, 76.
Zollicoffer, Felix K., invades Kentucky,

1 : 207, 208 ; killed at Mill Springs, 218.
Zweibrucken, childhood home of V., 1 : 3 ;

his benefactions to it, 8 : 318, 358 ; ovation

there, 319.

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